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Winners of the West
Vol. XI     No. 4
ST. JOSEPH, MISSOURI
MARCH 30, 1934
 
 
 

Battle Of The Little Big Horn
A TACTICAL STUDY

By COLONEL T. M. COUGHLAN, U. S. A., Retired

From THE CAVALRY JOURNAL, January-February, 1934

EDITOR'S NOTE: - We question whether any battle in all history has attained the prominence and exercised the talents of writers on such subjects, both civilian and military, as has the BATTLE OF THE LITTLE BIG HORN. The central figure in that tragic incident, Col. George A. Custer has been most unmercifully scored by his unfriendly critics, and loyally championed by his legion of friends. Scores of civilian writers have used this incident as a text over which to display their lack of knowledge of the real situation and conditions controlling the actions of Colonel Custer and his associates immediately preceding the fight. Every man of limited military experience even in the ranks, after reading such accounts could not fail to be convinced but that they were disrespectfully superficial, did not approach the real details, and details count for everything in such experiences as we shall see by reading the following article by Colonel Coughlan. Here in his article there is every detail that contributed the least per cent toward success, or failed to do its full part towards preventing an awful catastrophe, which it seems might have been preventable.

We recommend this article to a careful reading and careful study, and cordially invite comment.

Part 1
The success or failure of any combined undertaking is almost entirely dependent upon the manner in which each of the participants carries out his part of the plan of operation.

Briefly, the main cause of war between the troops and the Indians was the continuous and ever increasing encroachment of the whites upon the hunting grounds of the Indians.

In 1868 the government concluded a treaty with the Sioux Nation, setting off a large territory in the northwest, including the Black Hills of Dakota, their favorite hunting ground, to be their own forever. Establishment of military posts without the consent of the Indians caused massacres at Fort Steele and Phil Kearney and the annihilation of Fetterman's command. Then came the discover of gold in the Black Hills (1874) with the inevitable resulting inroads of covetous settlers. Great unrest prevailed among the Indians at this invasion of their territory. Hunting parties ( ostensibly ) were organized for the purpose of attacking settlers. Toward the close of 1875 the Indians unrest alarmed the Indian Department. The War Department was authorized by the President to chastise some of the warlike tribes encamped not far from their reservations, ostensibly for hunting purposes but in reality to organize war parties for depredations in the spring.

General Terry, Commander of the Department of Dakota, and Gen. Crook, Commander of the Department of the Platte through General Sheridan, were, on February 8, 1876, instructed to organize large commands for the purpose of pursuing and punishing all Sioux found away from their reservations.

Crook, pursuant to these instructions, with a force of over 1,000 men, comprising 15 companies of Cavalry and 5 companies of Infantry left Fort Fetterman on May 20, 1876 and on June 17 encountered Crazy Horse with a strong force near the headwaters of the Rosebud. Here Crook received a sound thrashing and, although maintaining possession of the battlefield, deemed it advisable to retrace his march to the camp of his wagon trains on Goose Creek and await reinforcements. This Indian band of about 1,5000 warriors under Crazy Horse was only part of the force encountered by Custer a week later. After his fight with Crook on the Rosebud, Crazy Horse withdrew and joined Sitting Bull on the Little Big Horn.

The reference to Crook's encounter with Crazy Horse on the Rosebud is noted merely to show that, if there had been any idea by higher authority of cooperation in this campaign between the columns of Crook and Terry, the attempt failed miserably. The Rosebud fight took place a week before and but a scant fifty miles from Sitting Bull's camp on the Little Big Horn, but Terry heard nothing of it for several weeks and then too late to avert the disaster.

Part II
It is apparent that, upon receiving instructions from General Sheridan, on February 8, 1876, Terry immediately began formulating his plan of campaign. This was not, as is generally supposed, Custer's expedition. It was Terry's. It is time now to clear up this point and to inform the service generally of the utter dependence of Custer's immediate battle upon the strategic plan of Terry, to whom Gibbon and Custer were the lieutenants or co-workers in the fulfillment thereof. There were necessarily two phases: first, the strategical maneuver planned by Terry and second, the tactical movements of Custer when immediately confronted by the enemy.

Aware of the growing strength of the Sioux and realizing the necessity of an adequate force with which to carry out his instructions, Terry, as early as February 16th, wrote Division Headquarters requesting that the three companies of the 7th Cavalry then serving in the Department of the Gulf be ordered to rejoin their regiment in his department. And again, on March 24th, he telegraphed Sheridan, urgently asking for the troops in Louisiana adding: "The most trustworthy scout on the Missouri recently in hostile camp reports not less than two thousand lodges" and the Indians are loaded down with ammunition." About two months later and when on the eve of starting, Terry telegraphed Sheridan from Fort Lincoln: "It is represented that they have 1,500 lodges, are confident and intend making a stand." From the fore-going two telegrams alone, it is apparent that Terry realized the strength and efficiency of the hostile force and from an ordinary estimate based on the number of lodges, that he would encounter a warrior strength of from 4,500 to 6,000, with which he was to oppose the combination of Gibbon's 400 and Custer's 600.

It is hardly reasonable to suppose that in the gradual building up of his plan of operations he did not keep Gibbon and Custer appraised constantly of the many authoritative reports of the hostile strength or that he considered sending Custer's command alone into battle against this formidable hostile array. Also in view of Terry's expression of the hostile strength, how is it possible that Custer could have so underestimated their number as to believe that he would be confronted by only 1,500 warriors at his (Custer's) maximum estimate?

In accordance with Terry's plan the movement of his two columns began early. Gibbon with six companies of the 7th Infantry left Fort Shaw, Montana, in the latter part of March; four companies of the Second Cavalry left Fort Ellis, Montana, on the first of April, Ninety-seven miles from Fort Ellis these two columns united under Gibbon's command and proceeded east on the Yellowstone beyond the mouth of the Tongue River where, on June 9th it doubled back on its trail, arrived and took position opposite the mouth of the Rosebud on the 13th and 14th of June.

Custer, with the entire 7th Cavalry, three companies of Infantry (guard for wagon train,) one platoon of Gatling guns, and 40 Arikara (Ree) Indian Scouts left Fort Abraham Lincoln, Dakota, on the 17th of May and proceeded west with the mouth of the Powder River as the general objective. General Terry accompanied this column.

On June 10th Major Reno was detached from the camp on the Powder River with six companies of the 7th Cavalry to scout the Powder River Valley as far up as the mouth of the Little Powder, thence west to the Mizpah, down that stream to its mouth and down the Tongue to its confluence with the Yellowstone, at which point he would then find General Terry with the balance of the command. After making this scout in which, contrary to orders, he included the Rosebud, Reno arrived at the mouth of that stream on June 17th. No Indians had been seen, but a large trail had been followed up the Rosebud for about forty miles.

Custer, at this time, was in camp with the balance of the 7th Cavalry at the mouth of the Tongue River awaiting the report of Reno's scout and, on the night of June 20th, bivouacked with Reno.

Terry, having early learned of the result of Reno's scout, practically completed his plan of operations and on the morning of June 20th went to Reno's bivouac where, after collecting all available information, the measures to be taken were discussed and the plan in its general features determined upon. Custer was told that afternoon of the work laid out for him, and he was cautioned to husband the forces of his men and animals. The same evening, leaving Custer to bring up his command, Terry proceeded up the Yellowstone on the steamer Far West, reaching Gibbon's camp, which was nearly opposite the mouth of the Rosebud. Before noon of the 21st of June Gibbon's column was put in motion up the north bank of the Yellowstone, in pursuant to Terry's plan, within an hour after the latter had arrived and before Custer's command had reached the mouth of the Rosebud on the south side. Thus it will be seen that Gibbon's troops were measuring the road to the mouth of the Big Horn according to the "plan," before Custer, who was marching with his command, could possibly take part in the conference.

From the foregoing it should be clear that Terry had now formed his plan in its detail; that Gibbon's force had been dispatched west in accordance with that plan, and that there remained now but to instruct Custer as to his future action in the joint maneuver. This was imparted to the latter and fully explained to both Gibbon and Custer at the conference of Terry, Gibbon and Custer late on the afternoon of June 21st aboard the steamer Far West. (Major J. S. Brisbin, commanding the 2nd Cavalry battalion, was present at this conference.) *The ordinary estimate of the inhabitants of an Indian village was three fighting men or from [ undecipherable ] to the lodge. At this conference Custer was offered the 2nd Cavalry battalion and Low's platoon of Gatling guns but declined, because he felt that he had a sufficient force without the 2nd Cavalry and that the platoon of Gatling guns would impede his march.

After the close of the conference, Low's platoon was ferried across to the north bank to overtake and join Gibbon's column, and Scouts George Herendeen, Mitch Boyer and several Crow scouts were carried to the south side to go with Custer. Herendeen was sent with Custer by Terry for the express purpose of communicating with Gibbon's column upon the result of the examination of the upper part of Tullock's Creek.

The gist of the plan as already stated was to direct the movements of the two columns in such a way that if the Indians fled they could not escape to the southeast without being driven upon Crook; they could not go westward because they were already near the eastern bank of the Big Horn River (then in flood) and the eastern boundary of the territory of the Crow Nation with whom they were at open hostility; northward they would be [ ] by Gibbon, and to the southward lie the Big Horn Mountains, in which they could not maintain themselves for any considerable time if they once permitted themselves to be cooped up therein.

If they made a stand, the purpose is clearly set forth in Terry's report; Custer was to keep on southward (after determining where the trail led) for the double purpose of intercepting flight, should it be attempted, but above all to so maneuver his strategic column as to give time for Gibbon's column to come up.

This plan was formed on the belief that the two columns might be brought into cooperating distance of each other. Or, as Gibbon states it in his letter of November, 6th, "I saw Custer depart on the 22nd with his fine regiment fully impressed with the conviction that our chief aim should be to so move that whatever force might be on the Little Big Horn should not escape us - And it was fully understood between us that to give my troops time to get up and to guard against escape of the Indians to the south, he should keep constantly feeling to his left."

And again, definite plan which was given to Gibbon and Custer was based on Reno's discoveries and on the stated opinions and known facts of such experienced Indian scouts as Boyer, Reynolds Girard and others who were with him. It contemplated a joint or combined operation of the two columns - not independent movement - and what the final event showed to be of more consequence than all other features, it contemplated taking no chances of defeat by attacking known superbrity of forces by insufficient means. Recollect here that by the ordinary computations of warrior strength of the two estimates [ ] Terry between the months of March and May, the Sioux had between 4,500 and 6,000 fighting men.

In addition to the definite explanation (already well understood by Custer through the conference held during the afternoon of June 21st) of the cooperative movements of Gibbon and Custer, the following are General Terry's written instructions to Custer:

Camp at mouth of Rosebud River, Montana Territory.

June 22nd, 1876,.
Lieutenant-Colonel Custer
7th Cavalry.

Colonel:

The Brigadier-General Commanding directs that, as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should [ ] unless you shall see sufficient reasons for departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Horn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue and then turn towards the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south or southeast by passing around your left flank. The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of course its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise, but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly in []osed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible.

The Department Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock's Creek, and that you should endeavor to send a scout through [ ] Colonel Gibbon's column, with information of the result of your examination. The lower part of this creek will be examined by a detachment from Colonel Gibbon's command. The supply steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far as the forks if the river is found to be navigable for that distance, and the Department Commander, who will accompany the column of Colonel Gibbon, desires you to report to him there not later than the evening of the time for which your troops are rationed, unless in the meantime you receive further orders.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. W. SMITH,
Acting Assistant Adjutant Gen.


The character of Terry's instructions are positive and clear as to the strategical maneuver but avoid definite directions to his two subordinates as to the tactics employed when immediately confronted by the enemy.

From the foregoing, to an open mind, it must be apparent that Terry had a well defined plan - that he communicated this plan to his two subordinates, Gibbon and Custer before their departure from the mouth of the Rosebud - that this plan was fully understood by Gibbon and Custer in joint conference - that, due to the various reports of hostile strength, it contemplated a combined cooperative movement, and that there was no idea in Terry's mind of either Gibbon or Custer attacking the hostile force alone, and that this belief was positively and clearly communicated by Terry to his 2 column commanders and understood and accepted by them in the joint conference at the mouth of the Rosebud on the afternoon of the 21st of June.

Part III
Gibbon's column was now on its way to the mouth of the Big Horn. Custer with the entire 7th Cavalry left the mouth of the Rosebud at noon, June 22nd, and proceeded up that stream, following the trail discovered by Reno. The command went into camp about 4:00 p.m., after marching twelve miles. The next day the command camped after marching about 33 miles. At some point during the march of June 23rd, or possibly the 24th, it was observed that the Indian trail diverged from the Rosebud and led west toward the Little Big Horn. Custer followed it. Hark back for a moment to Terry written instructions: "Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn toward the Little Horn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south or southeast by passing around your left flank," and again, "He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reasons for departing from them."

If there existed any possible military reason for Custer's departure from Terry's instructions at this time, it has not been brot to light. There was none. He was not nearly in contact with the enemy. Then, why the departure? What was the motive? We may look elsewhere for motive, but this article deals only with facts as they appear, and on Custer's subsequent actions and orders under Terry's instruction is this study undertaken.

What were the consequence of this wilful disregard of Terry's instructions?

1st. Disloyalty to his chief, who, toiling along with Gibbon's column, was in absolute ignorance of this violation of the plan by a trusted member of the team.

2nd. Neutralizing or putting Gibbon's command entirely out of the field of action.

3rd. By thus ignoring Terry and Gibbon and electing to go it alone, he saddled on his own command a greater task than the hitherto difficult one, and by this act placed the brunt of responsibility for the future outcome entirely upon his own shoulders. The primal cause of the disaster is here.

Custer's command was now approaching Tullock's Fork. He was ordered (and in this no discretion whatever was given him) on his way up the Rosebud to thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock's Creek and endeavor to send a scout through to Gibbon's column with the information thus obtained. Here was an excellent opportunity to inform Terry of the radical change made by him (Custer) in the plan and to acquaint Gibbon with his location and movements tending to further future cooperation. Scout Herendeen sent with Custer for no other object than to carry dispatches through to Gibbon via the Tullock was not made use of. The Tullock itself received scant notice. Lieutentant Varnum (now Colonel, retired) who was in command of all the scouts and necessarily familiar with all the duties required of them and what they did says in all his instructions quired of them and what they did says that in all his instructions from Custer in regard to scouting he never even heard of Tullock's Creek but was instructed to devote special attention to the opposite side, and that if any examination whatever was made of the Tullock valley it was made without his knowledge and by someone not under his control. No one has been found who made such examination, and the fact that no attempt was made to send Scout Herendeen through to Gibbon's column is conclusive that this part of the order was absolutely ignored.

Following the Indian trail which the scouts reported leading across the divide and into the valley of the Little Big Horn, Custer resumed his march again on the 24th shortly after 9:00 p.m. A halt was called at 2:00 a.m, June 25th after the command had proceeded about 10 miles toward the divide. In the meantime Lieutenant Varnum with the scouts had gone to the Crow's Nest for observation, at dawn, of the Little Big Horn Valley. Varnum then sent word to Custer that the village had been located. Shortly after 8:00 a.m., the regiment moved forward, and Custer himself hastened ahead to the Crow's Nest in order to confirm the report sent by Varnum. The regiment, having advanced within a short distance of the divide, halted again and here Custer returning from the lookout, called his officers together. He told them that the Indian scouts said the village was ahead, in the valley of the Little Big Horn; that he had not been able to see it himself and doubted that it was there, but that Mitch Bouyer the half-breed chief of the Crow scouts, had told him that he could see it plainly, some fifteen miles down the valley. Bouyer also told Custer at this time it was the largest village that had ever collected in the northwest and that he, Bouyer, had been with those Indians for over thirty years. This was after he had shown Custer the enormous pony herd from the Crow's Nest and before he, Custer, had divided his command.

From the heights of the Crow's Nest Varnum and his scouts made their inspection of the valley shortly after dawn. Had Custer, through his glasses, peered down the valley at this time instead of waiting until nearly noon when distant vision was more or less obscured and distorted by summer heat, he would undoubtedly have satisfied himself as to the unprecedented size of the Indian village which it is certain he was made aware of by his trusted and experienced Indian scouts. If the latter's advice was not to be heeded, why burden the command with their presence?

Near the noon hour of the 25th Custer led his regiment across the divide. It is alleged that here, realizing from the discovery of watchful Sioux scouts that further concealment was useless, Custer decidedly to strike as quickly as possible.

If the Sioux managed to impose scouts on the flanks and rear of Custer's column at this distance from their main body, it is not understood why the latter failed to at least equal the Indians in advance reconnaissance with his aggregation of over sixty Ree and Crow scouts, guides and interpreters.

He divided the regiment into three battalions, assigning one of three companies to Major Reno, another of three companies to Captain Benteen, and retaining the third of five companies under his own command. The remaining company was told off as escort for the pack train, which with its escort accounted for more than 20% of the regiment.

At about 12:15 p.m., Custer ordered Benteen with his battalion (approximately 125 men in all) to proceed to the left, scout the bluffs about three or four miles distant, "to pitch into anything he might find" and report to Custer. Twice during the first few minutes of his march Benteen received amendatory orders which directed him, in case he found nothing, to go on in the same direction to the valley beyond and, if he still found nothing to the next valley.

For this detachment of Benteen there is no apparent justification. The broad trail of the Sioux did not diverge here. Was he not informed by one of his best scouts that the largest village that had even been collected in the northwest lay in the opposite direction to which he was sending Benteen? No hint of a battle plan or scheme for future cooperation was given to Benteen and no provisions made for future communication with the main body. The regiment already believed by Terry inadequate (without Gibbon) to cope with the Sioux horde, was now further crippled by the irrevocable loss of one-fourth of its available combat strength. Note that Company B, augmented by one N. C. O. and six men from each of the other eleven companies and totaling 130 men, was escort for the pack train.

One authoritative writer states that the division of the command was not in itself faulty; that the same tactics were pursued at the battle of the Washita and were successful; that the latter was a surprise attack and there was full cooperation of the separate commanders. This point is disputed. At the Washita (1868) the division of the command was made after midnight of the night before the dawn attack, and the subdivisions were so closely situated that easy communication and full cooperation were readily available. The Washita fight, however, was not without its costly reconnaissance lesson to Custer, as when fully committed in action against Black Kettle's force in his immediate vicinity, the avalanche of hostiles from villages down the river and of whom he had no knowledge caused him to withdraw and beat a hasty retreat to his wagon train, a distance of over thirty miles. In this action Major Elliot with a detachment of nineteen men, conducting a reconnaissance, was cut off and wiped out.

Benteen was not lost from view, and the balance of the command continued its march down Sundance Creek toward the Little Big Horn, Reno on the left and Custer on the right. Shortly after 2:00 p.m. a lone tepee was sighted and passed. A heavy dust cloud was seen apparently some five miles distant. From the top of the knoll, Interpreter Fred Girard saw between the troops and the river a party of some forty Sioux apparently in flight. He turned in his saddle and shouted to Custer, "Here are your Indians running like devils." Instantly Custer ordered the Indians scouts ahead in pursuit but they refused to go. (Did these Indians instinctively know the facts?)

Reno was just coming up at the head of his battalion. Cooke rode to him and said: "General Custer directs that you take as fast a gait as you deem prudent and charge afterward and you will be supported by the whole outfit." Reno interpreted this order to mean that the balance of the regiment would act in close cooperation with him - that his (Reno's) battalion would be the advance guard for Custer and his five companies. He interpreted this order to mean that the balance of the regiment (less Benteen's battalion) would act in close cooperation with him and not at a far distant point. He was not only justified in that interpretation but doubtless such was Custer's intention when he gave the order. The phrase "supported by the whole outfit" here could not possibly include Benteen's battalion, which had left the main column two hours before and was now probably eight or ten miles to the left, and rear, whose position could at best be only approximated, absolutely beyond cooperating distance, and whose indefinite orders contemplated no cooperation with any other part of the regiment. When Benteen was sent away no village had been definitely located; no force of Indians had been seen; and there neither was, nor could have been at that time, any definite plan, either of approach or attack, in Custer's mind, despite assumptions of certain writers to the contrary.

As it was with Benteen, so it was with the detachment of Reno. No plan was mentioned. Custer's information of the enemy at that moment was insufficient for him to have formed a plan. He gave Reno no other instructions, and no further word was ever received from him by Reno, who went in apparently expecting Custer to follow and support him from the rear.

Upon receipt of his orders Reno made the three miles to the river at a sharp trot and crossed about 2:30 p. m. Custer followed at a slower gait, being some three-quarters of a mile behind when Reno's advanced guard reached the stream. Cooke, the adjutant of the regiment, and Keogh, commander of I Company, rode to the river with Reno's column. There, Keogh and Cooke turned back to rejoin Custer. Reno soon found that the Sioux, instead of running away, were streaming up the valley in heavy force to meet him. Interpreter Girard, knowing that Custer believed the enemy in flight, galloped back on the train, overtook Cooke, the adjutant, and gave him this information. Cooke answered that he would at once report the fact to Custer, who up to this time was still following Reno. Whether Cooke did so report, of course, no man can say, but it must be assumed that he did and within a very few minutes after 2:30 p.m.

Here, Custer was confronted with two phases diametrically in the immediate situation. He had already committed Reno to action in the belief that the Indians were running away and apparently followed Reno with the idea of immediately supporting him. A few minutes later he was informed that the enemy was advancing against Reno in heavy force and he (Custer) changed his direction to the right, ascended the bluffs and moved north paralleling the stream.

While there is no record of Custer's reasoning at this time, it is logical to suppose that his change in direction of march was decided upon in order to strike the enemy in flank or rear, as from the viewpoint of time it is manifestly easier to flank an advancing enemy than one who is retreating.

Reno crossed the stream, halted and reformed his command. Then, sending an orderly to Custer with the message that he had the enemy in force in his front, he trotted down the valley in line of battle, fully expecting Custer to be in his immediate rear. Twice before he halted, he had sent messages to Custer to tell him that the Sioux were there in force, but no word had come from his chief since the order to attack was given.

Good faith is as necessary a requirement in the senior as the junior, and if it be found impossible to fulfil a promise of support in an emergency, at least the junior or subordinate should be informed and in proper season. This is but an age-old principle of cooperation. With every opportunity to do so, Custer failed to acquaint Reno with this sudden and variant change in his expressed intention to support Reno's attack.

Had Custer informed Reno to expect no support from the rear but elsewhere, Reno might have remained longer in the bottom waiting for the attack that did a little later draw the foe from his front as he gained the bluff. It is apparent that Custer was singularly negligent in linking up his separate battalions.

When Reno's fight in the valley began, not one of the three fighting battalions had ammunition efficient for prolonged combat nor was within communicating distance of the reserve supply, nor was any of the four detachments of the regiment within supporting distance of any of the others. Not only were all separated by miles of difficult and enemy infested country, but no one of the commanders, Custer, Reno, Benteen, or McDougall, knew where any of the others were or what he was doing. Custer, the commander, by actively commanding a part of his force lost control over the greater portion of his command. This unfortunate separation and, as it proved, fatal ignorance of one another's acts and whereabouts, gave to the Sioux, whose horde outnumbered the soldiers at least six to one, every opportunity to beat them in detail; opportunities of which they promptly and thoroughly availed themselves.

It is hardly necessary to recount Reno's fight in the valley and subsequent retreat. Reno has been bitterly criticized for what he did. Custer, and not Reno, however, was responsible at the outset, or first phase, for the present situation. Reno was attempting to make the best of a desperate situation brought about by Custer's disregard of Terry's instructions. Reno was not a free agent. In the second phase he expected the support of the "whole outfit" and departed apparently whole-heartedly on his mission with a handful of men in the face of that determined, savage horde. Suppose he had charged Custer-like through the village as many critics say he should have done? What would have been the outcome? This is adequately answered by the testimony of Hare, Varnum and others at the Reno inquiry - his command, a mere handful would have been melted away like the summer snows. As it was, his action, whatever it may be termed, was responsible for the temporary saving of the lives of the balance of his battalion, aided and secured by the providential return of Benteen, whose subsequent leadership stood between utter destruction and the safety of the two united detachments.

During Reno's attack and subsequent retreat, Custer, with his five companies had been marching north on the bluffs east of the river. As there were no survivors, conjecture is the only fitting word to a description of what took place in his subsequent encounter with the Sioux. Reno crossed the river at 2:30, he attacked about 3:15, fought in the valley about half an hour and then retreated, reaching the bluff about 4:00. Benteen joined him about 4:10. It must have been at least 5:00 or later before the ammunition mules arrived. What was Custer's situation then? He had left Reno's trail about 3:00; he started Trumpeter Martin back about 3:15; he had been first attacked, according to Martin, about 3:20. It was now after 5:00 more than an hour and a half since the Indians had first fallen upon him. Chief Gall had left Reno's front about the time Reno withdrew his line into the timber or 3:30. He had not more than a twenty minute ride to Custer, which allows more than an hour of his participation in the attack, before Reno had the extra ammunition.

While Hare was gone for the ammunition mules, Weir and his company moved down the river in an attempt to communicate with or join Custer. He had succeeded in getting about a mile before he was compelled to stop because of the ever increasing number of Sioux in his front. In the meantime Reno was on the way to join him. Before Reno reached Weir the struggle below was over, and the Sioux were coming back. Weir had moved down the river about 4:30 to 4:45; Reno followed about 5:30. The Indians checked Weir about the time Reno started, and the retreat up the river to his first position began about 6:00. By 6:30, most of the command was back on the hill; by 7:00 all of it and, as the covering company (Godfrey's) made its last dash to safety, Reno was surrounded by thousands of yelling Sioux.

The foregoing chronology of events and movements is the best that has been suggested and is generally accepted. Could Reno have accomplished anything had he moved down the bluffs immediately upon his arrival from the bottom and upon being joined by Benteen? For answer, and from a consultation of the chronology of events, the following is deducted: The fighting strength of the Sioux that day was at least six to one; better armed, better prepared and as well, if not better, led; no finer mounted infantry existed. Whereas Custer probably believed that all the Sioux were speeding to attack Reno in the valley, the greater part of the Sioux had not gone to meet Reno but before Trumpeter Martin was out of sight (shortly after 3:20 p.m.) attacked Custer from the ravine which led to the ford in such numbers as to force him farther down the river than he intended to go. And there, struck again on the south flank by Crazy Horse and again on the north flank by Chief Gall, who had charged south from Reno's front at 3:30 p.m., Custer, opposing this mass of three or four thousand Sioux with his handful of two hundred and fifty, was hemmed in and, no later than 4:15 p.m., doomed to destruction, if not already done for.

Consider, now, Reno's plight. He reached the bluffs at about 4:00 p.m., having lost in killed, wounded and missing nearly half his battalion; his entire command (including himself) in a state of demoralization resultant from such losses; short of ammunition and burdened with wounded. Benteen joined him about 4:10 p.m., after a grueling march beginning the night before; Benteen had to share him ammunition. It was 4 miles to Custer. The ammunition mules did not arrive until five o'clock.

In the face of these fearful odds, neither Reno nor any other average soldier could have accomplished anything. The daring, dashing and courageous Custer would have failed under these conditions as he had failed in his fateful and futile attempt to take the Sioux in the flank or rear.

What would have happened had the regiment been held together? This is well answered by General Sheridan's official statement on the subject: "Had the Seventh Cavalry been kept together it is my belief it would have been able to handle the Indians on the Little Big Horn, and under any circumstances it could have at least defended itself; but separated as it was into three detachments, the Indians had largely the advantage, in addition to their overwhelming numbers."

What would have happened if Terry's plan had been followed to the letter? This question is not fairly or sufficiently answered by repeating the worn-out platitude that the Indians would have escaped. The conjecture that they would have stood and fought in this case is just as fair and logical. What if it is claimed that it was habitual to flee in the face of a strong force (which is not true?) The pitcher goes to the well once too often. This was the red man's day. He knew the white strength as well as the magnitude and efficiency of his own. He was justly elated over the recent victory of a sub chief over Crook's superb force. He was encumbered with women and children whom he knew to be an easy prey to Custer's cavalry. He probably knew, too of Gibbon's approach and that if he fled to the Big Horn Mountains, his only avenue of escape, he could not remain there and survive. No! The surmise that he would have stood and fought under the troop maneuver of Terry's plan is just as reasonable as the conjecture of flight.

The tactics of the Indians on that day resulted in their doing to Custer exactly what Custer had intended to do to them. They were able to do it because they had the leaders, the arms and the overwhelming forces, none of which facts were known or, if known, not appreciated by the 7th Cavalry.

To me, the finale was meaningly sardonic. Custer was evidently under the delusion that the Indians would try to escape. The Sioux not only escaped but, after killing Custer and his five companies to a man, leisurely and with savage dignity, put their immense cavalcade in motion with Reno shivering on the one side and Terry, uncertain, on the other.

In all history, there is no such record of savage victory over trained troops.

He will be ever remembered as the dashing, daring and courageous Custer, who died a hero with his men, but as far as his observance of tactics or strategy at the battle of the Little Big Horn is concerned, the book is closed.

Causes of the Disaster
The disaster of the Little Big Horn was the legitimate result, not only of the great superior strength and armament of the enemy, but of a planless battle - in many places, badly fought. The Indian triumph was not due so much to the general superiority of the red man as to the lack of generalship on the part of the whites. The victory was handed to the Indian on a silver platter.

In detail, my opinion is as follows:

Causes generally attributed to higher authority:
1.    The defective extraction of empty cartridge shells from the carbines - antiquated armament as opposed to the up-to-date repeating Winchesters of the Indians, issued to them by the government. General Schuyler tells me the Indians reported that many men were killed while vainly endeavoring to eject empty cartridge shells.

2.    The presence in ranks of many inexperienced recruits. Colonel Varnum tells me that in the Reno fight he saw men discharging their carbines in the air and that during the siege, night of 25-26th June, the officers were busy instructing the men how to aim and squeeze.

3.    Lack of target practice. There had been no systematic instruction. General Schuyler told me that Crook first instituted target practice in the Army after the bitter experiences of the battles of the Rosebud and the Little Big Horn.