On March 17, 1862, Sherman ordered the men of Hurlbut’s 4^th Division to disembark from their transports and pitch camp a mile west of the landing. From this position, Hurlbut’s men would be able to guard the Landing and also watch a secondary Corinth road that branched off from the main road nearby. This eastern Corinth Road ran south at a distance of about two miles from the main road. It then rejoined the main Corinth Road about four miles south of Shiloh Church.
 

Leaders

 
Maj. General U.S. Grant (1822-1885), Union Army of the Tennessee. After Shiloh Grant went on to capture Vicksburg and relieve Chattanooga. He became commander-in-chief of the Union armies and captured Richmond and Lee’s army in April 1865. Served as President, 1869-1877.

Brig. Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut (1815-1882), 4^th Division, Union Army of the Tennessee. Hurlbut later commanded the XVI Corps at Vicksburg, but was charged with corruption while commanding the Department of the Gulf in 1864-65. First commander of the G.A.R. (1869-1872).

April 6, 1862

At this point, the road lay open for Chalmers and Jackson, supported by Breckinridge, to march on Pittsburg Landing and the Union rear. However, Johnston’s death at 1430 had brought about a collapse of leadership and direction on the Confederate right. Instead of following Stuart’s retreat to the north, the victorious Confederates shifted their attack to the northwest, following Beauregard’s instructions to march to the sounds of the heaviest fighting. Here the Confederates ran directly into Brig. General Jacob G. Lauman’s brigade of Brig. Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut’s 4^th Division. The men of Breckinridge’s Reserve Corps and Brig. Gen. James M. Withers’ 2^nd Division of Bragg’s II Corps did succeed in driving Lauman back, thereby contributing to the subsequent Union surrender in the Hornet’s Nest. Their victory, however, would have been much greater had they followed Johnston’s orders to strike for the Tennessee River rather than Beauregard’s unfortunate directive to march to where the fighting was the heaviest.

Defense of the Hornet’s Nest

While Sherman and McClernand were fighting to defend the Union right, an even more desperate drama was being played out in the Union center. Here a whole new line was formed by two fresh Union divisions and the remains of Prentiss’ men, the Hornet’s Nest.

When the battle began Brig. Gen. Stephen Hurlbut formed the men of his 4^th Division in their camps along the River Road, about a mile southwest of Pittsburg Landing. About 0730 he received a plea for help from Sherman, and sent Col. James G. Veatch’s 2^nd Brigade to the front. Half an hour later Hurlbut received a desperate plea from Prentiss, and began marching his two remaining brigades, Col. N.G. Williams’ 1^st and Brig. Gen. Jacob G. Lauman’s 3^rd, to the south. By chance, Hurlbut arrived in Prentiss’ rear about 0830, just when Prentiss’ line was collapsing under intense Confederate pressure. Hurlbut immediately saw that there was no sense in proceeding farther, and formed his troops in a large cotton field immediately south of a blooming peach orchard. Hurlbut placed Mann’s Battery C, Missouri Artillery, under Lt. Edward Brotemann, in the center of his line, with Willliams’ brigade and the 2^nd Michigan Battery, under Lt. C.W. Laingm, on the left, and Lauman’s brigade and Capt. John B. Myers’ 13^th Ohio Battery on the right. Both wings were bent back, giving the division a convex line facing the enemy.

Hurlbut’s biggest mistake was a tactical one. He permitted Capt. John B. Meyers to put the five guns of his 13^th Ohio Battery about 150 yards in front of Lauman’s brigade, in a position that offered neither support nor cover. The Confederates got their artillery into position soon after Hurlbut’s men came up. Amazingly, the first Rebel shots were right on target. One shell killed Williams’ horse, knocking him senseless. Other shells landed right on Meyers’ battery and scared away many of his horses. This unnerved Meyers’ green cannoneers, who fled without firing a shot. (For t his poor showing, the battery was disbanded soon after the battle and Meyers was fired from the army.) The hasty retreat of Meyers’ men left the pieces in no man’s land, a tempting target for the advancing Confederate infantry.

The omens did not bode well for Hurlbut’s line. On the right, several of Lauman’s regiments were temporarily disorganized by Meyers’ stampeding horses. On the left, many of Williams’ men were scattering to seek what shelter they could from the Confederate artillery barrage.

Fortunately for Hurlbut, luck turned temporarily in his favor. Of the five Confederate brigades that had routed Prentiss, only one was left to face Hurlbut. Wood’s and Shaver’s brigades had already drifted off to the left to aid in the attack on McClernand and Sherman. Chalmers and Jackson were preparing to assault Hurlbut when they were ordered by Johnston to withdraw and move to attack Stuart’s brigade on the far Confederate right. This left Col. Daniel W. Adams (now commanding Brig. Gen. A.H. Gladden’s brigade) by himself facing Hurlbut. And Adams was able to send forward only a reinforced skirmish line. His men were simply too disorganized from their earlier fighting and charge through Prentiss’ camps to enable them to mount a new attack immediately.

The Confederate generals ordered Breckinridge’s Reserve Corps to move up to support their center, but Breckinridge’s nearest troops were more than an hour’s march away. The resultant delay in assaulting Hurlbut’s line perhaps cost the Confederacy the battle. The Confederates failed to follow up on the advantage they had gained by routing Prentiss, and they lost any temporary advantage they might have had against Hurlbut’s unsteady line.

Hurlbut took advantage of the lack of Confederate pressure on his front to withdraw his line 300 yards to the north. This withdrawal began accidentally when Col. Issac C. Pugh, commanding Williams’ brigade, withdrew his far left regiment for fear of being outflanked by Chalmers and Jackson. Hurlbut saw the move and thought it was not a bad idea. He promptly had his whole line fall back to a fence line on the north side of the cotton field he had originally held. This position had three advantages: the stabilizing influence of the protective fence line, the shelter provided by a woods on the right of the line, and the increased distance over which the attacking Confederates would have to advance, most of it open fields.

Hurlbut’s line was soon lengthened and reinforced. A few intact units of Prentiss’ division formed a tentative line along an old road on Hurlbut’s right. Prentiss’ men were exhausted but they had been resupplied with ammunition and they were determined to do their duty. In addition, they were reinforced by a new regiment, the 23^rd Missouri, fresh from Pittsburg Landing.

The heaviest reinforcement Hurlbut received was W.H.L. Wallace’s 2^nd Division, which doubled the strength of the new line. Wallace, who had been camped close to Pittsburg Landing, had formed up his men soon after breakfast. Shortly after 0900 he advanced all his brigades to the front. Wallace sent Brig. Gen. John McArthur’s 2^nd Brigade to the left, where he extended Pugh’s line on the east side of the Peach Orchard. Wallace then took his two remaining brigades, Col. James M. Tuttle’s 1^st and Col. Thomas W. Sweeny’s 3^rd, to Prentiss’ right. Here he formed along an old road. His position was a strong one, with woods for shelter and the large Duncan Field in front. At this point the whole Union line in the center was a rather strong one, with over 11,000 mostly fresh men and 38 cannon holding a bowed line about one-half mile long. The line’s only major weakness were its exposed flanks, and the fact that its center was held by Prentiss’ worn-out troops.

The best way for the Confederates to attack this newly formed line in the Union center would have been to outflank it, or to gather all available troops for a massive charge. At first the Confederates did neither, and they paid a bloody price for their mistake.

The first new Confederate unit to arrive opposite the Union center was Brig. Gen. B.F. Cheatham’s 2^nd Division of Polk’s corps. After being originally posted in the third Confederate line of battle, Cheatham arrived at the front just as Prentiss was being driven back. He continued on and reached the south side of Duncan field about 1000 hours. Cheatham then began an artillery bombardment of Wallace’s line and anxiously awaited reinforcements so that he could attack. Finally about 1100 he saw Col. Randall L. Gibson’s brigade of Bragg’s corps coming up. This was the support Cheatham wanted, and he eagerly began his charge. The result of this attack was predictably disastrous. Cheatham described it: "I was at once put the brigade in motion at double-quick time across the open field, about 300 yards in width, flanked on one side by a fence and dense thicket of forest trees and undergrowth. So soon as the brigade entered the field the enemy opened up upon us from his entire front a terrific fire of artillery and musketry, but failed altogether to check our movement until we reached the center of the field, when another part of the enemy’s force, concealed and protected by the fence and thicket to our left, opened a murderous cross-fire upon our new lines, which caused my command to halt and return their fire. After a short time I fell back to my original position."

As Cheatham retreated, he was pursued briefly by the 12^th and 14^th Iowa Regiments in the first Union counterattack of the day. These bold Union regiments then retreated when they met elements of Gibson’s brigade moving into position. Gibson then prepared to make an attack of his own. This got off to a terribly bad start when his left regiment, the 4^th Louisiana, was mistakenly fired on by the 9^th Tennessee of Cheatham’s brigade and lost over 100 men, a blow which understandably shook Gibson’s brigade, consisting of only three regiments.

The undaunted Gibson nevertheless continued to form for an attack on the Union center. It was about noon when he began moving through the thick underbrush towards Prentiss’ position. Gibson’s visibility was so limited that he was upon the Union line before he really knew it. A sudden volley erupted from the Yankee position and thoroughly scattered Gibson’s Louisianians. Thus the second Confederate attack on the Union center failed miserably.

Braxton Bragg personally witnessed Gibson’s attack, and was greatly annoyed to see the Louisianians retreat so readily. He responded by sending Gibson an order to attack again. Without thinking, Gibson formed his men up an charged right up to the mouth of Hickenlooper’s tired but game 5^th Ohio Battery. When the smoke cleared, the Confederates were again in retreat. Piles of ghastly mangled bodies marked the line and limit of their advance. The canister and bullets had flown so thickly that the attackers likened them to hornets. Thus the Union line received the now famous nickname "Hornet’s Nest."

Amazingly, Bragg ordered Gibson to attack yet again! Once more, the valiant little brigade charged up to Prentiss’ line, to maintain its honor. This time the attack did slightly better, if only because the Union defenders on this part of the line were getting tired and were running out of ammunition. Yet, courage and flesh could only avail so much against lead and iron. Back streamed Gibson’s men a third time. Still, the indomitable Bragg was convinced that Gibson had been repulsed only through lack of effort. Fortunately for Gibson, Bragg then left to supervise the Confederate right. If he had stayed, he might have ordered Gibson to make a fourth attack!

While Gibson was hurtling his men against the Union center, Breckinridge originally had formed at 0730 hours, near the intersection of the Corinth Road and the Bark Road. He was not ordered forward until 0830, when Beauregard ordered him to send one brigade to the left and two to the right. Accordingly, Breckinridge sent Col. Robert P. Trabue’s brigade to the left and Col. W.S. Statham’s and Col. John S. Bowen’s to the right. Two hours later Johnston sent for Breckinridge to come to the right, and was surprised to find most of his force already there.

Bowen and Jackson began arriving at the front shortly after 1100 hours. They were drawn up acing McArthur’s brigade. , which formed the far left of the Hornet’s Nest line. Jackson’s brigade had previously made little progress attacking here, largely because he had loaned two of his regiments to support Chalmer’s attack on Stuart. Though they outnumbered McArthur’s thin line, Statham and Bowen were slow to develop their attack. Their main problem was the many ravines they had to cross in order to reach the Union line. They also had some difficulty with their raw troops. For example, in one regiment a lieutenant accidentally wounded himself with his own weapon. Then the 45^th Tennessee mistakenly let loose a volley into the 20^th Tennessee. It then took Breckinridge, Johnston and Tennessee Governor Isham G. Harris quite awhile to restore Bowen’s and Statham’s lines to order.

Shortly before 1400, Bowen, Statham and Jackson were finally in position for the first massed attack against the Union center. In one of his last orders, Johnston ordered the attack to be made with the bayonet against the left end of the Union center. The weight of Confederate numbers overwhelmed McArthur’s defenders, who had been engaged here for about three hours. One by one, McArthur’s regiments were peeled back from the left. Here one of McArthur’s regiments, the 9^th Illinois, lost 365 of its 617 men, the highest percentage battle loss of all Union units in the battle. McArthur himself was wounded in the foot. By 1400 his whole brigade was in retreat.

Farther to the left, Stephen’s brigade of Maj. Gen. B.F. Cheatham’s division (Polk’s 2^nd Division) enjoyed less success in its attack on Lauman’s brigade. Stephen’s regiments charged right up to the guns of Ross’ 2^nd Michigan Battery, but were driven back bloodily. As Hurlbut surveyed the situation, he knew he had to do something to bolster his left at the Peach Orchard. Here Lauman, joined by the 32^nd Illinois of Pugh’s brigade was struck immediately by three Confederate brigades-those of Col. W.S. Statham, Brig. Gen. John S. Bowen and Brig. Gen. John K. Jackson; these were soon joined by a fourth brigade, Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers’, which turned westward after chasing Stuart’s brigade away from the Union right. The 32^nd Illinois was the first Federal unit to be overwhelmed. The Confederates then struck Lauman’s brigade in Wicker Field. Lauman fought tooth and nail, supported by Willard’s Battery A, 1^st Illinois Artillery. Lauman then managed to stall the onrushing Confederates temporarily by ordering the 57^th Illinois and 31^st Illinois to make a bold counterattack. However, renewed Confederate pressure forced him to order a general retreat about 1530.

The Confederates had now broken the back of the Union center, but they did not realize it. The ground was too rough to see what needed to be done and the temporary vacuum in high command created by Johnston’s death at 1430 left no one to give the needed orders. In addition, many of the attacking Confederate regiments were disorganized and low on ammunition and line officers.

The Confederate forces now pivoted the direction of their attack and headed across the Hamburg-Savannah Road for the Peach Orchard, which was held by Col. Isaac C. Hurlbut’s 1^st Brigade, now under Pugh. When the men of the 41^st Illinois - Pugh’s own regiment - saw what was coming, they promptly withdrew to the rear claiming they were out of ammunition. Soon Pugh’s whole line was in retreat. A few of his regiments managed to form between the Peach Orchard and a pond. There they halted there now disorganized Confederate attack for a moment.

There is no mention of the 32^nd Illinois’ activity on the second day of the battle, April 7, 1862.. Maps indicate that Hurlbut’s troops occupied a position along a road north of Dill Creek.

 
ORDER OF BATTLE
 

UNIT	STRENGTH	LOSSES	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING
Army of the Tennessee  Maj. Gen. U.S. Grant	47,721	10,944	1,513	6,601	2,830
4th Division Maj. Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut	7,825	1,869	317	1,441	111
1st Brigade  Col. Nelson G. Williams (w)	2,323	687	112	532	43
28th Illinois	558	245
32nd Illinois	652	158
41st Illinois	553	97
3rd Iowa	560	187

 

This is a picture of my son, Jacob William Andrew Harner taken on the Shiloh Battlefield during our visit in March, 1995. He is pointing to the 32nd Illinois’ marker which shows the point they "retreated" to following the first day’s battle. The 32nd moved to this location after the Federal units were overrun in The Peach Orchard.

We were pleased to find this marker (its on the entrance road to the park) as it validated the research we had spent many hours performing. I also have a photograph of the same marker taken by my Grandfather, J. W. Vane Harner some 50 years earlier.

-W.A. Harner

Teresa Davis