Evans, Paul D., 1924, The Holland
Land Company. The Buffalo Historical Society, Buffalo, NY.
Sources referenced as "Fairchild Collection" represent materials now
in the Archive of Lorenzo State Historic Site or the New York Public Library.
Sources referenced as "HCoP" (Holland Company Papers) are in the Holland
Land Company Archives, Amsterdam (microfilmed by the Holland Land Company
Project, SUNY Fredonia)
<:37> As was noted in
the preceding chapter, one of the inducements to Cazenove's purchase of
lands south of the Mohawk was the demand already evident for lots in that
region. Cazenove, not loath to prove to his principals what profitable
investments they bad made at his advice, was eager to open the lands to
immediate settlement. None of the other Dutch holdings was yet in
a situation to permit resales: in the Genesee the Indian title had yet
to be secured, in Pennsylvania the warrants had not even been located.
In central New York on the other hand the Dutch title was clear or seemed
to be; the lands were already surveyed into township units and further
subdivisions could be quickly made; best of all the tracts were not so
large as to be unmanageable in the hands of a single agent as yet inexperienced
in the land business. While Boon was carrying on his sugar experiments,
Lincklaen, according to Cazenove's plans, would take the initial steps
necessary for the resale of the great holdings acquired by the Dutch during
the preceding year. Lincklaen, fired with enthusiasm by his journeys
through the back country, was eager to undertake the enterprise and, when
in the spring of 1793 consent arrived from Holland, he lost no time in
making preparation for sales at Cazenovia.
Nothing will illustrate
better the methods which he planned to pursue than an extract from his
announcement to the public in a handbill dated at Albany April 23, 1793.
[Footnote 37-1]
<:38> "Mr. Lincklaen
being sensible that the progress of the new settlements, though going on
very rapidly, has, notwithstanding been very much retarded for the want
of proper assistance & encouragement, wishes to obviate this by turning
his constant care and attention to whatever has a tendency to promote the
good of the country at large, and his lands in particular. With this
view he is forming a settlement in the road township, at the outlet of
a beautiful lake of about three and a half miles long and one mile wide,
where he is laying out a town for the accommodation of mechanics; building
mills, erecting a well assorted store, potash works, and opening different
roads to Whitestown, the Salt-springs, the Chenango river and Catskill.
"The main road which leads
to Whitestown into the Genesee country, passes at six miles distance only
from the above mentioned town, where Mr. Lincklaen means to reside himself,
and where he will be happy to see the emigrants, and give them such farther
description of the country, and information with respect to the terms of
settling, as they may wish.
"The terms of payment will
be made very easy, and encouragement given to all kinds of mechanics.
"N.B. Mr. Lincklaen must
inform the public, that he will sell no lands but to actual settlers."
Where had Lincklaen acquired
these ideas for the opening of a new settlement? Here at the very
beginning, before he had yet sold a single acre, he was planning in its
entirety what James Wadsworth was later to dub a "hot-house settlement."
The proprietors themselves were to erect saw mills, grist mills, potash
works, to establish a general store, to open roads and having laid out
a town site to populate it by proper encouragement to mechanics, which
meant not merely the erection of shops, furnishing of tools and lending
of money to artisans, but such pleasant <:39> things as the establishment
of breweries and distilleries to supply the needs of the happy settlers.
If Lincklaen had been asked why such elaborate plans were necessary for
his settlement, he undoubtedly would have answered as Boon did five years
later for his establishment at Oldenbarneveld. [Footnote
39-1] They were designed "to enhance the value of the
land by encouraging settlement, to draw the attention of mechanics who
are unavoidably necessary and to give them and all those workmen who are
connected with them work and it is the settler who reaps the benefit.
This again attracts other settlers and by that means they enhance the value
of the lands," and consequently any loss which might arise from them was
purely imaginary.
Lincklaen and Boon had gained
their ideas from the same experiences. They bad traveled together
through the interior of New York and Pennsylvania and through parts of
New England, visiting settlements old and new, talking with proprietors,
settlers and would-be settlers. They had learned what it was that
made one establishment attractive and another repellent; and the lack of
what advantages deterred the Yankees from leaving their homes for the West.
They had seen how some land owners had succeeded in making rapid and apparently
very profitable retail sales by overcoming these difficulties. Above
all, they had been influenced by Williamson's magnificent attempt to turn
the wilderness into a blossoming paradise. [Footnote
39-2] Every one who had the slightest interest in the
land business was talking of the wonderful success which this energetic
and resourceful agent was winning in western New York. The two Dutch
travelers had <:40> studied his methods and drunk from the inexhaustible
wells of his enthusiasm. They too had visions of the new world which
was to spring out of the forest at their bidding. Who would not have
been generous in encouragement to the settlers when they were to be coworkers
in such a splendid enterprise? There were glory and happiness and
profit in store for both settler and proprietor. Lincklaen and Boon could
not have realized at the beginning the extent of the drafts they would
be required to make upon their principals in order to carry out these bright
schemes. They believed that after the first expenditures the settlements
would pay their own way and that thereafter the proprietors need trouble
themselves with nothing save means of disposing of their profits.
The proprietors were led to believe the same thing and gave their consent
and a free hand to their representatives in America to develop the enterprise.
When the accounts of the
establishment were made up four years after the beginning of sales, it
was found that not a cent had yet been remitted to Holland, that on the
contrary heavy drafts had been made upon the proprietors' bankers, development
expenditures having already reached the large sum of $128,000 as compared
with $87,000, the original cost of the land. [Footnote
40-1] Though considerably more than $10,000 had been advanced
to artisans and others whose presence on the lands was considered of value
in promoting their settlement, it would appear that the expenditure had
been only moderately successful. A census of the village of Cazenovia
in 1800 showed only 27 men in the place, among whom were 1 shoemaker, 2
blacksmiths, 2 carpenters, 2 bricklayers, 1 tailor; 1 tanner, 1 cooper
and 1 miller. [Footnote 40-2]
To this number there should undoubtedly be added some others located outside
the <:41> village. Two store-keepers had in addition received
$11,500 as loans to get their shops under way. But much the largest
item among expenditures was that of $81,767 which embraced the outlays
for building of saw and grist mills and of farm houses and barns, clearing
of farms and town lots, the purchase of stock and tools, the erection of
potash works and of a distillery and a brewery. [Footnote
41-1]
An analysis of the accounts
shows that the funds which had passed through Lincklaen's hands had not
been squandered. For most of them there was something tangible and
real to show. The establishment was undoubtedly more valuable than
five years previous. By 1800 there were 1600 inhabitants on the settlement;
in 1797 the number of settlers probably exceeded 1000. [Footnote
41-2] Their very presence increased the value of the unsold
lands. Many of them had certainly been attracted to the settlement
by the improvements which Lincklaen had undertaken. The money lent
to the storekeepers at least was drawing interest and the prospect of its
repayment was good. The proprietors owned several good mills, a number
of houses, some partially cleared farms and a certain amount of live stock.
All this Lincklaen could point to as an evidence of his activity and his
constant attention to the needs of his settlement. When the Dutch
complained that they did not want all those mills and farms and buildings
and debts, as this sort of investment <:42> did not pay, and there was
other use for the money invested in them, Lincklaen could admit all their
objections but justify himself with the claim that without such expenditures
the settlement would not have reached the flourishing state it was in,
nor would the lands unsold have been nearly as valuable as they were then.
It pleased the Dutch to learn that their settlement was in a prosperous
condition and that their lands were more valuable than when purchased,
but, if their investment was flourishing, why was it always calling for
help instead of yielding dividends, and, if their lands were more valuable,
why could they not sell them, take their gains and be done with the business?
We can not wonder at the
Dutch questioning, nor on the other hand can we withhold our sympathy from
Lincklaen. When he began his operations, neither he nor his principals
had anticipated such heavy expenditures as the first five years were to
show. The cash return from lands sold had not reached the proportions
that the agent had expected, and calls upon the proprietors' bankers had
continued much longer than he had counted upon. Moreover once the
"hot house" system was adopted, it was found to demand continually heavier
outlays. It had been intended that the carpenters, masons and smiths
should work off their indebtedness by labor upon the proprietors' constructions
and that much of the work of clearing and preparing the farms inventoried
above should be done by settlers who thereby would pay off the interest
accruing on their land debts. Not one of these people however was
able to live the first few years from his other labor alone. The
agent found it necessary to pay them wages in order to secure their services.
The mills, the tavern, the potash works and the distillery cost more than
had been anticipated and, though much had <:43> been expected of them,
they could not be made to show a profit on their own accounts. [Footnote
43-1]
All of these enterprises
bad undoubtedly helped to vivify the settlement. To Lincklaen's mind
and indeed according to the general sentiment of the period when they were
begun, they were essential to the success of a large establishment and,
since they would be introduced very slowly, if at all, by private individuals,
it was necessary that the owners should construct them. The Dutch
had been drawn into them before they were aware of the depth of the expenditures
to be required and now they asked if it would not have been better to allow
the settlement to take its own course with but a minimum of assistance
from the owners. It might have been slower but would it not have
been more profitable? Would it not have been wiser to leave it to
the natives themselves to supply mills, potash works and distilleries as
they became necessary, to allow the villages to grow up as they would on
the principle that the necessary artisans would come to them when there
should be work enough for their support, in short to leave the settlement
as much to itself as possible, confining the activities of the agent to
his duties of selling land and collecting payments? These were vital
questions of vast importance for the future of the Holland Company and
its settlers. In western New York they possessed over 3,000,000 acres
which would have to be sold out at retail, unless a sale en gros
could be made shortly; in Pennsylvania they held a million and a half of
acres and while a portion of this was already being settled the larger
part had not yet been opened to colonists. The system to be pursued
on these lands <:44> would therefore be largely determined by the experience
or the owners at Cazenovia and Oldenbarneveld. On 100,000 acres they
had paid out in five years over $100,000 without receiving one cent in
return. Suppose that their larger holdings should require outlays
in proportion! They were aghast at the idea. The thing was
impossible. And, after all, did not the fact that it was impossible
on a large establishment go to show that it was not necessary on a small
one? It was not difficult for the proprietors to prove to themselves
that it was time for retrenchment at Cazenovia.
In the fall of 1798 the
Dutch sent peremptory orders to their representatives in America to stop
all further development enterprises and to cut all expenses to the lowest
figure possible. [Footnote 44-1]
Busti, who now was in charge of the correspondence for the Cazenovia settlement,
had none of the sanguine temperament of his predecessor; indeed he saw
the future in colors quite as somber as his employers [Footnote
44-2] He impressed upon the agents in central New York
the absolute necessity of economy and, when this seemed to fail in its
purpose, he took measures to prevent further large expenditures there by
instructing the proprietors' bankers to furnish neither Lincklaen nor Mappa
more than $2000 without previous notice from him. Though this somewhat
drastic action was probably not necessary in Lincklaen's case, Busti felt
that stern measures were needed. At all events they were effective.
Lincklaen himself was exasperated by the trouble which the care of the
mills and his other enterprises caused him and, aside from their expense,
he had begun to doubt <:45> their wisdom. "Private enterprises,"
he wrote at the time, "must be introduced for the country will prosper
in direct proportion to the number of individuals who feel interested in
the general welfare on account of the property they possess. The
company should not lay out more money than is indispensably necessary for
the improvements of a private nature (1) because those improvements can
never be any profit to them and (2) by keeping all to themselves and undertaking
everything which appears profitable themselves, they will discourage the
emigration of valuable men and men of property." [Footnote
45-1] So Lincklaen willingly accepted the new order of
things. Thereafter no new undertakings demanding large expenditures
were begun either in Oldenbarneveld or in Cazenovia. Indeed at both
places the agents set out vigorously not merely to curtail expenses as
far as possible but to increase the income from their establishments.
Before we consider the methods employed by Lincklaen in this work, it will
be well to look more closely at the conditions under which the settlers
took up the lands at Cazenovia.
Lincklaen had promised at
the opening of his settlement that to actual settlers the terms for the
land would be made easy. He kept his word. The first ten families
to come received their lots of 100 acres at $l.00 per acre while the more
tardy settlers were charged $1.50. [Footnote
45-2] This was not a high price considering the location
and the terms offered. The demand was so great that surveyors could
barely keep ahead of land seekers; Lincklaen's office was filled with men
who found themselves forced to accept their fourth or fifth choice of lots
because others preceding them by a few moments had gained the more desirable
locations. It was natural therefore that the <:46> original low
price should soon be advanced. Leaving out of account the lands in
and immediately around the village of Cazenovia, we find that the average
price per acre charged during the first three years of settlement, was
somewhat less than $2.50.
The terms of payment were
also liberal. Though as much cash was accepted at the time of sale
as could be obtained from the settler, yet there was required only a payment
of $10.00 on each lot of 100 acres, and it seems probable that after the
first rush was passed, many were admitted to the lands without any cash
payment whatever. Credit of 10 years was allowed at 7% interest.
It was thought that the industrious settler could in the first few years
effect his clearing and establish himself, paying for his necessities from
his potash and whatever surplus products he could spare, and that later
he would gain from his lands the means to pay for them. Many other
settlements at the time were requiring larger cash deposits and allowing
shorter credit.
When terms were as liberal
it was not surprising that sales were brisk. By the end of the year
1795, nearly one-third of Lincklaen's agency had been sold out. At
the time it was not noted that a large proportion of those warmly welcomed
settlers were of the type that would never be able to pay for their lands,
nor even be desirous of paying for them. These were the "regulars"
to whom pioneering was a business. They loved the work of conquering
the forest but they had not any inclination for the arts of cultivation.
They were the men who felt themselves cramped when neighbors began to appear,
men whose work was gone when good roads began to be opened or frame houses
to be thought of. Some of them would undoubtedly make small payments
upon the lands they had taken up; but long before the contract price had
been paid, they would have sold out their "betterments" <:47> to more
stable and usually more wealthy settlers, and have moved on to wilder country
where they could live over again the cycle just completed. They rendered
unquestionable service in the building of the nation, but they proved a
most exasperating element to those land owners who expected payments from
them. At this time Lincklaen did not know them well enough to discount
their permanent value; he was happy in the very rapid settlement of his
lands.
Unfortunately, at this point,
Lincklaen and Cazenove made the mistake of sharply advancing the price
of lands and at the same time of introducing sterner terms of payment as
well as a system of wide reservations. The minimum price demanded
for the least desirable lands in Brackel township was $5.50; other more
desirable lots were fixed at various prices up to $10.00 per acre.
With the exception of a small portion of Brackel all lots thereafter were
to be sold on a 4 years' credit, 25% being required in hand at the time
of the contract. Moreover even these prices and terms were applicable
to but one-third of Lincklaen's agency, on-third having been already sold
and the last third now reserved for higher prices. [Footnote
47-1]
The experience of the next
few years amply demonstrated that the change in prices and terms had been
ill-timed. Although sales during the three seasons preceding the
end of the year 1795 had reached a total of almost 40,000 acres, those
of the next five years only slightly exceeded 3000 acres. [Footnote
47-2] The decline in sales resulted mostly from the new
terms combined with the competition of cheaper lands in western Pennsylvania
and in the Ohio valley. That region was more remote from market to
be <:48> sure but one could never tell when and where new markets might
spring up or what new routes of transportation might be opened. To
many settlers with slender resources it seemed much better to accept the
chances of the western country with its low land prices rather than to
assume such a large burden of debt in a more settled and accessible region.
There were also other reasons
for the decline. Most of the most desirable locations in the Cazenovia
settlement were either reserved or sold; the choice of lots was much more
limited than it had been earlier. Moreover something of the brilliant
promise which the settlement had held three years before had now disappeared.
In spite of all the good things which the agent had done for his settlers
life had not proved easy, nor profits quick or large. To be sure,
roads had been opened to both the Mohawk and the Chenango, but transportation
on those rivers, especially the latter, was difficult and costly.
Old Fort Schuyler was not proving the entrepôt which it had been
hoped. The marketing of excess produce was very difficult.
There were not many more dreams remaining about the establishment; the
realities were obtruding themselves too stubbornly upon both settlers and
agent. Many settlers wanted to go to regions whose possibilities
were still hidden and, in imagination at any rate, were greater than those
of Cazenovia. Finally there was another cause at work for the decreased
sales. The "regulars" among the pioneers were becoming restless;
many of them were selling their partially cleared lots and were moving
westward. The result of this was that many of the land seekers of
the wealthier class remained in Cazenovia but without purchasing from the
agent. They bought the contracts of the earlier settlers often at
prices lower than those Lincklaen was charging for uncleared land.
This indeed <:49> was a competition which every land agent had to meet
in the sale of his lands. The wise agent accepted it philosophically,
consoling himself with the thought that certainly the new settler would
be a more reliable debtor than his predecessor. He might even bring
with him capital and ability very necessary to the development of the settlement.
Lincklaen and Cazenove felt something of this and were therefore not discouraged
even when year followed year with no improvement in the situation.
Eventually, with the beginning of the new century, improvement began; the
course of sales thereafter will be followed on a later page.
Lincklaen understood from
the commencement of his agency that he must look to the New England states
for most of his settlers. Even before any land had been purchased
for him, he was making plans for a settlement which would prove attractive
to the farmers of Massachusetts and Connecticut and Vermont. A year
after his arrival in America he wrote Mr. Stadnitski a long letter filled
with tribute to the unique qualities displayed by the New Englanders in
the settlement of the back lands. What impressed him was their ruggedness,
their disregard of hardships, their skill as axemen and their practical
turn of mind which made it possible for them to overcome so easily the
difficulties offered by a new country. These were the men he wanted
to build up any lands which he might be given charge of, and these were
the men, as the event proved, whom he obtained. In August, 1798,
he reported that most of the settlers in these parts are Yankees, the others
Low Dutch. [Footnote 49-1]
There were to be sure some who had come from New Jersey and from Pennsylvania
but the great bulk of his purchasers were from the east of the Berkshires.
Indeed Lincklaen <:50> made special efforts to attract the Yankees to
his settlement. He had handbills printed and maps engraved.
These by the agency of the Cazenovia pastor were distributed among the
churches of Massachusetts and Connecticut and, we may presume, aided to
induce many to come on to the lands. [Footnote
50-1]
In a settlement of Yankees
it was natural that the agent should give some attention to the religious
and educational needs of his people. Lincklaen from the first had
had this in mind. Not a religions man at the time he nevertheless
appreciated the part which religion played in the lives of his people and
he coveted for him self and his principals the gratitude of the church-going
settlers which, he knew, would result from aid granted for a church.
During the first two years, the number of settlers did not warrant the
building of a church or the hiring of a pastor but in the course of 1795
the religiously inclined among the new settlers began laying plans for
the founding of a church. Lincklaen assigned them one lot in the
village of Cazenovia, one out lot and 150 acres in the lands reserved in
the Road Township. At the same time he set aside one village lot
and a lot of 150 acres for the aid of public instruction. [Footnote
50-2] Later when the settlement had grown more populous
he announced after some consideration that to the first church and to the
first school established in each of the five districts into which his agency
was divided he would assign a lot of 100 acres. It seems probable
that all of these were granted to the settlers during the course of the
year 1797. It is to be assumed that thereafter the settlers were
left to take care of these activities by themselves.
Yankee settlers were admirable
in many respects but <:51> in one they deserved no special praise: like
settlers from any other section they worried very little about the terms
of their land contracts as long as the land agent did not press them too
severely. During the first three years of settlement, Lincklaen was
too busy selling lands to bother greatly about the men who had agreed to
pay for them at the end of ten years and to keep up their interest on their
land debts in the interim. By 1796 frequent inquiries began coming
from the proprietors regarding the date when they might expect an end to
the heavy expenditures on their Cazenovia lands. Lincklaen then realized
that his settlement was not fulfilling his early calculations of paying
most of the agency's expenses from the proceeds of the current sales.
The Dutch were evidently becoming restive under the increasing burden of
expense; either he must give up the plan of settlement from which he hoped
so much, or he must increase his immediate income from the lands themselves.
Accordingly be began reminding the settlers of their unpaid interest instalments.
The burden of many of the replies which he received tallied with what he
knew to be true for part of his settlers: their failure to pay was not
the result of ill will but simply of their inability. Some had been
unable to raise any surplus produce beyond the barest needs of their families,
others had found it impossible to market the little they had for sale.
They were determined however to fulfill their contracts as soon as possible.
Lincklaen, knowing that
it was as unwise as useless to take legal action against these men, set
himself to find some means of helping them to pay their debts. That
which seemed the most feasible was assistance in the marketing of their
products. To this end he aided the agent at Oldenbarneveld to develop
the embryo village of Utica, known at the time as Old Fort Schuyler.
An account of the Utica enterprise will be given in the chapter <:52>
on Oldenbarneveld. [Footnote 52-1]
Of more immediate advantage to the settlers were Lincklaen's experiments
in receiving payments in kind. During the spring and summer of 1796
he sent his representative, DeClerc [Hendrick deClercq], through the community
gathering cattle from the settlers at current New York prices. As
the experiment resulted ill a loss of $500, it did not seem to Lincklaen
and Cazenove to warrant a repetition. [Footnote
52-2] Some attempts were soon after made to take pot and
pearl ashes in payment of interest but these also were shortly given up.
It was only later in Dutch experience with American land affairs, when
interests had accumulated in the Genesee to a far greater extent than at
this time in Cazenovia, that it was considered wise to abate a part of
the interest due as a means of collecting the rest.
In the course of DeClerc's
[deClercq's] search for cattle he seems to have found sufficient evidence
for Lincklaen to conclude that some of his settlers, though able to make
payments of interest, were using their money for other things. Against
these delinquents the agent resolved to bring suit. Evidently a number
were ejected for in the accounts of 1800 an item is included of somewhat
more than $8000 expended for lots sold on execution.
Lincklaen meanwhile was
busily engaged in his endeavors to get payments from men less obstinate,
especially to collect the interest due year by year. By persuasion
here, encouragement there, and now and then by coercive measures, he was
able before the end of 1797 to collect two- thirds of what was due for
the year. This left still a large amount unpaid but considering the
difficulties of the settlers and the relatively small amounts collected
the preceding years, it was encouraging. The high price of grain
caused by England's demand during <:53> the Napoleonic wars was partially
responsible for the greater ease that the settlers experienced in paying.
The following table will
give some idea of the state of Lincklaen's settlement at the end of the
year 1800: [Footnote 53-1]
Acres
in tract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .124,228
Acres
sold 1793-1800 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42,885
Principal
of all land sold . . . . . . . . . . . . . .$99,110
Principal
received to Jan. 1, 1801 . . . . . . . . (a) $24,609
Interest
arrears, Dec. 31, 1799 . . . . . . . . . . . $9,971
Interest
arrears, Jan. 1, 1801 . . . . . . . . . . . .$13,189
Total
interest paid 1794-1800 . . . . . . . . . . (b)
$21,620
(a) Includes $8398 paid by the agency for 25 lots sold on execution.
(b) Includes $1533 paid by the agency for 25 lots sold on execution.
To Busti whose vision of
the future in American lands was streaked with gray and to Lincklaen whose
great expectations of eight years before had faded one by one, this situation
was anything but encouraging. As we look back on it now, it does
not seem a bad showing. Of the lands sold not quite 10% had reverted.
This was unfortunate but not unnatural. Of a total principal of slightly
less than $100,000, 1-6th [1/6] had been received from the settlers.
Considering that most of these sales had been made with a very small cash
deposit, and that the rest of the land debts was not due until 1803, or
1804, the receipt by the end of 1800 of 1-6th [1/6] the purchase price
did not warrant any fears of disaster. To be sure it indicated that
the entire payments would not be made by the dates specified in the contracts,
but no experienced land agent would have expected any such happy termination
of his land business. He would be content that the lands, not yet
paid for, were becoming yearly more valuable and that as a consequence
his land debt was becoming more secure. It was true that, despite
the most strenuous efforts to collect, the arrears of interest were growing
annually; but it was something that in seven <:54> years the settlers
had paid more than $20,000 on their interest accounts. Meanwhile
their herds had been increasing as had their acreage of cleared land.
It could be expected therefore that in the years following they would find
their payments easier. This Lincklaen understood and when he could
forget the exaggerated expectations of his first years at Cazenovia, he
felt confident of the future.
Though Lincklaen's loyalty
and integrity were unquestioned from the beginning, the proprietors in
Holland thought it wise, after the settlement was once well started, to
give their agent a more personal interest in the enterprise than he had
had at first. The opportunity to effect this purpose came with the
change of the proprietorship from a joint ownership to that of a stock
company. It will be recalled that the first two townships were purchased
for the Club of Three, which comprised Stadnitski and Son, P. & C.
Van Eeghen, Ten Gate & Vollenhoven, and that the remaining lands under
Lincklaen's care were bought for the accounts of the Four Houses, one-half
going to the Van Staphorsts, one-fourth to Stadnitski and one-eighth each
to P. & C. Van Eeghen and to Ten Gate & Vollenhoven. [Footnote
54-1] The difficulties which arose in accounting because
of this unequal division combined with the desire on the part of some of
the proprietors to sell their holdings when convenient counseled a change
in the manner of ownership. Accordingly it was determined to establish
a stock company for the 119,195 acres at Cazenovia, and in the new division
to commute Lincklaen's 2 1/2% commission on all sales to a certain number
of shares as nearly equal as possible to the future value of those commissions.
[Footnote 54-2]
The change took place on August 6th 1794. To determine the capital,
each acre was evaluated at $5.50 or 1.3 and 1/3 florins <:55> Dutch
currency. This gave a total capital. of 1,589,266.13 florins to be
divided into 1,589 shares of 1000 florins, each representing 75 acres of
land, and one fractional share of fl.266.13 representing 20 acres.
These shares were divided as follows among the proprietors: Van Staphorst
and Hubbard 418, P. & C. Van Eeghen 244, Ten Gate & Vollenhoven
244, Pieter Stadnitski 502, Stadnitski & Son (their commission for
the management of the enterprise) 16, Lincklaen 126 4/15 plus 39 for his
commission, making a total for Lincklaen of 165 4/15 shares. The
126 4/15 shares were transferred to Lincklaen's account by Stadnitski whose
part in the original purchase entitled him to 628 4/15 shares. Whether
this was a purchase which Lincklaen made of Stadnitski or a gift made by
the latter to his protege' does not appear. From the frequent expressions
of gratitude in Lincklaen's letters to Stadnitski, the latter seems the
more probable.
It should be noted that,
though the share holders were for the most part the same, the stock company
formed for the lands at Cazenovia was quite distinct not only from that
soon after created for the lands north of the Mohawk but also from the
Holland Land Company properly so called which owned the lands in western
New York and Pennsylvania. The Willinks and Schimmelpenninck were
not concerned with the two companies owning land in central New York.
The act of incorporation
contained a clause which limited to fl. 75 per share, or 1 guilder
per acre, the amount which the shareholders might be called upon to pay
for the furtherance of their enterprise. At this time the Dutch had
no notion of the extent to which Lincklaen's undertakings would involve
them. When at the end of summer, 1795, they cast up their accounts,
they found that already the calls on their bankers in New York necessitated
a contribution of fl.80 per share. Within the next <:56>
year and a half, three more calls were made upon the shareholders for a
total of another fl.80 per share. Apparently at the time all
of the shares were still in the hands of the original purchasers and none
refused to meet the payments. As there was the possibility at any
time of a sale to some outsider, it was considered unsafe to allow the
old act to stand. On the 31st of March, 1797, therefore, a second
notorial act was procured by which the commissioners were permitted to
levy assessments as they might find it necessary upon the shareholders.
In case any shareholder should fail to make the payments when required,
his assessment would be increased 2% monthly for two years after which
time be should have no longer any claim to profits of the enterprise.
Under the terms of this act three more assessments, the last June 21st,
1798, were made upon the shareholders totaling 35 guilders per share.
Thereafter the settlement paid its own way. By that date the Dutch
had expended upon its account fl.507,164 or about fl.319
per share. These shares had been nominally valued four years before
at fl.1000 but it is doubtful if at any time they were worth that
much.
No record is available to
show the extent to which the shares were sold among the Dutch people.
It is probable that most of them remained in the hands of the original
purchasers and their heirs. During the summer of 1816 Van Eeghen
& Company informed Busti that they frankly did not know what the shares
were worth. So few of them appeared on the market that it was almost
impossible to say how the Dutch public evaluated them. The year before
they had been assessed for legal purposes at fl.150, and this appears
to have been considered a fair price for them. Though a few months
later, in October, 1815, a dividend was paid upon them of fl.15
per share <:57> and in May, 1816, another of fl.30, no new stimulus
seems to have been given them as an active stock. [Footnote
57-1]
Fortunately for Lincklaen
and other shareholders in the Cazenovia enterprise, that settlement had
hardly turned the corner of the new century before it began to recover
from the slump of the preceding five years. Prices were reduced from
the high level fixed in 1796. Land sales increased. Though
they did not attain the proportions reached during the first rush after
the opening of the settlement, yet they were steady and satisfactory.
From 1801 to 1815 an average of 3000 acres was sold each year. More
important even than the increased sales were the growing receipts.
Many of the newcomers were of a type somewhat wealthier than the settlers
of the previous years. Their initial payments were larger and their
later instalments more punctually paid. Moreover those earlier settlers,
from whom Lincklaen had found it impossible to make collections theretofore,
were now able to make small payments. Each year the clearings on
their farms were becoming larger and the size of their herds increasing.
Turnpike roads and other means of communication were bringing the markets
nearer to their settlement. Lincklaen's records show how successful
the settlers were in reducing their debts. [Footnote
57-2] By the end of the year 1809 they had paid upon their
land debts nearly $200,000 of principal and $70,000 of interest.
Over against the payments there was outstanding slightly more than $100,000
of principal and interest due on the land sales. During this period
there was a steady increase in the value of the unsold lands. Lots
which at the beginning of the settlement could hardly have been given away,
now sold at substantial prices and on shorter credit than at first was
possible. The years 1808 and <:55> 1809 to be sure failed to bring
any advance; indeed the land business began to take on an aspect dangerously
like that of a decade earlier; but when the effects of the embargo had
passed, sales again became brisk and collections good.
The second war with England
though threatening disaster at first soon proved a veritable boon to the
settlements of central New York. Many of those Yankee emigrants,
who would otherwise have passed by the Cazenovia lands in favor of others
further west, took counsel of discretion and fixed themselves on lands
less exposed to depredation. The price of all sorts of food-stuffs
rose so high that farmers with anything at all to sell were soon able to
lessen their debts considerably. The extraordinary growth in the
number of banks at the time increased the circulating medium hugely, while
the presence of a large body of troops on Lake Ontario added to the ready
money in circulation. [Footnote
58-1] Business was never more flourishing at Cazenovia
than in the years 1814 and 1815.
This unwonted prosperity
led to a surprising reaction among the directors in Holland. Instead
of determining them to hold on to their proverty with the hope of eventually
recovering their whole investment plus interest, it confirmed them in an
already half formed intention to sell out. The war was over in Europe,
Holland had entered upon a new era, and money which could again be counted
as safe in that country was needed for the work of reconstruction.
These facts combined with the thriving state of Cazenovia settlement induced
the directors to order a sale of the whole enterprise as soon as this could
be accomplished.
The order came to Lincklaen
during the summer of <:59> 1816 and alarmed him considerably. He feared
that no such sale could be made without great loss and, since most of his
fortune was tied up in his 166 shares, it might prove disastrous to him.
He suggested as a possible remedy that he become the purchaser himself.
[Footnote 59-1] Busti,
having had unpleasant experiences with so called whole sale purchasers
both in the Genesee and in Pennsylvania, welcomed the idea, for he knew
he could rely implicitly upon Lincklaen's honesty and he had great faith
in the ability of Lincklaen's foster-son, J.D. [Jonathan Denise] Ledyard,
who was already acting as assistant agent at Cazenovia. The directors
gave their consent and after rather lengthly [lengthy] negotiations a contract
of sale was made between Busti and Lincklaen at Philadelphia on November
24th, 1817.
The inventoried value of
the establishment was fixed at $284,000. This amount was so far discounted
as to make the purchase price $190,800. This Lincklaen agreed to
pay in twenty annual instalments, with interest at 4%, beginning the 1st
of January, 1818. As the purchase price included Lincklaen's own
share he had in reality to pay only $170,880.
Lincklaen at the time believed
that he had made a very good bargain. He cherished high hopes of
collecting a large share of the difference between the purchase price and
the inventoried value of the enterprise, and there was always the possibility
that the wild lands unsold might increase greatly in value. As the
sequel proved however the proprietors bad gained more than their agent.
They had sold out just before the financial stringency of 1819 put an end
to the temporary post-war prosperity. At no time after the sale was
made did the prospects at Cazenovia appear as bright as in the two or three
years before it. A combination of circumstances served to make the
land business of central New York <:60> very dull indeed. In addition
to the hard times which affected all parts of the country, Cazenovia suffered
from other difficulties. The opening by the Federal Government of
vast tracts of fertile lands in the Mississippi Valley at low prices offered
a competition for settlers which Cazenovia was wholly unable to meet.
Internal improvements in New York state and beyond opened routes to these
cheaper lands and so aided in the movement westward. Even the Erie
canal which did so much for other sections appears to have been less a
boon than a burden. To be sure it somewhat facilitated the carriage
of products to the New York market but the advantage thus gained was lost
by the competition which it made possible of produce from the western country.
Moreover the opening to settlement of the Mississippi Valley was a signal
for a general reduction in land prices. More than one family on Lincklaen's
settlement was induced to leave by the attractive terms offered by agents
to the west. These circumstances together account for many of the
difficulties experienced by the agents at Cazenovia during the 20 years
succeeding the sale to Lincklaen.
Lincklaen struggled against
the difficulties with more or less success until his death in 1822, when
Leydard [Ledyard] took up the burden. Ledyard was a man of excellent
business ability. Generous and kindly, he won the good will of his
settlers. If anyone was able to collect debts from them, it was he.
Perhaps under the influence of Busti he became convinced of the necessity
of aiding his settlers to pay their debts. Already, as has been seen,
a beginning had been made under Lincklaen of a system of payment in kind.
Ledyard continued it vigorously. Every year his agents passed through
the settlement offering generous prices for cattle, and usually collecting
a large number. The business on the face of it did not appear <:61>
profitable; annually there was a loss of 10 or 15% on the credit allowed
the settlers and sometimes as much as 25%, but this to Ledyard appeared
a relatively small sacrifice to make for the prosperity of his settlement.
Large payments were made in this way which would otherwise not have been
made at all. Brackel appears to have been populated largely under
the stimulus of the system. It required time and patience for its
development; Ledyard was quite willing to give both since it made it possible
for him to meet his obligations by aiding his debtors ~ their turn to meet
theirs.
Ledyard's system was a policy
of forbearance and encouragement. Rarely was a settler prosecuted
before the courts for failure to pay. If he were lazy, he might be
threatened, and often the stimulus brought results. Were he unfortunate
but well-meaning, he was encouraged and often assisted. In any case
he was given opportunity to fulfill his engagements. Little by little
Ledyard managed to collect what was owing to him and in turn to make the
payments due on his contract with the Dutch proprietors. New purchasers
were annually found for parts of the unsold lands; unusually large numbers
came during the boom years which preceded the panic of 1837. While
in the Genesee the Holland Company's agents were disposing of the remains
of their holdings, Ledyard at Cazenovia found sale for nearly all that
remained to him unsold. Early in the spring of 1841 he was able to
forward to Vanderkemp, Busti's successor at Philadelphia, the last payment
on the contract which his foster-father had made more than 20 years earlier.
Vanderkemp promptly sent to him the title papers and what was left of land
debts and unsold lands passed out of the hands of the Dutch proprietors.
The Cazenovia settlement as a Dutch enterprise had come to an end.
It had not been a rich investment;
but on the other <:62> hand the evil presentiments of disaster which
the proprietors had harbored at the end of the century had not materialized.
Roughly calculated, the proprietors by 1800 had invested $220,000 in the
settlement. By the first of January, 1816, Lincklaen had remitted
in yearly payments since 1801 to the proprietors' bankers in New York $225,000.
[Footnote 62-1]
Two years later he had purchased the entire enterprise for $190,000.
This with interest at 4% was paid by 1841. The dreams and visions
of 1793 had faded into hard realities, but when those realities had been
reduced into monetary terms, they were not disagreeable to look upon.
Moreover there was something else to be considered than the profit of the
business. To some of those who were concerned in the enterprise there
was a vast satisfaction in the successful opening and settlement of the
wild country to the south of Cazenovia Lake. Lincklaen and Ledyard,
who had given so much of themselves to the success of the settlement, had
every reason to be proud of their contribution. They had worked together
with the tough-bitted pioneers as well as the steadier and more prosperous
farmers who followed. Their combined efforts had brought to fruition
in half a century a region which had been virgin forest.
Footnote 37-1
HCoP, Box O-V, No.1.
Footnote 39-1
HCoP, Box V, No.3. Boon to Cazenove, March 1798.
Footnote 39-2
Charles Williamson was the agent of the Pulteney Association which
owned over a million acres mostly in the present county or Steuben.
For an account of Williamson's method see O. Turner: History of the
Pioneer Settlement of Phelps and Gorham's Purchase, especially pp.
252ff.
Footnote 40-1
HCoP, Box O-V, No.8, copy of a statement dated August 1, 1797.
Footnote 40-2
HCoP, Box O-V, No. 11.
Footnote 41-1
HCoP, Box O-V, No.8. Busti writing a year and a half later expressed
his satisfaction that the proprietors had refused their consent to the
establishment of a brewery at Oldenbarneveld on the owners' account.
The brewery at Cazenovia which lacked occupation was an irresistible argument
against calculations made in advance of the needs of settlement.
A population of six times that of Cazenovia and Oldenbarneveld combined
would be necessary to make a brewery succeed. Beer that cost $6.00
in Cazenovia could be had in Philadelphia for half that price. Moreover
eua de vie [water of life] and rum mixed with water were just as
good and cheaper. (HCoP, Chest 9. Letter Book, Busti to Stadnitski
and Van Heukelom, Dec.13, 1799.)
Footnote 41-2
HCoP, Box O-V, No. 11.
Footnote 43-1
HCoP, Box "Oude Papieren." In his proposal made at the time for a plan
of settlement in the Genesee, Lincklaen declared that though these enterprises
were profitable when run hy private individuals, for a company they were
a continual source of trouble, expense and vexation for it was almost impossible
to find honest people to attend them.
Footnote 44-1
HCoP, Chest 9. P. & C. Van Eeghen to Cazenove and Busti, Oct. 16,
1798.
Footnote 44-2
Paul Busti, an Italian resident of Holland, was a brother-in-law of
Ten Cate. He entered the employ of the Holland Company in 1796, reached
America in February, 1797, and cooperated with Cazenove until the latter
returned to Holland in the spring of 1799. Busti then had entire
charge at the Philadelphia office until his death in 1824.
Footnote 45-1
HCoP, Box M, No. 5.
Footnote 45-2
L.M.
Hammond: History of Madison County, page 210, apparently quoting
from an
account written by Major Foreman [Samuel S. Forman].
Footnote 47-1
HCoP, Chest 9, Letter Book, Cazenove to the Four Houses. Feb.19, 1796.
Footnote 47-2
Total sales at the end of the year 1800 amounted to 42,885 acres.
Footnote 49-1
HCoP, Box O-V, No.2, manuscript (in French), Aug. 1798 "Détails
sur Cazenovia."
Footnote 50-1
HCoP, Box O-V, No. 9. Lincklaen to Stadnitski & Van Heukelom,
July 23, 1800.
Footnote 50-2
HCoP, Chest 9, Letter Book, Cazenove to the Four Houses, Feb.19, 1796.
Footnote 52-1
See page 68 et seq. (this
is in Chapter III, not included here)
Footnote 52-2
HCoP, Chest 9, Letter Book, Cazenove to Stadnitski & Cuperus, May
10, 1797.
Footnote 53-1
HCoP, Box O-V, No. 12. The figures are given to the nearest dollar.
Footnote 54-1
See above page 19. (this
is in Chapter I, not included here)
Footnote 54-2
HCoP, Box O-V, No. 1. The original 119,195 acres was later increased
to 124,228 acres by purchase of adjoining lands.
Footnote 57-1
1 HCoP, Chest 9. Van Beghen & Co. to Busti, Aug.10, 1816.
Footnote 57-2
Fairchild Collection.
Footnote 58-1
Fairchild Collection, Lincklaen to Stadnitski & Van Heukelom, March
3, 1814.
Footnote 59-1
Fairchild Collection, Lincklaen to Busti, Sept. 9, 1816.
Footnote 62-1
Fairchild Collection, Copy of Lincklaen to Busti, Sept 9, 1816.