Return to: - Kelso Mounted Rifles

THE EASTER MANOEUVRES

HOSTILITIES COMMENCE.

PALMERSTON, April 17, 1908

Active hostilities commenced at 5 p.m. today. The combination of powers with which the Empire has become involved rendered it imperative for the Pacific and Australian squadrons to concentrate at certain points, with the result that a raiding force in transports, escorted by cruisers, has evaded the King's ships, and is operating in force against the Dominion.

The objective of the raiding force despatched against Otago is presumably Dunedin, and the enemy, while making a demonstration outside Taiaroa Heads, has successfully landed a force near Palmerston, which was this afternoon reported to be encamped on the Shag River. Their transports, with the cruisers, have stood out to sea again, and are not in sight. The defence force has been rapidly mobilised, and this morning was taking position just south, or in a line with south of the Waikouaiti Railway Station. On the outbreak of hostilities their dispositions were immediately altered to meet the possible contingencies.

Time is everything to the Invaders, who at present have no means of retreat or re-embarking, and their only chance of success would seem to lie in a rapid wheel westward and a sudden and overwhelming attack on the left flank of our defenders before they can be reinforced. If the enemy are successful in this, small detachments of reinforcements can be defeated by him in detail in a triumphal march southward.

The invading force (hereafter designated "Blue") is commanded by Colonel J. C. Nicholls, V.D. Major Logan commands the cavalry, and Lieutenant-colonel Stoneham, V.D., the infantry. The enemy's artillery is commanded by Captain Ritchie (of B Battery), and there are the usual details of engineers, telegraphists, Army Service Corps, transport, pioneers, and ambulance. The defence force (Red) is under the command of Colonel J. Boyne, V.D., with Colonel Bowler as cavalry commander. Major Murphy commands the infantry and Captain Tapley the guns. There are the usual details, under Captain Watson as brigade major. A special officer has been detailed for transport.

As no blood is to be spilt, and the warriors return on Monday evening to their peaceful pursuits, the issue is more or less in the hands of a sort of military arbitration court, known as umpires. The only umpires whose names have as yet been divulged are Lieutenant-colonel Headland and Captain Morris. Besides the umpires, there is the headquarter staff, that hovers watchfully between the combatants. Here are Colonel Smith, Director of Manoeuvres ; Captain Hickey, D.S.0., Acting Adjutant-general; Captain MacIndoe, Acting Quartermaster-general ; Lieutenant Lacey, commanding signallers ; and Brigade-surgeon Lieutenant-colonel de Lautour, medical officer in charge.

WITH THE BLUE FORCE.

The Blue Force, in command of Colonel Nicholls, V.D., was camped this morning in a bend of the Shag River about a mile N.E of Palmerston, in a position to command the bridge. The parade state this morning was as follows ; -
1st Regiment.

Staff.- Lieutenant-colonel Nicholls (in command), Major Logan, Captain Morris, Lieutenant and Quartermaster Christie, Surgeon-captains O'Neill and Falconer.
Otago Hussars.- One captain, 2 subalterns, 3 sergeant-majors, 2 sergeants, 1 corporal, 3 trumpeters, 22 troopers ; -total, 35.
North Otago Mounted Rifles.- One captain, 1 sub., 1 Sergeant-major, 5 sergeants, 1 corporal, 18 troopers; - total, 27.
Clutha Mounted Rifles.- One captain, 1 Sub., 1 sergeant-major. 4 sergeants, 1 bugler, 22 troopers;- total. 32
Maniototo Mounted Rifles. - One captain, 1 sub., 2 sergeants, 1 bugler, 8 troopers; - total, 13.

1st Battalion.

Staff.- Lieutenant-colonel Stoneham, Major Crawford, Captain and Adjutant McAra, Lieutenant Moncrieff, Surgeon-lieutenant-colonel Will, Chaplain-major Dutton.
Dunedin City Guards. - One captain, 3 subalterns, 1 colour-sergeant, 2 sergeants, 1 bugler, 18 privates; - total, 25.
Highland Rifles.- One captain, 1 subaltern, 1 colour-sergeant, 3 sergeants, 2 corporals, 1 bugler, 20 privates; - total, 29.
Dunedin Rifles.- One captain, 1 subaltern., 1 colour-sergeant, 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 1 bugler, 20 privates;- .total, 30.
Wakari Rifles.- One captain, 1 subaltern, 2 buglers;- total, 4.
Caversham Rifle's.- One subaltern, 1 colour- sergeant, 4 sergeants, 2 corporals, 1 bugler, 14 privates; - total, 22.
Cycling and Signalling Corps.- One captain, 3 subalterns, 4 sergeants, 3 corporals, 1 bugler, 23 privates ; -total, 34.
1st Battalion Band. - One sergeant, 1 corporal, 7 privates;- total, 9.

3rd Battalion

Staff. - Major Mahon, Captain and Adjutant Stubbs, Captain and Quartermaster Roach, Captain Mahon.
Oamaru (including Queen's) Rifles.- One captain, 2 subalterns. 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 16 privates; - total, 26.
King's Rifles. - One captain, 2 subalterns, 1 colour-sergeant, 2 sergeants, 1 corporal, 21 privates ;- total, 28.

Brigade Troops.

B Battery. - One captain, 2 subalterns, 2 sergeant-majors, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 trumpeters, 39 gunners; - total, 54.
Detachment No. 2 Company N.Z.E.V.. Two lieutenants, 1 sergeant, 1 trumpeter, 8 sappers;- total, 12.
No. 2 Company Field Hospital and Bearer Corps. - One sergeant-major, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, 1 bugler, 13 privates;- total, 17.
Total all ranks (including 3 sergeant-major instructors on permanent staff), 440.


Lieutenant-colonel Headland, V.D., is umpire with the Blue force, and with him is associated Captain Nelson (King's Hussars).

At 3 p.m. Lieutenant-colonel Smyth, director of manoeuvres, inspected the camp and troops drawn up in brigade order- cavalry on the right, infantry on the left, and the guns in the centre. At the time appointed the cavalry were thrown to the front, and splitting up into reconnoitring parties patrolled the road to front and flanks, thus covering the advance of the infantry and guns.

THE RED FORCE.

WAIKOUAITI, Friday.

The Red Force, consisting of, roughly speaking, 570 men mounted and on foot, which is to defend the City of Dunedin, was by 11 o'clock this morning encamped in the Waikouaiti district. The infantry, in all about 430 men, are encamped in an excellent well-sheltered spot, the property of Mr Heckler, on the Main South Road, about two miles from Waikouaiti. The mounted companies, numbering close on 150 men, are camped along Mr A. S. Orbell's River Station.
Lieutenant-colonel Smyth, with his staff officers, Lieutenant-colonel de Lautour, P.M.O., Captain Hickey, A.A.S., Captain MacIndoe, A.Q.M.S., are posted at Waikouaiti Township.

The Red Forces.

Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-colonel James Boyne, V.D. ; brigade major, Captain J. E. Watson; transport officer, Lieutenant Bryce; signalling officer, Lieutenant Robinson; intelligence officer, Captain Fraser; provost marshal, Captain Cuming. The grand total of the Red Force is 578 of all ranks.

The Enemy Lands.

At 5 o'clock, or shortly before, the forces encamped around Waikouaiti received telegraphic communication that an enemy had landed in the Shag Valley, and the presumption was that it was making or purposed making an advance on Dunedin. The mounted companies set out in entirety, and leaving a practically deserted camp, made for the heights overlooking the advancing enemy and Palmerston district. A section of the infantry also set out for the high country in the vicinity of Mount Watkins to give support to the mounted men, who had already taken up a position there.

HOSTILITIES CONTINUED.

BLUE FORCE.

GOODWOOD, Saturday night.

The occupation of the Goodwood Rise by Blue's cavalry on Friday evening was as follows: - Leaving Cemetery Hill at 5 p.m. they galloped forward and seized Mount Royal Hill, which dominates the rolling uplands known as Goodwood Rise. An advanced patrol came into collision with a detachment of Red's cavalry, who abandoned Goodwood after firing a few shots and retired across Flag Swamp. A maxim was placed in position commanding the approach across Flag Swamp, and at 11.30 p.m. the cavalry were relieved by infantry outposts. Tactically the position is excellent, with Mount Watkin on the right and the estuary on the left, while to the front stretches open country with little natural cover. The extent of the position is about four miles, and during the morning it was held on the extreme right by the Maniototo Rifles, in the centre by the Maniototo Rifles, in the centre of the Otago Hussars, and by the Clutha Mounted Rifles on the left. The infantry and artillery remained in camp at the foot of the hill in rear. The officer commanding is to be congratulated on his dispositions and on the success of his tactics. The various arms keep well in touch, and mobility and cohesion have been well maintained. Reinforcements can now be landed at Palmerston without fear of molestation. Communication is being kept up between the front and the base at the Shag River by means of heliograph by day and lamps at night. Early in the afternoon reconnaissance in force was made, and a cloud of cavalry made a demonstration on the extreme right. Under cover of this, Battery "B " galloped along the road in the rear of the position and shelled the enemy, who had been seen making entrenchments on Bald Head Hill. The guns were sheltered from view by the position, though the summit of Bald Head Hill and the hill next to it could be distinctly seen by the gunners. The Battery was remarkably smart in coming into action, but a most unfortunate delay occurred owing to defective ammunition. By this time Colonel Stoneham's infantry, carefully secured from view, had taken post, and Goodwood seemed to be impregnable, except for the fact that the right flank was to an extent dominated by the artillery of the enemy from Bald Head Hill. Battery " B," however, proceeded to deal with these in a workmanlike manner, the mean range being 4700 yards. Towards dark the enemy's outposts came into touch with Blue's patrols and detached posts, and a good deal of sputtering fire ensued. The enemy then retreated across the swamp. The outposts of Blue and those of the enemy are very close and the utmost vigilance is being exercised. Patrols of either side are continually falling foul of one another, but so far the captures made are unimportant and the fighting merely an affair of outposts. Major Logan has again proved himself to be a very keen and capable cavalry leader. He possesses the knack of handling his squadrons, and seems to know by intuition which particular ridge or tree belt conceals a body of the enemy's horse. It is fair to say that the men back up their leader remarkably well. Some good work has been put in by the infantry under Colonel Stoneham, V.P. It should be borne in mind that cavalry are excellent as a screen or for scouting, and great execution is done by the guns, but the slogging, back breaking work falls to the lot of the infantry, who must bear the brunt of the attack or defence. The infantry with the Blue Force are smart and soldierly; they march well and seem well up in everything relating to outpost work. The camp now occupied at Goodwood is an ideal spot for the purpose, and will be the "standing" camp till the end of the manoeuvres.

Blue has done what it wished to, in that it has effected a substantial footing in Otago, and has covered the landing of reinforcements. Nothing decisive has yet , been done, and if either a wide flanking movement or a crushing night attack is not soon delivered, the manoeuvres threaten to furnish yet another example of the irresistible force and the immovable object.

THE RED FORCE.

WAIKOUAITI, Saturday.

The following is the composition of the Red Force:

B Battery. - Captain H. L. Tapley and one gun (nine-pounder), representing four guns and 6o men.

Mounted Camp.

Second Regiment O.M R. - Lieutenant-colonel Bowler in command, Captain Saunders adjutant and second in command, Lieutenant White Acting-quartermaster.
A Squadron, Southland M.R. - Lieutenant Wilson and 23 men.
B Squadron, Mataura. - Captain Wayte, two officers, 36 men.
C Squadron, Wakatipu. - Captain Cuming. three officers, and one non-commissioned officer.
D Squadron, Kelso. - Captain Stewart, two officers, and 18 men.
E Squadron, Murihiku.- Captain Porter, two officers, and 21 men.
F Squadron, Wallace.- Captain Taylor, one officer, and 18 men.
Total, 137.

Infantry Camp

Second Battalion O.R.V.- Staff-major Murphy, Acting-adjutant Captain Lennie. Invercargill City Guards. - Captain Plans??? and 43 men.
Oreti Rifles. - Lieutenant Lennie and 37 men.
Awarua Rifles. - Captain O'Toole and 26 men.
Gore Rifles. - Captain Fraser and 18 men.
Winton Rifles. - Lieutenant Hammond and 32 men.
Orepuki Rifles. - Lieutenant Young and 19 men.
Bluff Guards.- Lieutenant Salmon and 19 men.
Colac Bay Rifles. - Captain Dawson and 27 men.
Total, 232.

Fourth Battalion O.R.V.- Staff Acting-major McClymont, Adjutant Captain Mitchell. Kaitangata Rifles. - Captain Moir, two lieutenants, and 26 men.

Owaka Rifles. - One sergeant and two men.
Popotunoa Rifles. - Lieutenant Garden and 17 men.
Bruce Rifles. - Lieutenant Stewart and 22 men.
Clutha Rifles.- Captain Mitchell and 21 men.
Total rank and file, 95.

Other Companies.

Dunedin Engineers. - Captain Ross and 36 officers and men.
First Railway Pioneers (Hillside Workshops) - Captain Scarle, two lieutenants, and 46 men.
Invercargill Battalion Band. - Bandmaster Bartlett and 21 bandsmen.
Bearer Corps. - Sergeant Bone and 10 men.
Total, 108.
Total in infantry camp, 435 rank and file.
Total in mounted camp, 137 rank and file.
Grand total of "Red" force, 578.

On Friday evening, as already stated, the defending Red Force had taken up positions right along the heights, stretching from Mount Watkin on the right to Pleasant River on the extreme left. A strong reconnoitring patrol of the 2nd Regiment O.M.R. and two infantry columns pushed out to the front and gained and maintained touch with the enemy almost immediately. The intention was to secure Brooklands and Goodwood and the junction of the neighbouring roads. With this end in view the officer commanding the Second Regiment Mounted Rifles, with a section of cyclists, pushed on to secure Brooklands. At Goodwood, where the road crosses the estuary, the infantry were to take up their positions. Sentinels were posted in a position overlooking the estuary, while signal stations were set up on the various hills. The troops took 24 hours' rations with them and 10 rounds of ammunition. The mounted men set out and patrolled Walker's road and Scott's road, and also secured the junction of the roads, which they were to endeavour to hold throughout the night. The left column of the infantry was to establish an outpost at the Quarry road and in the vicinity of Derdan's Hill, and also patrol Reid Road to the signalling station. A line of outposts was established, and preparations made for defence from Waikouaiti Station to Bald Head Hill. The right column consisted of A and B Companies of the No. 2 Battalion , 0.R.V., with a maxim gun, and the left column of the C and D Companies No. 4 Battalion 0.R.V., and a half company of Pioneers. The Dunedin Engineers, with signalling aparatus, etc., also a transport detachment, accompanied both columns. Members of the Bearer Corps were also detached with both columns. The above dispositions practically covered the Red Forces' first method of defence, and meant practically the placing in position of about half the available infantry and practically the whole of the mounted forces. At dawn on Saturday morning the B Battery, consisting of one gun, under Captain Tapley, and supposed to represent four guns and 60 men, took up a position on Tumai Hill. At 5 o'clock this morning the No. 2 Battalion O.R.V., consisting of Awarua, Gore, Winton, and Orepuki Rifles, went out to relieve the right column, while the No. 4 Battalion 0.R.V., composed of the Bruce, Clutha, and a half company of Pioneers, went out to relieve the left column. The left column proceeded by Quarry Road to the junction of Scott's Road and McAulay's and Reid's Roads.

In keeping with the first methods of defence adopted on Friday evening, outposts were sent ahead in all directions. The position resolved itself into a race between defenders and invaders to gain first the points of vantage and commanding positions in the vicinity of Goodwood. There was a close run for the positions referred to, but the enemy's outposts got there first, and, installing themselves, drove back the Reds' outposts and pickets after a brief but determined exchange of shots. The Reds' outposts fell back, but for no great distance, as the enemy preferred to remain where it was so advantageously placed. The Reds' pickets withdrew for about a mile, and there occupied what commanding positions there were, at the same time carrying out an effective guard over roads and railway line and other means of access southwards. There was some interrupted sniping throughout the night, but without any alteration of the respective positions. Meantime the main body of the Reds had advanced considerably and occupied the northern slopes of Derdan's Hill, and the vicinity on their left and the heights near the coast on their right. Likewise the enemy had come south a few miles and taken up positions on the heights facing the defenders, with some low-lying country, a few hills, and swamp intervening. This country was made the ground for skirmishing and reconnoitring, which went on till after midday. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon the Reds commenced a reconnaissance in force, and soon after the defending force had thrown out a strong mounted division to its right, and in the centre on Bald Head Hill and neighbouring heights dug entrenchments for the shelter of their forces from the possible big gun fire of the enemy. Quite unknown to the enemy, the B Battery, consisting of one 9lb gun, under Captain Tapley, and supposed to represent four guns and 60 men, had placed themselves on the heights to the right of the Main North road at Tumai, almost directly above the railway crossing and just south of Tumai Railway Station. The two maxim guns which the defending Reds were also possessed of were placed in the same locality. These operations were carried out quite unknown to the enemy, and the result was somewhat ridiculous. The invaders were evidently labouring under the impression that the Reds had placed all their big guns on Bald Head Hill to the left of the Main Road, and accordingly about 2 o'clock commenced a warn fusillade of shot and shell on to and all around this height with a view to dislodging an enemy that actually did not exist there. The guns on the right of the road going north meantime kept perfectly silent, and refused to be drawn. Their position over night remained still unknown, and the invaders will meet a warm reception in that quarter when they set up their attack on Sunday evening. The B Battery had expended considerable energy and shot, and all to no purpose. Throughout the night the usual outpost duties were maintained, being broken only by intermittent and irregular shooting between the opposing pickets and outposts. The Red Forces had practically all their men out over night with the exception of about 80, who were held in readiness in the camp and sent out at daybreak to add extra strength and to give relief. This however, was not needed, for the night passed uneventfully.

Sunday.
About 9 o'clock this morning an armistice was declared, and the troops withdrew to their respective camps, tired and bedraggled looking. In the afternoon divine service was held at the camp by Major-Chaplain Gray, 2nd Regiment O.M.R. There was a big muster, and Lieut.-Colonel Smyth and staff, also Colonel Boyne, commanding the Red Forces, were present. Chaplain Gray, in the course of a few remarks, made reference to the sad occurrences which had marked the manoeuvres, both on land and on sea, in the latter case referring to the sad drowning accident on Saturday night. He prayed that the sorrowing relatives would be comforted in their affliction. The service was short, but very impressive.

RED'S CAVALRY CAPTURED,

STARVING OUTPOSTS.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SMYTH SUMS UP.

A duel - even an artillery duel - becomes but a half-hearted business when only one side participates. The artillery "duel" fought on Saturday evening between the two forces was therefore rather incomplete.

On Saturday night the outposts were reinforoed, and some capital work was done, notably by the First Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Stoneham, and No. 3 (North Otago Rifles) further to the left, with Captain Morris and Lieutenant Vine. The men displayed great keenness, and evidently possess a knowledge of the scheme of outposts, pickets, and supports, patrolling, etc., most creditable to themselves and to those responsible for their instruction. The enemy was very much on the alert, and pushed his outpost line and advance posts further and further forward during the night. A dashing and rather pretty piece of work was done by a detachment of the North Otago Mounted Rifles, commanded by Captain Orbell. Dodging through Red's line of outposts, they cleverly discovered the supports, and wheeling rapidly into a paddock fired into them, and made off. The supports returned the fire, and thus disclosed their position to the whole of Blue's watchful outpost line. Captain Orbell extricated his command as adroitly as he got them in. He is said to have penetrated three-quarters of a mile inside the enemy's lines. Daybreak found both outpost screens amazingly close to each other, and several brushes occurred as the men fell back. Blue vacated all positions, and returned to camp at 9 a.m. The night had been bitterly cold, and it had gone hard with sentries compelled to remain glued to one particular spot. The dawn, among other things, revealed parties, in positions where tactically they had no right to be, but if their positions were bad, their excuses were excellent. Troops left in camp found the water frozen in the buckets when reveille was sounded, so the state of the atmosphere up on the hills and ridges can be imagined. Some of the men had not had their clothes off for 48 hours, but everyone looked remarkably well, and the sick reports remained blank. During the day the camp was inspected by Surgeon-general Skirman, P.M.O. for New Zealand, who is said to have been well pleased with the general neatness and arrangements. In the afternoon visitors flocked from far and wide, and the troops formed in square for divine service. In the centre by the drums stood Chaplain-major Dutton in uniform. The service commenced with, the Old Hundredth, and prayers over, the troops sat down to hear the sermon. It was a simple homely subject, eloquently expounded by an earnest man, and the words of the speaker went home not only to his military congregation but to the crowd of civilians fringing the outer edges of the square. He spoke of fighting the good fight, and pointed out how a defeat, or series of defeats, mattered little. What matter was how a man took his defeat. The fact of being conquered cowed some characters, while it tempered others, like fine steel, so that they rose again and became conquerors in their turn. At the end of the sermon the last sad tributes of respect were paid to the memory of the late Driver J. Logie, who about this time had been laid to rest at Dunedin. Spectators bared their heads, as the pipers formed up, and to the slow beat of the muffled drum played "The lament." Then the trumpeters and buglers assembled, and hillside and gorge woke reverberating to the clarion, stirring, yet ever mournful, notes of "The Last Post," the soldiers last farewell to a staunch comrade for ever laid low. (John Logie, (26) buried at Southern Cemetery Dunedin, 19 April 1908)

As the armistice closed at 5 o'clock the camp became a scene of much activity. Through the drone and skirl of the pipes and the roll and pattering of side drums broke clamorous impatient bugle calls. The lines were filled with troops as busy and active as ants. Greatcoats, blankets, and waterproof sheets became neat little, packets the size end shape of rolly-poly puddings. Orders were issued and copied into a hundred notebooks, guards and sentries were warned, and orderly sergeants hustled in all directions. Another contribution to the programme was " Boot and saddle" by the trumpeters, and soon the cavalry streamed, out with jingling bite and clattering hoofs, as serviceable a lot of men as can be found in the Empire. As company followed company, and squadron succeeded squadron, it was evident that the outpost line was to be heavily reinforced. Rifle fire sputtered wrathfully to the left, and the armistice was over. At about 11 p.m. heavy firing was heard on the right flank, and the infantry were driven by a strong force of the Red's mounted troops, who were working round to the rear of the position. Part of Blue's cavalry under Captain Freeman attacked the Reds vigorously, and, driving them back in confusion, left a detached post or mounted men in the position the infantry had been compelled to vacate. The Red Force then opened fire with their artillery from Tumai Hill, and Battery B then went into action, escorted by B and C Squadrons. One gun was placed by the maxim covering the main road, and the three others were soon busy on the left flank. Naturally the firing was mostly guesswork, the flashes from the guns alone revealing their location.

The defenders' mounted men had by this time rallied, and were discovered pushing on right round Blue's right flank, and the camp was threatened. Here the cohesion and discipline of the Blue Force became apparent. There was no bellowing of confused and contradictory orders, and no panic. Everyone was coolly alert. Orders were given quietly and executed with despatch. Captain Freeman was again sent out with the Otago Mounted Rifles, the Maniototos, the Otago Hussars, and the Cluthas, before whom the Reds were compelled to retire. Instead of retreating towards their supports (if, indeed, they possessed such things) they fell back to westward. Their retreat was then cutoff, and the entire force was captured. Red was therefore minus of nearly all his mounted troops.

It was then about 3 a.m., and Lieutenant-colonel Smyth and his staff appeared and put a stop to hostilities. Lieutenant-colonel Smyth said the men comprising the Red Force were starved and dead beat, and it would be useless prolonging the affair. The troops then withdrew to camp and busied themselves in preparations for their departure. Blue's outposts had been well fed and regularly relieved, so the infantry as they marched away looked as fresh as paint. The officer commanding had saved his cavalry very considerably by keeping them in whenever possible by night and keeping up communication by signals and cyclists instead of galloping the horses to death on "orderly" duty. Cavalry and guns provided a fine spectacle as they trotted off amid cheers to Palmerston. Battery B, the Clutha Mounted Rifles, the Otago Hussars, and the Maniototo Mounted Rifles entrained at Palmerston at 12.10 p.m., and the First Battalion and Engineers left Goodwood at 1.50 p.m.

The defenders, mounted and infantry, struck camp in the early morning, and, looking decidedly weary and tired of foot, with kit and baggage, traversed the two miles and a-half from the locality of their encampment to the Waikouaiti Railway Station, and by about 2 o'clock were all entrained and on their way south and homeward-bound. Before the breaking-up of camp Colonel Boyne paid a special tribute to the excellent work that had been performed by the Dunedin Engineers in the way of telegraphing and signalling.

The brains were decidedly on the side of the invaders. Officers in the Red Force, especially in minor positions, when interviewed as to their movements and impressions, seemed lamentably at sea with regard to the proceedings generally, and culpably and absurdly ignorant of the parts played by themselves and their units. These gentlemen pay far too much attention to the " pomp and circumstance " of war to the exclusion of that practical knock-about knowledge of such intrinsic value to the soldier. The duties of an officer do not lie in straining every nerve to support a dignity that should be a natural asset, or in punctiliously saluting, and returning salutes ad nauseam. It is to be hoped that these Volunteer officers will lay to heart the scathing but called-for criticism on their "soldiering" by Lieutenant-colonel Smyth, director of manoeuvres.

LIEUT.-COLONEL SMYTH'S CRITIQUE.

At the conference of officers of both forces held on Monday morning about 11 o'clock at headquarters, close to the Waikouaiti Railway Station, Lieut.-colonel Smyth addressed himself to those present - that is, the officers in command of both Red and Blue Forces. He would, he said, speak from his personal observations only. He had not been everywhere, as he could not be in every place at the one time, but what he had seen would form the current of his remarks. He would first begin with the Red Force, and put them out of their pain. In the first place, they had tried to cover too much ground, and they had an enormous front to cover with only a small line of men to do it. There were also Mount Durden and Bald Head Hill to be taken into account. These positions were too formidable to be neglected, and the Red Force would have done much better to have taken up their original line of defence in the vicinity of Merton. But they tried to cover still wider ground. This tendency to push forward should be guarded against. They had pushed forward into the river valley, the Mounted Rifles being sent out seven miles unsupported. It was, of course, hard to separate the scheme on paper from a separate scheme on the manoeuvring ground. There was a great deal that was very pretty on paper that was found to be absolutely impracticable when actual manoeuvring had to be carried out. The Red Force, by receiving supposed reinforcements, might be said to be growing gradually stronger, and should have held their ground at the first. In actual warfare it would not do to attack perfectly trained and disciplined troops such as the enemy might land with an imperfectly trained and hastily mobilised force. He had been sorry to see the same men of the Red Force on outpost duty daily. On the first night practically the whole of the Mounted Rifles were out, together with four companies of infantry. These were practically seven miles away from the camp. The Blues had done the same thing, but under vastly different circumstances. The Red outposts had been seven miles and a half away from their camp. It must be borne in mind that the outpost and defence lines were two very different things. The mounted men had also been left out at night, a useless and unnecessary proceeding. Every night Blue had taken in his mounted men and put out his infantry, which was perfectly correct. Putting out the mounted companies at night simply meant wearing out the men and horses for nothing. The Red's outpost had not been relieved daily, when, as a matter of fact, he would have liked to have seen them relieved every 12 hours. In consequence of this the men were absolutely deadbeat. They were exhausted, and the horses could hardly walk. And that was after only two days' work. As to information obtained, they had got none. Red knew nothing of Blue's march on Friday night, and although the Red's outposts were within a-quarter of a mile of the Blue camp they did not even know its position. In fact, there was a rumour abroad in the Red lines that the Blue force had two camps. Had they had a few small parties able to dash round the enemy's flanks they might have damaged Blue considerably on his march. This, however, had not been done. Lieut.-colonel Smyth then went on to speak of the patrolling. It was quite impossible, he said, to send a patrol by a road and expect it to find out anything. The work performed by the Mounted Rifles on each side had, he said, been excellent. Both Blue and Red Forces had been practically hung up for lack of information about each other's dispositions. The idea would have been to send a party round the flank in charge of a smart enterprising officer. But this had been neglected. Had even an officer with a couple of Blue men been sent up to the heights on the left, which were unoccupied by the Red Force, they might have discovered the whole of the Red's dispositions. General Baden-Powell had done this many times in Matabele Land, and had penetrated the enemy's lines and lain hidden when they were almost within touch with him. He himself had had a lesson in India in regard to using a large force when a small force could do better. He had on one occasion sent out a cavalry squadron to reconnoitre. They went a long distance off, but sent no reports in. Finally he sent out one young officer on a polo pony, who got on an eminence, and, returning, told him practically everything he wanted to know. The point was that the squadron had been seen by the enemy, and that the one man on the polo pony had not. The Red's battery had been very well placed, but had not been supported. There had only been a picket somewhere near it when there should have been a squadron. That was a very risky proceeding. The battery was pushed very far forward, and he would again remind them that the outposts were not placed to fight battles, but to delay the enemy and observe as much as possible. At 8.15 a.m. on the Saturday he had seen the Red's outposts advancing in skirmishing order to attack a patrol. This, of course, was nothing but a rabble. All these little skirmishing affairs and constant firing in the outpost lines did not do the slightest good, but afforded Blue all the information he sought for. At noon he (Lieut.-colonel Smyth) had come on to a picket near the Main Road. The officer in command of it, when questioned, said he had no orders, and could not say what he would do if attacked. He had not the remotest idea what was on his right and what was on his left. Such, a state of things was absolutely fatal. The work done by the Red's battery was very good. The officer in command had altered his position, and when fired at did not waste ammunition in responding, and by remaining silent did not disclose his position to the enemy. At 9 p.m. he (Lieut.-colonel Smyth) had met reinforcements coming to the outposts, and he would ask Colonel Boyne what was meant by that.
Colonel Boyne : To relieve the others.
Lieut-colonel Smyth : What! at 9 p.m.
Colonel Boyne : Oh I expected an attack.
Lieut.-colonel Smyth went on to say that he had been unable to locate the Red's machine guns. Apparently one had been left at the station during the whole four days. He would ask Colonel Boyne if he knew to whom the gun on the station belonged.
Colonel Boyne: I do not know whom it belonged to.
Lieut. -colonel Smyth said he did not say this gun belonged to the Red Force. He did not know whom it belonged to, but it certainly showed neglect and forgetfulness on somebody's part.

Commenting on the operations of the Blue Force, Lieut.-colonel Smyth said that the first move from the Shag River and the cavalry dash on Goodwood had been very well thought out and ably executed. This had promised well, but be had been disappointed in the terrible inaction, the deadly stagnation, that had subsequently set in. The Red Force had been much the same, but this stagnation had been all the more surprising in the Blue Force, following on a brilliant advance. The situation on Sunday night had been practically the same as it was on Friday night, when Blue had first occupied Goodwood. Such inaction seemed inexplicable. Blue's outposts has been well placed and alert, and the men had been regularly relieved. In consequence of this Blue infantry had been kept fresh, and was in much better condition than that of Red. Again, the O.C Blue Force has, economised the energy of his mounted troops. Communications had been kept up by means of signallers. He had helios and flags going by day and lamps by night, while despatches had been carried by cyclists. This had saved his horses from being galloped to death, and consequently his mounted troops had been fresh and ready for action when the crisis came. Lieut.-colonel Smyth had been glad to see that the cavalry had not been sent out at night on patrol work, but that the O.C. Blue Force had contented himself with throwing out his mounted men by day and relying on his infantry outposts by night. The maxim gun had been used to the fullest advantage, and the position selected for it had been well chosen. It had also been well screened.

Lieut.-colonel Smyth himself had been unable to discover its whereabouts till he had been near it some time. It had been placed so as to sweep the approach by or in the neighbourhood of the Main Road. Had the enemy advanced that way it would probably have wiped him out. Blue had not reconnoitred boldly enough, and the scouting had been timid. He (Lieut.-colonel Smyth) had come across one of their scouting parties. The leading scout had halted, and when asked the reason, replied that the enemy was in sight. He did not know, however, whether that enemy was an army corps or a drummer boy, and did not think of tying his horses and clambering through a hedge to look until it had been suggested to him. Certainly Blue had made a reconnaissance in force, but it had not been plucky enough. Commanding officers must learn to take risks when playing the game of war. He must lose a few lives, and if enterprise meant the capture of a few men, well, he must let them be captured. As it was the Blue Force had been absolutely "held up" for lack of information about the enemy. There were several things against a reconnaissance in force. It might engage the whole line if it failed to extricate itself from difficulties with the enemy, and if it retired it was in a sense a retreat, and therefore demoralising to the men. A reconnaissance in force, as the phrase implied, was to push back the enemy's advance posts and to discover his dispositions. It should be a forcible business. This reconnaissance had been a very poor little affair, and had been immediately checked by a little firing. It had, also failed in its purpose. Lieut.-colonel Smyth went on to say that at 9.45 p.m. on April 19 things began to look uncomfortable for the Blue camp, and he did not know that the officer commanding had made plans to meet certain contingencies. He doubted the wisdom of using artillery by night when the points to be shelled had not been noted and ranged during the day. A battery did no good unless it could observe, and this obviously was impracticable at night, and firing under such conditions not only wasted ammunition but disclosed the locality of the guns. The position chosen for himself by the O.C. Blue Force (being in camp) did not seem to be a good one. After two days of stagnation the dash made by Red's mounted men had been most refreshing. It was evident that Blue had been harassed and that his camp was rather like an unsettled hive. All the same, the attack had been very well met. In the matter of reconnaissance they must endeavour to strike a happy mean between over caution and rashness. The attacks by Red's mounted men had been dashing but rather rash, as if they did not seem to have been supported. Continuing, Lieut.-colonel Smyth said he had heard very heavy firing during the night. He had even heard volleys, which was bad, volley firing especially at night having been done away with. He had ridden over to Blue's camp quite expecting to find it in the hands of the Red Force. Instead of this, when riding through Red's frightfully scattered dispositions, he witnessed a state of affairs that was most discouraging. Scarcely an officer among the Red Force seemed to know what he was to do, where he had come from, or what was happening. There were tired, scattered, bedraggled groups of infantry, and stupid little driblets of two or three, where there should have been companies. Their leaders, when asked what they were doing, replied "Oh, we're watching such-and-such a point." Had Blue only been aware of this miserable state of affairs they would just have lit their pipes, and marched over their scattered, tired enemy right into Merton. Red's positon at this time was about the most dreadful thing he had ever seen. Captains were moving here and there, and mounted men were scouting behind the pickets. Blue could have gone right on to Merton. Even a girl's school could have done it and a trained, highly-disciplined enemy would simply have brushed Red away like flies. Lieutenant-colonel Smyth went on to say that he had found the Blue Force moving out in a very workmanlike methodical manner. Reverting to outposts and lines of defence, he thought the line of defence chosen by Colonel Boyne had been an excellent one, but, then, he had left it unoccupied. Owing to so many of the Red Force being kept on outpost at so great a distance from camp the men had been starved. Allowance had been made for a quarter of the force to be on outpost at a time, and when nearly all had been placed on outposts the calculations had been entirely upset. Men were starving in the outpost line while meat was being left unused, or being thrown away in camp. This in no way reflected on the D.A.Q.M.G., but the fault of those responsible in the Red Force. With the Red Force the men were wearied and starved, and were continually making complaints. The troops had even been getting food given to them by the residents. With the Blue Force the men had been well and regularly fed, and there had been no complaints. He was going to visit the various centres shortly, and would then be pleased to hear any explanations officers might care to offer, and point out one or two things which at present time did not permit him to do.

Otago Witness, Issue 2823, 22 April 1908, Page 30

Return to: - Kelso Mounted Rifles