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Title: A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents
       Section 1 (of 2) of Volume 3: Andrew Jackson (Second Term)

Author: James D. Richardson

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Language: English

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A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS

BY JAMES D. RICHARDSON

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE


VOLUME III


PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY OF CONGRESS 1902



Copyright 1897

BY JAMES D. RICHARDSON




Prefatory Note


The second volume of this compilation, issued a few weeks since, was
received with the same degree of favor as the first volume. It was a
matter of surprise that only sixteen years of our history, or eight
Congresses, could be comprised within the second volume, while the first
covered twenty-eight years, or fourteen Congresses. There is greater
surprise that this volume includes only the period covered by the four
years of the second term of Andrew Jackson and the four years of Martin
Van Buren's term--eight years in all, or four Congresses. However, it
will be found almost, if not quite, as interesting as the preceding
ones. In it will be found the conclusion of the controversy over the
United States Bank, including President Jackson's reasons for the
removal of the deposits from that bank; his Farewell Address, and other
important papers, all of which are characteristic of the man. It was
during the second Administration of President Jackson that the act
changing the ratio between the gold and silver dollar was passed.

This volume contains President Van Buren's message recommending the
independent treasury or subtreasury, and the discussion of that subject,
which terminated in what has been termed "the divorce of the bank and
state in the fiscal affairs of the Federal Government," and which
President Van Buren considered a second Declaration of Independence. The
controversy with Great Britain in relation to the northeastern boundary
of the United States is also included in Van Buren's Administration, and
will prove highly interesting.

The omission of indexes to Volumes I and II has been commented on. The
answer to such comments is, it was deemed best to omit the index to each
volume and publish a general and comprehensive index to the entire work,
in a separate volume. This index will be ready for distribution soon
after the issuance of the last volume.

JAMES D. RICHARDSON.

NOVEMBER 26,1896.




Andrew Jackson

March 4, 1833, to March 4, 1837




Andrew Jackson

SECOND INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

FELLOW-CITIZENS: The will of the American people, expressed through
their unsolicited suffrages, calls me before you to pass through the
solemnities preparatory to taking upon myself the duties of President of
the United States for another term. For their approbation of my public
conduct through a period which has not been without its difficulties,
and for this renewed expression of their confidence in my good
intentions, I am at a loss for terms adequate to the expression of my
gratitude. It shall be displayed to the extent of my humble abilities in
continued efforts so to administer the Government as to preserve their
liberty and promote their happiness.

So many events have occurred within the last four years which have
necessarily called forth--sometimes under circumstances the most
delicate and painful--my views of the principles and policy which ought
to be pursued by the General Government that I need on this occasion but
allude to a few leading considerations connected with some of them.

The foreign policy adopted by our Government soon after the formation
of our present Constitution, and very generally pursued by successive
Administrations, has been crowned with almost complete success, and has
elevated our character among the nations of the earth. To do justice to
all and to submit to wrong from none has been during my Administration
its governing maxim, and so happy have been its results that we are not
only at peace with all the world, but have few causes of controversy,
and those of minor importance, remaining unadjusted.

In the domestic policy of this Government there are two objects
which especially deserve the attention of the people and their
representatives, and which have been and will continue to be the
subjects of my increasing solicitude. They are the preservation of
the rights of the several States and the integrity of the Union.

These great objects are necessarily connected, and can only be attained
by an enlightened exercise of the powers of each within its appropriate
sphere in conformity with the public will constitutionally expressed.
To this end it becomes the duty of all to yield a ready and patriotic
submission to the laws constitutionally enacted, and thereby promote and
strengthen a proper confidence in those institutions of the several
States and of the United States which the people themselves have
ordained for their own government.

My experience in public concerns and the observation of a life
somewhat advanced confirm the opinions long since imbibed by me, that
the destruction of our State governments or the annihilation of their
control over the local concerns of the people would lead directly
to revolution and anarchy, and finally to despotism and military
domination. In proportion, therefore, as the General Government
encroaches upon the rights of the States, in the same proportion does
it impair its own power and detract from its ability to fulfill the
purposes of its creation. Solemnly impressed with these considerations,
my countrymen will ever find me ready to exercise my constitutional
powers in arresting measures which may directly or indirectly encroach
upon the rights of the States or tend to consolidate all political power
in the General Government. But of equal, and, indeed, of incalculable,
importance is the union of these States, and the sacred duty of all
to contribute to its preservation by a liberal support of the General
Government in the exercise of its just powers. You have been wisely
admonished to "accustom yourselves to think and speak of the Union as of
the palladium of your political safety and prosperity, watching for its
preservation with jealous anxiety, discountenancing whatever may suggest
even a suspicion that it can in any event be abandoned, and indignantly
frowning upon the first dawning of any attempt to alienate any portion
of our country from the rest or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now
link together the various parts." Without union our independence and
liberty would never have been achieved; without union they never can
be maintained. Divided into twenty-four, or even a smaller number, of
separate communities, we shall see our internal trade burdened with
numberless restraints and exactions; communication between distant
points and sections obstructed or cut off; our sons made soldiers to
deluge with blood the fields they now till in peace; the mass of our
people borne down and impoverished by taxes to support armies and
navies, and military leaders at the head of their victorious legions
becoming our lawgivers and judges. The loss of liberty, of all good
government, of peace, plenty, and happiness, must inevitably follow a
dissolution of the Union. In supporting it, therefore, we support all
that is dear to the freeman and the philanthropist.

The time at which I stand before you is full of interest. The eyes of
all nations are fixed on our Republic. The event of the existing crisis
will be decisive in the opinion of mankind of the practicability of our
federal system of government. Great is the stake placed in our hands;
great is the responsibility which must rest upon the people of the
United States. Let us realize the importance of the attitude in which we
stand before the world. Let us exercise forbearance and firmness. Let us
extricate our country from the dangers which surround it and learn
wisdom from the lessons they inculcate.

Deeply impressed with the truth of these observations, and under the
obligation of that solemn oath which I am about to take, I shall
continue to exert all my faculties to maintain the just powers of the
Constitution and to transmit unimpaired to posterity the blessings of
our Federal Union. At the same time, it will be my aim to inculcate by
my official acts the necessity of exercising by the General Government
those powers only that are clearly delegated; to encourage simplicity
and economy in the expenditures of the Government; to raise no more
money from the people than may be requisite for these objects, and in
a manner that will best promote the interests of all classes of the
community and of all portions of the Union. Constantly bearing in mind
that in entering into society "individuals must give up a share of
liberty to preserve the rest," it will be my desire so to discharge my
duties as to foster with our brethren in all parts of the country a
spirit of liberal concession and compromise, and, by reconciling our
fellow-citizens to those partial sacrifices which they must unavoidably
make for the preservation of a greater good, to recommend our invaluable
Government and Union to the confidence and affections of the American
people.

Finally, it is my most fervent prayer to that Almighty Being before whom
I now stand, and who has kept us in His hands from the infancy of our
Republic to the present day, that He will so overrule all my intentions
and actions and inspire the hearts of my fellow-citizens that we may be
preserved from dangers of all kinds and continue forever a united and
happy people.

MARCH 4, 1833.




REMOVAL OF THE PUBLIC DEPOSITS.

[Read to the Cabinet September 18, 1833]

Having carefully and anxiously considered all the facts and arguments
which have been submitted to him relative to a removal of the public
deposits from the Bank of the United States, the President deems it his
duty to communicate in this manner to his Cabinet the final conclusions
of his own mind and the reasons on which they are founded, in order to
put them in durable form and to prevent misconceptions.

The President's convictions of the dangerous tendencies of the Bank of
the United States, since signally illustrated by its own acts, were so
overpowering when he entered on the duties of Chief Magistrate that he
felt it his duty, notwithstanding the objections of the friends by whom
he was surrounded, to avail himself of the first occasion to call the
attention of Congress and the people to the question of its recharter.
The opinions expressed in his annual message of December, 1829, were
reiterated in those of December, 1830 and 1831, and in that of 1830
he threw out for consideration some suggestions in relation to a
substitute. At the session of 1831-32 an act was passed by a majority
of both Houses of Congress rechartering the present bank, upon which
the President felt it his duty to put his constitutional veto. In his
message returning that act he repeated and enlarged upon the principles
and views briefly asserted in his annual message, declaring the bank
to be, in his opinion, both inexpedient and unconstitutional, and
announcing to his countrymen very unequivocally his firm determination
never to sanction by his approval the continuance of that institution
or the establishment of any other upon similar principles.

There are strong reasons for believing that the motive of the bank in
asking for a recharter at that session of Congress was to make it a
leading question in the election of a President of the United States the
ensuing November, and all steps deemed necessary were taken to procure
from the people a reversal of the President's decision.

Although the charter was approaching its termination, and the bank was
aware that it was the intention of the Government to use the public
deposit as fast as it has accrued in the payment of the public debt,
yet did it extend its loans from January, 1831, to May, 1832, from
$42,402,304.24 to $70,428,070.72, being an increase of $28,025,766.48
in sixteen months. It is confidently believed that the leading object of
this immense extension of its loans was to bring as large a portion of
the people as possible under its power and influence, and it has been
disclosed that some of the largest sums were granted on very unusual
terms to the conductors of the public press. In some of these cases the
motive was made manifest by the nominal or insufficient security taken
for the loans, by the large amounts discounted, by the extraordinary
time allowed for payment, and especially by the subsequent conduct of
those receiving the accommodations.

Having taken these preliminary steps to obtain control over public
opinion, the bank came into Congress and asked a new charter. The object
avowed by many of the advocates of the bank was _to put the President
to the test_, that the country might know his final determination
relative to the bank prior to the ensuing election. Many documents and
articles were printed and circulated at the expense of the bank to bring
the people to a favorable decision upon its pretensions. Those whom the
bank appears to have made its debtors for the special occasion were
warned of the ruin which awaited them should the President be sustained,
and attempts were made to alarm the whole people by painting the
depression in the price of property and produce and the general loss,
inconvenience, and distress which it was represented would immediately
follow the reelection of the President in opposition to the bank.

Can it now be said that the question of a recharter of the bank was not
decided at the election which ensued? Had the veto been equivocal, or
had it not covered the whole ground; if it had merely taken exceptions
to the details of the bill or to the time of its passage; if it had not
met the whole ground of constitutionality and expediency, then there
might have been some plausibility for the allegation that the question
was not decided by the people. It was to compel the President to take
his stand that the question was brought forward at that particular
time. He met the challenge, willingly took the position into which his
adversaries sought to force him, and frankly declared his unalterable
opposition to the bank as being both unconstitutional and inexpedient.
On that ground the case was argued to the people; and now that the
people have sustained the President, notwithstanding the array of
influence and power which was brought to bear upon him, it is too late,
he confidently thinks, to say that the question has not been decided.
Whatever may be the opinions of others, the President considers his
reelection as a decision of the people against the bank. In the
concluding paragraph of his veto message he said:


  I have now done my duty to my country. If sustained by my
  fellow-citizens, I shall be grateful and happy; if not, I shall find
  in the motives which impel me ample grounds for contentment and peace.


He was sustained by a just people, and he desires to evince his
gratitude by carrying into effect their decision so far as it depends
upon him.

Of all the substitutes for the present bank which have been suggested,
none seems to have united any considerable portion of the public in its
favor. Most of them are liable to the same constitutional objections for
which the present bank has been condemned, and perhaps to all there are
strong objections on the score of expediency. In ridding the country of
an irresponsible power which has attempted to control the Government,
care must be taken not to unite the same power with the executive
branch. To give a President the control over the currency and the power
over individuals now possessed by the Bank of the United States, even
with the material difference that he is responsible to the people, would
be as objectionable and as dangerous as to leave it as it is. Neither
one nor the other is necessary, and therefore ought not to be resorted
to.

On the whole, the President considers it as conclusively settled that
the charter of the Bank of the United States will not be renewed, and
he has no reasonable ground to believe that any substitute will be
established. Being bound to regulate his course by the laws as they
exist, and not to anticipate the interference of the legislative power
for the purpose of framing new systems, it is proper for him seasonably
to consider the means by which the services rendered by the Bank of the
United States are to be performed after its charter shall expire.

The existing laws declare that--

  The deposits of the money of the United States in places in which the
  said bank and branches thereof may be established shall be made in said
  bank or branches thereof unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall at
  any time otherwise order and direct, in which case the Secretary of the
  Treasury shall immediately lay before Congress, if in session, and, if
  not, immediately after the commencement of the next session, the reasons
  of such order or direction.

The power of the Secretary of the Treasury over the deposits is
_unqualified_. The provision that he shall report his reasons to
Congress is no limitation. Had it not been inserted he would have been
responsible to Congress had he made a removal for any other than good
reasons, and his responsibility now ceases upon the rendition of
sufficient ones to Congress. The only object of the provision is to make
his reasons accessible to Congress and enable that body the more readily
to judge of their soundness and purity, and thereupon to make such
further provision by law as the legislative power may think proper in
relation to the deposit of the public money. Those reasons may be very
diversified. It was asserted by the Secretary of the Treasury, without
contradiction, as early as 1817, that he had power "to control the
proceedings" of the Bank of the United States at any moment "by changing
the deposits to the State banks" should it pursue an illiberal course
toward those institutions; that "the Secretary of the Treasury will
always be disposed to support the credit of the State banks, and will
invariably direct transfers from the deposits of the public money in aid
of their legitimate exertions to maintain their credit;" and he asserted
a right to employ the State banks when the Bank of the United States
should refuse to receive on deposit the notes of such State banks as the
public interest required should be received in payment of the public
dues. In several instances he did transfer the public deposits to State
banks in the immediate vicinity of branches, for reasons connected only
with the safety of those banks, the public convenience, and the
interests of the Treasury.

If it was lawful for Mr. Crawford, the Secretary of the Treasury at that
time, to act on these principles, it will be difficult to discover any
sound reason against the application of similar principles in still
stronger cases. And it is a matter of surprise that a power which in
the infancy of the bank was freely asserted as one of the ordinary and
familiar duties of the Secretary of the Treasury should now be gravely
questioned, and attempts made to excite and alarm the public mind as if
some new and unheard-of power was about to be usurped by the executive
branch of the Government.

It is but a little more than two and a half years to the termination of
the charter of the present bank. It is considered as the decision of the
country that it shall then cease to exist, and no man, the President
believes, has reasonable ground for expectation that any other Bank of
the United States will be created by Congress.

To the Treasury Department is intrusted the safe-keeping and faithful
application of the public moneys. A plan of collection different from
the present must therefore be introduced and put in complete operation
before the dissolution of the present bank. When shall it be commenced?
Shall no step be taken in this essential concern until the charter
expires and the Treasury finds itself without an agent, its accounts in
confusion, with no depository for its funds, and the whole business of
the Government deranged, or shall it be delayed until six months, or a
year, or two years before the expiration of the charter? It is obvious
that any new system which may be substituted in the place of the Bank
of the United States could not be suddenly carried into effect on the
termination of its existence without serious inconvenience to the
Government and the people. Its vast amount of notes are then to be
redeemed and withdrawn-from circulation and its immense debt collected.
These operations must be gradual, otherwise much suffering and distress
will be brought upon the community.

It ought to be not a work of months only, but of years, and the
President thinks it can not, with due attention to the interests of the
people, be longer postponed. It is safer to begin it too soon than to
delay it too long.

It is for the wisdom of Congress to decide upon the best substitute
to be adopted in the place of the Bank of the United States, and the
President would have felt himself relieved from a heavy and painful
responsibility if in the charter to the bank Congress had reserved to
itself the power of directing at its pleasure the public money to be
elsewhere deposited, and had not devolved that power exclusively on one
of the Executive Departments. It is useless now to inquire why this high
and important power was surrendered by those who are peculiarly and
appropriately the guardians of the public money. Perhaps it was an
oversight. But as the President presumes that the charter to the bank is
to be considered as a contract on the part of the Government, it is not
now in the power of Congress to disregard its stipulations; and by the
terms of that contract the public money is to be deposited in the bank
during the continuance of its charter unless the Secretary of the
Treasury shall otherwise direct. Unless, therefore, the Secretary of the
Treasury first acts, Congress have no power over the subject, for they
can not add a new clause to the charter or strike one out of it without
the consent of the bank, and consequently the public money must remain
in that institution to the last hour of its existence unless the
Secretary of the Treasury shall remove it at an earlier day. The
responsibility is thus thrown upon the executive branch of the
Government of deciding how long before the expiration of the charter the
public interest will require the deposits to be placed elsewhere; and
although according to the frame and principle of our Government this
decision would seem more properly to belong to the legislative power,
yet as the law has imposed it upon the executive department the duty
ought to be faithfully and firmly met, and the decision made and
executed upon the best lights that can be obtained and the best judgment
that can be formed. It would ill become the executive branch of the
Government to shrink from any duty which the law imposes on it, to fix
upon others the responsibility which justly belongs to itself. And while
the President anxiously wishes to abstain from the exercise of doubtful
powers and to avoid all interference with the rights and duties
of others, he must yet with unshaken constancy discharge his own
obligations, and can not allow himself to turn aside in order to avoid
any responsibility which the high trust with which he has been honored
requires him to encounter; and it being the duty of one of the Executive
Departments to decide in the first instance, subject to the future
action of the legislative power, whether the public deposits shall
remain in the Bank of the United States until the end of its existence
or be withdrawn some time before, the President has felt himself bound
to examine the question carefully and deliberately in order to make up
his judgment on the subject, and in his opinion the near approach of
the termination of the charter and the public considerations heretofore
mentioned are of themselves amply sufficient to justify the removal of
the deposits, without reference to the conduct of the bank or their
safety in its keeping.

But in the conduct of the bank may be found other reasons, very
imperative in their character, and which require prompt action.
Developments have been made from time to time of its faithlessness as
a public agent, its misapplication of public funds, its interference in
elections, its efforts by the machinery of committees to deprive the
Government directors of a full knowledge of its concerns, and, above
all, its flagrant misconduct as recently and unexpectedly disclosed
in placing all the funds of the bank, including the money of the
Government, at the disposition of the president of the bank as means
of operating upon public opinion and procuring a new charter, without
requiring him to render a voucher for their disbursement. A brief
recapitulation of the facts which justify these charges, and which have
come to the knowledge of the public and the President, will, he thinks,
remove every reasonable doubt as to the course which it is now the duty
of the President to pursue.

We have seen that in sixteen months ending in May, 1832, the bank
had extended its loans more than $28,000,000, although it knew the
Government intended to appropriate most of its large deposit during that
year in payment of the public debt. It was in May, 1832, that its loans
arrived at the maximum, and in the preceding March so sensible was the
bank that it would not be able to pay over the public deposit when
it would be required by the Government that it commenced a secret
negotiation, without the approbation or knowledge of the Government,
with the agents for about $2,700,000 of the 3 per cent stocks held in
Holland, with a view of inducing them not to come forward for payment
for one or more years after notice should be given by the Treasury
Department. This arrangement would have enabled the bank to keep and use
during time the public money set apart for the payment of these stocks.
After this negotiation had commenced, the Secretary of the Treasury
informed the bank that it was his intention to pay off one-half of the
3 percents on the 1st of the succeeding July, which amounted to about
$6,500,000. The president of the bank, although the committee of
investigation was then looking into its affairs at Philadelphia, came
immediately to Washington, and upon representing that the bank was
desirous of accommodating the importing merchants at New York (which it
failed to do) and undertaking to pay the interest itself, procured the
consent of the Secretary, after consultation with the President, to
postpone the payment until the succeeding 1st of October.

Conscious that at the end of that quarter the bank would not be able
to pay over the deposits, and that further indulgence was not to be
expected of the Government, an agent was dispatched to England secretly
to negotiate with the holders of the public debt in Europe and induce
them by the offer of an equal or higher interest than that paid by the
Government to hold back their claims for one year, during which the bank
expected thus to retain the use of $5,000,000 of the public money, which
the Government should set apart for the payment of that debt. The agent
made an arrangement on terms, in part, which were in direct violation
of the charter of the bank, and when some incidents connected with this
secret negotiation accidentally came to the knowledge of the public and
the Government, then, and not before, so much of it as was palpably in
violation of the charter was disavowed. A modification of the rest was
attempted with the view of getting the certificates without payment of
the money, and thus absolving the Government from its liability to the
holders. In this scheme the bank was partially successful, but to this
day the certificates of a portion of these stocks have not been paid and
the bank retains the use of the money.

This effort to thwart the Government in the payment of the public debt
that it might retain the public money to be used for their private
interests, palliated by pretenses notoriously unfounded and insincere,
would have justified the instant withdrawal of the public deposits.
The negotiation itself rendered doubtful the ability of the bank to meet
the demands of the Treasury, and the misrepresentations by which it was
attempted to be justified proved that no reliance could be placed upon
its allegations.

If the question of a removal of the deposits presented itself to the
Executive in the same attitude that it appeared before the House of
Representatives at their last session, their resolution in relation to
the safety of the deposits would be entitled to more weight, although
the decision of the question of removal has been confided by law to
another department of the Government. But the question now occurs
attended by other circumstances and new disclosures of the most serious
import. It is true that in the message of the President which produced
this inquiry and resolution on the part of the House of Representatives
it was his object to obtain the aid of that body in making a thorough
examination into the conduct and condition of the bank and its branches
in order to enable the executive department to decide whether the public
money was longer safe in its hands. The limited power of the Secretary
of the Treasury over the subject disabled him from making the
investigation as fully and satisfactorily as it could be done by a
committee of the House of Representatives, and hence the President
desired the assistance of Congress to obtain for the Treasury Department
a full knowledge of all the facts which were necessary to guide his
judgment. But it was not his purpose, as the language of his message
will show, to ask the representatives of the people to assume a
responsibility which did not belong to them and relieve the executive
branch of the Government from the duty which the law had imposed upon
it. It is due to the President that his object in that proceeding should
be distinctly understood, and that he should acquit himself of all
suspicion of seeking to escape from the performance of his own duties or
of desiring to interpose another body between himself and the people in
order to avoid a measure which he is called upon to meet. But although
as an act of justice to himself he disclaims any design of soliciting
the opinion of the House of Representatives in relation to his own
duties in order to shelter himself from responsibility under the
sanction of their counsel, yet he is at all times ready to listen to
the suggestions of the representatives of the people, whether given
voluntarily or upon solicitation, and to consider them with the profound
respect to which all will admit that they are justly entitled. Whatever
may be the consequences, however, to himself, he must finally form his
own judgment where the Constitution and the law make it his duty to
decide, and must act accordingly; and he is bound to suppose that such
a course on his part will never be regarded by that elevated body as a
mark of disrespect to itself, but that they will, on the contrary,
esteem it the strongest evidence he can give of his fixed resolution
conscientiously to discharge his duty to them and the country.

A new state of things has, however, arisen since the close of the
last session of Congress, and evidence has since been laid before
the President which he is persuaded would have led the House of
Representatives to a different conclusion if it had come to their
knowledge. The fact that the bank controls, and in some cases
substantially _owns_, and by its money _supports_ some of the leading
presses of the country is now more clearly established. Editors to
whom it loaned extravagant sums in 1831 and 1832, on unusual time and
nominal security, have since turned out to be insolvent, and to others
apparently in no better condition accommodations still more extravagant,
on terms more unusual, and some without any security, have also been
heedlessly granted.

The allegation which has so often circulated through these channels that
the Treasury was bankrupt and the bank was sustaining it, when for many
years there has not been less, on an average, than six millions of
public money in that institution, might be passed over as a harmless
misrepresentation; but when it is attempted by substantial acts to
impair the credit of the Government and tarnish the honor of the
country, such charges require more serious attention. With six millions
of public money in its vaults, after having had the use of from five to
twelve millions for nine years without interest, it became the purchaser
of a bill drawn by our Government on that of France for about $900,000,
being the first installment of the French indemnity. The purchase money
was left in the use of the bank, being simply added to the Treasury
deposit. The bank sold the bill in England, and the holder sent it to
France for collection, and arrangements not having been made by the
French Government for its payment, it was taken up by the agents of the
bank in Paris with the funds of the bank in their hands. Under these
circumstances it has through its organs openly assailed the credit of
the Government, and has actually made and persists in a demand of 15 per
cent, or $158,842.77, as damages, when no damage, or none beyond some
trifling expense, has in fact been sustained, and when the bank had
in its own possession on deposit several millions of the public money
which it was then using for its own profit. Is a fiscal agent of the
Government which thus seeks to enrich itself at the expense of the
public worthy of further trust?

There are other important facts not in the contemplation of the House
of Representatives or not known to the members at the time they voted
for the resolution.

Although the charter and the rules of the bank both declare that "not
less than seven directors" shall be necessary to the transaction of
business, yet the most important business, even that of granting
discounts to any extent, is intrusted to a committee of five members,
who do not report to the board.

To cut off all means of communication with the Government in relation
to its most important acts at the commencement of the present year, not
one of the Government directors was placed on any one committee; and
although since, by an unusual remodeling of those bodies, some of those
directors have been placed on some of the committees, they are yet
entirely excluded from the committee of exchange, through which the
greatest and most objectionable loans have been made.

When the Government directors made an effort to bring back the business
of the bank to the board in obedience to the charter and the existing
regulations, the board not only overruled their attempt, but altered the
rule so as to make it conform to the practice, in direct violation of
one of the most important provisions of the charter which gave them
existence.

It has long been known that the president of the bank, by his single
will, originates and executes many of the most important measures
connected with the management and credit of the bank, and that the
committee as well as the board of directors are left in entire ignorance
of many acts done and correspondence carried on in their names, and
apparently under their authority. The fact has been recently disclosed
that an unlimited discretion has been and is now vested in the president
of the bank to expend its funds in payment for preparing and circulating
articles and purchasing pamphlets and newspapers, calculated by their
contents to operate on elections and secure a renewal of its charter.
It appears from the official report of the public directors that on the
30th November, 1830, the president submitted to the board an article
published in the American Quarterly Review containing favorable notices
of the bank, and suggested the expediency of giving it a wider
circulation at the expense of the bank; whereupon the board passed the
following resolution, viz:


  _Resolved_, That the president be authorized to take such measures in
  regard to the circulation of the contents of the said article, either
  in whole or in part, as he may deem most for the interest of the bank.


By an entry in the minutes of the bank dated March 11, 1831, it appears
that the president had not only caused a large edition of that article
to be issued, but had also, before the resolution of 30th November was
adopted, procured to be printed and widely circulated numerous copies of
the reports of General Smith and Mr. McDuffie in favor of the bank; and
on that day he suggested the expediency of extending his power to the
printing of other articles which might subserve the purposes of the
institution, whereupon the following resolution was adopted, viz--


  _Resolved_, That the president is hereby authorized to cause to be
  prepared and circulated such documents and papers as may communicate
  to the people information in regard to the nature and operations of
  the bank.


The expenditures purporting to have been made under authority of these
resolutions during the years 1831 and 1832 were about $80,000. For a
portion of these expenditures vouchers were rendered, from which it
appears that they were incurred in the purchase of some hundred thousand
copies of newspapers, reports and speeches made in Congress, reviews
of the veto message and reviews of speeches against the bank, etc.
For another large portion no vouchers whatever were rendered, but the
various sums were paid on orders of the president of the bank, making
reference to the resolution of the 11th of March, 1831.

On ascertaining these facts and perceiving that expenditures of a
similar character were still continued, the Government directors a few
weeks ago offered a resolution in the board calling for a specific
account of these expenditures, showing the objects to which they had
been applied and the persons to whom the money had been paid. This
reasonable proposition was voted down.

They also offered a resolution rescinding the resolutions of November,
1830, and March, 1831. This also was rejected.

Not content with thus refusing to recall the obnoxious power or even to
require such an account of the expenditure as would show whether the
money of the bank had in fact been applied to the objects contemplated
by these resolutions, as obnoxious as they were, the board renewed the
power already conferred, and even enjoined renewed attention to its
exercise by adopting the following in lieu of the propositions submitted
by the Government directors, viz:


  _Resolved_, That the board have confidence in the wisdom and integrity
  of the president and in the propriety of the resolutions of 30th
  November, 1830, and 11th March, 1831, and entertain a full conviction
  of the necessity of a renewed attention to the object of those
  resolutions, and that the president be authorized and requested to
  continue his exertions for the promotion of said object.


Taken in connection with the nature of the expenditures heretofore made,
as recently disclosed, which the board not only tolerate, but approve,
this resolution puts the funds of the bank at the disposition of the
president for the purpose of employing the whole press of the country in
the service of the bank, to hire writers and newspapers, and to pay out
such sums as he pleases to what person and for what services he pleases
without the responsibility of rendering any specific account. The bank
is thus converted into a vast electioneering engine, with means to
embroil the country in deadly feuds, and, under cover of expenditures in
themselves improper, extend its corruption through all the ramifications
of society.

Some of the items for which accounts have been rendered show the
construction which has been given to the resolutions and the way in
which the power it confers has been exerted. The money has not been
expended merely in the publication and distribution of speeches, reports
of committees, or articles written for the purpose of showing the
constitutionality or usefulness of the bank, but publications have been
prepared and extensively circulated containing the grossest invectives
against the officers of the Government, and the money which belongs to
the stockholders and to the public has been freely applied in efforts to
degrade in public estimation those who were supposed to be instrumental
in resisting the wishes of this grasping and dangerous institution. As
the president of the bank has not been required to settle his accounts,
no one but himself knows how much more than the sum already mentioned
may have been squandered, and for which a credit may hereafter be
claimed in his account under this most extraordinary resolution. With
these facts before us can we be surprised at the torrent of abuse
incessantly poured out against all who are supposed to stand in the way
of the cupidity or ambition of the Bank of the United States? Can we be
surprised at sudden and unexpected changes of opinion in favor of an
institution which has millions to lavish and avows its determination not
to spare its means when they are necessary to accomplish its purposes?
The refusal to render an account of the manner in which a part of the
money expended has been applied gives just cause for the suspicion that
it has been used for purposes which it is not deemed prudent to expose
to the eyes of an intelligent and virtuous people. Those who act justly
do not shun the light, nor do they refuse explanations when the
propriety of their conduct is brought into question.

With these facts before him in an official report from the Government
directors, the President would feel that he was not only responsible for
all the abuses and corruptions the bank has committed or may commit, but
almost an accomplice in a conspiracy against that Government which he
has sworn honestly to administer, if he did not take every step within
his constitutional and legal power likely to be efficient in putting an
end to these enormities. If it be possible within the scope of human
affairs to find a reason for removing the Government deposits and
leaving the bank to its own resource for the means of effecting its
criminal designs, we have it here. Was it expected when the moneys of
the United States were directed to be placed in that bank that they
would be put under the control of one man empowered to spend millions
without rendering a voucher or specifying the object? Can they be
considered safe with the evidence before us that tens of thousands have
been spent for highly improper, if not corrupt, purposes, and that the
same motive may lead to the expenditure of hundreds of thousands, and
even millions, more? And can we justify ourselves to the people by
longer lending to it the money and power of the Government to be
employed for such purposes?

It has been alleged by some as an objection to the removal of the
deposits that the bank has the power, and in that event will have the
disposition, to destroy the State banks employed by the Government,
and bring distress upon the country. It has been the fortune of the
President to encounter dangers which were represented as equally
alarming, and he has seen them vanish before resolution and energy.
Pictures equally appalling were paraded before him when this bank came
to demand a new charter. But what was the result? Has the country been
ruined, or even distressed? Was it ever more prosperous than since that
act? The President verily believes the bank has not the power to produce
the calamities its friends threaten. The funds of the Government will
not be annihilated by being transferred. They will immediately be issued
for the benefit of trade, and if the Bank of the United States curtails
its loans the State banks, strengthened by the public deposits, will
extend theirs. What comes in through one bank will go out through
others, and the equilibrium will be preserved. Should the bank, for the
mere purpose of producing distress, press its debtors more heavily than
some of them can bear, the consequences will recoil upon itself, and in
the attempts to embarrass the country it will only bring loss and ruin
upon the holders of its own stock. But if the President believed the
bank possessed all the power which has been attributed to it, his
determination would only be rendered the more inflexible. If, indeed,
this corporation now holds in its hands the happiness and prosperity of
the American people, it is high time to take the alarm. If the despotism
be already upon us and our only safety is in the mercy of the despot,
recent developments in relation to his designs and the means he employs
show how necessary it is to shake it off. The struggle can never come
with less distress to the people or under more favorable auspices than
at the present moment.

All doubt as to the willingness of the State banks to undertake the
service of the Government to the same extent and on the same terms as it
is now performed by the Bank of the United States is put to rest by the
report of the agent recently employed to collect information, and from
that willingness their own safety in the operation may be confidently
inferred. Knowing their own resources better than they can be known by
others, it is not to be supposed that they would be willing to place
themselves in a situation which they can not occupy without danger of
annihilation or embarrassment. The only consideration applies to the
safety of the public funds if deposited in those institutions, and when
it is seen that the directors of many of them are not only willing
to pledge the character and capital of the corporations in giving
success to this measure, but also their own property and reputation, we
can not doubt that they at least believe the public deposits would be
safe in their management. The President thinks that these facts and
circumstances afford as strong a guaranty as can be had in human
affairs for the safety of the public funds and the practicability of
a new system of collection and disbursement through the agency of the
State banks.

From all these considerations the President thinks that the State banks
ought immediately to be employed in the collection and disbursement of
the public revenue, and the funds now in the Bank of the United States
drawn out with all convenient dispatch. The safety of the public moneys
if deposited in the State banks must be secured beyond all reasonable
doubts; but the extent and nature of the security, in addition to their
capital, if any be deemed necessary, is a subject of detail to which the
Treasury Department will undoubtedly give its anxious attention. The
banks to be employed must remit the moneys of the Government without
charge, as the Bank of the United States now does; must render all the
services which that bank now performs; must keep the Government advised
of their situation by periodical returns; in fine, in any arrangement
with the State banks the Government must not in any respect be placed on
a worse footing than it now is. The President is happy to perceive by
the report of the agent that the banks which he has consulted have, in
general, consented to perform the service on these terms, and that those
in New York have further agreed to make payments in London without other
charge than the mere cost of the bills of exchange.

It should also be enjoined upon any banks which may be employed that
it will be expected of them to facilitate domestic exchanges for the
benefit of internal commerce; to grant all reasonable facilities to the
payers of the revenue; to exercise the utmost liberality toward the
other State banks, and do nothing uselessly to embarrass the Bank of
the United States.

As one of the most serious objections to the Bank of the United States
is the power which it concentrates, care must be taken in finding other
agents for the service of the Treasury not to raise up another power
equally formidable. Although it would probably be impossible to produce
such a result by any organization of the State banks which could be
devised, yet it is desirable to avoid even the appearance. To this end
it would be expedient to assume no more power over them and interfere no
more in their affairs than might be absolutely necessary to the security
of the public deposit and the faithful performance of their duties
as agents of the Treasury. Any interference by them in the political
contests of the country with a view to influence elections ought, in the
opinion of the President, to be followed by an immediate discharge from
the public service.

It is the desire of the President that the control of the banks and
the currency shall, as far as possible, be entirely separated from the
political power of the country as well as wrested from an institution
which has already attempted to subject the Government to its will.
In his opinion the action of the General Government on this subject
ought not to extend beyond the grant in the Constitution, which only
authorizes Congress "to coin money and regulate the value thereof;"
all else belongs to the States and the people, and must be regulated
by public opinion and the interests of trade.

In conclusion, the President must be permitted to remark that he looks
upon the pending question as of higher consideration than the mere
transfer of a sum of money from one bank to another. Its decision may
affect the character of our Government for ages to come. Should the bank
be suffered longer to use the public moneys in the accomplishment of its
purposes, with the proofs of its faithlessness and corruption before
our eyes, the patriotic among our citizens will despair of success in
struggling against its power, and we shall be responsible for entailing
it upon our country forever. Viewing it as a question of transcendent
importance, both in the principles and consequences it involves, the
President could not, in justice to the responsibility which he owes to
the country, refrain from pressing upon the Secretary of the Treasury
his view of the considerations which impel to immediate action. Upon him
has been devolved by the Constitution and the suffrages of the American
people the duty of superintending the operation of the Executive
Departments of the Government and seeing that the laws are faithfully
executed. In the performance of this high trust it is his undoubted
right to express to those whom the laws and his own choice have made his
associates in the administration of the Government his opinion of their
duties under circumstances as they arise. It is this right which he now
exercises. Far be it from him to expect or require that any member of
the Cabinet should at his request, order, or dictation do any act which
he believes unlawful or in his conscience condemns. From them and from
his fellow-citizens in general he desires only that aid and support
which their reason approves and their conscience sanctions.

In the remarks he has made on this all-important question he trusts
the Secretary of the Treasury will see only the frank and respectful
declarations of the opinions which the President has formed on a measure
of great national interest deeply affecting the character and usefulness
of his Administration, and not a spirit of dictation, which the
President would be as careful to avoid as ready to resist. Happy will he
be if the facts now disclosed produce uniformity of opinion and unity of
action among the members of the Administration.

The President again repeats that he begs his Cabinet to consider the
proposed measure as his own, in the support of which he shall require
no one of them to make a sacrifice of opinion or principle. Its
responsibility has been assumed after the most mature deliberation
and reflection as necessary to preserve the morals of the people, the
freedom of the press, and the purity of the elective franchise, without
which all will unite in saying that the blood and treasure expended by
our forefathers in the establishment of our happy system of government
will have been vain and fruitless. Under these convictions he feels that
a measure so important to the American people can not be commenced too
soon, and he therefore names the 1st day of October next as a period
proper for the change of the deposits, or sooner, provided the necessary
arrangements with the State banks can be made.

ANDREW JACKSON.




FIFTH ANNUAL MESSAGE.

December 3, 1833.

_Fellow-Citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives_:

On your assembling to perform the high trusts which the people of the
United States have confided to you, of legislating for their common
welfare, it gives me pleasure to congratulate you upon the happy
condition of our beloved country. By the favor of Divine Providence
health is again restored to us, peace reigns within our borders,
abundance crowns the labors of our fields, commerce and domestic
industry flourish and increase, and individual happiness rewards the
private virtue and enterprise of our citizens.

Our condition abroad is no less honorable than it is prosperous at home.
Seeking nothing that is not right and determined to submit to nothing
that is wrong, but desiring honest friendships and liberal intercourse
with all nations, the United States have gained throughout the world
the confidence and respect which are due to a policy so just and so
congenial to the character of the American people and to the spirit of
their institutions.

In bringing to your notice the particular state of our foreign affairs,
it affords me high gratification to inform you that they are in a
condition which promises the continuance of friendship with all nations.

With Great Britain the interesting question of our northeastern boundary
remains still undecided. A negotiation, however, upon that subject has
been renewed since the close of the last Congress, and a proposition has
been submitted to the British Government with the view of establishing,
in conformity with the resolution of the Senate, the line designated by
the treaty of 1783. Though no definitive answer has been received, it
may be daily looked for, and I entertain a hope that the overture may
ultimately lead to a satisfactory adjustment of this important matter.

I have the satisfaction to inform you that a negotiation which, by
desire of the House of Representatives, was opened some years ago with
the British Government, for the erection of light-houses on the Bahamas,
has been successful. Those works, when completed, together with those
which the United States have constructed on the western side of the Gulf
of Florida, will contribute essentially to the safety of navigation
in that sea. This joint participation in establishments interesting
to humanity and beneficial to commerce is worthy of two enlightened
nations, and indicates feelings which can not fail to have a happy
influence upon their political relations. It is gratifying to the
friends of both to perceive that the intercourse between the two people
is becoming daily more extensive, and that sentiments of mutual good
will have grown up befitting their common origin and justifying the hope
that by wise counsels on each side not only unsettled questions may be
satisfactorily terminated, but new causes of misunderstanding prevented.

Notwithstanding that I continue to receive the most amicable assurances
from the Government of France, and that in all other respects the most
friendly relations exist between the United States and that Government,
it is to be regretted that the stipulations of the convention concluded
on the 4th July, 1831, remain in some important parts unfulfilled.

By the second article of that convention it was stipulated that the sum
payable to the United States should be paid at Paris, in six annual
installments, into the hands of such person or persons as should be
authorized by the Government of the United States to receive it, and
by the same article the first installment was payable on the 2d day of
February, 1833. By the act of Congress of the 13th July, 1832, it was
made the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to cause the several
installments, with the interest thereon, to be received from the French
Government and transferred to the United States in such manner as he may
deem best; and by the same act of Congress the stipulations on the part
of the United States in the convention were in all respects fulfilled.
Not doubting that a treaty thus made and ratified by the two
Governments, and faithfully executed by the United States, would be
promptly complied with by the other party, and desiring to avoid the
risk and expense of intermediate agencies, the Secretary of the Treasury
deemed it advisable to receive and transfer the first installment by
means of a draft upon the French minister of finance. A draft for this
purpose was accordingly drawn in favor of the cashier of the Bank of the
United States for the amount accruing to the United States out of the
first installment, and the interest payable with it. This bill was not
drawn at Washington until five days after the installment was payable
at Paris, and was accompanied by a special authority from the President
authorizing the cashier or his assigns to receive the amount. The mode
thus adopted of receiving the installment was officially made known
to the French Government by the American chargé d'affaires at Paris,
pursuant to instructions from the Department of State. The bill,
however, though not presented for payment until the 23d day of March,
was not paid, and for the reason assigned by the French minister of
finance that no appropriation had been made by the French Chambers.
It is not known to me that up to that period any appropriation had been
required of the Chambers, and although a communication was subsequently
made to the Chambers by direction of the King, recommending that the
necessary provision should be made for carrying the convention into
effect, it was at an advanced period of the session, and the subject
was finally postponed until the next meeting of the Chambers.

Notwithstanding it has been supposed by the French ministry that the
financial stipulations of the treaty can not be carried into effect
without an appropriation by the Chambers, it appears to me to be not
only consistent with the character of France, but due to the character
of both Governments, as well as to the rights of our citizens, to treat
the convention, made and ratified in proper form, as pledging the good
faith of the French Government for its execution, and as imposing upon
each department an obligation to fulfill it; and I have received
assurances through our chargé d'affaires at Paris and the French
minister plenipotentiary at Washington, and more recently through the
minister of the United States at Paris, that the delay has not proceeded
from any indisposition on the part of the King and his ministers to
fulfill the treaty, and that measures will be presented at the next
meeting of the Chambers, and with a reasonable hope of success, to
obtain the necessary appropriation.

It is necessary to state, however, that the documents, except certain
lists of vessels captured, condemned, or burnt at sea, proper to
facilitate the examination and liquidation of the reclamations comprised
in the stipulations of the convention, and which by the sixth article
France engaged to communicate to the United States by the intermediary
of the legation, though repeatedly applied for by the American chargé
d'affaires under instructions from this Government, have not yet been
communicated; and this delay, it is apprehended, will necessarily
prevent the completion of the duties assigned to the commissioners
within the time at present prescribed by law.

The reasons for delaying to communicate these documents have not been
explicitly stated, and this is the more to be regretted as it is not
understood that the interposition of the Chambers is in any manner
required for the delivery of those papers.

Under these circumstances, in a case so important to the interests
of our citizens and to the character of our country, and under
disappointments so unexpected, I deemed it my duty, however I might
respect the general assurances to which I have adverted, no longer to
delay the appointment of a minister plenipotentiary to Paris, but to
dispatch him in season to communicate the result of his application to
the French Government at an early period of your session. I accordingly
appointed a distinguished citizen for this purpose, who proceeded on his
mission in August last and was presented to the King early in the month
of October. He is particularly instructed as to all matters connected
with the present posture of affairs, and I indulge the hope that with
the representations he is instructed to make, and from the disposition
manifested by the King and his ministers in their recent assurances to
our minister at Paris, the subject will be early considered, and
satisfactorily disposed of at the next meeting of the Chambers.

As this subject involves important interests and has attracted a
considerable share of the public attention, I have deemed it proper
to make this explicit statement of its actual condition, and should
I be disappointed in the hope now entertained the subject will be
again brought to the notice of Congress in such manner as the occasion
may require.

The friendly relations which have always been maintained between the
United States and Russia have been further extended and strengthened by
the treaty of navigation and commerce concluded on the 6th of December
last, and sanctioned by the Senate before the close of its last session.
The ratifications having been since exchanged, the liberal provisions
of the treaty are now in full force, and under the encouragement which
they have secured a flourishing and increasing commerce, yielding its
benefits to the enterprise of both nations, affords to each the just
recompense of wise measures, and adds new motives for that mutual
friendship which the two countries have hitherto cherished toward
each other.

It affords me peculiar satisfaction to state that the Government of
Spain has at length yielded to the justice of the claims which have been
so long urged in behalf of our citizens, and has expressed a willingness
to provide an indemnification as soon as the proper amount can be agreed
upon. Upon this latter point it is probable an understanding had taken
place between the minister of the United States and the Spanish
Government before the decease of the late King of Spain; and, unless
that event may have delayed its completion, there is reason to hope that
it may be in my power to announce to you early in your present session
the conclusion of a convention upon terms not less favorable than those
entered into for similar objects with other nations. That act of justice
would well accord with the character of Spain, and is due to the United
States from their ancient friend. It could not fail to strengthen the
sentiments of amity and good will between the two nations which it is so
much the wish of the United States to cherish and so truly the interest
of both to maintain.

By the first section of an act of Congress passed on the 13th of July,
1832, the tonnage duty on Spanish ships arriving from the ports of Spain
was limited to the duty payable on American vessels in the ports of
Spain previous to the 20th of October, 1817, being 5 cents per ton. That
act was intended to give effect on our side to an arrangement made with
the Spanish Government by which discriminating duties of tonnage were to
be abolished in the ports of the United States and Spain on the vessels
of the two nations. Pursuant to that arrangement, which was carried into
effect on the part of Spain on the 20th of May, 1832, by a royal order
dated the 20th of April, 1832, American vessels in the ports of Spain
have paid 5 cents per ton, which rate of duty is also paid in those
ports by Spanish ships; but as American vessels pay no tonnage duty
in the ports of the United States, the duty of 5 cents payable in our
ports by Spanish vessels under the act above mentioned is really a
discriminating duty, operating to the disadvantage of Spain. Though no
complaint has yet been made on the part of Spain, we are not the less
bound by the obligations of good faith to remove the discrimination,
and I recommend that the act be amended accordingly. As the royal order
above alluded to includes the ports of the Balearic and Canary islands
as well as those of Spain, it would seem that the provisions of the act
of Congress should be equally extensive, and that for the repayment of
such duties as may have been improperly received an addition should be
made to the sum appropriated at the last session of Congress for
refunding discriminating duties.

As the arrangement referred to, however, did not embrace the islands of
Cuba and Puerto Rico, discriminating duties to the prejudice of American
shipping continue to be levied there. From the extent of the commerce
carried on between the United States and those islands, particularly the
former, this discrimination causes serious injury to one of those great
national interests which it has been considered an essential part of our
policy to cherish, and has given rise to complaints on the part of our
merchants. Under instructions given to our minister at Madrid, earnest
representations have been made by him to the Spanish Government upon
this subject, and there is reason to expect, from the friendly
disposition which is entertained toward this country, that a beneficial
change will be produced. The disadvantage, however, to which our
shipping is subjected by the operation of these discriminating duties
requires that they be met by suitable countervailing duties during your
present session, power being at the same time vested in the President
to modify or discontinue them as the discriminating duties on American
vessels or their cargoes may be modified or discontinued at those
islands. Intimations have been given to the Spanish Government that
the United States may be obliged to resort to such measures as are of
necessary self-defense, and there is no reason to apprehend that it
would be unfavorably received. The proposed proceeding if adopted
would not be permitted, however, in any degree to induce a relaxation
in the efforts of our minister to effect a repeal of this irregularity
by friendly negotiation, and it might serve to give force to his
representations by showing the dangers to which that valuable trade is
exposed by the obstructions and burdens which a system of discriminating
and countervailing duties necessarily produces.

The selection and preparation of the Florida archives for the purpose of
being delivered over to the United States, in conformity with the royal
order as mentioned in my last annual message, though in progress, has
not yet been completed. This delay has been produced partly by causes
which were unavoidable, particularly the prevalence of the cholera at
Havana; but measures have been taken which it is believed will expedite
the delivery of those important records.

Congress were informed at the opening of the last session that
"owing, as was alleged, to embarrassments in the finances of Portugal,
consequent upon the civil war in which that nation was engaged," payment
had been made of only one installment of the amount which the Portuguese
Government had stipulated to pay for indemnifying our citizens for
property illegally captured in the blockade of Terceira. Since that
time a postponement for two years, with interest, of the two remaining
installments was requested by the Portuguese Government, and as a
consideration it offered to stipulate that rice of the United States
should be admitted into Portugal at the same duties as Brazilian rice.
Being satisfied that no better arrangement could be made, my consent was
given, and a royal order of the King of Portugal was accordingly issued
on the 4th of February last for the reduction of the duty on rice of the
United States. It would give me great pleasure if in speaking of that
country, in whose prosperity the United States are so much interested,
and with whom a long-subsisting, extensive, and mutually advantageous
commercial intercourse has strengthened the relations of friendship,
I could announce to you the restoration of its internal tranquillity.

Subsequently to the commencement of the last session of Congress the
final installment payable by Denmark under the convention of the 28th
day of March, 1830, was received. The commissioners for examining the
claims have since terminated their labors, and their awards have been
paid at the Treasury as they have been called for. The justice rendered
to our citizens by that Government is thus completed, and a pledge
is thereby afforded for the maintenance of that friendly intercourse
becoming the relations that the two nations mutually bear to each other.

It is satisfactory to inform you that the Danish Government have
recently issued an ordinance by which the commerce with the island of
St. Croix is placed on a more liberal footing than heretofore. This
change can not fail to prove beneficial to the trade between the United
States and that colony, and the advantages likely to flow from it may
lead to greater relaxations in the colonial systems of other nations.

The ratifications of the convention with the King of the Two Sicilies
have been duly exchanged, and the commissioners appointed for examining
the claims under it have entered upon the duties assigned to them by
law. The friendship that the interests of the two nations require of
them being now established, it may be hoped that each will enjoy the
benefits which a liberal commerce should yield to both.

A treaty of amity and commerce between the United States and Belgium
was concluded during the last winter and received the sanction of the
Senate, but the exchange of the ratifications has been hitherto delayed,
in consequence, in the first instance, of some delay in the reception of
the treaty at Brussels, and, subsequently, of the absence of the Belgian
minister of foreign affairs at the important conferences in which his
Government is engaged at London. That treaty does but embody those
enlarged principles of friendly policy which it is sincerely hoped will
always regulate the conduct of the two nations having such strong
motives to maintain amicable relations toward each other and so
sincerely desirous to cherish them.

With all the other European powers with whom the United States have
formed diplomatic relations and with the Sublime Porte the best
understanding prevails. From all I continue to receive assurances of
good will toward the United States--assurances which it gives me no less
pleasure to reciprocate than to receive. With all, the engagements which
have been entered into are fulfilled with good faith on both sides.
Measures have also been taken to enlarge our friendly relations and
extend our commercial intercourse with other States. The system we have
pursued of aiming at no exclusive advantages, of dealing with all on
terms of fair and equal reciprocity, and of adhering scrupulously to all
our engagements is well calculated to give success to efforts intended
to be mutually beneficial.

The wars of which the southern part of this continent was so long the
theater, and which were carried on either by the mother country against
the States which had formerly been her colonies or by the States against
each other, having terminated, and their civil dissensions having so
far subsided as with; few exceptions no longer to disturb the public
tranquillity, it is earnestly hoped those States will be able to employ
themselves without interruption in perfecting their institutions,
cultivating the arts of peace, and promoting by wise councils and able
exertions the public and private prosperity which their patriotic
struggles so well entitle them to enjoy.

With those States our relations have undergone but little change during
the present year. No reunion having yet taken place between the States
which composed the Republic of Colombia, our chargé d'affaires at Bogota
has been accredited to the Government of New Grenada, and we have,
therefore, no diplomatic relations with Venezuela and Equator, except
as they may be included in those heretofore formed with the Colombian
Republic.

It is understood that representatives from the three States were
about to assemble at Bogota to confer on the subject of their mutual
interests, particularly that of their union, and if the result should
render it necessary, measures will be taken on our part to preserve with
each that friendship and those liberal commercial connections which it
has been the constant desire of the United States to cultivate with
their sister Republics of this hemisphere. Until the important question
of reunion shall be settled, however, the different matters which have
been under discussion between the United States and the Republic of
Colombia, or either of the States which composed it, are not likely
to be brought to a satisfactory issue.

In consequence of the illness of the chargé d'affaires appointed to
Central America at the last session of Congress, he was prevented from
proceeding on his mission until the month of October. It is hoped,
however, that he is by this time at his post, and that the official
intercourse, unfortunately so long interrupted, has been thus renewed on
the part of the two nations so amicably and advantageously connected by
engagements founded on the most enlarged principles of commercial
reciprocity.

It is gratifying to state that since my last annual message some of the
most important claims of our fellow-citizens upon the Government of
Brazil have been satisfactorily adjusted, and a reliance is placed on
the friendly dispositions manifested by it that justice will also be
done in others. No new causes of complaint have arisen, and the trade
between the two countries flourishes under the encouragement secured
to it by the liberal provisions of the treaty.

It is cause of regret that, owing, probably, to the civil dissensions
which have occupied the attention of the Mexican Government, the time
fixed by the treaty of limits with the United States for the meeting of
the commissioners to define the boundaries between the two nations has
been suffered to expire without the appointment of any commissioners on
the part of that Government. While the true boundary remains in doubt by
either party it is difficult to give effect to those measures which are
necessary to the protection and quiet of our numerous citizens residing
near that frontier. The subject is one of great solicitude to the United
States, and will not fail to receive my earnest attention.

The treaty concluded with Chili and approved by the Senate at its last
session was also ratified by the Chilian Government, but with certain
additional and explanatory articles of a nature to have required it to
be again submitted to the Senate. The time limited for the exchange of
the ratifications, however, having since expired, the action of both
Governments on the treaty will again become necessary.

The negotiations commenced with the Argentine Republic relative to
the outrages committed on our vessels engaged in the fisheries at the
Falkland Islands by persons acting under the color of its authority, as
well as the other matters in controversy between the two Governments,
have been suspended by the departure of the chargé d'affaires of the
United States from Buenos Ayres. It is understood, however, that a
minister was subsequently appointed by that Government to renew the
negotiation in the United States, but though daily expected he has
not yet arrived in this country.

With Peru no treaty has yet been formed, and with Bolivia no diplomatic
intercourse has yet been established. It will be my endeavor to
encourage those sentiments of amity and that liberal commerce which
belong to the relations in which all the independent States of this
continent stand toward each other.

I deem it proper to recommend to your notice the revision of our
consular system. This has become an important branch of the public
service, inasmuch as it is intimately connected with the preservation
of our national character abroad, with the interest of our citizens in
foreign countries, with the regulation and care of our commerce, and
with the protection of our seamen. At the close of the last session of
Congress I communicated a report from the Secretary of State upon the
subject, to which I now refer, as containing information which may be
useful in any inquiries that Congress may see fit to institute with a
view to a salutary reform of the system.

It gives me great pleasure to congratulate you upon the prosperous
condition of the finances of the country, as will appear from the report
which the Secretary of the Treasury will in due time lay before you.
The receipts into the Treasury during the present year will amount to
more than $32,000,000. The revenue derived from customs will, it is
believed, be more than $28,000,000, and the public lands will yield about
$3,000,000. The expenditures within the year for all objects, including
$2,572,240.99 on account of the public debt, will not amount to
$25,000,000, and a large balance will remain in the Treasury after
satisfying all the appropriations chargeable on the revenue for the
present year.

The measures taken by the Secretary of the Treasury will probably enable
him to pay off in the course of the present year the residue of the
exchanged 4-1/2 per cent stock, redeemable on the 1st of January next.
It has therefore been included in the estimated expenditures of this
year, and forms a part of the sum above stated to have been paid on
account of the public debt. The payment of this stock will reduce the
whole debt of the United States, funded and unfunded, to the sum of
$4,760,082.08, and as provision has already been made for the 4-1/2
percents above mentioned, and charged in the expenses of the present
year, the sum last stated is all that now remains of the national debt;
and the revenue of the coming year, together with the balance now in the
Treasury, will be sufficient to discharge it, after meeting the current
expenses of the Government. Under the power given to the commissioners
of the sinking fund, it will, I have no doubt, be purchased on favorable
terms within the year.

From this view of the state of the finances and the public engagements
yet to be fulfilled you will perceive that if Providence permits me
to meet you at another session I shall have the high gratification of
announcing to you that the national debt is extinguished. I can not
refrain from expressing the pleasure I feel at the near approach of that
desirable event. The short period of time within which the public debt
will have been discharged is strong evidence of the abundant resources
of the country and of the prudence and economy with which the Government
has heretofore been administered. We have waged two wars since we became
a nation, with one of the most powerful kingdoms in the world, both of
them undertaken in defense of our dearest rights, both successfully
prosecuted and honorably terminated; and many of those who partook in
the first struggle as well as in the second will have lived to see
the last item of the debt incurred in these necessary but expensive
conflicts faithfully and honestly discharged. And we shall have the
proud satisfaction of bequeathing to the public servants who follow us
in the administration of the Government the rare blessing of a revenue
sufficiently abundant, raised without injustice or oppression to our
citizens, and unencumbered with any burdens but what they themselves
shall think proper to impose upon it.

The flourishing state of the finances ought not, however, to encourage
us to indulge in a lavish expenditure of the public treasure. The
receipts of the present year do not furnish the test by which we are to
estimate the income of the next. The changes made in our revenue system
by the acts of Congress of 1832 and 1833, and more especially by the
former, have swelled the receipts of the present year far beyond the
amount to be expected in future years upon the reduced tariff of duties.
The shortened credits on revenue bonds and the cash duties on woolens
which were introduced by the act of 1832, and took effect on the 4th of
March last, have brought large sums into the Treasury in 1833, which,
according to the credits formerly given, would not have been payable
until 1834, and would have formed a part of the income of that year.
These causes would of themselves produce a great diminution of the
receipts in the year 1834 as compared with the present one, and they
will be still more diminished by the reduced rates of duties which take
place on the 1st of January next on some of the most important and
productive articles. Upon the best estimates that can be made the
receipts of the next year, with the aid of the unappropriated amount
now in the Treasury, will not be much more than sufficient to meet the
expenses of the year and pay the small remnant of the national debt
which yet remains unsatisfied. I can not, therefore, recommend to you
any alteration in the present tariff of duties. The rate as now fixed by
law on the various articles was adopted at the last session of Congress,
as a matter of compromise, with unusual unanimity, and unless it is
found to produce more than the necessities of the Government call for
there would seem to be no reason at this time to justify a change.

But while I forbear to recommend any further reduction of the duties
beyond that already provided for by the existing laws, I must earnestly
and respectfully press upon Congress the importance of abstaining from
all appropriations which are not absolutely required for the public
interest and authorized by the powers clearly delegated to the United
States. We are beginning a new era in our Government. The national debt,
which has so long been a burden on the Treasury, will be finally
discharged in the course of the ensuing year. No more money will
afterwards be needed than what may be necessary to meet the ordinary
expenses of the Government. Now, then, is the proper moment to fix our
system of expenditure on firm and durable principles, and I can not
too strongly urge the necessity of a rigid economy and an inflexible
determination not to enlarge the income beyond the real necessities
of the Government and not to increase the wants of the Government by
unnecessary and profuse expenditures. If a contrary course should be
pursued, it may happen that the revenue of 1834 will fall short of the
demands upon it, and after reducing the tariff in order to lighten the
burdens of the people, and providing for a still further reduction to
take effect hereafter, it would be much to be deplored if at the end of
another year we should find ourselves obliged to retrace our steps and
impose additional taxes to meet unnecessary expenditures.

It is my duty on this occasion to call your attention to the
destruction of the public building occupied by the Treasury Department,
which happened since the last adjournment of Congress. A thorough
inquiry into the causes of this loss was directed and made at the time,
the result of which will be duly communicated to you. I take pleasure,
however, in stating here that by the laudable exertions of the officers
of the Department and many of the citizens of the District but few
papers were lost, and none that will materially affect the public
interest.

The public convenience requires that another building should be erected
as soon as practicable, and in providing for it it will be advisable to
enlarge in some manner the accommodations for the public officers of
the several Departments, and to authorize the erection of suitable
depositories for the safe-keeping of the public documents and records.

Since the last adjournment of Congress the Secretary of the Treasury
has directed the money of the United States to be deposited in certain
State banks designated by him, and he will immediately lay before you
his reasons for this direction. I concur with him entirely in the view
he has taken of the subject, and some months before the removal I urged
upon the Department the propriety of taking that step. The near approach
of the day on which the charter will expire, as well as the conduct
of the bank, appeared to me to call for this measure upon the high
considerations of public interest and public duty. The extent of its
misconduct, however, although known to be great, was not at that time
fully developed by proof. It was not until late in the month of August
that I received from the Government directors an official report
establishing beyond question that this great and powerful institution
had been actively engaged in attempting to influence the elections of
the public officers by means of its money, and that, in violation of
the express provisions of its charter, it had by a formal resolution
placed its funds at the disposition of its president to be employed in
sustaining the political power of the bank. A copy of this resolution is
contained in the report of the Government directors before referred to,
and however the object may be disguised by cautious language, no one can
doubt that this money was in truth intended for electioneering purposes,
and the particular uses to which it was proved to have been applied
abundantly show that it was so understood. Not only was the evidence
complete as to the past application of the money and power of the bank
to electioneering purposes, but that the resolution of the board of
directors authorized the same course to be pursued in future.

It being thus established by unquestionable proof that the Bank of the
United States was converted into a permanent electioneering engine, it
appeared to me that the path of duty which the executive department of
the Government ought to pursue was not doubtful. As by the terms of the
bank charter no officer but the Secretary of the Treasury could remove
the deposits, it seemed to me that this authority ought to be at once
exerted to deprive that great corporation of the support and countenance
of the Government in such an use of its funds and such an exertion
of its power. In this point of the case the question is distinctly
presented whether the people of the United States are to govern through
representatives chosen by their unbiased suffrages or whether the money
and power of a great corporation are to be secretly exerted to influence
their judgment and control their decisions. It must now be determined
whether the bank is to have its candidates for all offices in the
country, from the highest to the lowest, or whether candidates on both
sides of political questions shall be brought forward as heretofore and
supported by the usual means.

At this time the efforts of the bank to control public opinion,
through the distresses of some and the fears of others, are equally
apparent, and, if possible, more objectionable. By a curtailment of its
accommodations more rapid than any emergency requires, and even while
it retains specie to an almost unprecedented amount in its vaults,
it is attempting to produce great embarrassment in one portion of the
community, while through presses known to have been sustained by its
money it attempts by unfounded alarms to create a panic in all.

These are the means by which it seems to expect that it can force a
restoration of the deposits, and as a necessary consequence extort from
Congress a renewal of its charter. I am happy to know that through the
good sense of our people the effort to get up a panic has hitherto
failed, and that through the increased accommodations which the State
banks have been enabled to afford, no public distress has followed the
exertions of the bank, and it can not be doubted that the exercise of
its power and the expenditure of its money, as well as its efforts to
spread groundless alarm, will be met and rebuked as they deserve. In my
own sphere of duty I should feel myself called on by the facts disclosed
to order a _scire facias_ against the bank, with a view to put an end to
the chartered rights it has so palpably violated, were it not that the
charter itself will expire as soon as a decision would probably be
obtained from the court of last resort.

I called the attention of Congress to this subject in my last annual
message, and informed them that such measures as were within the reach
of the Secretary of the Treasury had been taken to enable him to judge
whether the public deposits in the Bank of the United States were
entirely safe; but that as his single powers might be inadequate to the
object, I recommended the subject to Congress as worthy of their serious
investigation, declaring it as my opinion that an inquiry into the
transactions of that institution, embracing the branches as well as the
principal bank, was called for by the credit which was given throughout
the country to many serious charges impeaching their character, and
which, if true, might justly excite the apprehension that they were no
longer a safe depository for the public money. The extent to which the
examination thus recommended was gone into is spread upon your journals,
and is too well known to require to be stated. Such as was made resulted
in a report from a majority of the Committee of Ways and Means touching
certain specified points only, concluding with a resolution that the
Government deposits might safely be continued in the Bank of the United
States. This resolution was adopted at the close of the session by the
vote of a majority of the House of Representatives.

Although I may not always be able to concur in the views of the
public interest or the duties of its agents which may be taken by the
other departments of the Government or either of its branches, I am,
notwithstanding, wholly incapable of receiving otherwise than with the
most sincere respect all opinions or suggestions proceeding from such a
source, and in respect to none am I more inclined to do so than to the
House of Representatives. But it will be seen from the brief views at
this time taken of the subject by myself, as well as the more ample ones
presented by the Secretary of the Treasury, that the change in the
deposits which has been ordered has been deemed to be called for by
considerations which are not affected by the proceedings referred to,
and which, if correctly viewed by that Department, rendered its act
a matter of imperious duty.

Coming as you do, for the most part, immediately from the people and the
States by election, and possessing the fullest opportunity to know their
sentiments, the present Congress will be sincerely solicitous to carry
into full and fair effect the will of their constituents in regard to
this institution. It will be for those in whose behalf we all act to
decide whether the executive department of the Government, in the steps
which it has taken on this subject, has been found in the line of its
duty.

The accompanying report of the Secretary of War, with the documents
annexed to it, exhibits the operations of the War Department for the
past year and the condition of the various subjects intrusted to its
administration.

It will be seen from them that the Army maintains the character it has
heretofore acquired for efficiency and military knowledge. Nothing has
occurred since your last session to require its services beyond the
ordinary routine of duties which upon the seaboard and the inland
frontier devolve upon it in a time of peace. The system so wisely
adopted and so long pursued of constructing fortifications at exposed
points and of preparing and collecting the supplies necessary for the
military defense of the country, and thus providently furnishing in
peace the means of defense in war, has been continued with the usual
results. I recommend to your consideration the various subjects
suggested in the report of the Secretary of War. Their adoption would
promote the public service and meliorate the condition of the Army.

Our relations with the various Indian tribes have been undisturbed
since the termination of the difficulties growing out of the hostile
aggressions of the Sac and Fox Indians. Several treaties have been
formed for the relinquishment of territory to the United States and
for the migration of the occupants of the region assigned for their
residence west of the Mississippi. Should these treaties be ratified by
the Senate, provision will have been made for the removal of almost all
the tribes now remaining east of that river and for the termination of
many difficult and embarrassing questions arising out of their anomalous
political condition. It is to be hoped that those portions of two of the
Southern tribes, which in that event will present the only remaining
difficulties, will realize the necessity of emigration, and will
speedily resort to it. My original convictions upon this subject have
been confirmed by the course of events for several years, and experience
is every day adding to their strength.

That those tribes can not exist surrounded by our settlements and in
continual contact with our citizens is certain. They have neither
the intelligence, the industry, the moral habits, nor the desire of
improvement which are essential to any favorable change in their
condition. Established in the midst of another and a superior race,
and without appreciating the causes of their inferiority or seeking to
control them, they must necessarily yield to the force of circumstances
and ere long disappear. Such has been their fate heretofore, and if it
is to be averted--and it is--it can only be done by a general removal
beyond our boundary and by the reorganization of their political system
upon principles adapted to the new relations in which they will be
placed. The experiment which has been recently made has so far proved
successful. The emigrants generally are represented to be prosperous
and contented, the country suitable to their wants and habits, and the
essential articles of subsistence easily procured. When the report
of the commissioners now engaged in investigating the condition and
prospects of these Indians and in devising a plan for their intercourse
and government is received, I trust ample means of information will
be in possession of the Government for adjusting all the unsettled
questions connected with this interesting subject.

The operations of the Navy during the year and its present condition are
fully exhibited in the annual report from the Navy Department.

Suggestions are made by the Secretary of various improvements, which
deserve careful consideration, and most of which, if adopted, bid fair
to promote the efficiency of this important branch of the public
service. Among these are the new organization of the Navy Board, the
revision of the pay to officers, and a change in the period of time or
in the manner of making the annual appropriations, to which I beg leave
to call your particular attention.

The views which are presented on almost every portion of our naval
concerns, and especially on the amount of force and the number of
officers, and the general course of policy appropriate in the present
state of our country for securing the great and useful purposes of naval
protection in peace and due preparation for the contingencies of war,
meet with my entire approbation.

It will be perceived from the report referred to that the fiscal
concerns of the establishment are in an excellent condition, and it is
hoped that Congress may feel disposed to make promptly every suitable
provision desired either for preserving or improving the system.

The general Post-Office Department has continued, upon the strength of
its own resources, to facilitate the means of communication between
the various portions of the Union with increased activity. The method,
however, in which the accounts of the transportation of the mail have
always been kept appears to have presented an imperfect view of its
expenses. It has recently been discovered that from the earliest records
of the Department the annual statements have been calculated to exhibit
an amount considerably short of the actual expense incurred for that
service. These illusory statements, together with the expense of
carrying into effect the law of the last session of Congress
establishing new mail routes, and a disposition on the part of the head
of the Department to gratify the wishes of the public in the extension
of mail facilities, have induced him to incur responsibilities for their
improvement beyond what the current resources of the Department would
sustain. As soon as he had discovered the imperfection of the method he
caused an investigation to be made of its results and applied the proper
remedy to correct the evil. It became necessary for him to withdraw some
of the improvements which he had made to bring the expenses of the
Department within its own resources. These expenses were incurred for
the public good, and the public have enjoyed their benefit. They are now
but partially suspended, and that where they may be discontinued with
the least inconvenience to the country.

The progressive increase in the income from postages has equaled the
highest expectations, and it affords demonstrative evidence of the
growing importance and great utility of this Department. The details
are exhibited in the accompanying report of the Postmaster-General.

The many distressing accidents which have of late occurred in that
portion of our navigation carried on by the use of steam power deserve
the immediate and unremitting attention of the constituted authorities
of the country. The fact that the number of those fatal disasters is
constantly increasing, notwithstanding the great improvements which are
everywhere made in the machinery employed and in the rapid advances
which have been made in that branch of science, shows very clearly that
they are in a great degree the result of criminal negligence on the
part of those by whom the vessels are navigated and to whose care and
attention the lives and property of our citizens are so extensively
intrusted.

That these evils may be greatly lessened, if not substantially removed,
by means of precautionary and penal legislation seems to be highly
probable. So far, therefore, as the subject can be regarded as within
the constitutional purview of Congress I earnestly recommend it to your
prompt and serious consideration.

I would also call your attention to the views I have heretofore
expressed of the propriety of amending the Constitution in relation to
the mode of electing the President and the Vice-President of the United
States. Regarding it as all important to the future quiet and harmony
of the people that every intermediate agency in the election of these
officers should be removed and that their eligibility should be limited
to one term of either four or six years, I can not too earnestly invite
your consideration of the subject.

Trusting that your deliberations on all the topics of general
interest to which I have adverted, and such others as your more
extensive knowledge of the wants of our beloved country may suggest,
may be crowned with success, I tender you in conclusion the cooperation
which it may be in my power to afford them.

ANDREW JACKSON.




SPECIAL MESSAGES.


WASHINGTON, _December 5, 1833_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

In compliance with the resolution of the Senate at its last session,
requesting the President "to cause to be prepared and laid before the
Senate at the commencement of its next session a plan for equalizing the
pay of the officers in the Army and Navy according to their relative
rank, and providing a stated salary or fixed compensation for their
services in lieu of present allowances," I submit herewith a report from
the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments, to whom the subject was
referred. It is believed the plan they have presented meets
substantially the objects of the resolution.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _December 6, 1833_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I transmit herewith to the House of Representatives a communication from
the War Department, showing the circumstances under which the sum of
$5,000, appropriated for subsistence of the Army, was transferred to the
service of the medical and hospital department, and which, by the law
authorizing the transfer, are required to be laid before Congress during
the first week of their session.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _December 6, 1833_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I transmit herewith, for the information of the House, the report of the
survey made in pursuance of the fourth section of the act of Congress of
the 4th July, 1832, authorizing the survey of canal routes in the
Territory of Florida.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _December 11, 1833_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of the Treasury,
exhibiting certain transfers of appropriations that have been made in
that Department in pursuance of the power vested in the President by the
first section of the act of Congress of the 3d March, 1809, entitled
"An act further to amend the several acts for the establishment and
regulation of the Treasury, War, and Navy Departments."

ANDREW JACKSON.


WASHINGTON, _December 12, 1833_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I have attentively considered the resolution of the Senate of the 11th
instant, requesting the President of the United States to communicate
to the Senate "a copy of the paper which has been published, and which
purports to have been read by him to the heads of the Executive
Departments, dated the 18th day of September last, relating to the
removal of the deposits of the public money from the Bank of the United
States and its offices."

The executive is a coordinate and independent branch of the Government
equally with the Senate, and I have yet to learn under what
constitutional authority that branch of the Legislature has a right to
require of me an account of any communication, either verbally or in
writing, made to the heads of Departments acting as a Cabinet council.
As well might I be required to detail to the Senate the free and private
conversations I have held with those officers on any subject relating to
their duties and my own.

Feeling my responsibility to the American people, I am willing upon all
occasions to explain to them the grounds of my conduct, and I am willing
upon all proper occasions to give to either branch of the Legislature
any information in my possession that can be useful in the execution of
the appropriate duties confided to them.

Knowing the constitutional rights of the Senate, I shall be the last man
under any circumstances to interfere with them. Knowing those of the
Executive, I shall at all times endeavor to maintain them agreeably to
the provisions of the Constitution and the solemn oath I have taken to
support and defend it.

I am constrained, therefore, by a proper sense of my own self-respect
and of the rights secured by the Constitution to the executive branch of
the Government to decline a compliance with your request.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _December 23, 1833_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

The rules and regulations herewith submitted have been prepared by a
board of officers in conformity with an act passed May 19, 1832.[1]

They are approved by me, and in pursuance of the provisions of said act
are now communicated to the House of Representatives for the purpose of
obtaining to them the sanction of Congress.

ANDREW JACKSON.

[Footnote 1: An act authorizing the revision and extension of the rules
and regulations of the naval service.]



WASHINGTON, _December 24, 1833_.

_To the Senate_:

I transmit herewith, for the consideration of the Senate as to the
ratification thereof, the following Indian treaties that have been
received since the adjournment of the last session of Congress, viz:


No. 1. Treaty with the Seminole Indians, made May 9, 1832.

No. 2. Treaty with the Cherokees west of the Mississippi, made
14th February, 1833.

No. 3. Treaty with the Creeks west of the Mississippi, made 14th
February, 1833.

No. 4. Assignment to the Seminoles of a tract of land for their
residence west of the Mississippi, made 28th March, 1833.

No. 5. Agreement with the Apalachiccla band of Indians, made 18th
June, 1833.

No. 6. Treaty with the united bands of Ottoes and Missourians, made
21st September, 1833.

No. 7. Treaty with the four confederated bands of Pawnees residing
on the Platt and Loup Fork, made 9th October, 1833.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _January 6, 1834_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

I communicate to Congress an extract of a letter recently received from
R.J. Leib, consul of the United States at Tangier, by which it appears
that that officer has been induced to receive from the Emperor of
Morocco a present of a lion and two horses, which he holds as belonging
to the United States. There being no funds at the disposal of the
Executive applicable to the objects stated by Mr. Leib, I submit the
whole subject to the consideration of Congress for such direction as
in their wisdom may seem proper.

I have directed instructions to be given to all our ministers and agents
abroad requiring that in future, unless previously authorized by
Congress, they will not under any circumstances accept presents of any
description from any foreign state.

I deem it proper on this occasion to invite the attention of Congress
to the presents which have heretofore been made to our public officers,
and which have been deposited under the orders of the Government in
the Department of State. These articles are altogether useless to the
Government, and the care and preservation of them in the Department
of State are attended with considerably inconvenience.

The provision of the Constitution which forbids any officer, without the
consent of Congress, to accept any present from any foreign power may be
considered as having been satisfied by the surrender of the articles to
the Government, and they might now be disposed of by Congress to those
for whom they were originally intended, or to their heirs, with obvious
propriety in both cases, and in the latter would be received as grateful
memorials of the surrender of the present.

As under the positive order now given similar presents can not hereafter
be received, even for the purpose of being placed at the disposal of the
Government, I recommend to Congress to authorize by law that the
articles already in the Department of State shall be delivered to the
persons to whom they were originally presented, if living, and to the
heirs of such as may have died.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _January 7, 1834_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

In compliance with the resolution requesting the President of the United
States to lay before the House "a copy of any contract which may have
been made for the construction of a bridge across the Potomac opposite
to the city of Washington, together with the authority under which such
contract may have been made, the names of the contractors and their
securities, if any, and the plan and estimate of the cost of such a
bridge," I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of the
Treasury, to whom the resolution was referred, containing all the
information upon the subject which he is now able to communicate.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _January 9, 1834_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit to the Senate, for their constitutional action, a treaty
concluded between the commissioners on the part of the United States and
the united nation of Chippewas, Ottawas, and Potawatamies, at Chicago,
on the 26th of September, 1833, to the cession of certain lands in the
State of Illinois and Territory of Michigan.

I transmit also sundry documents relating thereto that I think proper
should be laid before the Senate.

I understand the country ceded by this treaty is considered a valuable
one and its acquisition important to that section of the Union. Under
these circumstances, as the objection to a ratification applies to
those stipulations in the third article which provide that $100,000 and
$150,000 shall be granted in satisfaction of claims to reservations and
for debts due from the Indians to individuals, I recommend that the
treaty be ratified, with the condition that an agent be appointed to
proceed to Chicago investigate the justice of these claims. If they are
all well founded and have been assented to by the Indians with a full
knowledge of the circumstances, a proper investigation of them will do
the claimants no injury, but will place the matter beyond suspicion. If,
on the other hand, they are unjust and have not been fully understood by
the Indians, the fraud will in that event vitiate them, and they ought
not to be paid. To the United States, in a mere pecuniary point of view,
it is of no importance to whom the money provided by this treaty is
paid. They stipulate to pay a given amount, and that amount they must
pay, but the consideration is yielded by the Indians, and they are
entitled to its value. Whatever is granted in claims must be withheld
from them, and if not so granted it becomes theirs. Considering the
relations in which the Indians stand to the United States, it appears
to me just to exercise their supervisory authority. It has been done in
more than one instance, and as its object in this case is to ascertain
whether any fraud exists, and if there does to correct it, I consider
such a ratification within the proper scope of the treaty-making power.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _January 22, 1834_.

_To the Senate_:

I transmit to the Senate a report[2] from the Secretary of State,
containing the information requested by their resolution of the 9th
instant, with the documents which accompany that report.

ANDREW JACKSON.

[Footnote 2: Relating to presents from foreign governments to officers
of the United States.]



WASHINGTON, _January 25, 1834_.

_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:

I transmit herewith to the House of Representatives a letter from the
Secretary of State, together with the accompanying papers, relating to
a claim preferred to that Department, through the British legation at
Washington, for indemnification for losses alleged to have been
sustained by the owners of the ship _Francis and Eliza_, libeled at New
Orleans in 1819, and condemned and sold by the sentence and decree of
the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana,
but afterwards restored upon an appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States, that such legislative provision may be made by Congress
in behalf of those interested as shall appear just and proper in the
case.

ANDREW JACKSON.



FEBRUARY 4, 1834.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

I deem it my duty to communicate to Congress the recent conduct of the
Bank of the United States in refusing to deliver the books, papers, and
funds in its possession relating to the execution of the act of Congress
of June 7, 1832, entitled "An act supplementary to the 'Act for the
relief of certain surviving officers and soldiers of the Revolution.'"
The correspondence reported by the Secretary of War, and herewith
transmitted, will show the grounds assumed by the bank to justify its
refusal to make the transfer directed by the War Department. It does not
profess to claim the privilege of this agency as a right secured to it
by contract, nor as a benefit conferred by the Government, but as a
burden, from which it is willing to be relieved. It places its refusal
upon the extraordinary ground that the corporation has a right to sit in
judgment upon the legality of the acts of the constituted authorities in
a matter in which the stockholders are admitted to have no interest, and
it impedes and defeats, as far as its power will permit, the execution
of a measure of the Administration, because the opinion of the
corporation upon the construction of an act of Congress differs from
that of the proper officers of the United States.

The claim of this corporation thus to usurp the functions of the
judicial power and to prescribe to the executive department the manner
in which it shall execute the trust confided to it by law is without
example in the history of our country. If the acts of the public
servants, who are responsible to the people for the manner in which
they execute their duty, may thus be checked and controlled by an
irresponsible money corporation, then indeed the whole frame of our
Government is changed, and we have established a power in the Bank
of the United States above what we derive from the people.

It will be seen from the accompanying statement (marked A) that
according to the latest accounts received at the War Department the Bank
of the United States and its branches have in their possession near half
a million of the public money, received by them under the law of 1832,
which they have not yet accounted for, and which they refuse to pay over
to the proper agents for the use of those persons for whose benefit it
was withdrawn from the Treasury. It is to be regretted that this attempt
on the part of the bank to guide and direct the Executive upon the
construction and execution of an act of Congress should have been put
forward and insisted on in a case where the immediate sufferers from
their conduct will be the surviving veterans of the Revolutionary war,
for this evil falls exclusively upon the gallant defenders of their
country and delays and embarrasses the payment of the debt which the
gratitude of the nation has awarded to them, and which in many instances
is necessary for their subsistence and comfort in their declining years.

The character of the claim set up by the bank and the interest of the
parties to be immediately affected by it make it my duty to submit the
whole subject to the consideration of Congress, and I leave it to their
wisdom to adopt such measures as the honor of the Government and the
just claims of the individuals injured by the proceedings may be deemed
to require.

Having called for the opinion of the Attorney-General upon this occasion
with a view to a thorough investigation of the question which has thus
been presented for my consideration, I inclose a copy of the report of
that officer and add my entire concurrence in the views he has taken.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _February 12, 1834_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I transmit to the House of Representatives a report[3] from the
Secretary of State, in relation to the subject of a resolution of the
8th of this month.

ANDREW JACKSON.

[Footnote 3: Relating to the boundary line between Georgia and Florida.]



WASHINGTON, _February 12, 1834_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I transmit to the House of Representatives a report from the Secretary
of State, containing the information requested[4] by the resolution of
the 14th ultimo, with the documents which accompanied that report.

ANDREW JACKSON.

[Footnote 4: List of presents from foreign governments to officers of
the United States, deposited in the State Department.]



WASHINGTON, _February 22, 1834_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit herewith to the Senate, for their advice concerning its
ratification, an additional and explanatory convention to the treaty of
peace, amity, commerce, and navigation between the United States and
the Republic of Chile, which additional and explanatory convention was
concluded at the city of Santiago by the plenipotentiaries of the United
States and of Chile on the 1st of September, 1833. I also transmit a
report from the Secretary of State on the subject.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _March 8, 1834_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I transmit herewith to the House a report from the Secretary of State,
containing the instructions and other papers called for by the
resolution of the House of the 14th ultimo, "relative to the trade
between the United States and the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico," etc.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _March 11, 1834_.

_To the Senate_:

I renominate Henry D. Gilpin, Peter Wager, and John T. Sullivan, of
Philadelphia, and Hugh McEldery, of Baltimore, to be directors in the
Bank of the United States for the year 1834.

I disclaim all pretension of right on the part of the President
officially to inquire into or call in question the reasons of the
Senate for rejecting any nomination whatsoever. As the President is
not responsible to them for the reasons which induce him to make a
nomination, so they are not responsible to him for the reasons which
induce them to reject it. In these respects each is independent of
the other and both responsible to their respective constituents.
Nevertheless, the attitude in which certain vital interests of the
country are placed by the rejection of the gentlemen now renominated
require of me frankly to communicate my views of the consequences
which must necessarily follow this act of the Senate if it be not
reconsidered.

The characters and standing of these gentlemen are well known to the
community, and eminently qualify them for the offices to which I propose
to appoint them. Their confirmation by the Senate at its last session to
the same offices is proof that such was the opinion of them entertained
by the Senate at that time, and unless something has occurred since to
change it this act may now be referred to as evidence that their talents
and pursuits justified their selection. The refusal, however, to confirm
their nominations to the same offices shows that there is something
in the conduct of these gentlemen during the last year which, in the
opinion of the Senate, disqualifies them, and as no charge has been
made against them as men or citizens, nothing which impeaches the
fair private character they possessed when the Senate gave them their
sanction at its last session, and as it, moreover, appears from the
Journal of the Senate recently transmitted for my inspection that it was
deemed unnecessary to inquire into their qualifications or character,
it is to be inferred that the change in the opinion of the Senate
has arisen from the official conduct of these gentlemen. The only
circumstances in their official conduct which have been deemed of
sufficient importance to attract public attention are the two reports
made by them to the executive department of the Government, the one
bearing date the 22d day of April and the other the 19th day of August
last, both of which reports were communicated to the Senate by the
Secretary of the Treasury with his reasons for removing the deposit.

The truth of the facts stated in these reports is not, I presume,
questioned by anyone. The high character and standing of the citizens
by whom they were made prevent any doubt upon the subject. Indeed, the
statements have not been denied by the president of the bank and the
other directors. On the contrary, they have insisted that they were
authorized to use the money of the bank in the manner stated in the two
reports, and have not denied that the charges there made against the
corporation are substantially true.

It must be taken, therefore, as admitted that the statements of the
public directors in the reports above mentioned are correct, and they
disclose the most alarming abuses on the part of the corporation and the
most strenuous exertions on their part to put an end to them. They prove
that enormous sums were secretly lavished in a manner and for purposes
that can not be justified, and that the whole of the immense capital
of the bank has been virtually placed at the disposal of a single
individual, to be used, if he thinks proper, to corrupt the press and
to control the proceedings of the Government by exercising an undue
influence over elections.

The reports are made in obedience to my official directions, and I
herewith transmit copies of my letters calling for information of the
proceedings of the bank. Were they bound to disregard the call? Was it
their duty to remain silent while abuses of the most injurious and
dangerous character were daily practiced? Were they bound to conceal
from the constituted authorities a course of measures destructive to the
best interests of the country and intended gradually and secretly to
subvert the foundations of our Government and to transfer its powers
from the hands of the people to a great moneyed corporation? Was it
their duty to sit in silence at the board and witness all these abuses
without an attempt to correct them, or, in case of failure there, not to
appeal to higher authority? The eighth fundamental rule authorizes any
one of the directors, whether elected or appointed, who may have been
absent when an excess of debt was created, or who may have dissented
from the act, to exonerate himself from personal responsibility by
giving notice of the fact to the President of the United States,
thus recognizing the propriety of communicating to that officer the
proceedings of the board in such cases. But independently of any
argument to be derived from the principle recognized in the rule
referred to, I can not doubt for a moment that it is the right and the
duty of every director at the board to attempt to correct all illegal
proceedings, and, in case of failure, to disclose them, and that every
one of them, whether elected by the stockholders or appointed by the
Government, who had knowledge of the facts and concealed them, would be
justly amenable to the severest censure.

But in the case of the public director it was their peculiar and
official duty to make the disclosures, and the call upon them for
information could not have been disregarded without a flagrant breach
of their trust. The directors appointed by the United States can not be
regarded in the light of the ordinary directors of a bank appointed by
the stockholders and charged with the care of their pecuniary interests
in the corporation. They have higher and more important duties. They are
public officers. They are placed at the board not merely to represent
the stock held by the United States, but to observe the conduct of the
corporation and to watch over the public interests. It was foreseen
that this great moneyed monopoly might be so managed as to endanger the
interests of the country, and it was therefore deemed necessary as a
measure of precaution to place at the board watchful sentinels, who
should observe its conduct and stand ready to report to the proper
officers of the Government every act of the board which might affect
injuriously the interests of the people.

The whole frame of the charter, as well as the manner of their
appointment, proves this to be their true character. The United States
are not represented at the board by these directors merely on account
of the stock held by the Government. The right of the United States to
appoint directors and the number appointed do not depend upon the amount
of the stock, for if every share should be sold and the United States
cease to be a stockholder altogether, yet under the charter the right
to appoint five directors would still remain. In such a case what would
be the character of the directors? They would represent no stock and
be chosen by no stockholders. Yet they would have a right to sit at
the board, to vote on all questions submitted to it, and to be made
acquainted with all the proceedings of the corporation. They would not
in such a case be ordinary directors chosen by the stockholders in
proportion to their stock, but they would be public officers, appointed
to guard the public interest, and their duties must conform to their
office. They are not the duties of an ordinary director chosen by a
stockholder, but they are the peculiar duties of a public officer who
is bound on all occasions to protect to the utmost of his lawful means
the public interests, and, where his own authority is not sufficient
to prevent injury, to inform those to whom the law has confided the
necessary power. Such, then, is the character and such are the duties
of the directors appointed by the United States, whether the public be
stockholders or not. They are officers of the United States, and not
the mere representatives of a stockholder.

The mode of their appointment and their tenure of office confirm this
position. They are appointed like other officers of the Government and
by the same authority. They do not hold their offices irrevocably a year
after their appointment; on the contrary, by the express terms of the
law, they are liable to be removed from office at any time by the
President when in his judgment the public interest shall require it.
In every aspect, therefore, in which the subject can be considered it is
evident that the five directors appointed by the United States are to be
regarded as public officers who are placed there in order to observe the
conduct of the corporation and to prevent abuses which might otherwise
be committed.

Such being the character of the directors appointed on behalf of the
United States, it is obviously their duty to resist, and in case of
failure to report to the President or to the Secretary of the Treasury,
any proceedings of the board by which the public interests may be
injuriously affected. The President may order a _scire facias_ against
the bank for a violation of its charter, and the Secretary of the
Treasury is empowered to direct the money of the United States to be
deposited elsewhere when in his judgment the public interest requires it
to be done. The directors of this bank, like all others, are accustomed
to sit with closed doors, and do not report their proceedings to any
department of the Government.

The monthly return which the charter requires to be made to the Treasury
Department gives nothing more than a general statement of its pecuniary
condition, and of that but an imperfect one; for although it shows the
amount loaned at the bank and its different branches, it does not show
the condition of its debtors nor the circumstances under which the loans
were made. It does not show whether they were in truth accommodations
granted in the regular and ordinary course of business upon fair banking
principles or from other motives. Under the name of loans advances may
be made to persons notoriously insolvent for the most corrupt and
improper purposes, and a course of proceeding may be adopted in
violation of its charter, while upon the face of its monthly statement
everything would appear to be fair and correct.

How, then, is the executive branch of the Government to become
acquainted with the official conduct of the public directors or the
abuses practiced by the corporation for its private ends and in
violation of its duty to the public? The power of displacing the public
directors and that of issuing a _scire facias_ and of removing the
deposits were not intended to be idle and nugatory provisions without
the means of enforcement. Yet they must be wholly inoperative and
useless unless there be some means by which the official conduct of the
public directors and the abuses of power on the part of the corporation
may be brought to the knowledge of the executive department of the
Government.

Will it be said that the power is given to the Secretary of the
Treasury to examine himself, or by his authorized agent, into the
conduct and condition of the bank? The answer is obvious. It could not
have been expected or intended that he would make an examination unless
information was first given to him which excited his suspicions; and
if he did make such a general examination without previous information
of misconduct, it is most probable that in the complex concerns and
accounts of a bank it would result in nothing, whatever abuses might
have been practiced.

It is, indeed, the duty of every director to give information of such
misconduct on the part of the board. But the power to issue a _scire
facias_ and to remove the deposits presupposes that the directors
elected by the stockholders might abuse their power, and it can not be
presumed that Congress intended to rely on these same directors to give
information of their own misconduct. The Government is not accustomed
to rely on the offending party to disclose his offense. It was intended
that the power to issue a _scire facias_ and remove the deposits be
real and effective. The necessary means of information were therefore
provided in the charter, and five officers of the Government, appointed
in the usual manner, responsible to the public and not to the
stockholders, were placed as sentinels at the board, and are bound by
the nature and character of their office to resist, and if unsuccessful
to report to the proper authority, every infraction of the charter and
every abuse of power, in order that due measures should be taken to
punish or correct it; and in like manner it is their duty to give, when
called upon, any explanation of their own official conduct touching the
management of the institution.

It was perhaps scarcely necessary to present to the Senate these views
of the power of the Executive and of the duties of the five directors
appointed by the United States. But the bank is believed to be now
striving to obtain for itself the government of the country, and is
seeking by new and strained constructions to wrest from the hands of the
constituted authorities the salutary control reserved by the charter;
and as misrepresentation is one of its most usual weapons of attack,
I have deemed it my duty to put before the Senate in a manner not to be
misunderstood the principles on which I have acted.

Entertaining as I do a solemn conviction of the truth of these
principles, I must adhere to them and act upon them with constancy and
firmness. Aware as I now am of the dangerous machinations of the bank,
it is more than ever my duty to be vigilant in guarding the rights of
the people from the impending danger. And I should feel that I ought to
forfeit the confidence with which my countrymen have honored me if I did
not require regular and full reports of everything in the proceedings
of the bank calculated to affect injuriously the public interests from
the public directors; and if the directors should fail to give the
information called for, it would be my imperious duty to exercise
the power conferred on me by law of removing them from office and of
appointing others who would discharge their duties with more fidelity to
the public. I can never suffer anyone to hold office under me who would
connive at corruption or who should fail to give the alarm when he saw
the enemies of liberty endeavoring to sap the foundations of our free
institutions and to subject the free people of the United States to the
dominion of a great moneyed corporation.

Any directors of the bank, therefore, who might be appointed by the
Government would be required to report to the Executive as fully as the
late directors have done, and more frequently, because the danger is
more imminent; and it would be my duty to require of them a full detail
of every part of the proceedings of the corporation, or any of its
officers, in order that I might be enabled to decide whether I should
exercise the power of ordering a _scire facias_, which is reserved to
the President by the charter, or adopt such other lawful measures as the
interests of the country might require. It is too obvious to be doubted
that the misconduct of the corporation would never have been brought to
light by the aid of a public proceeding at the board of directors. The
board when called on by the Government directors refused to institute an
inquiry or require an account, and the mode adopted by the latter was
the only one by which the object could be attained. It would be absurd
to admit the right of the Government directors to give information and
at the same time deny the means of obtaining it. It would be but another
mode of enabling the bank to conceal its proceedings and practice with
impunity its corruptions. In the mode of obtaining the information,
therefore, and in their efforts to put an end to the abuses disclosed,
as well as in reporting them, the conduct of the late directors was
judicious and praiseworthy, and the honesty, firmness, and intelligence
which they have displayed entitle them, in my opinion, to the gratitude
of the country.

But if I do not mistake the principles on which the Senate have recently
rejected them, the conduct which I deem worthy of praise they treat as
a breach of duty, and in their judgment the measures which they took to
obtain the informations and their efforts to put an end to the practices
disclosed and the reports they have made to the Executive, although true
in all their parts, are regarded as an offense and supposed to require
some decisive mark of strong disapprobation.

If the views of the Senate be such as I have supposed, the difficulty of
sending to the Senate any other names than those of the late directors
will be at once apparent. I can not consent to place before the Senate
the name of anyone who is not prepared with firmness and honesty to
discharge the duties of a public director in the manner they were
fulfilled by those whom the Senate have refused to confirm. If for
performing a duty lawfully required of them by the Executive they are
to be punished by the subsequent rejection of the Senate, it would not
only be useless, but cruel, to place men of character and honor in that
situation, if even such men could be found to accept it. If they failed
to give the required information or to take proper measures to obtain
it, they would be removed by the Executive. If they gave the information
and took proper measures to obtain it, they would upon the next
nomination be rejected by the Senate. It would be unjust in me to place
any other citizens in the predicament in which this unlooked-for
decision of the Senate has placed the estimable and honorable men who
were directors during the last year.

If I am not in error in relation to the principles upon which these
gentlemen have been rejected, the necessary consequence will be that
the bank will hereafter be without Government directors, and the people
of the United States must be deprived of their chief means of protection
against its abuses, for whatever conflicting opinions may exist as to
the right of the directors appointed in January, 1833, to hold over
until new appointments shall be made, it is very obvious that whilst
their rejection by the Senate remains in force they can not with
propriety attempt to exercise such a power. In the present state of
things, therefore, the corporation will be enabled effectually to
accomplish the object it has been so long endeavoring to attain.
Its exchange committees and its delegated powers to its president may
hereafter be dispensed with without incurring the danger of exposing
its proceedings to the public view. The sentinels which the law had
placed at its board can no longer appear there.

Justice to myself and to the faithful officers by whom the public has
been so well and so honorably served without compensation or reward
during the last year has required of me this full and frank exposition
of my motives for nominating them again after their rejection by the
Senate. I repeat that I do not question the right of the Senate to
confirm or reject at their pleasure, and if there had been any reason
to suppose that the rejection in this case had not been produced by the
causes to which I have attributed it, or if my views of their duties and
the present importance of their rigid performance were other than they
are, I should have cheerfully acquiesced and attempted to find others
who would accept the unenviable trust; but I can not consent to appoint
directors of the bank to be the subservient instruments or silent
spectators of its abuses and corruptions, nor can I ask honorable men to
undertake the thankless duty with the certain prospect of being rebuked
by the Senate for its faithful performance in pursuance of the lawful
directions of the Executive.

I repeat that I do not claim a right to inquire into or officially
to censure the acts of the Senate, but the situation in which the
important interests of the American people vested in the Bank of the
United States and affected by its arrangements must necessarily be left
by the rejection of the gentlemen now renominated has made it my duty
to give this explanation to the Senate and submit the matter to their
reconsideration. If it shall be determined by the Senate that all
channels of information in relation to the corrupt proceedings of this
dangerous corporation shall be cut off and the Government and country
left exposed to its unrestrained machinations against the purity of the
press and public liberty, I shall, after having made this effort to
avert so great an evil, rest for the justification of my official course
with respectful confidence on the judgment of the American people.

In conclusion it is proper I should inform the Senate that there is now
no Government director appointed for the present year, Mr. Bayard, who
was nominated, and confirmed by the Senate, having refused to accept
that appointment.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _March 14, 1834_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of State, accompanied by
a copy of a letter from the commissioners appointed to adjust the claims
of our citizens under the late treaty with Naples, and suggest for the
consideration of Congress the expediency of extending the term allowed
for the performance of the duties assigned to them.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _March 20, 1834_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit herewith to the Senate a report[5] from the Secretary of
State, with the documents accompanying it, in pursuance of their
resolution of the 7th instant, relative to the ship _Olive Branch_.

ANDREW JACKSON.

[Footnote 5: Transmitting memorial of the heir at law of General Ira
Allen, relative to the capture, detention, and condemnation of the ship
_Olive Branch_ and her cargo by the British Government; also copy of
instructions given to the United States minister to Great Britain and of
correspondence between him and the British Government on the subject.]



WASHINGTON, _March 22, 1834_.

_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:

I transmit to the House of Representatives a report[6] from the Secretary
of State, upon the subject of a resolution of the 10th instant, which
was referred to that officer.

ANDREW JACKSON.

[Footnote 6: Transmitting correspondence and papers relating to the
claim of Don Juan Madrazo, a Spanish subject, for losses occasioned
by acts of the United States and Georgia.]



WASHINGTON, _April 1, 1834_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

I transmit for the consideration of Congress a report from the Secretary
of State, and recommend that legislative measures may be taken to
prevent the counterfeiting of foreign coins and the exporting of
counterfeit coins from the United States.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _April 2, 1834_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

I lay before Congress a communication from the governor of New York and
a copy of a communication from the governor of New Jersey, addressed to
me with a view of obtaining the consent of Congress to an agreement
which has been entered into by the States of New York and New Jersey
to settle the boundary line between those States. The agreement and
authenticated copies of the acts of the legislatures of New York and
New Jersey relating to it are also transmitted.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _April 8, 1834_.

_To the Senate_:

I transmit herewith a report from the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, made in compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 29th
ultimo, calling for "the dates of the proclamations and the times of
sale specified in each of the sales of the public lands in the district
of country acquired from the Choctaw tribe of Indians by the treaty of
Dancing Rabbit Creek and from the Creek tribe of Indians in Alabama; and
also the causes, if any existed, of a shorter notice being given for the
sale of these lands than is usual in the sale of the other public lands."

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _April 17, 1834_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit to the Senate, for their consideration and advice with regard
to its ratification, a convention for the settlement of claims between
the United States of America and Her Catholic Majesty, concluded at
Madrid on the 17th of February, 1834.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _May 1, 1834_.

_The Speaker of the House of Representatives_:

I submit for the sanction of Congress certain proposals for amending the
present laws in relation to the naval service, prepared and reported by
the board constituted under the act of May 19, 1832.

The papers on this subject are Nos. 1 to 5, inclusive.

These proposals are approved by me, and if adopted in the form of laws
appear well suited "to the present and future exigencies of that
important arm of national defense."

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _May 12, 1834_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:

I communicate to Congress copies of a treaty of navigation and commerce
between the United States and His Majesty the Emperor of all the
Russias, concluded at St. Petersburg on the 6th (18th) of December,
1832, and the ratifications of which were exchanged in this city on
the 11th of May, 1833.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _May 13, 1834_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:

I communicate to Congress copies of a convention between the United
States and His Majesty the King of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, to
terminate the reclamations of the former for the depredations inflicted
upon American commerce by Murat during the years 1809, 1810, 1811,
and 1812, concluded at Naples on the 14th of October, 1832, and the
ratifications of which were exchanged at the same place on the 8th
of June, 1833.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _May 15, 1834_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

I transmit herewith to Congress copies of a treaty of peace, amity,
commerce, and navigation between the United States and the Republic of
Chilé, concluded at Santiago de Chilé on the 1st of September, 1833, and
the ratifications of which were exchanged in this city on the 29th of
April last.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _May 19, 1834_.

_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:

I transmit a letter from the Marquis de Rochambeau to the minister of
the United States in France, together with a translation of the same,
referring to the petition of certain descendants of the Count de
Rochambeau, which was communicated to the House of Representatives with
my message of the 22d of February, 1833. Extracts from the dispatches of
Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State respecting the same subject are
also sent.

I likewise transmit, for the consideration of the House, a petition
from the heirs of the Baron de Kalb, accompanied by a note from General
Lafayette, praying remuneration for the services rendered by the Baron
to the United States during the War of the Revolution.

ANDREW JACKSON.



MAY 21, 1834.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I nominate Arthur St. Clair to be register of the land office for the
district of lands subject to sale at Indianapolis, in the State of
Indiana, in the place of William B. Slaughter, appointed during the
recess of the Senate.

As Arthur St. Clair was heretofore appointed to this office and was
removed during the recess, it is proper to state the reasons which
induce me again to nominate him to the Senate.

During the last summer an agent was appointed by the Treasury
Department to examine the land offices in Indiana, and upon his report
to the Department of the proceedings in the register's and receiver's
offices at Indianapolis I deemed it proper to remove both of those
officers without delay. A subsequent examination by a different agent
enabled the parties to offer explanations of the charges against them
in the first report, and although I am satisfied that the duty of the
first agent was honestly and faithfully performed by him, yet the
circumstances on which his report is founded have since been so
explained as to acquit both of the officers who were removed of any
intentional misconduct. In the case of Mr. St. Clair, however, it
appears from both of the reports that he had permitted the clerk in his
office to be the agent of speculations in land scrip contrary to the
instructions received by him from the Treasury Department, but I am
convinced that he himself did not participate in the speculation nor
share in the profits, and that he gave the permission under a mistaken
construction of the order and erroneous views of his duty as an officer.
His mistake in this respect seems to have arisen in a great measure
from his reliance on the judgment of others in whom he might well have
supposed he could confide, and who appear to have sanctioned the course
he adopted without sufficiently examining the subject and the evils to
which such a practice would necessarily lead. Under these circumstances
I have believed it to be an act of justice to Mr. St. Clair to present
his name again to the Senate, as he can be reinstated in the office from
which he was removed without injury to the person who in the recess was
selected to succeed him. And I should have adopted the same course in
relation to the receiver but for the peculiar circumstances in which his
successor has been placed, and which would render it an act of injustice
to him not to submit his name to the Senate for confirmation.

The reports and papers in relation to these removals are herewith
transmitted to the Senate, in order that they may act in the case with
the whole evidence before them.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _May 21, 1834_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I lay before the House of Representatives a copy of a "convention for
the settlement of claims between the United States of America and Her
Catholic Majesty," concluded on the 17th of February last.

This convention has been ratified by me, agreeably to the Constitution,
and will be immediately transmitted to Madrid, where it will doubtless
be ratified by Her Majesty.

It is deemed proper to communicate the convention thus early, that
provision may be made for carrying the first article into effect as soon
as the ratifications shall have been exchanged, in order that our
citizens may with as little delay as possible obtain the stipulated
compensation.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _May 28, 1834_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit herewith to the Senate, for their advice and consent as
to the ratification of the same, a treaty and a supplement thereto,
concluded between John H. Eaton, a commissioner on the part of the
United States, and a delegation from the Chickasaw tribe of Indians,
together with the journal of proceedings.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _May 30, 1834_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

It having been represented to me by persons whose statements and
opinions were thought worthy of confidence that the trade of the United
States might be extended and rendered more lucrative by commercial
arrangements with the countries bordering on the Indian Ocean, and
being informed that the success of any efforts which might be made to
accomplish that object would materially depend upon the secrecy with
which they should be conducted, I appointed Mr. Edmund Roberts a special
agent of this Government for the purpose of visiting those seas and
concluding such commercial conventions as might have the effect of
securing additional advantages to our trade in that quarter. This agency
has resulted in the conclusion of treaties with the King of Siam and
the Sultan of Muscat, whereby the commerce of the United States with
the countries subject to the dominion of those princes, which had been
previously embarrassed by serious disadvantages and obstructions, is
placed upon a footing with that of the most favored nation. These
treaties, the former of which was signed at the city of Siayuthia
(commonly called Bankok) on the 20th day of March, 1833, and the latter
at the city of Muscat on the 21st day of September of the same year,
are submitted to the Senate for their consideration and advice.

I transmit a copy of the instructions which were given to the special
agent and a communication made by him to the Secretary of State,
containing particular and important information respecting the countries
with which these treaties have been concluded. The expenses of the
agency have been defrayed out of the contingent fund for foreign
intercourse.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _June 13, 1834_.

_To the Senate_:

I have this day received a resolution of the 12th instant, requesting me
to communicate to the Senate a copy of the first official communication
which was made to Andrew Stevenson of the intention of the President to
nominate him as a minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary to
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his answer thereto.

As a compliance with this resolution might be deemed an admission of
the right of the Senate to call upon the President for confidential
correspondence of this description, I consider it proper on this
occasion to remark that I do not acknowledge such a right. But to avoid
misrepresentation I herewith transmit a copy of the paper in question,
which was the only communication made to Mr. Stevenson on the subject.

This communication merely intimated the intention of the President in a
particular contingency to offer to Mr. Stevenson the place of minister
to the Court of St. James, and as the negotiations to which it refers
were commenced early in April, 1833, in this city instead of London, and
have been since conducted here, no further communication was made to
him. I have no knowledge that an answer was received from Mr. Stevenson;
none is to be found in the Department of State and none has been
received by me.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _June 18, 1834_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:

I transmit to Congress an extract of a dispatch from Mr. Livingston, the
minister of the United States at Paris, dated the 7th ultimo, and the
copy of a communication made to him by Captain Ballard, commander of the
frigate _United States_, by which it appears that in firing a national
salute from that ship at Toulon, in honor of the birthday of the King
of the French, two men were killed and four others wounded on board the
French ship of war _Suffren_. Suitable explanations were immediately
made to the French admiral; and the officers and crew of the American
frigate, with that generosity which distinguishes their profession,
promptly contributed, by a liberal subscription, toward providing for
the families of the unfortunate sufferers. I am sure, however, that I
should not do justice to the feelings of the American people on this
occasion if I did not invite Congress to assume, on their part, this
melancholy duty. I propose, therefore, that the same provision be made
by law for these French seamen and their families as would be made for
American seamen killed or wounded in battle. This proceeding will show
the deep sensibility with which the disastrous accident is viewed by the
United States, and their readiness to alleviate those consequences which
can not be remedied.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _June 20, 1834_.

_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, for their consideration, a
memorial from the granddaughters of the Count de Rochambeau, together
with their letter to the minister of the United States in France, from
whom these papers have been recently received.

Translations of these documents accompany them.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _June 21, 1834_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:

The afflicting intelligence of the death of the illustrious Lafayette
has been received by me this morning.

I have issued the general order inclosed[7] to cause appropriate honors
to be paid by the Army and Navy to the memory of one so highly venerated
and beloved by my countrymen, and whom Providence has been pleased to
remove so unexpectedly from the agitating scenes of life.

ANDREW JACKSON.

[Footnote 7: See under Executive Orders, pp. 94-95.]



JUNE 23, 1834.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit for the consideration and action of the Senate a treaty
concluded with the Cherokees for the cession of their lands east of the
Mississippi River.

It is known to the Senate that for some years great difficulties have
been experienced in the relations of that tribe. Without further
allusion to these than as they furnish strong inducements to a final
settlement of all the questions involved in our intercourse with these
Indians, it is obvious from the existing state of things that they
can not continue in their present position with any hope of ultimate
prosperity. I have been, therefore, desirous that a just and
satisfactory arrangement should be made for their removal, and
propositions to that effect upon a liberal scale have been repeatedly
made to them. These have until now been rejected, and their rejection,
I have been induced to believe, has been owing more to the ascendency
acquired by individuals who are unwilling to go than to the deliberative
opinion of a majority of the Cherokee people. Some years since a form
of government was established among them, but since the extension of
the laws of Georgia and Alabama over them this government can have no
binding effect upon a great majority of them. Its obligation is also
denied by many of them in consequence of the continuance of certain
persons in power contrary to the principles of their fundamental
articles of association. A delegation from the persons claiming to hold
their authority under the former existing state of things is in this
city, and have communicated with the War Department on the subject of
their situation and removal. They deny the right of the persons who have
negotiated this treaty to perform such an act, and have remonstrated
against it. Copies of their communications are herewith transmitted.

The delegation who have signed the present treaty have produced an
authority from William Hicks, designating himself as principal chief,
and others, signing the same in an official capacity. It is understood
from the report of Major Currie, the enrolling agent, that public
notice was given to all persons desirous of emigrating to attend
upon a particular day and place in order to appoint representatives
to communicate with the Government and to arrange the terms of cession
and removal. In conformity with this notice a meeting was held and the
authority herein referred to was the result.

In consequence of this application John H. Eaton was appointed to meet
and confer with them and to report their views to the War Department.
These are embodied in the treaty which is presented to your
consideration.

Under these circumstances I submit the matter to the decision of the
Senate. The practice of the Government has not been very strict on the
subject of the authority of the persons negotiating treaties on the part
of the Indians. Sometimes it has been done by persons representing the
tribe and sometimes by the individuals composing it. I am not aware that
a case similar in its features to the present has ever before required
the action of the Government. But, independently of the considerations
which so forcibly urge a settlement of this matter, no injustice can be
done to the Indians by the ratification of this treaty. It is expressly
provided that it will not be binding upon them till a majority has
assented to its stipulations. When that assent is given no one can
justly deny its obligation.

The Cherokees east of the Mississippi occupy a portion of the
territories of four States, to wit, Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee,
and Alabama. The treaty provides that the communities inhabiting
those divisions shall each be considered as acting for themselves
independently of the others. We have frequently in our intercourse
with the Indians treated with different portions of the same tribe as
separate communities. Nor is there any injustice in this as long as they
are separated into divisions without any very strong bond of union, and
frequently with different interests and views. By requiring the assent
of a majority to any act which will bind them we insure the preservation
of a principle which will afford adequate security to their rights.

ANDREW JACKSON.




VETO MESSAGE.[8]


[Footnote 8: Pocket veto.]

DECEMBER 4, 1833.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

At the close of the last session of Congress I received from that body
a bill entitled "An act to appropriate for a limited time the proceeds
of the sales of the public lands of the United States and for granting
lands to certain States." The brief period then remaining before
the rising of Congress and the extreme pressure of official duties
unavoidable on such occasions did not leave me sufficient time for that
full consideration of the subject which was due to its great importance.
Subsequent consideration and reflection have, however, confirmed the
objections to the bill which presented themselves to my mind upon its
first perusal, and have satisfied me that it ought not to become a law.
I felt myself, therefore, constrained to withhold from it my approval,
and now return it to the Senate, in which it originated, with the
reasons on which my dissent is founded.

I am fully sensible of the importance, as it respects both the harmony
and union of the States, of making, as soon as circumstances will allow
of it, a proper and final disposition of the whole subject of the public
lands, and any measure for that object providing for the reimbursement
to the United States of those expenses with which they are justly
chargeable that may be consistent with my views of the Constitution,
sound policy, and the rights of the respective States will readily
receive my cooperation. This bill, however, is not of that character.
The arrangement it contemplates is not permanent, but limited to five
years only, and in its terms appears to anticipate alterations within
that time, at the discretion of Congress; and it furnishes no adequate
security against those continued agitations of the subject which it
should be the principal object of any measure for the disposition of
the public lands to avert.

Neither the merits of the bill under consideration nor the validity of
the objections which I have felt it to be my duty to make to its passage
can be correctly appreciated without a full understanding of the manner
in which the public lands upon which it is intended to operate were
acquired and the conditions upon which they are now held by the United
States. I will therefore precede the statement of those objections by a
brief but distinct exposition of these points.

The waste lands within the United States constituted one of the early
obstacles to the organization of any government for the protection of
their common interests. In October, 1777, while Congress were framing
the Articles of Confederation, a proposition was made to amend them to
the following effect, viz:


  That the United States in Congress assembled shall have the sole and
  exclusive right and power to ascertain and fix the western boundary of
  such States as claim to the Mississippi or South Sea, and lay out the
  land beyond the boundary so ascertained into separate and independent
  States from time to time as the numbers and circumstances of the people
  thereof may require.


It was, however, rejected, Maryland only voting for it, and so difficult
did the subject appear that the patriots of that body agreed to waive it
in the Articles of Confederation and leave it for future settlement.

On the submission of the Articles to the several State legislatures for
ratification the most formidable objection was found to be in this
subject of the waste lands. Maryland, Rhode Island, and New Jersey
instructed their delegates in Congress to move amendments to them
providing that the waste or Crown lands should be considered the common
property of the United States, but they were rejected. All the States
except Maryland acceded to the Articles, notwithstanding some of them
did so with the reservation that their claim to those lands as common
property was not thereby abandoned.

On the sole ground that no declaration to that effect was contained in
the Articles, Maryland withheld her assent, and in May, 1779, embodied
her objections in the form of instructions to her delegates, which were
entered upon the Journals of Congress. The following extracts are from
that document, viz:


  Is it possible that those States who are ambitiously grasping at
  territories to which in our judgment they have not the least shadow of
  exclusive right will use with greater moderation the increase of wealth
  and power derived from those territories when acquired than what they
  have displayed in their endeavors to acquire them? ...

  We are convinced policy and justice require that a country unsettled at
  the commencement of this war, claimed by the British Crown and ceded to
  it by the treaty of Paris, if wrested from the common enemy by the blood
  and treasure of the thirteen States, should be considered as a common
  property, subject to be parceled out by Congress into free, convenient,
  and independent governments, in such manner and at such times as the
  wisdom of that assembly shall hereafter direct. ...


Virginia proceeded to open a land office for the sale of her Western
lands, which produced such excitement as to induce Congress, in October,
1779, to interpose and earnestly recommend to "the said State and all
States similarly circumstanced to forbear settling or issuing warrants
for such unappropriated lands, or granting the same, during the
continuance of the present war."

In March, 1780, the legislature of New York passed an act tendering a
cession to the United States of the claims of that State to the Western
territory, preceded by a preamble to the following effect, viz:


  Whereas nothing under Divine Providence can more effectually contribute
  to the tranquillity and safety of the United States of America than a
  federal alliance on such liberal principles as will give satisfaction to
  its respective members; and whereas the Articles of Confederation and
  Perpetual Union recommended by the honorable Congress of the United
  States of America have not proved acceptable to all the States, it
  having been conceived that a portion of the waste and uncultivated
  territory within the limits or claims of certain States ought to be
  appropriated as a common fund for the expenses of the war, and the
  people of the State of New York being on all occasions disposed to
  manifest their regard for their sister States and their earnest desire
  to promote the general interest and security, and more especially to
  accelerate the federal alliance, by removing as far as it depends upon
  them the before-mentioned impediment to its final accomplishment. ...


This act of New York, the instructions of Maryland, and a remonstrance
of Virginia were referred to a committee of Congress, who reported a
preamble and resolutions thereon, which were adopted on the 6th
September, 1780; so much of which as is necessary to elucidate the
subject is to the following effect, viz:


  That it appears advisable to press upon those States which can remove
  the embarrassments respecting the Western country a liberal surrender of
  a portion of their territorial claims, since they can not be preserved
  entire without endangering the stability of the General Confederacy; to
  remind them how indispensably necessary it is to establish the Federal
  Union on a fixed and permanent basis and on principles acceptable to all
  its respective members; how essential to public credit and confidence,
  to the support of our Army, to the vigor of our counsels and success of
  our measures, to our tranquillity at home, our reputation abroad, to our
  very existence as a free, sovereign, and independent people; that they
  are fully persuaded the wisdom of the several legislatures will lead
  them to a full and impartial consideration of a subject so interesting
  to the United States, and so necessary to the happy establishment of the
  Federal Union; that they are confirmed in these expectations by a review
  of the before-mentioned act of the legislature of New York, submitted to
  their consideration. ...

  _Resolved_, That copies of the several papers referred to the committee
  be transmitted, with a copy of the report, to the legislatures of the
  several States, and that it be earnestly recommended to those States who
  have claims to the Western country to pass such laws and give their
  delegates in Congress such powers as may effectually remove the only
  obstacle to a final ratification of the Articles of Confederation, and
  that the legislature of Maryland be earnestly requested to authorize
  their delegates in Congress to subscribe the said Articles.


Following up this policy, Congress proceeded, on the 10th October, 1780,
to pass a resolution pledging the United States to the several States as
to the manner in which any lands that might be ceded by them should be
disposed of, the material parts of which are as follows, viz:


  _Resolved_, That the unappropriated lands which may be ceded or
  relinquished to the United States by any particular State pursuant to
  the recommendation of Congress of the 6th day of September last shall be
  disposed of for the common benefit of the United States and be settled
  and formed into distinct republican States, which shall become members
  of the Federal Union and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom,
  and independence as the other States; ... that the said lands shall be
  granted or settled at such times and under such regulations as shall
  hereafter be agreed on by the United States in Congress assembled, or
  nine or more of them.


In February, 1781, the legislature of Maryland passed an act authorizing
their delegates in Congress to sign the Articles of Confederation. The
following are extracts from the preamble and body of the act, viz:


  Whereas it hath been said that the common enemy is encouraged by this
  State not acceding to the Confederation to hope that the union of the
  sister States may be dissolved, and therefore prosecutes the war in
  expectation of an event so disgraceful to America, and our friends and
  illustrious ally are impressed with an idea that the common cause would
  be promoted by our formally acceding to the Confederation. ...


The act of which this is the preamble authorizes the delegates of that
State to sign the Articles, and proceeds to declare "that by acceding
to the said Confederation this State doth not relinquish, nor intend
to relinquish, any right or interest she hath with the other united or
confederated States to the back country," etc.

On the 1st of March, 1781, the delegates of Maryland signed the Articles
of Confederation, and the Federal Union under that compact was complete.
The conflicting claims to the Western lands, however, were not disposed
of, and continued to give great trouble to Congress. Repeated and urgent
calls were made by Congress upon the States claiming them to make
liberal cessions to the United States, and it was not until long after
the present Constitution was formed that the grants were completed.

The deed of cession from New York was executed on the 1st of March,
1781, the day the Articles of Confederation were ratified, and it was
accepted by Congress on the 29th October, 1782. One of the conditions of
this cession thus tendered and accepted was that the lands ceded to the
United States "_shall be and inure for the use and benefit of such of
the United States as shall become members of the federal alliance of
the said States, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever_."

The Virginia deed of cession was executed and accepted on the 1st day of
March, 1784. One of the conditions of this cession is as follows, viz:


  That all the lands within the territory as ceded to the United States,
  and not reserved for or appropriated to any of the before-mentioned
  purposes or disposed of in bounties to the officers and soldiers of the
  American Army, _shall be considered as a common fund for the use and
  benefit of such of the United States as have become or shall become
  members of the confederation or federal alliance of the said States,
  Virginia inclusive, according to their usual respective proportions in
  the general charge and expenditure, and shall be faithfully and bona
  fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no other use or purpose
  whatsoever_.


Within the years 1785, 1786, and 1787 Massachusetts, Connecticut, and
South Carolina ceded their claims upon similar conditions. The Federal
Government went into operation under the existing Constitution on
the 4th of March, 1789. The following is the only provision of that
Constitution which has a direct bearing on the subject of the public
lands, viz:


  The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules
  and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging
  to the United States, and nothing in this Constitution shall be so
  construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States or of any
  particular State.


Thus the Constitution left all the compacts before made in full force,
and the rights of all parties remained the same under the new Government
as they were under the Confederation.

The deed of cession of North Carolina was executed in December, 1789,
and accepted by an act of Congress approved April 2, 1790. The third
condition of this cession was in the following words, viz:


  That all the lands intended to be ceded by virtue of this act to the
  United States of America, and not appropriated as before mentioned,
  _shall be considered as a common fund for the use and benefit of the
  United States of America, North Carolina inclusive, according to their
  respective and usual proportions of the general charge and expenditure,
  and shall be faithfully disposed of for that purpose, and for no other
  use or purpose whatever_.


The cession of Georgia was completed on the 16th June, 1802, and in its
leading condition is precisely like that of Virginia and North Carolina.
This grant completed the title of the United States to all those lands
generally called _public lands_ lying within the original limits of the
Confederacy. Those which have been acquired by the purchase of Louisiana
and Florida, having been paid for out of the common treasure of the
United States, are as much the property of the General Government, to
be disposed of for the common benefit, as those ceded by the several
States.

By the facts here collected from the early history of our Republic it
appears that the subject of the public lands entered into the elements
of its institutions. It was only upon the condition that those lands
should be considered as common property, to be disposed of for the
benefit of the United States, that some of the States agreed to come
into a "perpetual union." The States claiming those lands acceded to
those views and transferred their claims to the United States upon
certain specific conditions, and on those conditions the grants were
accepted. These solemn compacts, invited by Congress in a resolution
declaring the purposes to which the proceeds of these lands should be
applied, originating before the Constitution and forming the basis on
which it was made, bound the United States to a particular course of
policy in relation to them by ties as strong as can be invented to
secure the faith of nations.

As early as May, 1785, Congress, in execution of these compacts, passed
an ordinance providing for the sales of lands in the Western territory
and directing the proceeds to be paid into the Treasury of the United
States. With the same object other ordinances were adopted prior to the
organization of the present Government.

In further execution of these compacts the Congress of the United States
under the present Constitution, as early as the 4th of August, 1790, in
"An act making provision for the debt of the United States," enacted as
follows, viz:


  That the proceeds of sales which shall be made of lands in the
  Western territory now belonging or that may hereafter belong to the
  United States shall be and are hereby appropriated toward sinking or
  discharging the debts for the payment whereof the United States now
  are or by virtue of this act may be holden, and shall be applied solely
  to that use until the said debt shall be fully satisfied.


To secure to the Government of the United States forever the power to
execute these compacts in good faith the Congress of the Confederation,
as early as July 13, 1787, in an ordinance for the government of the
territory of the United States northwest of the river Ohio, prescribed
to the people inhabiting the Western territory certain conditions which
were declared to be "articles of compact between the original States and
the people and States in the said territory," which should "forever
remain unalterable, unless by common consent." In one of these articles
it is declared that--


  The legislatures of those districts, or new States, shall never
  interfere with the primary disposal of the soil by the United States in
  Congress assembled, nor with any regulations Congress may find necessary
  for securing the title in such soil to the _bona fide purchasers_.


This condition has been exacted from the people of all the new
territories, and to put its obligation beyond dispute each new State
carved out of the public domain has been required explicitly to
recognize it as one of the conditions of admission into the Union. Some
of them have declared through their conventions in separate acts that
their people "forever disclaim all right and title to the waste and
unappropriated lands lying within this State, and that the same shall
be and remain at the sole and entire disposition of the United States."

With such care have the United States reserved to themselves, in all
their acts down to this day, in legislating for the Territories and
admitting States into the Union, the unshackled power to execute in good
faith the compacts of cession made with the original States. From these
facts and proceedings it plainly and certainly results--

1. That one of the fundamental principles on which the Confederation of
the United States was originally based was that the waste lands of the
West within their limits should be the common property of the United
States.

2. That those lands were ceded to the United States by the States which
claimed them, and the cessions were accepted on the express condition
that they should be disposed of for the common benefit of the States,
according to their respective proportions in the general charge and
expenditure, and for no other purpose whatsoever.

3. That in execution of these solemn compacts the Congress of the United
States did, under the Confederation, proceed to sell these lands and put
the avails into the common Treasury, and under the new Constitution did
repeatedly pledge them for the payment of the public debt of the United
States, by which pledge each State was expected to profit in proportion
to the general charge to be made upon it for that object.

These are the first principles of this whole subject, which I think
can not be contested by anyone who examines the proceedings of the
Revolutionary Congress, the cessions of the several States, and the acts
of Congress under the new Constitution. Keeping them deeply impressed
upon the mind, let us proceed to examine how far the objects of the
cessions have been completed, and see whether those compacts are not
still obligatory upon the United States.

The debt for which these lands were pledged by Congress may be
considered as paid, and they are consequently released from that lien.
But that pledge formed no part of the compacts with the States, or of
the conditions upon which the cessions were made. It was a contract
between new parties--between the United States and their creditors.
Upon payment of the debt the compacts remain in full force, and the
obligation of the United States to dispose of the lands for the common
benefit is neither destroyed nor impaired. As they can not now be
executed in that mode, the only legitimate question which can arise is,
In what other way are these lands to be hereafter disposed of for the
common benefit of the several States, "_according to their respective
and usual proportion in the general charge and expenditure?_" The
cessions of Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia in express terms,
and all the rest impliedly, not only provide thus specifically the
proportion according to which each State shall profit by the proceeds
of the land sales, but they proceed to declare that they shall be
"_faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no
other use or purpose whatsoever_." This is the fundamental law of the
land at this moment, growing out of compacts which are older than the
Constitution, and formed the corner stone on which the Union itself
was erected.

In the practice of the Government the proceeds of the public lands have
not been set apart _as a separate fund_ for the payment of the public
debt, but have been and are now paid into the Treasury, where they
constitute a part of the aggregate of revenue upon which the Government
draws as well for its current expenditures as for payment of the public
debt. In this manner they have heretofore and do now lessen the general
charge upon the people of the several States in the exact proportions
stipulated in the compacts.

These general charges have been composed not only of the public debt and
the usual expenditures attending the civil and military administrations
of the Government, but of the amounts paid to the States with which
these compacts were formed, the amounts paid the Indians for their
right of possession, the amounts paid for the purchase of Louisiana and
Florida, and the amounts paid surveyors, registers, receivers, clerks,
etc., employed in preparing for market and selling the Western domain.

From the origin of the land system down to the 30th September, 1832, the
amount expended for all these purposes has been about $49,701,280, and
the amount received from the sales, deducting payments on account of
roads, etc., about $38,386,624. The revenue arising from the public
lands, therefore, has not been sufficient to meet the general charges
on the Treasury which have grown out of them by about $11,314,656. Yet
in having been applied to lessen those charges the conditions of the
compacts have been thus far fulfilled, and each State has profited
according to its usual proportion in the general charge and expenditure.
The annual proceeds of land sales have increased and the charges have
diminished, so that at a reduced price those lands would now defray all
current charges growing out of them and save the Treasury from further
advances on their account. Their original intent and object, therefore,
would be accomplished as fully as it has hitherto been by reducing the
price and hereafter, as heretofore, bringing the proceeds into the
Treasury. Indeed, as this is the only mode in which the objects of the
original compact can be attained, it may be considered for all practical
purposes that it is one of their requirements.

The bill before me begins with an entire subversion of every one of the
compacts by which the United States became possessed of their Western
domain, and treats the subject as if they never had existence and as if
the United States were the original and unconditional owners of all the
public lands. The first section directs--


  That from and after the 31st day of December, 1832, there shall be
  allowed and paid to each of the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
  Alabama, Missouri, Mississippi, and Louisiana, over and above what each
  of the said States is entitled to by the terms of the compacts entered
  into between them respectively upon their admission into the Union and
  the United States, the sum of 12-1/2 per cent upon the net amount of the
  sales of the public lands which subsequent to the day aforesaid shall be
  made within the several limits of the said States, which said sum of
  12-1/2 per cent shall be applied to some object or objects of internal
  improvement or education within the said States under the direction of
  their several legislatures.


This 12-1/2 per cent is to be taken out of the net proceeds of the land
sales before any apportionment is made, and the same seven States which
are first to receive this proportion are also to receive their due
proportion of the residue according to the ratio of general
distribution.

Now, waiving all considerations of equity or policy in regard to this
provision, what more need be said to demonstrate its objectionable
character than that it is in direct and undisguised violation of the
pledge given by Congress to the States before a single cession was made,
that it abrogates the condition upon which some of the States came into
the Union, and that it sets at naught the terms of cession spread upon
the face of every grant under which the title to that portion of the
public land is held by the Federal Government?

In the apportionment of the remaining seven-eighths of the proceeds this
bill, in a manner equally undisguised, violates the conditions upon
which the United States acquired title to the ceded lands. Abandoning
altogether the ratio of distribution according to the general charge and
expenditure provided by the compacts, it adopts that of the Federal
representative population. Virginia and other States which ceded their
lands upon the express condition that they should receive a benefit from
their sales in proportion to their part of the general charge are by the
bill allowed only a portion of seven-eighths of their proceeds, and that
not in the proportion of general charge and expenditure, but in the
ratio of their Federal representative population.

The Constitution of the United States did not delegate to Congress the
power to abrogate these compacts. On the contrary, by declaring that
nothing in it "_shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the
United States or of any particular State_," it virtually provides that
these compacts and the rights they secure shall remain untouched by
the legislative power, which shall only make all "_needful rules and
regulations_" for carrying them into effect. All beyond this would seem
to be an assumption of undelegated power.

These ancient compacts are invaluable monuments of an age of virtue,
patriotism, and disinterestedness. They exhibit the price that great
States which had won liberty were willing to pay for that union without
which they plainly saw it could not be preserved. It was not for
territory or state power that our Revolutionary fathers took up arms;
it was for individual liberty and the right of self-government. The
expulsion from the continent of British armies and British power was to
them a barren conquest if through the collisions of the redeemed States
the individual rights for which they fought should become the prey of
petty military tyrannies established at home. To avert such consequences
and throw around liberty the shield of union, States whose relative
strength at the time gave them a preponderating power magnanimously
sacrificed domains which would have made them the rivals of empires,
only stipulating that they should be disposed of for the common benefit
of themselves and the other confederated States. This enlightened policy
produced union and has secured liberty. It has made our waste lands
to swarm with a busy people and added many powerful States to our
Confederation. As well for the fruits which these noble works of our
ancestors have produced as for the devotedness in which they originated,
we should hesitate before we demolish them.

But there are other principles asserted in the bill which would have
impelled me to withhold my signature had I not seen in it a violation
of the compacts by which the United States acquired title to a large
portion of the public lands. It reasserts the principle contained in
the bill authorizing a subscription to the stock of the Maysville,
Washington, Paris and Lexington Turnpike Road Company, from which I was
compelled to withhold my consent for reasons contained in my message of
the 27th May, 1830, to the House of Representatives.

The leading principle then asserted was that Congress possesses no
constitutional power to appropriate any part of the moneys of the
United States for objects of a local character within the States.
That principle I can not be mistaken in supposing has received the
unequivocal sanction of the American people, and all subsequent
reflection has but satisfied me more thoroughly that the interests of
our people and the purity of our Government, if not its existence,
depend on its observance. The public lands are the common property of
the United States, and the moneys arising from their sales are a part of
the public revenue. This bill proposes to raise from and appropriate a
portion of this public revenue to certain States, providing expressly
that it shall "_be applied to objects of internal improvement or
education within those States_," and then proceeds to appropriate the
balance to all the States, with the declaration that it shall be applied
"_to such purposes as the legislatures of the said respective States
shall deem proper_." The former appropriation is expressly for internal
improvements or education, without qualification as to the kind of
improvements, and therefore in express violation of the principle
maintained in my objections to the turnpike-road bill above referred
to. The latter appropriation is more broad, and gives the money to be
applied to any local purpose whatsoever. It will not be denied that
under the provisions of the bill a portion of the money might have been
applied to making the very road to which the bill of 1830 had reference,
and must of course come within the scope of the same principle. If the
money of the United States can not be applied to local purposes _through
its own agents_, as little can it be permitted to be thus expended
_through the agency of the State governments_.

It has been supposed that with all the reductions in our revenue which
could be speedily effected by Congress without injury to the substantial
interests of the country there might be for some years to come a surplus
of moneys in the Treasury, and that there was in principle no objection
to returning them to the people by whom they were paid. As the literal
accomplishment of such an object is obviously impracticable, it was
thought admissible, as the nearest approximation to it, to hand them
over to the State governments, the more immediate representatives of
the people, to be by them applied to the benefit of those to whom they
properly belonged. The principle and the object were to return to the
people an unavoidable surplus of revenue which might have been paid by
them under a system which could not at once be abandoned, but even this
resource, which at one time seemed to be almost the only alternative to
save the General Government from grasping unlimited power over internal
improvements, was suggested with doubts of its constitutionality.

But this bill assumes a new principle. Its object is not to return to
the people an unavoidable surplus of revenue paid in by them, but to
create a surplus for distribution among the States. It seizes the entire
proceeds of one source of revenue and sets them apart as a surplus,
making it necessary to raise the moneys for supporting the Government
and meeting the general charges from other sources. It even throws the
entire land system upon the customs for its support, and makes the
public lands a perpetual charge upon the Treasury. It does not return
to the people moneys accidentally or unavoidably paid by them to the
Government, by which they are not wanted, but compels the people to pay
moneys into the Treasury for the mere purpose of creating a surplus for
distribution to their State governments. If this principle be once
admitted, it is not difficult to perceive to what consequences it may
lead. Already this bill, by throwing the land system on the revenues
from imports for support, virtually distributes among the States a part
of those revenues. The proportion may be increased from time to time,
without any departure from the principle now asserted, until the State
governments shall derive all the funds necessary for their support from
the Treasury of the United States, or, if a sufficient supply should be
obtained by some States and not by others, the deficient States might
complain; and to put an end to all further difficulty Congress, without
assuming any new principle, need go but one step further and put the
salaries of all the State governors, judges, and other officers, with a
sufficient sum for other expenses, in their general appropriation bill.

It appears to me that a more direct road to consolidation can not be
devised. Money is power, and in that Government which pays all the
public officers of the States will all political power be substantially
concentrated. The State governments, if governments they might be
called, would lose all their independence and dignity; the economy which
now distinguishes them would be converted into a profusion, limited
only by the extent of the supply. Being the dependents of the General
Government, and looking to its Treasury as the source of all their
emoluments, the State officers, under whatever names they might pass and
by whatever forms their duties might be prescribed, would in effect be
the mere stipendiaries and instruments of the central power.

I am quite sure that the intelligent people of our several States will
be satisfied on a little reflection that it is neither wise nor safe to
release the members of their local legislatures from the responsibility
of levying the taxes necessary to support their State governments and
vest it in Congress, over most of whose members they have no control.
They will not think it expedient that Congress shall be the taxgatherer
and paymaster of all their State governments, thus amalgamating all
their officers into one mass of common interest and common feeling.
It is too obvious that such a course would subvert our well-balanced
system of government, and ultimately deprive us of all the blessings
now derived from our happy Union.

However willing I might be that any unavoidable surplus in the
Treasury should be returned to the people through their State
governments, I can not assent to the principle that a surplus may be
created for the purpose of distribution. Viewing this bill as in effect
assuming the right not only to create a surplus for that purpose, but to
divide the contents of the Treasury among the States without limitation,
from whatever source they may be derived, and asserting the power to
raise and appropriate money for the support of every State government
and institution, as well as for making every local improvement, however
trivial, I can not give it my assent.

It is difficult to perceive what advantages would accrue to the old
States or the new from the system of distribution which this bill
proposes if it were otherwise unobjectionable. It requires no argument
to prove that if $3,000,000 a year, or any other sum, shall be taken out
of the Treasury by this bill for distribution it must be replaced by the
same sum collected from the people through some other means. The old
States will receive annually a sum of money from the Treasury, but they
will pay in a larger sum, together with the expenses of collection and
distribution. It is only their proportion of _seven-eighths_ of the
proceeds of land sales which they are _to receive_, but they must _pay_
their due proportion of the _whole_. Disguise it as we may, the bill
proposes to them a dead loss in the ratio of _eight_ to _seven_,
in addition to expenses and other incidental losses. This assertion
is not the less true because it may not at first be palpable. Their
receipts will be in large sums, but their payments in small ones. The
_governments_ of the States will receive _seven_ dollars, for which the
_people_ of the States will pay _eight_. The large sums received will
be palpable to the senses; the small sums paid it requires thought to
identify. But a little consideration will satisfy the people that the
effect is the same as if _seven hundred dollars_ were given them from
the public Treasury, for which they were at the same time required to
pay in taxes, direct or indirect, _eight hundred_.

I deceive myself greatly if the new States would find their interests
promoted by such a system as this bill proposes. Their true policy
consists in the rapid settling and improvement of the waste lands within
their limits. As a means of hastening those events, they have long been
looking to a reduction in the price of public lands upon the final
payment of the national debt. The effect of the proposed system would be
to prevent that reduction. It is true the bill reserves to Congress the
power to reduce the price, but the effect of its details as now arranged
would probably be forever to prevent its exercise.

With the just men who inhabit the new States it is a sufficient reason
to reject this system that it is in violation of the fundamental laws
of the Republic and its Constitution. But if it were a mere question of
interest or expediency they would still reject it. They would not sell
their bright prospect of increasing wealth and growing power at such
a price. They would not place a sum of money to be paid into their
treasuries in competition with the settlement of their waste lands and
the increase of their population. They would not consider a small
or a large annual sum to be paid to their governments and immediately
expended as an equivalent for that enduring wealth which is composed of
flocks and herds and cultivated farms. No temptation will allure them
from that object of abiding interest, the settlement of their waste
lands, and the increase of a hardy race of free citizens, their glory
in peace and their defense in war.

On the whole, I adhere to the opinion, expressed by me in my annual
message of 1832, that it is our true policy that the public lands shall
cease as soon as practicable to be a source of revenue, except for the
payment of those general charges which grow out of the acquisition of
the lands, their survey and sale. Although these expenses have not been
met by the proceeds of sales heretofore, it is quite certain they will
be hereafter, even after a considerable reduction in the price. By
meeting in the Treasury so much of the general charge as arises from
that source they will hereafter, as they have been heretofore, be
disposed of for the common benefit of the United States, according to
the compacts of cession. I do not doubt that it is the real interest
of each and all the States in the Union, and particularly of the new
States, that the price of these lands shall be reduced and graduated,
and that after they have been offered for a certain number of years
the refuse remaining unsold shall be abandoned to the States and the
machinery of our land system entirely withdrawn. It can not be supposed
the compacts intended that the United States should retain forever a
title to lands within the States which are of no value, and no doubt
is entertained that the general interest would be best promoted by
surrendering such lands to the States.

This plan for disposing of the public lands impairs no principle,
violates no compact, and deranges no system. Already has the price of
those lands been reduced from $2 per acre to $1.25, and upon the will of
Congress it depends whether there shall be a further reduction. While
the burdens of the East are diminishing by the reduction of the duties
upon imports, it seems but equal justice that the chief burden of the
West should be lightened in an equal degree at least. It would be just
to the old States and the new, conciliate every interest, disarm the
subject of all its dangers, and add another guaranty to the perpetuity
of our happy Union.

Sensible, however, of the difficulties which surround this important
subject, I can only add to my regrets at finding myself again compelled
to disagree with the legislative power the sincere declaration that any
plan which shall promise a final and satisfactory disposition of the
question and be compatible with the Constitution and public faith shall
have my hearty concurrence.

ANDREW JACKSON.

[NOTE.--For reasons for the pocket veto of "An act to improve the
navigation of the Wabash River," see Sixth Annual Message, dated
December 1, 1834, pp. 118-123.]




PROTEST.[9]


[Footnote 9: The Senate ordered that it be not entered on the Journal.]

APRIL 15, 1834.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

It appears by the published Journal of the Senate that on the 26th of
December last a resolution was offered by a member of the Senate, which
after a protracted debate was on the 28th day of March last modified
by the mover and passed by the votes of twenty-six Senators out of
forty-six who were present and voted, in the following words, viz:


  _Resolved_, That the President, in the late Executive proceedings in
  relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority and
  power not conferred by the Constitution and laws, but in derogation of
  both.


Having had the honor, through the voluntary suffrages of the American
people, to fill the office of President of the United States during
the period which may be presumed to have been referred to in this
resolution, it is sufficiently evident that the censure it inflicts was
intended for myself. Without notice, unheard and untried, I thus find
myself charged on the records of the Senate, and in a form hitherto
unknown in our history, with the high crime of violating the laws and
Constitution of my country.

It can seldom be necessary for any department of the Government, when
assailed in conversation or debate or by the strictures of the press or
of popular assemblies, to step out of its ordinary path for the purpose
of vindicating its conduct or of pointing out any irregularity or
injustice in the manner of the attack; but when the Chief Executive
Magistrate is, by one of the most important branches of the Government
in its official capacity, in a public manner, and by its recorded
sentence, but without precedent, competent authority, or just cause,
declared guilty of a breach of the laws and Constitution, it is due to
his station, to public opinion, and to a proper self-respect that the
officer thus denounced should promptly expose the wrong which has been
done.

In the present case, moreover, there is even a stronger necessity for
such a vindication. By an express provision of the Constitution, before
the President of the United States can enter on the execution of his
office he is required to take an oath or affirmation in the following
words:


  I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the
  office of President of the United States and will to the best of my
  ability preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United
  States.


The duty of defending so far as in him lies the integrity of the
Constitution would indeed have resulted from the very nature of his
office, but by thus expressing it in the official oath or affirmation,
which in this respect differs from that of any other functionary, the
founders of our Republic have attested their sense of its importance
and have given to it a peculiar solemnity and force. Bound to the
performance of this duty by the oath I have taken, by the strongest
obligations of gratitude to the American people, and by the ties which
unite my every earthly interest with the welfare and glory of my
country, and perfectly convinced that the discussion and passage of
the above-mentioned resolution were not only unauthorized by the
Constitution, but in many respects repugnant to its provisions and
subversive of the rights secured by it to other coordinate departments,
I deem it an imperative duty to maintain the supremacy of that sacred
instrument and the immunities of the department intrusted to my care
by all means consistent with my own lawful powers, with the rights of
others, and with the genius of our civil institutions. To this end I
have caused this my _solemn protest_ against the aforesaid proceedings
to be placed on the files of the executive department and to be
transmitted to the Senate.

It is alike due to the subject, the Senate, and the people that the
views which I have taken of the proceedings referred to, and which
compel me to regard them in the light that has been mentioned, should
be exhibited at length, and with the freedom and firmness which are
required by an occasion so unprecedented and peculiar.

Under the Constitution of the United States the powers and functions
of the various departments of the Federal Government and their
responsibilities for violation or neglect of duty are clearly defined
or result by necessary inference. The legislative power is, subject to
the qualified negative of the President, vested in the Congress of the
United States, composed of the Senate and House of Representatives; the
executive power is vested exclusively in the President, except that in
the conclusion of treaties and in certain appointments to office he is
to act with the advice and consent of the Senate; the judicial power is
vested exclusively in the Supreme and other courts of the United States,
except in cases of impeachment, for which purpose the accusatory power
is vested in the House of Representatives and that of hearing and
determining in the Senate. But although for the special purposes which
have been mentioned there is an occasional intermixture of the powers of
the different departments, yet with these exceptions each of the three
great departments is independent of the others in its sphere of action,
and when it deviates from that sphere is not responsible to the others
further than it is expressly made so in the Constitution. In every other
respect each of them is the coequal of the other two, and all are the
servants of the American people, without power or right to control or
censure each other in the service of their common superior, save only
in the manner and to the degree which that superior has prescribed.

The responsibilities of the President are numerous and weighty.
He is liable to impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors, and on
due conviction to removal from office and perpetual disqualification;
and notwithstanding such conviction, he may also be indicted and
punished according to law. He is also liable to the private action
of any party who may have been injured by his illegal mandates or
instructions in the same manner and to the same extent as the humblest
functionary. In addition to the responsibilities which may thus be
enforced by impeachment, criminal prosecution, or suit at law, he
is also accountable at the bar of public opinion for every act of his
Administration. Subject only to the restraints of truth and justice,
the free people of the United States have the undoubted right, as
individuals or collectively, orally or in writing, at such times and in
such language and form as they may think proper, to discuss his official
conduct and to express and promulgate their opinions concerning it.
Indirectly also his conduct may come under review in either branch of
the Legislature, or in the Senate when acting in its executive capacity,
and so far as the executive or legislative proceedings of these bodies
may require it, it may be exercised by them. These are believed to be
the proper and only modes in which the President of the United States
is to be held accountable for his official conduct.

Tested by these principles, the resolution of the Senate is wholly
unauthorized by the Constitution, and in derogation of its entire
spirit. It assumes that a single branch of the legislative department
may for the purposes of a public censure, and without any view to
legislation or impeachment, take up, consider, and decide upon the
official acts of the Executive. But in no part of the Constitution is
the President subjected to any such responsibility, and in no part of
that instrument is any such power conferred on either branch of the
Legislature.

The justice of these conclusions will be illustrated and confirmed by
a brief analysis of the powers of the Senate and a comparison of their
recent proceedings with those powers.

The high functions assigned by the Constitution to the Senate are in
their nature either legislative, executive, or judicial. It is only in
the exercise of its judicial powers, when sitting as a court for the
trial of impeachments, that the Senate is expressly authorized and
necessarily required to consider and decide upon the conduct of the
President or any other public officer. Indirectly, however, as has
already been suggested, it may frequently be called on to perform that
office. Cases may occur in the course of its legislative or executive
proceedings in which it may be indispensable to the proper exercise of
its powers that it should inquire into and decide upon the conduct of
the President or other public officers, and in every such case its
constitutional right to do so is cheerfully conceded. But to authorize
the Senate to enter on such a task in its legislative or executive
capacity the inquiry must actually grow out of and tend to some
legislative or executive action, and the decision, when expressed,
must take the form of some appropriate legislative or executive act.

The resolution in question was introduced, discussed, and passed not as
a joint but as a separate resolution. It asserts no legislative power,
proposes no legislative action, and neither possesses the form nor any
of the attributes of a legislative measure. It does not appear to have
been entertained or passed with any view or expectation of its issuing
in a law or joint resolution, or in the repeal of any law or joint
resolution, or in any other legislative action.

Whilst wanting both the form and substance of a legislative measure,
it is equally manifest that the resolution was not justified by any
of the executive powers conferred on the Senate. These powers relate
exclusively to the consideration of treaties and nominations to office,
and they are exercised in secret session and with closed doors. This
resolution does not apply to any treaty or nomination, and was passed
in a public session.

Nor does this proceeding in any way belong to that class of incidental
resolutions which relate to the officers of the Senate, to their Chamber
and other appurtenances, or to subjects of order and other matters of
the like nature, in all which either House may lawfully proceed without
any cooperation with the other or with the President.

On the contrary, the whole phraseology and sense of the resolution seem
to be judicial. Its essence, true character, and only practical effect
are to be found in the conduct which it charges upon the President and
in the judgment which it pronounces on that conduct. The resolution,
therefore, though discussed and adopted by the Senate in its legislative
capacity, is in its office and in all its characteristics essentially
judicial.

That the Senate possesses a high judicial power and that instances may
occur in which the President of the United States will be amenable to it
is undeniable; but under the provisions of the Constitution it would
seem to be equally plain that neither the President nor any other
officer can be rightfully subjected to the operation of the judicial
power of the Senate except in the cases and under the forms prescribed
by the Constitution.

The Constitution declares that "the President, Vice-President, and all
civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on
impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes
and misdemeanors;" that the House of Representatives "shall have the
sole power of impeachment;" that the Senate "shall have the sole power
to try all impeachments;" that "when sitting for that purpose they shall
be on oath or affirmation;" that "when the President of the United
States is tried the Chief Justice shall preside;" that "no person shall
be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members
present," and that "judgment shall not extend further than to removal
from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor,
trust, or profit under the United States."

The resolution above quoted charges, in substance, that in certain
proceedings relating to the public revenue the President has usurped
authority and power not conferred upon him by the Constitution and
laws, and that in doing so he violated both. Any such act constitutes
a high crime--one of the highest, indeed, which the President can
commit--a crime which justly exposes him to impeachment by the House
of Representatives, and, upon due conviction, to removal from office
and to the complete and immutable disfranchisement prescribed by the
Constitution. The resolution, then, was in substance an impeachment of
the President, and in its passage amounts to a declaration by a majority
of the Senate that he is guilty of an impeachable offense. As such it is
spread upon the journals of the Senate, published to the nation and to
the world, made part of our enduring archives, and incorporated in the
history of the age. The punishment of removal from office and future
disqualification does not, it is true, follow this decision, nor would
it have followed the like decision if the regular forms of proceeding
had been pursued, because the requisite number did not concur in the
result. But the moral influence of a solemn declaration by a majority of
the Senate that the accused is guilty of the offense charged upon him
has been as effectually secured as if the like declaration had been
made upon an impeachment expressed in the same terms. Indeed, a greater
practical effect has been gained, because the votes given for the
resolution, though not sufficient to authorize a judgment of guilty
on an impeachment, were numerous enough to carry that resolution.

That the resolution does not expressly allege that the assumption of
power and authority which it condemns was intentional and corrupt is no
answer to the preceding view of its character and effect. The act thus
condemned necessarily implies volition and design in the individual to
whom it is imputed, and, being unlawful in its character, the legal
conclusion is that it was prompted by improper motives and committed
with an unlawful intent. The charge is not of a mistake in the exercise
of supposed powers, but of the assumption of powers not conferred by
the Constitution and laws, but in derogation of both, and nothing is
suggested to excuse or palliate the turpitude of the act. In the absence
of any such excuse or palliation there is only room for one inference,
and that is that the intent was unlawful and corrupt. Besides, the
resolution not only contains no mitigating suggestions, but, on the
contrary, it holds up the act complained of as justly obnoxious to
censure and reprobation, and thus as distinctly stamps it with impurity
of motive as if the strongest epithets had been used.

The President of the United States, therefore, has been by a majority of
his constitutional triers accused and found guilty of an impeachable
offense, but in no part of this proceeding have the directions of the
Constitution been observed.

The impeachment, instead of being preferred and prosecuted by the House
of Representatives, originated in the Senate, and was prosecuted without
the aid or concurrence of the other House. The oath or affirmation
prescribed by the Constitution was not taken by the Senators, the Chief
Justice did not preside, no notice of the charge was given to the
accused, and no opportunity afforded him to respond to the accusation,
to meet his accusers face to face, to cross-examine the witnesses, to
procure counteracting testimony, or to be heard in his defense. The
safeguards and formalities which the Constitution has connected with
the power of impeachment were doubtless supposed by the framers of that
instrument to be essential to the protection of the public servant, to
the attainment of justice, and to the order, impartiality, and dignity
of the procedure. These safeguards and formalities were not only
practically disregarded in the commencement and conduct of these
proceedings, but in their result I find myself convicted by less than
two-thirds of the members present of an impeachable offense.

In vain may it be alleged in defense of this proceeding that the form of
the resolution is not that of an impeachment or of a judgment thereupon,
that the punishment prescribed in the Constitution does not follow its
adoption, or that in this case no impeachment is to be expected from the
House of Representatives. It is because it did not assume the form of an
impeachment that it is the more palpably repugnant to the Constitution,
for it is through that form only that the President is judicially
responsible to the Senate; and though neither removal from office nor
future disqualification ensues, yet it is not to be presumed that the
framers of the Constitution considered either or both of those results
as constituting the whole of the punishment they prescribed. The
judgment of _guilty_ by the highest tribunal in the Union, the stigma it
would inflict on the offender, his family, and fame, and the perpetual
record on the Journal, handing down to future generations the story of
his disgrace, were doubtless regarded by them as the bitterest portions,
if not the very essence, of that punishment. So far, therefore, as some
of its most material parts are concerned, the passage, recording, and
promulgation of the resolution are an attempt to bring them on the
President in a manner unauthorized by the Constitution. To shield him
and other officers who are liable to impeachment from consequences
so momentous, except when really merited by official delinquencies,
the Constitution has most carefully guarded the whole process of
impeachment. A majority of the House of Representatives must think the
officer guilty before he can be charged. Two-thirds of the Senate must
pronounce him guilty or he is deemed to be innocent. Forty-six Senators
appear by the Journal to have been present when the vote on the
resolution was taken. If after all the solemnities of an impeachment
thirty of those Senators had voted that the President was guilty, yet
would he have been acquitted; but by the mode of proceeding adopted in
the present case a lasting record of conviction has been entered up by
the votes of twenty-six Senators without an impeachment or trial, whilst
the Constitution expressly declares that to the entry of such a judgment
an accusation by the House of Representatives, a trial by the Senate,
and a concurrence of two-thirds in the vote of guilty shall be
indispensable prerequisites.

Whether or not an impeachment was to be expected from the House of
Representatives was a point on which the Senate had no constitutional
right to speculate, and in respect to which, even had it possessed the
spirit of prophecy, its anticipations would have furnished no just
ground for this procedure. Admitting that there was reason to believe
that a violation of the Constitution and laws had been actually
committed by the President, still it was the duty of the Senate, as his
sole constitutional judges, to wait for an impeachment until the other
House should think proper to prefer it. The members of the Senate
could have no right to infer that no impeachment was intended. On the
contrary, every legal and rational presumption on their part ought to
have been that if there was good reason to believe him guilty of an
impeachable offense the House of Representatives would perform its
constitutional duty by arraigning the offender before the justice of
his country. The contrary presumption would involve an implication
derogatory to the integrity and honor of the representatives of the
people. But suppose the suspicion thus implied were actually entertained
and for good cause, how can it justify the assumption by the Senate of
powers not conferred by the Constitution?

It is only necessary to look at the condition in which the Senate and
the President have been placed by this proceeding to perceive its utter
incompatibility with the provisions and the spirit of the Constitution
and with the plainest dictates of humanity and justice.

If the House of Representatives shall be of opinion that there is just
ground for the censure pronounced upon the President, then will it be
the solemn duty of that House to prefer the proper accusation and to
cause him to be brought to trial by the constitutional tribunal. But in
what condition would he find that tribunal? A majority of its members
have already considered the case, and have not only formed but expressed
a deliberate judgment upon its merits. It is the policy of our benign
systems of jurisprudence to secure in all criminal proceedings, and even
in the most trivial litigations, a fair, unprejudiced, and impartial
trial, and surely it can not be less important that such a trial should
be secured to the highest officer of the Government.

The Constitution makes the House of Representatives the exclusive
judges, in the first instance, of the question whether the President
has committed an impeachable offense. A majority of the Senate, whose
interference with this preliminary question has for the best of all
reasons been studiously excluded, anticipate the action of the House of
Representatives, assume not only the function which belongs exclusively
to that body, but convert themselves into accusers, witnesses, counsel,
and judges, and prejudge the whole case, thus presenting the appalling
spectacle in a free State of judges going through a labored preparation
for an impartial hearing and decision by a previous _ex parte_
investigation and sentence against the supposed offender.

There is no more settled axiom in that Government whence we derived the
model of this part of our Constitution than that "the lords can not
impeach any to themselves, nor join in the accusation, _because they
are judges_." Independently of the general reasons on which this rule
is founded, its propriety and importance are greatly increased by the
nature of the impeaching power. The power of arraigning the high
officers of government before a tribunal whose sentence may expel them
from their seats and brand them as infamous is eminently a popular
remedy--a remedy designed to be employed for the protection of private
right and public liberty against the abuses of injustice and the
encroachments of arbitrary power. But the framers of the Constitution
were also undoubtedly aware that this formidable instrument had been and
might be abused, and that from its very nature an impeachment for high
crimes and misdemeanors, whatever might be its result, would in most
cases be accompanied by so much of dishonor and reproach, solicitude and
suffering, as to make the power of preferring it one of the highest
solemnity and importance. It was due to both these considerations that
the impeaching power should be lodged in the hands of those who from
the mode of their election and the tenure of their offices would most
accurately express the popular will and at the same time be most
directly and speedily amenable to the people. The theory of these wise
and benignant intentions is in the present case effectually defeated by
the proceedings of the Senate. The members of that body represent not
the people, but the States; and though they are undoubtedly responsible
to the States, yet from their extended term of service the effect of
that responsibility during the whole period of that term must very much
depend upon their own impressions of its obligatory force. When a body
thus constituted expresses beforehand its opinion in a particular case,
and thus indirectly invites a prosecution, it not only assumes a power
intended for wise reasons to be confined to others, but it shields the
latter from that exclusive and personal responsibility under which it
was intended to be exercised, and reverses the whole scheme of this
part of the Constitution.

Such would be some of the objections to this procedure, even if it were
admitted that there is just ground for imputing to the President the
offenses charged in the resolution. But if, on the other hand, the House
of Representatives shall be of opinion that there is no reason for
charging them upon him, and shall therefore deem it improper to prefer
an impeachment, then will the violation of privilege as it respects that
House, of justice as it regards the President, and of the Constitution
as it relates to both be only the more conspicuous and impressive.

The constitutional mode of procedure on an impeachment has not only been
wholly disregarded, but some of the first principles of natural right
and enlightened jurisprudence have been violated in the very form of the
resolution. It carefully abstains from averring in _which_ of "the late
proceedings in relation to the public revenue the President has assumed
upon himself authority and power not conferred by the Constitution and
laws," It carefully abstains from specifying _what laws_ or _what parts_
of the Constitution have been violated. Why was not the certainty of the
offense--"the nature and cause of the accusation"--set out in the manner
required in the Constitution before even the humblest individual, for
the smallest crime, can be exposed to condemnation? Such a specification
was due to the accused that he might direct his defense to the real
points of attack, to the people that they might clearly understand in
what particulars their institutions had been violated, and to the truth
and certainty of our public annals. As the record now stands, whilst
the resolution plainly charges upon the President at least one act of
usurpation in "the late Executive proceedings in relation to the public
revenue," and is so framed that those Senators who believed that one
such act, and only one, had been committed could assent to it, its
language is yet broad enough to include several such acts, and so it
may have been regarded by some of those who voted for it. But though
the accusation is thus comprehensive in the censures it implies, there
is no such certainty of time, place, or circumstance as to exhibit the
particular conclusion of fact or law which induced any one Senator to
vote for it; and it may well have happened that whilst one Senator
believed that some particular act embraced in the resolution was an
arbitrary and unconstitutional assumption of power, others of the
majority may have deemed that very act both constitutional and
expedient, or, if not expedient, yet still within the pale of the
Constitution; and thus a majority of the Senators may have been enabled
to concur in a vague and undefined accusation that the President, in
the course of "the late Executive proceedings in relation to the public
revenue," had violated the Constitution and laws, whilst if a separate
vote had been taken in respect to each particular act included within
the general terms the accusers of the President might on any such vote
have been found in the minority.

Still further to exemplify this feature of the proceeding, it is
important to be remarked that the resolution as originally offered
to the Senate specified with adequate precision certain acts of the
President which it denounced as a violation of the Constitution and
laws, and that it was not until the very close of the debate, and
when perhaps it was apprehended that a majority might not sustain the
specific accusation contained in it, that the resolution was so modified
as to assume its present form. A more striking illustration of the
soundness and necessity of the rules which forbid vague and indefinite
generalities and require a reasonable certainty in all judicial
allegations, and a more glaring instance of the violation of those
rules, has seldom been exhibited.

In this view of the resolution it must certainly be regarded not as a
vindication of any particular provision of the law or the Constitution,
but simply as an official rebuke or condemnatory sentence, too general
and indefinite to be easily repelled, but yet sufficiently precise to
bring into discredit the conduct and motives of the Executive. But
whatever it may have been intended to accomplish, it is obvious that
the vague, general, and abstract form of the resolution is in perfect
keeping with those other departures from first principles and settled
improvements in jurisprudence so properly the boast of free countries
in modern times. And it is not too much to say of the whole of these
proceedings that if they shall be approved and sustained by an
intelligent people, then will that great contest with arbitrary power
which had established in statutes, in bills of rights, in sacred
charters, and in constitutions of government the right of every citizen
to a notice before trial, to a hearing before conviction, and to an
impartial tribunal for deciding on the charge have been waged in vain.

If the resolution had been left in its original form it is not to be
presumed that it could ever have received the assent of a majority
of the Senate, for the acts therein specified as violations of the
Constitution and laws were clearly within the limits of the Executive
authority. They are the "dismissing the late Secretary of the Treasury
because he would not, contrary to his sense of his own duty, remove the
money of the United States in deposit with the Bank of the United States
and its branches in conformity with the President's opinion, and
appointing his successor to effect such removal, which has been done."
But as no other specification has been substituted, and as these were
the "Executive proceedings in relation to the public revenue"
principally referred to in the course of the discussion, they will
doubtless be generally regarded as the acts intended to be denounced as
"an assumption of authority and power not conferred by the Constitution
or laws, but in derogation of both." It is therefore due to the occasion
that a condensed summary of the views of the Executive in respect to
them should be here exhibited.

By the Constitution "the executive power is vested in a President
of the United States." Among the duties imposed upon him, and which he
is sworn to perform, is that of "taking care that the laws be faithfully
executed." Being thus made responsible for the entire action of the
executive department, it was but reasonable that the power of
appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws--a
power in its nature executive--should remain in his hands. It is
therefore not only his right, but the Constitution makes it his duty,
to "nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
appoint" all "officers of the United States whose appointments are not
in the Constitution otherwise provided for," with a proviso that the
appointment of inferior officers may be vested in the President alone,
in the courts of justice, or in the heads of Departments.

The executive power vested in the Senate is neither that of "nominating"
nor "appointing." It is merely a check upon the Executive power of
appointment. If individuals are proposed for appointment by the
President by them deemed incompetent or unworthy, they may withhold
their consent and the appointment can not be made. They check the
action of the Executive, but can not in relation to those very subjects
act themselves nor direct him. Selections are still made by the
President, and the negative given to the Senate, without diminishing his
responsibility, furnishes an additional guaranty to the country that the
subordinate executive as well as the judicial offices shall be filled
with worthy and competent men.

The whole executive power being vested in the President, who is
responsible for its exercise, it is a necessary consequence that he
should have a right to employ agents of his own choice to aid him in the
performance of his duties, and to discharge them when he is no longer
willing to be responsible for their acts. In strict accordance with this
principle, the power of removal, which, like that of appointment, is
an original executive power, is left unchecked by the Constitution in
relation to all executive officers, for whose conduct the President
is responsible, while it is taken from him in relation to judicial
officers, for whose acts he is not responsible. In the Government from
which many of the fundamental principles of our system are derived the
head of the executive department originally had power to appoint and
remove at will all officers, executive and judicial. It was to take
the judges out of this general power of removal, and thus make them
independent of the Executive, that the tenure of their offices was
changed to good behavior. Nor is it conceivable why they are placed in
our Constitution upon a tenure different from that of all other officers
appointed by the Executive unless it be for the same purpose.

But if there were any just ground for doubt on the face of the
Constitution whether all executive officers are removable at the will of
the President, it is obviated by the cotemporaneous construction of the
instrument and the uniform practice under it.

The power of removal was a topic of solemn debate in the Congress of
1789 while organizing the administrative departments of the Government,
and it was finally decided that the President derived from the
Constitution the power of removal so far as it regards that department
for whose acts he is responsible. Although the debate covered the whole
ground, embracing the Treasury as well as all the other Executive
Departments, it arose on a motion to strike out of the bill to establish
a Department of Foreign Affairs, since called the Department of State,
a clause declaring the Secretary "to be removable from office by the
President of the United States." After that motion had been decided in
the negative it was perceived that these words did not convey the sense
of the House of Representatives in relation to the true source of
the power of removal. With the avowed object of preventing any future
inference that this power was exercised by the President in virtue of
a grant from Congress, when in fact that body considered it as derived
from the Constitution, the words which had been the subject of debate
were struck out, and in lieu thereof a clause was inserted in a
provision concerning the chief clerk of the Department, which declared
that "whenever the said principal officer shall be removed from office
by the President of the United States, or in any other case of vacancy,"
the chief clerk should during such vacancy have charge of the papers
of the office. This change having been made for the express purpose of
declaring the sense of Congress that the President derived the power
of removal from the Constitution, the act as it passed has always been
considered as a full expression of the sense of the legislature on this
important part of the American Constitution.

Here, then, we have the concurrent authority of President Washington, of
the Senate, and the House of Representatives, numbers of whom had taken
an active part in the convention which framed the Constitution and in
the State conventions which adopted it, that the President derived an
unqualified power of removal from that instrument itself, which is
"beyond the reach of legislative authority." Upon this principle the
Government has now been steadily administered for about forty-five
years, during which there have been numerous removals made by the
President or by his direction, embracing every grade of executive
officers from the heads of Departments to the messengers of bureaus.

The Treasury Department in the discussions of 1789 was considered on
the same footing as the other Executive Departments, and in the act
establishing it were incorporated the precise words indicative of the
sense of Congress that the President derives his power to remove the
Secretary from the Constitution, which appear in the act establishing
the Department of Foreign Affairs. An Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury was created, and it was provided that he should take charge of
the books and papers of the Department "whenever the Secretary shall
be removed from office by the President of the United States." The
Secretary of the Treasury being appointed by the President, and being
considered as constitutionally removable by him, it appears never to
have occurred to anyone in the Congress of 1789, or since until very
recently, that he was other than an executive officer, the mere
instrument of the Chief Magistrate in the execution of the laws,
subject, like all other heads of Departments, to his supervision and
control. No such idea as an officer of the Congress can be found in the
Constitution or appears to have suggested itself to those who organized
the Government. There are officers of each House the appointment of
which is authorized by the Constitution, but all officers referred to in
that instrument as coming within the appointing power of the President,
whether established thereby or created by law, are "officers of the
United States." No joint power of appointment is given to the two Houses
of Congress, nor is there any accountability to them as one body; but
as soon as any office is created by law, of whatever name or character,
the appointment of the person or persons to fill it devolves by the
Constitution upon the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, unless it be an inferior office, and the appointment be vested
by the law itself "in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in
the heads of Departments."

But at the time of the organization of the Treasury Department an
incident occurred which distinctly evinces the unanimous concurrence
of the First Congress in the principle that the Treasury Department is
wholly executive in its character and responsibilities. A motion was
made to strike out the provision of the bill making it the duty of the
Secretary "to digest and report plans for the improvement and management
of the revenue and for the support of public credit," on the ground
that it would give the executive department of the Government too much
influence and power in Congress. The motion was not opposed on the
ground that the Secretary was the officer of Congress and responsible
to that body, which would have been conclusive if admitted, but on other
ground, which conceded his executive character throughout. The whole
discussion evinces an unanimous concurrence in the principle that the
Secretary of the Treasury is wholly an executive officer, and the
struggle of the minority was to restrict his power as such. From that
time down to the present the Secretary of the Treasury, the Treasurer,
Register, Comptrollers, Auditors, and clerks who fill the offices of
that Department have in the practice of the Government been considered
and treated as on the same footing with corresponding grades of officers
in all the other Executive Departments.

The custody of the public property, under such regulations as may be
prescribed by legislative authority, has always been considered an
appropriate function of the executive department in this and all other
Governments. In accordance with this principle, every species of
property belonging to the United States (excepting that which is in the
use of the several coordinate departments of the Government as means
to aid them in performing their appropriate functions) is in charge of
officers appointed by the President, whether it be lands, or buildings,
or merchandise, or provisions, or clothing, or arms and munitions of
war. The superintendents and keepers of the whole are appointed by the
President, responsible to him, and removable at his will.

Public money is but a species of public property. It can not be raised
by taxation or customs, nor brought into the Treasury in any other way
except by law; but whenever or howsoever obtained, its custody always
has been and always must be, unless the Constitution be changed,
intrusted to the executive department. No officer can be created by
Congress for the purpose of taking charge of it whose appointment would
not by the Constitution at once devolve on the President and who would
not be responsible to him for the faithful performance of his duties.
The legislative power may undoubtedly bind him and the President by any
laws they may think proper to enact; they may prescribe in what place
particular portions of the public property shall be kept and for what
reason it shall be removed, as they may direct that supplies for the
Army or Navy shall be kept in particular stores, and it will be the duty
of the President to see that the law is faithfully executed; yet will
the custody remain in the executive department of the Government. Were
the Congress to assume, with or without a legislative act, the power of
appointing officers, independently of the President, to take the charge
and custody of the public property contained in the military and naval
arsenals, magazines, and storehouses, it is believed that such an act
would be regarded by all as a palpable usurpation of executive power,
subversive of the form as well as the fundamental principles of our
Government. But where is the difference in principle whether the public
property be in the form of arms, munitions of war, and supplies or in
gold and silver or bank notes? None can be perceived; none is believed
to exist. Congress can not, therefore, take out of the hands of the
executive department the custody of the public property or money without
an assumption of executive power and a subversion of the first
principles of the Constitution.

The Congress of the United States have never passed an act imperatively
directing that the public moneys shall be kept in any particular place
or places. From the origin of the Government to the year 1816 the
statute book was wholly silent on the subject. In 1789 a Treasurer was
created, subordinate to the Secretary of the Treasury, and through him
to the President. He was required to give bond safely to keep and
faithfully to disburse the public moneys, without any direction as to
the manner or places in which they should be kept. By reference to the
practice of the Government it is found that from its first organization
the Secretary of the Treasury, acting under the supervision of the
President, designated the places in which the public moneys should be
kept, and especially directed all transfers from place to place. This
practice was continued, with the silent acquiescence of Congress, from
1789 down to 1816, and although many banks were selected and discharged,
and although a portion of the moneys were first placed in the State
banks, and then in the former Bank of the United States, and upon the
dissolution of that were again transferred to the State banks, no
legislation was thought necessary by Congress, and all the operations
were originated and perfected by Executive authority. The Secretary of
the Treasury, responsible to the President, and with his approbation,
made contracts and arrangements in relation to the whole subject-matter,
which was thus entirely committed to the direction of the President
under his responsibilities to the American people and to those who were
authorized to impeach and punish him for any breach of this important
trust.

The act of 1816 establishing the Bank of the United States directed the
deposits of public money to be made in that bank and its branches in
places in which the said bank and branches thereof may be established,
"unless the Secretary of the Treasury should otherwise order and
direct," in which event he was required to give his reasons to Congress.
This was but a continuation of his preexisting power as the head of an
Executive Department to direct where the deposits should be made, with
the superadded obligation of giving his reasons to Congress for making
them elsewhere than in the Bank of the United States and its branches.
It is not to be considered that this provision in any degree altered the
relation between the Secretary of the Treasury and the President as the
responsible head of the executive department, or released the latter
from his constitutional obligation to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed." On the contrary, it increased his responsibilities
by adding another to the long list of laws which it was his duty to
carry into effect.

It would be an extraordinary result if because the person charged by
law with a public duty is one of his Secretaries it were less the duty
of the President to see that law faithfully executed than other laws
enjoining duties upon subordinate officers or private citizens. If there
be any difference, it would seem that the obligation is the stronger in
relation to the former, because the neglect is in his presence and the
remedy at hand.

It can not be doubted that it was the legal duty of the Secretary of the
Treasury to order and direct the deposits of the public money to be made
elsewhere than in the Bank of the United States _whenever sufficient
reasons existed for making the change_. If in such a case he neglected
or refused to act, he would neglect or refuse to execute the law.
What would be the sworn duty of the President? Could he say that the
Constitution did not bind him to see the law faithfully executed because
it was one of his Secretaries and not himself upon whom the service was
specially imposed? Might he not be asked whether there was any such
limitation to his obligations prescribed in the Constitution? Whether he
is not equally bound to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,
whether they impose duties on the highest officer of State or the lowest
subordinate in any of the Departments? Might he not be told that it was
for the sole purpose of causing all executive officers, from the highest
to the lowest, faithfully to perform the services required of them by
law that the people of the United States have made him their Chief
Magistrate and the Constitution has clothed him with the entire
executive power of this Government? The principles implied in these
questions appear too plain to need elucidation.

But here also we have a cotemporaneous construction of the act which
shows that it was not understood as in any way changing the relations
between the President and Secretary of the Treasury, or as placing the
latter out of Executive control even in relation to the deposits of the
public money. Nor on that point are we left to any equivocal testimony.
The documents of the Treasury Department show that the Secretary of the
Treasury did apply to the President and obtained his approbation and
sanction to the original transfer of the public deposits to the present
Bank of the United States, and did carry the measure into effect in
obedience to his decision. They also show that transfers of the public
deposits from the branches of the Bank of the United States to State
banks at Chillicothe, Cincinnati, and Louisville, in 1819, were made
with the approbation of the President and by his authority. They show
that upon all important questions appertaining to his Department,
whether they related to the public deposits or other matters, it was
the constant practice of the Secretary of the Treasury to obtain for
his acts the approval and sanction of the President. These acts and the
principles on which they were founded were known to all the departments
of the Government, to Congress and the country, and until very recently
appear never to have been called in question.

Thus was it settled by the Constitution, the laws, and the whole
practice of the Government that the entire executive power is vested
in the President of the United States; that as incident to that power
the right of appointing and removing those officers who are to aid
him in the execution of the laws, with such restrictions only as the
Constitution prescribes, is vested in the President; that the Secretary
of the Treasury is one of those officers; that the custody of the public
property and money is an Executive function which, in relation to the
money, has always been exercised through the Secretary of the Treasury
and his subordinates; that in the performance of these duties he is
subject to the supervision and control of the President, and in all
important measures having relation to them consults the Chief Magistrate
and obtains his approval and sanction; that the law establishing the
bank did not, as it could not, change the relation between the President
and the Secretary--did not release the former from his obligation to
see the law faithfully executed nor the latter from the President's
supervision and control; that afterwards and before the Secretary did
in fact consult and obtain the sanction of the President to transfers
and removals of the public deposits, and that all departments of the
Government, and the nation itself, approved or acquiesced in these acts
and principles as in strict conformity with our Constitution and laws.

During the last year the approaching termination, according to the
provisions of its charter and the solemn decision of the American
people, of the Bank of the United States made it expedient, and its
exposed abuses and corruptions made it, in my opinion, the duty of the
Secretary of the Treasury, to place the moneys of the United States in
other depositories. The Secretary did not concur in that opinion, and
declined giving the necessary order and direction. So glaring were the
abuses and corruptions of the bank, so evident its fixed purpose to
persevere in them, and so palpable its design by its money and power to
control the Government and change its character, that I deemed it the
imperative duty of the Executive authority, by the exertion of every
power confided to it by the Constitution and laws, to check its career
and lessen its ability to do mischief, even in the painful alternative
of dismissing the head of one of the Departments. At the time the
removal was made other causes sufficient to justify it existed, but
if they had not the Secretary would have been dismissed for this
cause only.

His place I supplied by one whose opinions were well known to me,
and whose frank expression of them in another situation and generous
sacrifices of interest and feeling when unexpectedly called to the
station he now occupies ought forever to have shielded his motives from
Suspicion and his character from reproach. In accordance with the views
long before expressed by him he proceeded, with my sanction, to make
arrangements for depositing the moneys of the United States in other
safe institutions.

The resolution of the Senate as originally framed and as passed, if it
refers to these acts, presupposes a right in that body to interfere with
this exercise of Executive power. If the principle be once admitted, it
is not difficult to perceive where it may end. If by a mere denunciation
like this resolution the President should ever be induced to act in a
matter of official duty contrary to the honest convictions of his own
mind in compliance with the wishes of the Senate, the constitutional
independence of the executive department would be as effectually
destroyed and its power as effectually transferred to the Senate as if
that end had been accomplished by an amendment of the Constitution. But
if the Senate have a right to interfere with the Executive powers, they
have also the right to make that interference effective, and if the
assertion of the power implied in the resolution be silently acquiesced
in we may reasonably apprehend that it will be followed at some future
day by an attempt at actual enforcement. The Senate may refuse, except
on the condition that he will surrender his opinions to theirs and obey
their will, to perform their own constitutional functions, to pass the
necessary laws, to sanction appropriations proposed by the House of
Representatives, and to confirm proper nominations made by the
President. It has already been maintained (and it is not conceivable
that the resolution of the Senate can be based on any other principle)
that the Secretary of the Treasury is the officer of Congress and
independent of the President; that the President has no right to control
him, and consequently none to remove him. With the same propriety and on
similar grounds may the Secretary of State, the Secretaries of War and
the Navy, and the Postmaster-General each in succession be declared
independent of the President, the subordinates of Congress, and
removable only with the concurrence of the Senate. Followed to its
consequences, this principle will be found effectually to destroy one
coordinate department of the Government, to concentrate in the hands
of the Senate the whole executive power, and to leave the President
as powerless as he would be useless--the shadow of authority after
the substance had departed.

The time and the occasion which have called forth the resolution of the
Senate seem to impose upon me an additional obligation not to pass it
over in silence. Nearly forty-five years had the President exercised,
without a question as to his rightful authority, those powers for the
recent assumption of which he is now denounced. The vicissitudes of
peace and war had attended our Government; violent parties, watchful to
take advantage of any seeming usurpation on the part of the Executive,
had distracted our councils; frequent removals, or forced resignations
in every sense tantamount to removals, had been made of the Secretary
and other officers of the Treasury, and yet in no one instance is it
known that any man, whether patriot or partisan, had raised his voice
against it as a violation of the Constitution. The expediency and
justice of such changes in reference to public officers of all grades
have frequently been the topic of discussion, but the constitutional
right of the President to appoint, control, and remove the head of the
Treasury as well as all other Departments seems to have been universally
conceded. And what is the occasion upon which other principles have been
first officially asserted? The Bank of the United States, a great
moneyed monopoly, had attempted to obtain a renewal of its charter
by controlling the elections of the people and the action of the
Government. The use of its corporate funds and power in that attempt
was fully disclosed, and it was made known to the President that the
corporation was putting in train the same course of measures, with the
view of making another vigorous effort, through an interference in
the elections of the people, to control public opinion and force the
Government to yield to its demands. This, with its corruption of the
press, its violation of its charter, its exclusion of the Government
directors from its proceedings, its neglect of duty and arrogant
pretensions, made it, in the opinion of the President, incompatible with
the public interest and the safety of our institutions that it should
be longer employed as the fiscal agent of the Treasury. A Secretary of
the Treasury appointed in the recess of the Senate, who had not been
confirmed by that body, and whom the President might or might not at
his pleasure nominate to them, refused to do what his superior in the
executive department considered the most imperative of his duties, and
became in fact, however innocent his motives, the protector of the bank.
And on this occasion it is discovered for the first time that those who
framed the Constitution misunderstood it; that the First Congress and
all its successors have been under a delusion; that the practice of near
forty-five years is but a continued usurpation; that the Secretary of
the Treasury is not responsible to the President, and that to remove him
is a violation of the Constitution and laws for which the President
deserves to stand forever dishonored on the journals of the Senate.

There are also some other circumstances connected with the discussion
and passage of the resolution to which I feel it to be not only my
right, but my duty, to refer. It appears by the Journal of the Senate
that among the twenty-six Senators who voted for the resolution on its
final passage, and who had supported it in debate in its original form,
were one of the Senators from the State of Maine, the two Senators from
New Jersey, and one of the Senators from Ohio. It also appears by the
same Journal and by the files of the Senate that the legislatures of
these States had severally expressed their opinions in respect to the
Executive proceedings drawn in question before the Senate.

The two branches of the legislature of the State of Maine on the 25th
of January, 1834, passed a preamble and series of resolutions in the
following words:


  Whereas at an early period after the election of Andrew Jackson to the
  Presidency, in accordance with the sentiments which he had uniformly
  expressed, the attention of Congress was called to the constitutionality
  and expediency of the renewal of the charter of the United States Bank;
  and

  Whereas the bank has transcended its chartered limits in the management
  of its business transactions, and has abandoned the object of its
  creation by engaging in political controversies, by wielding its power
  and influence to embarrass the Administration of the General Government,
  and by bringing insolvency and distress upon the commercial community;
  and

  Whereas the public security from such an institution consists less in
  its present pecuniary capacity to discharge its liabilities than in the
  fidelity with which the trusts reposed in it have been executed; and

  Whereas the abuse and misapplication of the powers conferred have
  destroyed the confidence of the public in the officers of the bank and
  demonstrated that such powers endanger the stability of republican
  institutions: Therefore,

  _Resolved_, That in the removal of the public deposits from the Bank
  of the United States, as well as in the manner of their removal, we
  recognize in the Administration an adherence to constitutional rights
  and the performance of a public duty.

  _Resolved_, That this legislature entertain the same opinion as
  heretofore expressed by preceding legislatures of this State, that the
  Bank of the United States ought not to be rechartered.

  _Resolved_, That the Senators of this State in the Congress of the
  United States be instructed and the Representatives be requested to
  oppose the restoration of the deposits and the renewal of the charter
  of the United States Bank.


On the 11th of January, 1834, the house of assembly and council
composing the legislature of the State of New Jersey passed a preamble
and a series of resolutions in the following words:


  Whereas the present crisis in our public affairs calls for a decided
  expression of the voice of the people of this State; and

  Whereas we consider it the undoubted right of the legislatures of the
  several States to instruct those who represent their interests in the
  councils of the nation in all matters which intimately concern the
  public weal and may affect the happiness or well-being of the people:
  Therefore,

  1. _Be it resolved by the council and general assembly of this State_,
  That while we acknowledge with feelings of devout gratitude our
  obligations to the Great Ruler of Nations for His mercies to us as a
  people that we have been preserved alike from foreign war, from the
  evils of internal commotions, and the machinations of designing and
  ambitious men who would prostrate the fair fabric of our Union, that
  we ought nevertheless to humble ourselves in His presence and implore
  His aid for the perpetuation of our republican institutions and for a
  continuance of that unexampled prosperity which our country has hitherto
  enjoyed.

  2. _Resolved_, That we have undiminished confidence in the integrity and
  firmness of the venerable patriot who now holds the distinguished post
  of Chief Magistrate of this nation, and whose purity of purpose and
  elevated motives have so often received the unqualified approbation of
  a large majority of his fellow-citizens.

  3. _Resolved_, That we view with agitation and alarm the existence of a
  great moneyed incorporation which threatens to embarrass the operations
  of the Government and by means of its unbounded influence upon the
  currency of the country to scatter distress and ruin throughout the
  community, and that we therefore solemnly believe the present Bank of
  the United States ought not to be rechartered.

  4. _Resolved_, That our Senators in Congress be instructed and our
  members of the House of Representatives be requested to sustain, by
  their votes and influence, the course adopted by the Secretary of the
  Treasury, Mr. Taney, in relation to the Bank of the United States and
  the deposits of the Government moneys, believing as we do the course
  of the Secretary to have been constitutional, and that the public good
  required its adoption.

  5. _Resolved_, That the governor be requested to forward a copy of the
  above resolutions to each of our Senators and Representatives from this
  State to the Congress of the United States.


On the 21st day of February last the legislature of the same State
reiterated the opinions and instructions before given by joint
resolutions in the following words:


  _Resolved by the council and general assembly of the State of New
  Jersey_, That they do adhere to the resolutions passed by them on the
  11th day of January last, relative to the President of the United
  States, the Bank of the United States, and the course of Mr. Taney
  in removing the Government deposits.

  _Resolved_, That the legislature of New Jersey have not seen any
  reason to depart from such resolutions since the passage thereof,
  and it is their wish that they should receive from our Senators and
  Representatives of this State in the Congress of the United States that
  attention and obedience which are due to the opinion of a sovereign
  State openly expressed in its legislative capacity.


On the 2d of January, 1834, the senate and house of representatives
composing the legislature of Ohio passed a preamble and resolutions in
the following words:


  Whereas there is reason to believe that the Bank of the United States
  will attempt to obtain a renewal of its charter at the present session
  of Congress; and

  Whereas it is abundantly evident that said bank has exercised powers
  derogatory to the spirit of our free institutions and dangerous to the
  liberties of these United States; and

  Whereas there is just reason to doubt the constitutional power of
  Congress to grant acts of incorporation for banking purposes out of
  the District of Columbia; and

  Whereas we believe the proper disposal of the public lands to be of the
  utmost importance to the people of these United States, and that honor
  and good faith require their equitable distribution: Therefore,

  _Resolved by the general assembly of the State of Ohio_, That we
  consider the removal of the public deposits from the Bank of the United
  States as required by the best interests of our country, and that a
  proper sense of public duty imperiously demanded that that institution
  should be no longer used as a depository of the public funds.

  _Resolved also_, That we view with decided disapprobation the renewed
  attempts in Congress to secure the passage of the bill providing for the
  disposal of the public domain upon the principles proposed by Mr. Clay,
  inasmuch as we believe that such a law would be unequal in its
  operations and unjust in its results.

  _Resolved also_, That we heartily approve of the principles set forth
  in the late veto message upon that subject; and

  _Resolved_, That our Senators in Congress be instructed and our
  Representatives requested to use their influence to prevent the
  rechartering of the Bank of the United States, to sustain the
  Administration in its removal of the public deposits, and to oppose the
  passage of a land bill containing the principles adopted in the act upon
  that subject passed at the last session of Congress.

  _Resolved_, That the governor be requested to transmit copies of the
  foregoing preamble and resolutions to each of our Senators and
  Representatives.


It is thus seen that four Senators have declared by their votes that the
President, in the late Executive proceedings in relation to the revenue,
had been guilty of the impeachable offense of "assuming upon himself
authority and power not conferred by the Constitution and laws, but in
derogation of both," whilst the legislatures of their respective States
had deliberately approved those very proceedings as consistent with the
Constitution and demanded by the public good. If these four votes had
been given in accordance with the sentiments of the legislatures, as
above expressed, there would have been but twenty-two votes out of
forty-six for censuring the President, and the unprecedented record
of his conviction could not have been placed upon the Journal of the
Senate.

In thus referring to the resolutions and instructions of the State
legislatures I disclaim and repudiate all authority or design to
interfere with the responsibility due from members of the Senate to
their own consciences, their constituents, and their country. The facts
now stated belong to the history of these proceedings, and are important
to the just development of the principles and interests involved in them
as well as to the proper vindication of the executive department, and
with that view, and that view only, are they here made the topic of
remark.

The dangerous tendency of the doctrine which denies to the President
the power of supervising, directing, and controlling the Secretary of
the Treasury in like manner with the other executive officers would
soon be manifest in practice were the doctrine to be established. The
President is the direct representative of the American people, but the
Secretaries are not. If the Secretary of the Treasury be independent
of the President in the execution of the laws, then is there no direct
responsibility to the people in that important branch of this Government
to which is committed the care of the national finances. And it is in
the power of the Bank of the United States, or any other corporation,
body of men, or individuals, if a Secretary shall be found to accord
with them in opinion or can be induced in practice to promote their
views, to control through him the whole action of the Government
(so far as it is exercised by his Department) in defiance of the Chief
Magistrate elected by the people and responsible to them.

But the evil tendency of the particular doctrine adverted to, though
sufficiently serious, would be as nothing in comparison with the
pernicious consequences which would inevitably flow from the approbation
and allowance by the people and the practice by the Senate of the
unconstitutional power of arraigning and censuring the official conduct
of the Executive in the manner recently pursued. Such proceedings are
eminently calculated to unsettle the foundations of the Government, to
disturb the harmonious action of its different departments, and to break
down the checks and balances by which the wisdom of its framers sought
to insure its stability and usefulness.

The honest differences of opinion which occasionally exist between the
Senate and the President in regard to matters in which both are obliged
to participate are sufficiently embarrassing; but if the course recently
adopted by the Senate shall hereafter be frequently pursued, it is not
only obvious that the harmony of the relations between the President and
the Senate will be destroyed, but that other and graver effects will
ultimately ensue. If the censures of the Senate be submitted to by the
President, the confidence of the people in his ability and virtue and
the character and usefulness of his Administration will soon be at an
end, and the real power of the Government will fall into the hands of a
body holding their offices for long terms, not elected by the people and
not to them directly responsible. If, on the other hand, the illegal
censures of the Senate should be resisted by the President, collisions
and angry controversies might ensue, discreditable in their progress and
in the end compelling the people to adopt the conclusion either that
their Chief Magistrate was unworthy of their respect or that the Senate
was chargeable with calumny and injustice. Either of these results would
impair public confidence in the perfection of the system and lead to
serious alterations of its framework or to the practical abandonment of
some of its provisions.

The influence of such proceedings on the other departments of the
Government, and more especially on the States, could not fail to be
extensively pernicious. When the judges in the last resort of official
misconduct themselves overleap the bounds of their authority as
prescribed by the Constitution, what general disregard of its provisions
might not their example be expected to produce? And who does not
perceive that such contempt of the Federal Constitution by one of its
most important departments would hold out the strongest temptations to
resistance on the part of the State sovereignties whenever they shall
suppose their just rights to have been invaded? Thus all the independent
departments of the Government, and the States which compose our
confederated Union, instead of attending to their appropriate duties and
leaving those who may offend to be reclaimed or punished in the manner
pointed out in the Constitution, would fall to mutual crimination and
recrimination and give to the people confusion and anarchy instead of
order and law, until at length some form of aristocratic power would be
established on the ruins of the Constitution or the States be broken
into separate communities.

Far be it from me to charge or to insinuate that the present Senate of
the United States intend in the most distant way to encourage such a
result. It is not of their motives or designs, but only of the tendency
of their acts, that it is my duty to speak. It is, if possible, to
make Senators themselves sensible of the danger which lurks under the
precedent set in their resolution, and at any rate to perform my duty
as the responsible head of one of the coequal departments of the
Government, that I have been compelled to point out the consequences
to which the discussion and passage of the resolution may lead if the
tendency of the measure be not checked in its inception. It is due to
the high trust with which I have been charged, to those who may be
called to succeed me in it, to the representatives of the people whose
constitutional prerogative has been unlawfully assumed, to the people
and to the States, and to the Constitution they have established that
I should not permit its provisions to be broken down by such an attack
on the executive department without at least some effort "to preserve,
protect, and defend" them. With this view, and for the reasons which
have been stated, I do hereby _solemnly protest_ against the
aforementioned proceedings of the Senate as unauthorized by the
Constitution, contrary to its spirit and to several of its express
provisions, subversive of that distribution of the powers of government
which it has ordained and established, destructive of the checks and
safeguards by which those powers were intended on the one hand to be
controlled and on the other to be protected, and calculated by their
immediate and collateral effects, by their character and tendency, to
concentrate in the hands of a body not directly amenable to the people
a degree of influence and power dangerous to their liberties and fatal
to the Constitution of their choice.

The resolution of the Senate contains an imputation upon my private as
well as upon my public character, and as it must stand forever on their
journals, I can not close this substitute for that defense which I have
not been allowed to present in the ordinary form without remarking
that I have lived in vain if it be necessary to enter into a formal
vindication of my character and purposes from such an imputation. In
vain do I bear upon my person enduring memorials of that contest in
which American liberty was purchased; in vain have I since periled
property, fame, and life in defense of the rights and privileges so
dearly bought; in vain am I now, without a personal aspiration or the
hope of individual advantage, encountering responsibilities and dangers
from which by mere inactivity in relation to a single point I might have
been exempt, if any serious doubts can be entertained as to the purity
of my purposes and motives. If I had been ambitious, I should have
sought an alliance with that powerful institution which even now aspires
to no divided empire. If I had been venal, I should have sold myself to
its designs. Had I preferred personal comfort and official ease to the
performance of my arduous duty, I should have ceased to molest it. In
the history of conquerors and usurpers, never in the fire of youth nor
in the vigor of manhood could I find an attraction to lure me from the
path of duty, and now I shall scarcely find an inducement to commence
their career of ambition when gray hairs and a decaying frame, instead
of inviting to toil and battle, call me to the contemplation of other
worlds, where conquerors cease to be honored and usurpers expiate their
crimes. The only ambition I can feel is to acquit myself to Him to whom
I must soon render an account of my stewardship, to serve my fellow-men,
and live respected and honored in the history of my country. No;
the ambition which leads me on is an anxious desire and a fixed
determination to return to the people unimpaired the sacred trust they
have confided to my charge; to heal the wounds of the Constitution and
preserve it from further violation; to persuade my countrymen, so far
as I may, that it is not in a splendid government supported by powerful
monopolies and aristocratical establishments that they will find
happiness or their liberties protection, but in a plain system, void
of pomp, protecting all and granting favors to none, dispensing its
blessings, like the dews of Heaven, unseen and unfelt save in the
freshness and beauty they contribute to produce. It is such a government
that the genius of our people requires; such an one only under which our
States may remain for ages to come united, prosperous, and free. If
the Almighty Being who has hitherto sustained and protected me will
but vouchsafe to make my feeble powers instrumental to such a result,
I shall anticipate with pleasure the place to be assigned me in the
history of my country, and die contented with the belief that I have
contributed in some small degree to increase the value and prolong the
duration of American liberty.

To the end that the resolution of the Senate may not be hereafter
drawn into precedent with the authority of silent acquiescence on the
part of the executive department, and to the end also that my motives
and views in the Executive proceedings denounced in that resolution may
be known to my fellow-citizens, to the world, and to all posterity, I
respectfully request that this message and protest may be entered at
length on the journals of the Senate.

ANDREW JACKSON.



APRIL 21, 1834.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

Having reason to believe that certain passages contained in my message
and protest transmitted to the Senate on the 17th [15th] instant may be
misunderstood, I think it proper to state that it was not my intention
to deny in the said message the power and right of the legislative
department to provide by law for the custody, safe-keeping, and
disposition of the public money and property of the United States.

Although I am well satisfied that such a construction is not warranted
by anything contained in that message, yet aware from experience that
detached passages of an argumentative document, when disconnected from
their context and considered without reference to previous limitations
and the particular positions they were intended to refute or to
establish, may be made to bear a construction varying altogether from
the sentiments really entertained and intended to be expressed, and
deeply solicitous that my views on this point should not, either now or
hereafter, be misapprehended, I have deemed it due to the gravity of
the subject, to the great interests it involves, and to the Senate
as well as to myself to embrace the earliest opportunity to make this
communication.

I admit without reserve, as I have before done, the constitutional power
of the Legislature to prescribe by law the place or places in which the
public money or other property is to be deposited, and to make such
regulations concerning its custody, removal, or disposition as they may
think proper to enact. Nor do I claim for the Executive any right to
the possession or disposition of the public property or treasure or
any authority to interfere with the same, except when such possession,
disposition, or authority is given to him by law. Nor do I claim the
right in any manner to supervise or interfere with the person intrusted
with such property or treasure, unless he be an officer whose
appointment, under the Constitution and laws, is devolved upon the
President alone or in conjunction with the Senate, and for whose conduct
he is constitutionally responsible.

As the message and protest referred to may appear on the Journal of
the Senate and remain among the recorded documents of the nation,
I am unwilling that opinions should be imputed to me, even through
misconstruction, which are not entertained, and more particularly
am I solicitous that I may not be supposed to claim for myself or
my successors any power or authority not clearly granted by the
Constitution and laws to the President. I have therefore respectfully to
request that this communication may be considered a part of that message
and that it may be entered therewith on the journals of the Senate.

ANDREW JACKSON.




EXECUTIVE ORDERS.


HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

_Washington, June 21, 1834_.

ORDER 46.


The Major-General Commanding the Army has received through the War
Department the following General Order from the President of the United
States:

GENERAL ORDER.

WASHINGTON, _June 21, 1834_.

Information having been received of the death of General Lafayette,
the President considers it due to his own feelings as well as to the
character and services of that lamented man to announce the event to
the Army and Navy.

Lafayette was a citizen of France, but he was the distinguished friend
of the United States. In early life he embarked in that contest which
secured freedom and independence to our country. His services and
sacrifices constitute a part of our Revolutionary history, and his
memory will be second only to that of Washington in the hearts of the
American people. In his own country and in ours he was the zealous and
uniform friend and advocate of rational liberty. Consistent in his
principles and conduct, he never during a long life committed an act
which exposed him to just accusation or which will expose his memory
to reproach. Living at a period of great excitement and of moral and
political revolutions, engaged in many of the important events which
fixed the attention of the world, and invited to guide the destinies of
France at two of the most momentous eras of her history, his political
integrity and personal disinterestedness have not been called in
question. Happy in such a life, he has been happy in his death. He
has been taken from the theater of action with faculties unimpaired,
with a reputation unquestioned, and an object of veneration wherever
civilization and the rights of man have extended; and mourning, as we
may and must, his departure, let us rejoice that this associate of
Washington has gone, as we humbly hope, to rejoin his illustrious
commander in the fullness of days and of honor.

He came in his youth to defend our country. He came in the maturity of
his age to witness her growth in all the elements of prosperity, and
while witnessing these he received those testimonials of national
gratitude which proved how strong was his hold upon the affections of
the American people.

One melancholy duty remains to be performed. The last major-general of
the Revolutionary army has died. Himself a young and humble participator
in the struggles of that period, the President feels called on as well
by personal as public considerations to direct that appropriate honors
be paid to the memory of this distinguished patriot and soldier. He
therefore orders that the same honors be rendered upon this occasion at
the different military and naval stations as were observed upon the
decease of Washington, the Father of his Country, and his contemporary
in arms.

In ordering this homage to be paid to the memory of one so eminent in
the field, so wise in council, so endeared in private life, and so well
and favorably known to both hemispheres the President feels assured that
he is anticipating the sentiments not of the Army and Navy only, but of
the whole American people.

ANDREW JACKSON.


In obedience to the commands of the President, the following funeral
honors will be paid at the several stations of the Army:

At daybreak twenty-four guns will be fired in quick succession, and one
gun at the interval of every half hour thereafter till sunset.

The flags of the several stations will during the day be at half-mast.
The officers of the Army will wear crape on the left arm for the period
of six months.

This order will be carried into effect under the direction of the
commanding officer of each post and station the day after its reception.

By command of Major-General Macomb, commanding in chief:

R. JONES,

_Adjutant-General_



GREEN HILL, _October 12, 1834_.

Hon. LEVI WOODBURY,

_Secretary of the Treasury_.

MY DEAR SIR: I inclose you two letters from two of our most respectable
citizens. They are good men and true. The letters relate to matters
under your immediate charge, and when I come on to Washington will see
about them.

Marshall was our candidate for the legislature, and has no doubt lost
his election through the influence of the United States officers at that
post, who are all of them opposed to us, and if we lose _Brown_ this
winter from the Senate it will be owing mainly and chiefly to this.
The county of Carterett sends three members to the legislature, and is
Jackson to the _hub_; but Major Kirby, who commands at Fort Macon, has
used his influence in conjunction with D. Borden, who finds the troops
with provisions, in favor of the opposition, and have beaten our men by
small majorities. The troops, it seems, were paid off in Virginia money,
which is below _par_ in our State, and this just on the eve of the
election, and hence you may see the turn that was given to the matter.
Dr. Hunt, who wishes to be appointed surgeon at Occracock, is a fine
man, and I should like for him to have it; but of these matters more
when I see you.

You see our new bank has gone into operation. Suppose you open a
correspondence [with] them about the matter we have been talking about.
It is _all important_ that this matter should be attended to. With
sentiments of great respect, I am, dear sir, yours, etc.,

J. SPEIGHT.

[Indorsement.]

Let a strict inquiry be had into the conduct of the officers
complained of, and particularly why the paymaster has paid the troops in
depreciated paper when he could as easily paid them in specie. It is his
duty in all cases so to do, as all the revenue is specie and all public
dues are payable in specie.

A.J.




SIXTH ANNUAL MESSAGE.


DECEMBER 1, 1834.

_Fellow-Citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives_:

In performing my duty at the opening of your present session it gives me
pleasure to congratulate you again upon the prosperous condition of our
beloved country. Divine Providence has favored us with general health,
with rich rewards in the fields of agriculture and in every branch of
labor, and with peace to cultivate and extend the various resources
which employ the virtue and enterprise of our citizens. Let us trust
that in surveying a scene so flattering to our free institutions our
joint deliberations to preserve them may be crowned with success.

Our foreign relations continue, with but few exceptions, to maintain the
favorable aspect which they bore in my last annual message, and promise
to extend those advantages which the principles that regulate our
intercourse with other nations are so well calculated to secure.

The question of the northeastern boundary is still pending with Great
Britain, and the proposition made in accordance with the resolution of
the Senate for the establishment of a line according to the treaty of
1783 has not been accepted by that Government. Believing that every
disposition is felt on both sides to adjust this perplexing question to
the satisfaction of all the parties interested in it, the hope is yet
indulged that it may be effected on the basis of that proposition.

With the Governments of Austria, Russia, Prussia, Holland, Sweden, and
Denmark the best understanding exists. Commerce with all is fostered and
protected by reciprocal good will under the sanction of liberal
conventional or legal provisions.

In the midst of her internal difficulties the Queen of Spain has
ratified the convention for the payment of the claims of our citizens
arising since 1819. It is in the course of execution on her part, and a
copy of it is now laid before you for such legislation as may be found
necessary to enable those interested to derive the benefits of it.

Yielding to the force of circumstances and to the wise counsels of time
and experience, that power has finally resolved no longer to occupy the
unnatural position in which she stood to the new Governments established
in this hemisphere. I have the great satisfaction of stating to you that
in preparing the way for the restoration of harmony between those who
have sprung from the same ancestors, who are allied by common interests,
profess the same religion, and speak the same language the United States
have been actively instrumental. Our efforts to effect this good work
will be persevered in while they are deemed useful to the parties and
our entire disinterestedness continues to be felt and understood. The
act of Congress to countervail the discriminating duties to the
prejudice of our navigation levied in Cuba and Puerto Rico has been
transmitted to the minister of the United States at Madrid, to be
communicated to the Government of the Queen. No intelligence of its
receipt has yet reached the Department of State. If the present
condition of the country permits the Government to make a careful and
enlarged examination of the true interests of these important portions
of its dominions, no doubt is entertained that their future intercourse
with the United States will be placed upon a more just and liberal
basis.

The Florida archives have not yet been selected and delivered. Recent
orders have been sent to the agent of the United States at Havana to
return with all that he can obtain, so that they may be in Washington
before the session of the Supreme Court, to be used in the legal
questions there pending to which the Government is a party.

Internal tranquillity is happily restored to Portugal. The distracted
state of the country rendered unavoidable the postponement of a final
payment of the just claims of our citizens. Our diplomatic relations
will be soon resumed, and the long-subsisting friendship with that power
affords the strongest guaranty that the balance due will receive prompt
attention.

The first installment due under the convention of indemnity with the
King of the Two Sicilies has been duly received, and an offer has been
made to extinguish the whole by a prompt payment--an offer I did not
consider myself authorized to accept, as the indemnification provided
is the exclusive property of individual citizens of the United States.
The original adjustment of our claims and the anxiety displayed to
fulfill at once the stipulations made for the payment of them are highly
honorable to the Government of the Two Sicilies. When it is recollected
that they were the result of the injustice of an intrusive power
temporarily dominant in its territory, a repugnance to acknowledge and
to pay which would have been neither unnatural nor unexpected, the
circumstances can not fail to exalt its character for justice and good
faith in the eyes of all nations.

The treaty of amity and commerce between the United States and Belgium,
brought to your notice in my last annual message as sanctioned by the
Senate, but the ratifications of which had not been exchanged owing
to a delay in its reception at Brussels and a subsequent absence
of the Belgian minister of foreign affairs, has been, after mature
deliberation, finally disavowed by that Government as inconsistent
with the powers and instructions given to their minister who negotiated
it. This disavowal was entirely unexpected, as the liberal principles
embodied in the convention, and which form the groundwork of the
objections to it, were perfectly satisfactory to the Belgian
representative, and were supposed to be not only within the powers
granted, but expressly conformable to the instructions given to him.
An offer, not yet accepted, has been made by Belgium to renew
negotiations for a treaty less liberal in its provisions on questions
of general maritime law.

Our newly established relations with the Sublime Porte promise to
be useful to our commerce and satisfactory in every respect to this
Government. Our intercourse with the Barbary Powers continues without
important change, except that the present political state of Algiers has
induced me to terminate the residence there of a salaried consul and
to substitute an ordinary consulate, to remain so long as the place
continues in the possession of France. Our first treaty with one of
these powers, the Emperor of Morocco, was formed in 1786, and was
limited to fifty years. That period has almost expired. I shall take
measures to renew it with the greater satisfaction as its stipulations
are just and liberal and have been, with mutual fidelity and reciprocal
advantage, scrupulously fulfilled.

Intestine dissensions have too frequently occurred to mar the
prosperity, interrupt the commerce, and distract the governments of most
of the nations of this hemisphere which have separated themselves from
Spain. When a firm and permanent understanding with the parent country
shall have produced a formal acknowledgment of their independence, and
the idea of danger from that quarter can be no longer entertained, the
friends of freedom expect that those countries, so favored by nature,
will be distinguished for their love of justice and their devotion
to those peaceful arts the assiduous cultivation of which confers
honor upon nations and gives value to human life. In the meantime
I confidently hope that the apprehensions entertained that some of
the people of these luxuriant regions may be tempted, in a moment of
unworthy distrust of their own capacity for the enjoyment of liberty, to
commit the too common error of purchasing present repose by bestowing
on some favorite leaders the fatal gift of irresponsible power will
not be realized. With all these Governments and with that of Brazil no
unexpected changes in our relations have occurred during the present
year. Frequent causes of just complaint have arisen upon the part of the
citizens of the United States, sometimes from the irregular action of
the constituted subordinate authorities of the maritime regions and
sometimes from the leaders or partisans of those in arms against the
established Governments. In all cases representations have been or
will be made, and as soon as their political affairs are in a settled
position it is expected that our friendly remonstrances will be
followed by adequate redress.

The Government of Mexico made known in December last the appointment
of commissioners and a surveyor on its part to run, in conjunction with
ours, the boundary line between its territories and the United States,
and excused the delay for the reasons anticipated--the prevalence of
civil war. The commissioners and surveyors not having met within the
time stipulated by the treaty, a new arrangement became necessary,
and our chargé d'affaires was instructed in January last to negotiate
in Mexico an article additional to the preexisting treaty. This
instruction was acknowledged, and no difficulty was apprehended in
the accomplishment of that object. By information just received that
additional article to the treaty will be obtained and transmitted to
this country as soon as it can receive the ratification of the Mexican
Congress.

The reunion of the three States of New Grenada, Venezuela, and Equador,
forming the Republic of Colombia, seems every day to become more
improbable. The commissioners of the two first are understood to be now
negotiating a just division of the obligations contracted by them when
united under one government. The civil war in Equador, it is believed,
has prevented even the appointment of a commissioner on its part.

I propose at an early day to submit, in the proper form, the appointment
of a diplomatic agent to Venezuela, the importance of the commerce of
that country to the United States and the large claims of our citizens
upon the Government arising before and since the division of Colombia
rendering it, in my judgment, improper longer to delay this step.

Our representatives to Central America, Peru, and Brazil are either at
or on their way to their respective posts.

From the Argentine Republic, from which a minister was expected to this
Government, nothing further has been heard. Occasion has been taken on
the departure of a new consul to Buenos Ayres to remind that Government
that its long-delayed minister, whose appointment had been made known to
us, had not arrived.

It becomes my unpleasant duty to inform you that this pacific and highly
gratifying picture of our foreign relations does not include those with
France at this time. It is not possible that any Government and people
could be more sincerely desirous of conciliating a just and friendly
intercourse with another nation than are those of the United States
with their ancient ally and friend. This disposition is founded as well
on the most grateful and honorable recollections associated with our
struggle for independence as upon a well-grounded conviction that it is
consonant with the true policy of both. The people of the United States
could not, therefore, see without the deepest regret even a temporary
interruption of the friendly relations between the two countries--a
regret which would, I am sure, be greatly aggravated if there should
turn out to be any reasonable ground for attributing such a result to
any act of omission or commission on our part. I derive, therefore, the
highest satisfaction from being able to assure you that the whole course
of this Government has been characterized by a spirit so conciliatory
and forbearing as to make it impossible that our justice and moderation
should be questioned, whatever may be the consequences of a longer
perseverance on the part of the French Government in her omission to
satisfy the conceded claims of our citizens.

The history of the accumulated and unprovoked aggressions upon our
commerce committed by authority of the existing Governments of France
between the years 1800 and 1817 has been rendered too painfully familiar
to Americans to make its repetition either necessary or desirable. It
will be sufficient here to remark that there has for many years been
scarcely a single administration of the French Government by whom the
justice and legality of the claims of our citizens to indemnity were
not to a very considerable extent admitted, and yet near a quarter of
a century has been wasted in ineffectual negotiations to secure it.

Deeply sensible of the injurious effects resulting from this state of
things upon the interests and character of both nations, I regarded it
as among my first duties to cause one more effort to be made to satisfy
France that a just and liberal settlement of our claims was as well due
to her own honor as to their incontestable validity. The negotiation for
this purpose was commenced with the late Government of France, and was
prosecuted with such success as to leave no reasonable ground to doubt
that a settlement of a character quite as liberal as that which was
subsequently made would have been effected had not the revolution by
which the negotiation was cut off taken place. The discussions were
resumed with the present Government, and the result showed that we
were not wrong in supposing that an event by which the two Governments
were made to approach each other so much nearer in their political
principles, and by which the motives for the most liberal and friendly
intercourse were so greatly multiplied, could exercise no other than a
salutary influence upon the negotiation. After the most deliberate and
thorough examination of the whole subject a treaty between the two
Governments was concluded and signed at Paris on the 4th of July, 1831,
by which it was stipulated that "the French Government, in order to
liberate itself from all the reclamations preferred against it by
citizens of the United States for unlawful seizures, captures,
sequestrations, confiscations, or destruction of their vessels, cargoes,
or other property, engages to pay a sum of 25,000,000 francs to the
United States, who shall distribute it among those entitled in the
manner and according to the rules it shall determine;" and it was also
stipulated on the part of the French Government that this 25,000,000
francs should "be paid at Paris, in six annual installments of 4,166,666
francs and 66 centimes each, into the hands of such person or persons as
shall be authorized by the Government of the United States to receive
it," the first installment to be paid "at the expiration of one year
next following the exchange of the ratifications of this convention and
the others at successive intervals of a year, one after another, till
the whole shall be paid. To the amount of each of the said installments
shall be added interest at 4 per cent thereupon, as upon the other
installments then remaining unpaid, the said interest to be computed
from the day of the exchange of the present convention."

It was also stipulated on the part of the United States, for the
purpose of being completely liberated from all the reclamations
presented by France on behalf of its citizens, that the sum of 1,500,000
francs should be paid to the Government of France in six annual
installments, to be deducted out of the annual sums which France had
agreed to pay, interest thereupon being in like manner computed from
the day of the exchange of the ratifications. In addition to this
stipulation, important advantages were secured to France by the
following article, viz:

The wines of France, from and after the exchange of the ratifications of
the present convention, shall be admitted to consumption in the States
of the Union at duties which shall not exceed the following rates by the
gallon (such as it is used at present for wines in the United States),
to wit: 6 cents for red wines in casks; 10 cents for white wines in
casks, and 22 cents for wines of all sorts in bottles. The proportions
existing between the duties on French wines thus reduced and the general
rates of the tariff which went into operation the 1st January, 1829,
shall be maintained in case the Government of the United States should
think proper to diminish those general rates in a new tariff.

In consideration of this stipulation, which shall be binding on
the United States for ten years, the French Government abandons the
reclamations which it had formed in relation to the eighth article of
the treaty of cession of Louisiana. It engages, moreover, to establish
on the _long-staple_ cottons of the United States which after the
exchange of the ratifications of the present convention shall be brought
directly thence to France by the vessels of the United States or by
French vessels the same duties as on _short-staple_ cottons.

This treaty was duly ratified in the manner prescribed by the
constitutions of both countries, and the ratification was exchanged
at the city of Washington on the 2d of February, 1832. On account of
its commercial stipulations it was in five days thereafter laid before
the Congress of the United States, which proceeded to enact such laws
favorable to the commerce of France as were necessary to carry it into
full execution, and France has from that period to the present been in
the unrestricted enjoyment of the valuable privileges that were thus
secured to her. The faith of the French nation having been thus solemnly
pledged through its constitutional organ for the liquidation and
ultimate payment of the long-deferred claims of our citizens, as also
for the adjustment of other points of great and reciprocal benefits
to both countries, and the United States having, with a fidelity
and promptitude by which their conduct will, I trust, be always
characterized, done everything that was necessary to carry the treaty
into full and fair effect on their part, counted with the most perfect
confidence on equal fidelity and promptitude on the part of the French
Government. In this reasonable expectation we have been, I regret to
inform you, wholly disappointed. No legislative provision has been made
by France for the execution of the treaty, either as it respects the
indemnity to be paid or the commercial benefits to be secured to the
United States, and the relations between the United States and that
power in consequence thereof are placed in a situation threatening to
interrupt the good understanding which has so long and so happily
existed between the two nations.

Not only has the French Government been thus wanting in the performance
of the stipulations it has so solemnly entered into with the United
States, but its omissions have been marked by circumstances which would
seem to leave us without satisfactory evidences that such performance
will certainly take place at a future period. Advice of the exchange of
ratifications reached Paris prior to the 8th April, 1832. The French
Chambers were then sitting, and continued in session until the 21st of
that month, and although one installment of the indemnity was payable on
the 2d of February, 1833, one year after the exchange of ratifications,
no application was made to the Chambers for the required appropriation,
and in consequence of no appropriation having then been made the draft
of the United States Government for that installment was dishonored by
the minister of finance, and the United States thereby involved in
much controversy. The next session of the Chambers commenced on
the 19th November, 1832, and continued until the 25th April, 1833.
Notwithstanding the omission to pay the first installment had been made
the subject of earnest remonstrance on our part, the treaty with the
United States and a bill making the necessary appropriations to execute
it were not laid before the Chamber of Deputies until the 6th of April,
nearly five months after its meeting, and only nineteen days before the
close of the session. The bill was read and referred to a committee, but
there was no further action upon it. The next session of the Chambers
commenced on the 26th of April, 1833, and continued until the 26th of
June following. A new bill was introduced on the 11th of June, but
nothing important was done in relation to it during the session. In the
month of April, 1834, nearly three years after the signature of the
treaty, the final action of the French Chambers upon the bill to carry
the treaty into effect was obtained, and resulted in a refusal of the
necessary appropriations. The avowed grounds upon which the bill was
rejected are to be found in the published debates of that body, and
no observations of mine can be necessary to satisfy Congress of their
utter insufficiency. Although the gross amount of the claims of our
citizens is probably greater than will be ultimately allowed by the
commissioners, sufficient is, nevertheless, shown to render it
absolutely certain that the indemnity falls far short of the actual
amount of our just claims, independently of the question of damages and
interest for the detention. That the settlement involved a sacrifice
in this respect was well known at the time--a sacrifice which was
cheerfully acquiesced in by the different branches of the Federal
Government, whose action upon the treaty was required from a sincere
desire to avoid further collision upon this old and disturbing subject
and in the confident expectation that the general relations between the
two countries would be improved thereby.

The refusal to vote the appropriation, the news of which was received
from our minister in Paris about the 15th day of May last, might have
been considered the final determination of the French Government not
to execute the stipulations of the treaty, and would have justified an
immediate communication of the facts to Congress, with a recommendation
of such ultimate measures as the interest and honor of the United States
might seem to require. But with the news of the refusal of the Chambers
to make the appropriation were conveyed the regrets of the King and a
declaration that a national vessel should be forthwith sent out with
instructions to the French minister to give the most ample explanations
of the past and the strongest assurances for the future. After a long
passage the promised dispatch vessel arrived. The pledges given by the
French minister upon receipt of his instructions were that as soon
after the election of the new members as the charter would permit
the legislative Chambers of France should be called together and
the proposition for an appropriation laid before them; that all the
constitutional powers of the King and his cabinet should be exerted to
accomplish the object, and that the result should be made known early
enough to be communicated to Congress at the commencement of the
present session. Relying upon these pledges, and not doubting that the
acknowledged justice of our claims, the promised exertions of the King
and his cabinet, and, above all, that sacred regard for the national
faith and honor for which the French character has been so distinguished
would secure an early execution of the treaty in all its parts, I did
not deem it necessary to call the attention of Congress to the subject
at the last session.

I regret to say that the pledges made through the minister of France
have not been redeemed. The new Chambers met on the 3its July last, and
although the subject of fulfilling treaties was alluded to in the speech
from the throne, no attempt was made by the King or his cabinet to
procure an appropriation to carry it into execution. The reasons given
for this omission, although they might be considered sufficient in an
ordinary case, are not consistent with the expectations founded upon the
assurances given here, for there is no constitutional obstacle to
entering into legislative business at the first meeting of the Chambers.
This point, however, might have been overlooked had not the Chambers,
instead of being called to meet at so early a day that the result of
their deliberations might be communicated to me before the meeting of
Congress, been prorogued to the 29th of the present month--a period so
late that their decision can scarcely be made known to the present
Congress prior to its dissolution. To avoid this delay our minister in
Paris, in virtue of the assurance given by the French minister in the
United States, strongly urged the convocation of the Chambers at an
earlier day, but without success. It is proper to remark, however, that
this refusal has been accompanied with the most positive assurances on
the part of the executive government of France of their intention to
press the appropriation at the ensuing session of the Chambers.

The executive branch of this Government has, as matters stand, exhausted
all the authority upon the subject with which it is invested and which
it had any reason to believe could be beneficially employed.

The idea of acquiescing in the refusal to execute the treaty will not,
I am confident, be for a moment entertained by any branch of this
Government, and further negotiation upon the subject is equally out of
the question.

If it shall be the pleasure of Congress to await the further action
of the French Chambers, no further consideration of the subject will
at this session probably be required at your hands. But if from the
original delay in asking for an appropriation, from the refusal of the
Chambers to grant it when asked, from the omission to bring the subject
before the Chambers at their last session, from the fact that, including
that session, there have been five different occasions when the
appropriation might have been made, and from the delay in convoking the
Chambers until some weeks after the meeting of Congress, when it was
well known that a communication of the whole subject to Congress at the
last session was prevented by assurances that it should be disposed of
before its present meeting, you should feel yourselves constrained to
doubt whether it be the intention of the French Government, in all its
branches, to carry the treaty into effect, and think that such measures
as the occasion may be deemed to call for should be now adopted, the
important question arises what those measures shall be.

Our institutions are essentially pacific. Peace and friendly intercourse
with all nations are as much the desire of our Government as they are
the interest of our people. But these objects are not to be permanently
secured by surrendering the rights of our citizens or permitting solemn
treaties for their indemnity, in cases of flagrant wrong, to be
abrogated or set aside.

It is undoubtedly in the power of Congress seriously to affect the
agricultural and manufacturing interests of France by the passage
of laws relating to her trade with the United States. Her products,
manufactures, and tonnage may be subjected to heavy duties in our ports,
or all commercial intercourse with her may be suspended. But there
are powerful and to my mind conclusive objections to this mode of
proceeding. We can not embarrass or cut off the trade of France without
at the same time in some degree embarrassing or cutting off our own
trade. The injury of such a warfare must fall, though unequally, upon
our own citizens, and could not but impair the means of the Government
and weaken that united sentiment in support of the rights and honor of
the nation which must now pervade every bosom. Nor is it impossible that
such a course of legislation would introduce once more into our national
councils those disturbing questions in relation to the tariff of duties
which have been so recently put to rest. Besides, by every measure
adopted by the Government of the United States with the view of injuring
France the clear perception of right which will induce our own people
and the rulers and people of all other nations, even of France herself,
to pronounce our quarrel just will be obscured and the support rendered
to us in a final resort to more decisive measures will be more limited
and equivocal. There is but one point in the controversy, and upon that
the whole civilized world must pronounce France to be in the wrong. We
insist that she shall pay us a sum of money which she has acknowledged
to be due, and of the justice of this demand there can be but one
opinion among mankind. True policy would seem to dictate that the
question at issue should be kept thus disencumbered and that not the
slightest pretense should be given to France to persist in her refusal
to make payment by any act on our part affecting the interests of her
people. The question should be left, as it is now, in such an attitude
that when France fulfills her treaty stipulations all controversy will
be at an end.

It is my conviction that the United States ought to insist on a prompt
execution of the treaty, and in case it be refused or longer delayed
take redress into their own hands. After the delay on the part of France
of a quarter of a century in acknowledging these claims by treaty, it is
not to be tolerated that another quarter of a century is to be wasted in
negotiating about the payment. The laws of nations provide a remedy for
such occasions. It is a well-settled principle of the international code
that where one nation owes another a liquidated debt which it refuses or
neglects to pay the aggrieved party may seize on the property belonging
to the other, its citizens or subjects, sufficient to pay the debt
without giving just cause of war. This remedy has been repeatedly
resorted to, and recently by France herself toward Portugal, under
circumstances less unquestionable.

The time at which resort should be had to this or any other mode of
redress is a point to be decided by Congress. If an appropriation shall
not be made by the French Chambers at their next session, it may justly
be concluded that the Government of France has finally determined to
disregard its own solemn undertaking and refuse to pay an acknowledged
debt. In that event every day's delay on our part will be a stain upon
our national honor, as well as a denial of justice to our injured
citizens. Prompt measures, when the refusal of France shall be complete,
will not only be most honorable and just, but will have the best effect
upon our national character.

Since France, in violation of the pledges given through her minister
here, has delayed her final action so long that her decision will
not probably be known in time to be communicated to this Congress,
I recommend that a law be passed authorizing reprisals upon French
property in case provision shall not be made for the payment of the debt
at the approaching session of the French Chambers. Such a measure ought
not to be considered by France as a menace. Her pride and power are too
well known to expect anything from her fears and preclude the necessity
of a declaration that nothing partaking of the character of intimidation
is intended by us. She ought to look upon it as the evidence only of an
inflexible determination on the part of the United States to insist
on their rights. That Government, by doing only what it has itself
acknowledged to be just, will be able to spare the United States the
necessity of taking redress into their own hands and save the property
of French citizens from that seizure and sequestration which American
citizens so long endured without retaliation or redress. If she should
continue to refuse that act of acknowledged justice and, in violation
of the law of nations, make reprisals on our part the occasion of
hostilities against the United States, she would but add violence to
injustice, and could not fail to expose herself to the just censure
of civilized nations and to the retributive judgments of Heaven.

Collision with France is the more to be regretted on account of the
position she occupies in Europe in relation to liberal institutions, but
in maintaining our national rights and honor all governments are alike
to us. If by a collision with France in a case where she is clearly
in the wrong the march of liberal principles shall be impeded, the
responsibility for that result as well as every other will rest on her
own head.

Having submitted these considerations, it belongs to Congress to decide
whether after what has taken place it will still await the further
action of the French Chambers or now adopt such provisional measures
as it may deem necessary and best adapted to protect the rights and
maintain the honor of the country. Whatever that decision may be, it
will be faithfully enforced by the Executive as far as he is authorized
so to do.

According to the estimate of the Treasury Department, the revenue
accruing from all sources during the present year will amount to
$20,624,717, which, with the balance remaining in the Treasury
on the 1st of January last of $11,702,905, produces an aggregate of
$32,327,623. The total expenditure during the year for all objects,
including the public debt, is estimated at $25,591,390, which will leave
a balance in the Treasury on the 1st of January, 1835, of $6,736,232.
In this balance, however, will be included about $1,150,000 of what was
heretofore reported by the Department as not effective.

Of former appropriations it is estimated that there will remain
unexpended at the close of the year $8,002,925, and that of this sum
there will not be required more than $5,141,964 to accomplish the
objects of all the current appropriations. Thus it appears that after
satisfying all those appropriations and after discharging the last item
of our public debt, which will be done on the 1st of January next, there
will remain unexpended in the Treasury an effective balance of about
$440,000. That such should be the aspect of our finances is highly
flattering to the industry and enterprise of our population and
auspicious of the wealth and prosperity which await the future
cultivation of their growing resources. It is not deemed prudent,
however, to recommend any change for the present in our impost rates,
the effect of the gradual reduction now in progress in many of them not
being sufficiently tested to guide us in determining the precise amount
of revenue which they will produce.

Free from public debt, at peace with all the world, and with no
complicated interests to consult in our intercourse with foreign powers,
the present may be hailed as the epoch in our history the most favorable
for the settlement of those principles in our domestic policy which
shall be best calculated to give stability to our Republic and secure
the blessings of freedom to our citizens.

Among these principles, from our past experience, it can not be doubted
that simplicity in the character of the Federal Government and a rigid
economy in its administration should be regarded as fundamental and
sacred. All must be sensible that the existence of the public debt, by
rendering taxation necessary for its extinguishment, has increased the
difficulties which are inseparable from every exercise of the taxing
power, and that it was in this respect a remote agent in producing those
disturbing questions which grew out of the discussions relating to
the tariff. If such has been the tendency of a debt incurred in the
acquisition and maintenance of our national rights and liberties, the
obligations of which all portions of the Union cheerfully acknowledged,
it must be obvious that whatever is calculated to increase the burdens
of Government without necessity must be fatal to all our hopes of
preserving its true character. While we are felicitating ourselves,
therefore, upon the extinguishment of the national debt and the
prosperous state of our finances, let us not be tempted to depart from
those sound maxims of public policy which enjoin a just adaptation of
the revenue to the expenditures that are consistent with a rigid economy
and an entire abstinence from all topics of legislation that are not
clearly within the constitutional powers of the Government and suggested
by the wants of the country. Properly regarded under such a policy,
every diminution of the public burdens arising from taxation gives to
individual enterprise increased power and furnishes to all the members
of our happy Confederacy new motives for patriotic affection and
support. But above all, its most important effect will be found in its
influence upon the character of the Government by confining its action
to those objects which will be sure to secure to it the attachment and
support of our fellow-citizens.

Circumstances make it my duty to call the attention of Congress to
the Bank of the United States. Created for the convenience of the
Government, that institution has become the scourge of the people. Its
interference to postpone the payment of a portion of the national debt
that it might retain the public money appropriated for that purpose to
strengthen it in a political contest, the extraordinary extension and
contraction of its accommodations to the community, its corrupt and
partisan loans, its exclusion of the public directors from a knowledge
of its most important proceedings, the unlimited authority conferred on
the president to expend its funds in hiring writers and procuring the
execution of printing, and the use made of that authority, the retention
of the pension money and books after the selection of new agents, the
groundless claim to heavy damages in consequence of the protest of the
bill drawn on the French Government, have through various channels been
laid before Congress. Immediately after the close of the last session
the bank, through its president, announced its ability and readiness to
abandon the system of unparalleled curtailment and the interruption of
domestic exchanges which it had practiced upon from the 1st of August,
1833, to the 30th of June, 1834, and to extend its accommodations to
the community. The grounds assumed in this annunciation amounted to an
acknowledgment that the curtailment, in the extent to which it had been
carried, was not necessary to the safety of the bank, and had been
persisted in merely to induce Congress to grant the prayer of the bank
in its memorial relative to the removal of the deposits and to give it
a new charter. They were substantially a confession that all the real
distresses which individuals and the country had endured for the
preceding six or eight months had been needlessly produced by it,
with the view of affecting through the sufferings of the people the
legislative action of Congress. It is a subject of congratulation
that Congress and the country had the virtue and firmness to bear the
infliction, that the energies of our people soon found relief from this
wanton tyranny in vast importations of the precious metals from almost
every part of the world, and that at the close of this tremendous effort
to control our Government the bank found itself powerless and no longer
able to loan out its surplus means. The community had learned to manage
its affairs without its assistance, and trade had already found new
auxiliaries, so that on the 1st of October last the extraordinary
spectacle was presented of a national bank more than one-half of whose
capital was either lying unproductive in its vaults or in the hands of
foreign bankers.

To the needless distresses brought on the country during the last
session of Congress has since been added the open seizure of the
dividends on the public stock to the amount of $170,041, under pretense
of paying damages, cost, and interest upon the protested French bill.
This sum constituted a portion of the estimated revenues for the year
1834, upon which the appropriations made by Congress were based. It
would as soon have been expected that our collectors would seize on the
customs or the receivers of our land offices on the moneys arising from
the sale of public lands under pretenses of claims against the United
States as that the bank would have retained the dividends. Indeed, if
the principle be established that anyone who chooses to set up a claim
against the United States may without authority of law seize on the
public property or money wherever he can find it to pay such claim,
there will remain no assurance that our revenue will reach the Treasury
or that it will be applied after the appropriation to the purposes
designated in the law. The paymasters of our Army and the pursers of our
Navy may under like pretenses apply to their own use moneys appropriated
to set in motion the public force, and in time of war leave the country
without defense. This measure resorted to by the bank is disorganizing
and revolutionary, and if generally resorted to by private citizens in
like cases would fill the land with anarchy and violence.

It is a constitutional provision "that no money shall be drawn from
the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law." The
palpable object of this provision is to prevent the expenditure of the
public money for any purpose whatsoever which shall not have been first
approved by the representatives of the people and the States in Congress
assembled. It vests the power of declaring for what purposes the public
money shall be expended in the legislative department of the Government,
to the exclusion of the executive and judicial, and it is not within
the constitutional authority of either of those departments to pay it
away without law or to sanction its payment. According to this plain
constitutional provision, the claim of the bank can never be paid
without an appropriation by act of Congress. But the bank has never
asked for an appropriation. It attempts to defeat the provision of the
Constitution and obtain payment without an act of Congress. Instead of
awaiting an appropriation passed by both Houses and approved by the
President, it makes an appropriation for itself and invites an appeal
to the judiciary to sanction it. That the money had not technically
been paid into the Treasury does not affect the principle intended to
be established by the Constitution. The Executive and the judiciary
have as little right to appropriate and expend the public money without
authority of law before it is placed to the credit of the Treasury as to
take it from the Treasury. In the annual report of the Secretary of the
Treasury, and in his correspondence with the president of the bank, and
the opinions of the Attorney-General accompanying it, you will find a
further examination of the claims of the bank and the course it has
pursued.

It seems due to the safety of the public funds remaining in that bank
and to the honor of the American people that measures be taken to
separate the Government entirely from an institution so mischievous to
the public prosperity and so regardless of the Constitution and laws. By
transferring the public deposits, by appointing other pension agents as
far as it had the power, by ordering the discontinuance of the receipt
of bank checks in the payment of the public dues after the 1st day of
January, the Executive has exerted all its lawful authority to sever the
connection between the Government and this faithless corporation.

The high-handed career of this institution imposes upon the
constitutional functionaries of this Government duties of the gravest
and most imperative character--duties which they can not avoid and from
which I trust there will be no inclination on the part of any of them
to shrink. My own sense of them is most clear, as is also my readiness
to discharge those which may rightfully fall on me. To continue any
business relations with the Bank of the United States that may be
avoided without a violation of the national faith after that institution
has set at open defiance the conceded right of the Government to examine
its affairs, after it has done all in its power to deride the public
authority in other respects and to bring it into disrepute at home and
abroad, after it has attempted to defeat the clearly expressed will of
the people by turning against them the immense power intrusted to its
hands and by involving a country otherwise peaceful, flourishing, and
happy, in dissension, embarrassment, and distress, would make the nation
itself a party to the degradation so sedulously prepared for its public
agents and do much to destroy the confidence of mankind in popular
governments and to bring into contempt their authority and efficiency.
In guarding against an evil of such magnitude considerations of
temporary convenience should be thrown out of the question, and we
should be influenced by such motives only as look to the honor and
preservation of the republican system. Deeply and solemnly impressed
with the justice of these views, I feel it to be my duty to recommend to
you that a law be passed authorizing the sale of the public stock: that
the provision of the charter requiring the receipt of notes of the bank
in payment of public dues shall, in accordance with the power reserved
to Congress in the fourteenth section of the charter, be suspended until
the bank pays to the Treasury the dividends withheld, and that all laws
connecting the Government or its officers with the bank, directly or
indirectly, be repealed, and that the institution be left hereafter
to its own resources and means.

Events have satisfied my mind, and I think the minds of the American
people, that the mischiefs and dangers which flow from a national bank
far overbalance all its advantages. The bold effort the present bank has
made to control the Government, the distresses it has wantonly produced,
the violence of which it has been the occasion in one of our cities
famed for its observance of law and order, are but premonitions of the
fate which awaits the American people should they be deluded into a
perpetuation of this institution or the establishment of another like
it. It is fervently hoped that thus admonished those who have heretofore
favored the establishment of a substitute for the present bank will
be induced to abandon it, as it is evidently better to incur any
inconvenience that may be reasonably expected than to concentrate the
whole moneyed power of the Republic in any form whatsoever or under
any restrictions.

Happily it is already illustrated that the agency of such an institution
is not necessary to the fiscal operations of the Government. The State
banks are found fully adequate to the performance of all services which
were required of the Bank of the United States, quite as promptly and
with the same cheapness. They have maintained themselves and discharged
all these duties while the Bank of the United States was still powerful
and in the field as an open enemy, and it is not possible to conceive
that they will find greater difficulties in their operations when that
enemy shall cease to exist.

The attention of Congress is earnestly invited to the regulation of the
deposits in the State banks by law. Although the power now exercised by
the executive department in this behalf is only such as was uniformly
exerted through every Administration from the origin of the Government
up to the establishment of the present bank, yet it is one which
is susceptible of regulation by law, and therefore ought so to be
regulated. The power of Congress to direct in what places the Treasurer
shall keep the moneys in the Treasury and to impose restrictions upon
the Executive authority in relation to their custody and removal is
unlimited, and its exercise will rather be courted than discouraged by
those public officers and agents on whom rests the responsibility for
their safety. It is desirable that as little power as possible should
be left to the President or the Secretary of the Treasury over those
institutions, which, being thus freed from Executive influence, and
without a common head to direct their operations, would have neither the
temptation nor the ability to interfere in the political conflicts of
the country. Not deriving their charters from the national authorities,
they would never have those inducements to meddle in general elections
which have led the Bank of the United States to agitate and convulse the
country for upward of two years.

The progress of our gold coinage is creditable to the officers of
the Mint, and promises in a short period to furnish the country with a
sound and portable currency, which will much diminish the inconvenience
to travelers of the want of a general paper currency should the State
banks be incapable of furnishing it. Those institutions have already
shown themselves competent to purchase and furnish domestic exchange
for the convenience of trade at reasonable rates, and not a doubt is
entertained that in a short period all the wants of the country in bank
accommodations and exchange will be supplied as promptly and as cheaply
as they have heretofore been by the Bank of the United States. If the
several States shall be induced gradually to reform their banking
systems and prohibit the issue of all small notes, we shall in a few
years have a currency as sound and as little liable to fluctuations
as any other commercial country.

The report of the Secretary of War, together with the accompanying
documents from the several bureaus of that Department, will exhibit
the situation of the various objects committed to its administration.

No event has occurred since your last session rendering necessary any
movements of the Army, with the exception of the expedition of the
regiment of dragoons into the territory of the wandering and predatory
tribes inhabiting the western frontier and living adjacent to the
Mexican boundary. These tribes have been heretofore known to us
principally by their attacks upon our own citizens and upon other
Indians entitled to the protection of the United States. It became
necessary for the peace of the frontiers to check these habitual
inroads, and I am happy to inform you that the object has been effected
without the commission of any act of hostility. Colonel Dodge and the
troops under his command have acted with equal firmness and humanity,
and an arrangement has been made with those Indians which it is hoped
will assure their permanent pacific relations with the United States and
the other tribes of Indians upon that border. It is to be regretted that
the prevalence of sickness in that quarter has deprived the country of a
number of valuable lives, and particularly that General Leavenworth, an
officer well known, and esteemed for his gallant services in the late
war and for his subsequent good conduct, has fallen a victim to his zeal
and exertions in the discharge of his duty.

The Army is in a high state of discipline. Its moral condition, so far
as that is known here, is good, and the various branches of the public
service are carefully attended to. It is amply sufficient under its
present organization for providing the necessary garrisons for the
seaboard and for the defense of the internal frontier, and also for
preserving the elements of military knowledge and for keeping pace
with those improvements which modern experience is continually making.
And these objects appear to me to embrace all the legitimate purposes
for which a permanent military force should be maintained in our
country. The lessons of history teach us its danger and the tendency
which exists to an increase. This can be best met and averted by a just
caution on the part of the public itself, and of those who represent
them in Congress.

From the duties which devolve on the Engineer Department and upon
the topographical engineers, a different organization seems to be
demanded by the public interest, and I recommend the subject to
your consideration.

No important change has during this season taken place in the condition
of the Indians. Arrangements are in progress for the removal of the
Creeks, and will soon be for the removal of the Seminoles. I regret that
the Cherokees east of the Mississippi have not yet determined as a
community to remove. How long the personal causes which have heretofore
retarded that ultimately inevitable measure will continue to operate
I am unable to conjecture. It is certain, however, that delay will bring
with it accumulated evils which will render their condition more and
more unpleasant. The experience of every year adds to the conviction
that emigration, and that alone, can preserve from destruction the
remnant of the tribes yet living amongst us. The facility with which the
necessaries of life are procured and the treaty stipulations providing
aid for the emigrant Indians in their agricultural pursuits and in the
important concern of education, and their removal from those causes
which have heretofore depressed all and destroyed many of the tribes,
can not fail to stimulate their exertions and to reward their industry.

The two laws passed at the last session of Congress on the subject of
Indian affairs have been carried into effect, and detailed instructions
for their administration have been given. It will be seen by the
estimates for the present session that a great reduction will take place
in the expenditures of the Department in consequence of these laws, and
there is reason to believe that their operation will be salutary and
that the colonization of the Indians on the western frontier, together
with a judicious system of administration, will still further reduce
the expenses of this branch of the public service and at the same time
promote its usefulness and efficiency.

Circumstances have been recently developed showing the existence of
extensive frauds under the various laws granting pensions and gratuities
for Revolutionary services. It is impossible to estimate the amount
which may have been thus fraudulently obtained from the National
Treasury. I am satisfied, however, it has been such as to justify a
reexamination of the system and the adoption of the necessary checks in
its administration. All will agree that the services and sufferings of
the remnant of our Revolutionary band should be fully compensated; but
while this is done, every proper precaution should be taken to prevent
the admission of fabricated and fraudulent claims. In the present mode
of proceeding the attestations and certificates of the judicial officers
of the various States form a considerable portion of the checks which
are interposed against the commission of frauds. These, however, have
been and may be fabricated, and in such a way as to elude detection at
the examining offices. And independently of this practical difficulty,
it is ascertained that these documents are often loosely granted;
sometimes even blank certificates have been issued; sometimes prepared
papers have been signed without inquiry, and in one instance, at least,
the seal of the court has been within reach of a person most interested
in its improper application. It is obvious that under such circumstances
no severity of administration can check the abuse of the law. And
information has from time to time been communicated to the Pension
Office questioning or denying the right of persons placed upon the
pension list to the bounty of the country. Such cautions are always
attended to and examined, but a far more general investigation is called
for, and I therefore recommend, in conformity with the suggestion of the
Secretary of War, that an actual inspection should be made in each State
into the circumstances and claims of every person now drawing a pension.
The honest veteran has nothing to fear from such a scrutiny, while the
fraudulent claimant will be detected and the public Treasury relieved to
an amount, I have reason to believe, far greater than has heretofore
been suspected. The details of such a plan could be so regulated as to
interpose the necessary checks without any burdensome operation upon the
pensioners. The object should be twofold:

1. To look into the original justice of the claims, so far as this can
be done under a proper system of regulations, by an examination of the
claimants themselves and by inquiring in the vicinity of their residence
into their history and into the opinion entertained of their
Revolutionary services.

2. To ascertain in all cases whether the original claimant is living,
and this by actual personal inspection.

This measure will, if adopted, be productive, I think, of the desired
results, and I therefore recommend it to your consideration, with the
further suggestion that all payments should be suspended till the
necessary reports are received.

It will be seen by a tabular statement annexed to the documents
transmitted to Congress that the appropriations for objects connected
with the War Department, made at the last session, for the service of
the year 1834, excluding the permanent appropriation for the payment of
military gratuities under the act of June 7, 1832, the appropriation of
$200,000 for arming and equipping the militia, and the appropriation of
$10,000 for the civilization of the Indians, which are not annually
renewed, amounted to the sum of $9,003,261, and that the estimates of
appropriations necessary for the same branches of service for the year
1835 amount to the sum of $5,778,964, making a difference in the
appropriations of the current year over the estimates of the
appropriations for the next of $3,224,297.

The principal causes which have operated at this time to produce this
great difference are shown in the reports and documents and in the
detailed estimates. Some of these causes are accidental and temporary;
while others are permanent, and, aided by a just course of
administration, may continue to operate beneficially upon the public
expenditures.

A just economy, expending where the public service requires and
withholding where it does not, is among the indispensable duties of
the Government.

I refer you to the accompanying report of the Secretary of the Navy
and to the documents with it for a full view of the operations of that
important branch of our service during the present year. It will be
seen that the wisdom and liberality with which Congress has provided
for the gradual increase of our navy material have been seconded by a
corresponding zeal and fidelity on the part of those to whom has been
confided the execution of the laws on the subject, and that but a short
period would be now required to put in commission a force large enough
for any exigency into which the country may be thrown.

When we reflect upon our position in relation to other nations, it
must be apparent that in the event of conflicts with them we must look
chiefly to our Navy for the protection of our national rights. The wide
seas which separate us from other Governments must of necessity be the
theater on which an enemy will aim to assail us, and unless we are
prepared to meet him on this element we can not be said to possess the
power requisite to repel or prevent aggressions. We can not, therefore,
watch with too much attention this arm of our defense, or cherish with
too much care the means by which it can possess the necessary efficiency
and extension. To this end our policy has been heretofore wisely
directed to the constant employment of a force sufficient to guard our
commerce, and to the rapid accumulation of the materials which are
necessary to repair our vessels and construct with ease such new ones
as may be required in a state of war.

In accordance with this policy, I recommend to your consideration the
erection of the additional dry dock described by the Secretary of the
Navy, and also the construction of the steam batteries to which he has
referred, for the purpose of testing their efficacy as auxiliaries to
the system of defense now in use.

The report of the Postmaster-General herewith submitted exhibits the
condition and prospects of that Department. From that document it
appears that there was a deficit in the funds of the Department at
the commencement of the present year beyond its available means of
$315,599.98, which on the 1st July last had been reduced to $268,092.74.
It appears also that the revenues for the coming year will exceed the
expenditures about $270,000, which, with the excess of revenue which
will result from the operations of the current half year, may be
expected, independently of any increase in the gross amount of postages,
to supply the entire deficit before the end of 1835. But as this
calculation is based on the gross amount of postages which had accrued
within the period embraced by the times of striking the balances, it is
obvious that without a progressive increase in the amount of postages
the existing retrenchments must be persevered in through the year 1836
that the Department may accumulate a surplus fund sufficient to place
it in a condition of perfect ease.

It will be observed that the revenues of the Post-Office Department,
though they have increased, and their amount is above that of any former
year, have yet fallen short of the estimates more than $100,000. This is
attributed in a great degree to the increase of free letters growing out
of the extension and abuse of the franking privilege. There has been a
gradual increase in the number of executive offices to which it has been
granted, and by an act passed in March, 1833, it was extended to members
of Congress throughout the whole year. It is believed that a revision of
the laws relative to the franking privilege, with some enactments to
enforce more rigidly the restrictions under which it is granted, would
operate beneficially to the country, by enabling the Department at an
earlier period to restore the mail facilities that have been withdrawn,
and to extend them more widely, as the growing settlements of the
country may require.

To a measure so important to the Government and so just to our
constituents, who ask no exclusive privileges for themselves and are not
willing to concede them to others, I earnestly recommend the serious
attention of Congress.

The importance of the Post-Office Department and the magnitude to which
it has grown, both in its revenues and in its operations, seem to demand
its reorganization by law. The whole of its receipts and disbursements
have hitherto been left entirely to Executive control and individual
discretion. The principle is as sound in relation to this as to any
other Department of the Government, that as little discretion should be
confided to the executive officer who controls it as is compatible with
its efficiency. It is therefore earnestly recommended that it be
organized with an auditor and treasurer of its own, appointed by the
President and Senate, who shall be branches of the Treasury Department.

Your attention is again respectfully invited to the defect which exists
in the judicial system of the United States. Nothing can be more
desirable than the uniform operation of the Federal judiciary throughout
the several States, all of which, standing on the same footing as
members of the Union, have equal rights to the advantages and benefits
resulting from its laws. This object is not attained by the judicial
acts now in force, because they leave one-fourth of the States without
circuit courts.

It is undoubtedly the duty of Congress to place all the States on the
same footing in this respect, either by the creation of an additional
number of associate judges or by an enlargement of the circuits assigned
to those already appointed so as to include the new States. Whatever may
be the difficulty in a proper organization of the judicial system so as
to secure its efficiency and uniformity in all parts of the Union and at
the same time to avoid such an increase of judges as would encumber the
supreme appellate tribunal, it should not be allowed to weigh against
the great injustice which the present operation of the system produces.

I trust that I may be also pardoned for renewing the recommendation
I have so often submitted to your attention in regard to the mode of
electing the President and Vice-President of the United States. All the
reflection I have been able to bestow upon the subject increases my
conviction that the best interests of the country will be promoted by
the adoption of some plan which will secure in all contingencies that
important right of sovereignty to the direct control of the people.
Could this be attained, and the terms of those officers be limited to a
single period of either four or six years, I think our liberties would
possess an additional safeguard.

At your last session I called the attention of Congress to the
destruction of the public building occupied by the Treasury Department.
As the public interest requires that another building should be erected
with as little delay as possible, it is hoped that the means will be
seasonably provided and that they will be ample enough to authorize such
an enlargement and improvement in the plan of the building as will more
effectually accommodate the public officers and secure the public
documents deposited in it from the casualties of fire.

I have not been able to satisfy myself that the bill entitled "An act to
improve the navigation of the Wabash River," which was sent to me at the
close of your last session, ought to pass, and I have therefore withheld
from it my approval and now return it to the Senate, the body in which
it originated.

There can be no question connected with the administration of public
affairs more important or more difficult to be satisfactorily dealt with
than that which relates to the rightful authority and proper action of
the Federal Government upon the subject of internal improvements. To
inherent embarrassments have been added others resulting from the course
of our legislation concerning it.

I have heretofore communicated freely with Congress upon this subject,
and in adverting to it again I can not refrain from expressing my
increased conviction of its extreme importance as well in regard to
its bearing upon the maintenance of the Constitution and the prudent
management of the public revenue as on account of its disturbing effect
upon the harmony of the Union.

We are in no danger from violations of the Constitution by which
encroachments are made upon the personal rights of the citizen. The
sentence of condemnation long since pronounced by the American people
upon acts of that character will, I doubt not, continue to prove as
salutary in its effects as it is irreversible in its nature. But against
the dangers of unconstitutional acts which, instead of menacing the
vengeance of offended authority, proffer local advantages and bring
in their train the patronage of the Government, we are, I fear, not so
safe. To suppose that because our Government has been instituted for the
benefit of the people it must therefore have the power to do whatever
may seem to conduce to the public good is an error into which even
honest minds are too apt to fall. In yielding themselves to this fallacy
they overlook the great considerations in which the Federal Constitution
was founded. They forget that in consequence of the conceded diversities
in the interest and condition of the different States it was foreseen at
the period of its adoption that although a particular measure of the
Government might be beneficial and proper in one State it might be the
reverse in another; that it was for this reason the States would not
consent to make a grant to the Federal Government of the general and
usual powers of government, but of such only as were specifically
enumerated, and the probable effects of which they could, as they
thought, safely anticipate; and they forget also the paramount
obligation upon all to abide by the compact then so solemnly and, as
it was hoped, so firmly established. In addition to the dangers to the
Constitution springing from the sources I have stated, there has been
one which was perhaps greater than all. I allude to the materials which
this subject has afforded for sinister appeals to selfish feelings, and
the opinion heretofore so extensively entertained of its adaptation to
the purposes of personal ambition. With such stimulants it is not
surprising that the acts and pretensions of the Federal Government in
this behalf should sometimes have been carried to an alarming extent.
The questions which have arisen upon this subject have related--

First. To the power of making internal improvements within the limits of
a State, with the right of territorial jurisdiction, sufficient at least
for their preservation and use.

Second. To the right of appropriating money in aid of such works when
carried on by a State or by a company in virtue of State authority,
surrendering the claim of jurisdiction; and

Third. To the propriety of appropriation for improvements of a
particular class, viz, for light-houses, beacons, buoys, public piers,
and for the removal of sand bars, sawyers, and other temporary and
partial impediments in our navigable rivers and harbors.

The claims of power for the General Government upon each of these
points certainly present matter of the deepest interest. The first is,
however, of much the greatest importance, inasmuch as, in addition to
the dangers of unequal and improvident expenditures of public moneys
common to all, there is superadded to that the conflicting jurisdictions
of the respective governments. Federal jurisdiction, at least to the
extent I have stated, has been justly regarded by its advocates as
necessarily appurtenant to the power in question, if that exists by
the Constitution. That the most injurious conflicts would unavoidably
arise between the respective jurisdictions of the State and Federal
Governments in the absence of a constitutional provision marking out
their respective boundaries can not be doubted. The local advantages to
be obtained would induce the States to overlook in the beginning the
dangers and difficulties to which they might ultimately be exposed. The
powers exercised by the Federal Government would soon be regarded with
jealousy by the State authorities, and originating as they must from
implication or assumption, it would be impossible to affix to them
certain and safe limits. Opportunities and temptations to the assumption
of power incompatible with State sovereignty would be increased and
those barriers which resist the tendency of our system toward
consolidation greatly weakened. The officers and agents of the General
Government might not always have the discretion to abstain from
intermeddling with State concerns, and if they did they would not always
escape the suspicion of having done so. Collisions and consequent
irritations would spring up; that harmony which should ever exist
between the General Government and each member of the Confederacy would
be frequently interrupted; a spirit of contention would be engendered
and the dangers of disunion greatly multiplied.

Yet we all know that notwithstanding these grave objections this
dangerous doctrine was at one time apparently proceeding to its final
establishment with fearful rapidity. The desire to embark the Federal
Government in works of internal improvement prevailed in the highest
degree during the first session of the first Congress that I had the
honor to meet in my present situation. When the bill authorizing a
subscription on the part of the United States for stock in the Maysville
and Lexington Turnpike Company passed the two Houses, there had been
reported by the Committees of Internal Improvements bills containing
appropriations for such objects, inclusive of those for the Cumberland
road and for harbors and light-houses, to the amount of $106,000,000. In
this amount was included authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to
subscribe for the stock of different companies to a great extent, and
the residue was principally for the direct construction of roads by this
Government. In addition to these projects, which had been presented to
the two Houses under the sanction and recommendation of their respective
Committees on Internal Improvements, there were then still pending
before the committees, and in memorials to Congress presented but not
referred, different projects for works of a similar character, the
expense of which can not be estimated with certainty, but must have
exceeded $100,000,000.

Regarding the bill authorizing a subscription to the stock of the
Maysville and Lexington Turnpike Company as the entering wedge of a
system which, however weak at first, might soon become strong enough to
rive the bands of the Union asunder, and believing that if its passage
was acquiesced in by the Executive and the people there would no longer
be any limitation upon the authority of the General Government in
respect to the appropriation of money for such objects, I deemed it an
imperative duty to withhold from it the Executive approval. Although
from the obviously local character of that work I might well have
contented myself with a refusal to approve the bill upon that ground,
yet sensible of the vital importance of the subject, and anxious that
my views and opinions in regard to the whole matter should be fully
understood by Congress and by my constituents, I felt it my duty to go
further. I therefore embraced that early occasion to apprise Congress
that in my opinion the Constitution did not confer upon it the power
to authorize the construction of ordinary roads and canals within the
limits of a State and to say, respectfully, that no bill admitting such
a power could receive my official sanction. I did so in the confident
expectation that the speedy settlement of the public mind upon the whole
subject would be greatly facilitated by the difference between the two
Houses and myself, and that the harmonious action of the several
departments of the Federal Government in regard to it would be
ultimately secured.

So far, at least, as it regards this branch of the subject, my best
hopes have been realized. Nearly four years have elapsed, and several
sessions of Congress have intervened, and no attempt within my
recollection has been made to induce Congress to exercise this power.
The applications for the construction of roads and canals which were
formerly multiplied upon your files are no longer presented, and we have
good reason to infer that the current of public sentiment has become
so decided against the pretension as effectually to discourage its
reassertion. So thinking, I derive the greatest satisfaction from the
conviction that thus much at least has been secured upon this important
and embarrassing subject.

From attempts to appropriate the national funds to objects which are
confessedly of a local character we can not, I trust, have anything
further to apprehend. My views in regard to the expediency of making
appropriations for works which are claimed to be of a national character
and prosecuted under State authority--assuming that Congress have the
right to do so--were stated in my annual message to Congress in 1830,
and also in that containing my objections to the Maysville road bill.

So thoroughly convinced am I that no such appropriations ought to
be made by Congress until a suitable constitutional provision is
made upon the subject, and so essential do I regard the point to the
highest interests of our country, that I could not consider myself as
discharging my duty to my constituents in giving the Executive sanction
to any bill containing such an appropriation. If the people of the
United States desire that the public Treasury shall be resorted to for
the means to prosecute such works, they will concur in an amendment of
the Constitution prescribing a rule by which the national character
of the works is to be tested, and by which the greatest practicable
equality of benefits may be secured to each member of the Confederacy.
The effects of such a regulation would be most salutary in preventing
unprofitable expenditures, in securing our legislation from the
pernicious consequences of a scramble for the favors of Government,
and in repressing the spirit of discontent which must inevitably arise
from an unequal distribution of treasures which belong alike to all.

There is another class of appropriations for what may be called, without
impropriety, internal improvements, which have always been regarded as
standing upon different grounds from those to which I have referred. I
allude to such as have for their object the improvement of our harbors,
the removal of partial and temporary obstructions in our navigable
rivers, for the facility and security of our foreign commerce. The
grounds upon which I distinguished appropriations of this character from
others have already been stated to Congress. I will now only add that at
the first session of Congress under the new Constitution it was provided
by law that all expenses which should accrue from and after the 15th day
of August, 1789, in the necessary support and maintenance and repairs of
all light-houses, beacons, buoys, and public piers erected, placed, or
sunk before the passage of the act within any bay, inlet, harbor, or
port of the United States, for rendering the navigation thereof easy and
safe, should be defrayed out of the Treasury of the United States, and,
further, that it should be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury
to provide by contracts, with the approbation of the President, for
rebuilding when necessary and keeping in good repair the light-houses,
beacons, buoys, and public piers in the several States, and for
furnishing them with supplies. Appropriations for similar objects have
been continued from that time to the present without interruption or
dispute. As a natural consequence of the increase and extension of our
foreign commerce, ports of entry and delivery have been multiplied and
established, not only upon our seaboard, but in the interior of the
country upon our lakes and navigable rivers. The convenience and
safety of this commerce have led to the gradual extension of these
expenditures; to the erection of light-houses, the placing, planting,
and sinking of buoys, beacons, and piers, and to the removal of partial
and temporary obstructions in our navigable rivers and in the harbors
upon our Great Lakes as well as on the seaboard. Although I have
expressed to Congress my apprehension that these expenditures have
sometimes been extravagant and disproportionate to the advantages to be
derived from them, I have not felt it to be my duty to refuse my assent
to bills containing them, and have contented myself to follow in this
respect in the footsteps of all my predecessors. Sensible, however, from
experience and observation of the great abuses to which the unrestricted
exercise of this authority by Congress was exposed, I have prescribed a
limitation for the government of my own conduct by which expenditures of
this character are confined to places below the ports of entry or
delivery established by law. I am very sensible that this restriction is
not as satisfactory as could be desired, and that much embarrassment may
be caused to the executive department in its execution by appropriations
for remote and not well-understood objects. But as neither my own
reflections nor the lights which I may properly derive from other
sources have supplied me with a better, I shall continue to apply my
best exertions to a faithful application of the rule upon which it is
founded. I sincerely regret that I could not give my assent to the bill
entitled "An act to improve the navigation of the Wabash River;" but
I could not have done so without receding from the ground which I have,
upon the fullest consideration, taken upon this subject, and of which
Congress has been heretofore apprised, and without throwing the subject
again open to abuses which no good citizen entertaining my opinions
could desire.

I rely upon the intelligence and candor of my fellow-citizens, in whose
liberal indulgence I have already so largely participated, for a correct
appreciation of my motives in interposing as I have done on this and
other occasions checks to a course of legislation which, without in the
slightest degree calling in question the motives of others, I consider
as sanctioning improper and unconstitutional expenditures of public
treasure.

I am not hostile to internal improvements, and wish to see them extended
to every part of the country. But I am fully persuaded, if they are not
commenced in a proper manner, confined to proper objects, and conducted
under an authority generally conceded to be rightful, that a successful
prosecution of them can not be reasonably expected. The attempt will
meet with resistance where it might otherwise receive support, and
instead of strengthening the bonds of our Confederacy it will only
multiply and aggravate the causes of disunion.

ANDREW JACKSON.




SPECIAL MESSAGES


WASHINGTON, _December 4, 1834_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives_:

I transmit to Congress a communication addressed to me by M. George
Washington Lafayette, accompanying a copy of the Declaration of
Independence engraved on copper, which his illustrious father bequeathed
to Congress to be placed in their library as a last tribute of respect,
patriotic love, and affection for his adopted country.

I have a mournful satisfaction in transmitting this precious bequest of
that great and good man who through a long life, under many vicissitudes
and in both hemispheres, sustained the principles of civil liberty
asserted in that memorable Declaration, and who from his youth to the
last moment of his life cherished for our beloved country the most
generous attachment.

ANDREW JACKSON.

The bequest accompanies the message to the House of Representatives.

A.J.



PARIS, _June 15, 1834_.

SIR: A great misfortune has given me more than one solemn and important
duty to fulfill, and the ardent desire of accomplishing with fidelity my
father's last will emboldens me to claim the patronage of the President
of the United States and his benevolent intervention when I am obliged
respectfully and mournfully to address the Senate and Representatives of
a whole nation.

Our forever beloved parent possessed a copper plate on which was
inscribed the first engraved copy of the American Declaration of
Independence, and his last intention in departing this world was that
the precious plate should be presented to the Congress of the United
States, to be deposited in their library as a last tribute of respect,
patriotic love, and affection for his adopted country.

Will it be permitted to me, a faithful disciple of that American school
whose principles are so admirably exposed in that immortal Declaration,
to hope that you, sir, would do me the honor to communicate this letter
to both Houses of Congress at the same time that in the name of his
afflicted family you would present to them my venerated father's gift?

In craving such an important favor, sir, the son of General Lafayette,
the adopted grandson of Washington, knows and shall never forget that he
would become unworthy of it if he was ever to cease to be a French and
American patriot. With the utmost respect, I am, sir, your devoted and
obedient servant,

GEORGE W. LAFAYETTE.



WASHINGTON, _December 10, 1834_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:

The joint resolutions of Congress unanimously expressing their
sensibility on the intelligence of the death of General Lafayette were
communicated, in compliance with their will, to George Washington
Lafayette and the other members of the family of that illustrious man.
By their request I now present the heartfelt acknowledgments of the
surviving descendants of our beloved friend for that highly valued proof
of the sympathy of the United States.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _June 27, 1834_.

GEORGE WASHINGTON LAFAYETTE AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY OF THE
LATE GENERAL LAFAYETTE:

In compliance with the will of Congress, I transmit to you the joint
resolutions of the two Houses unanimously expressing the sensibility
with which they received the intelligence of the death of "General
Lafayette, the friend of the United States, the friend of Washington,
and the friend of liberty;" and I also assure you of the condolence of
this whole nation in the irreparable bereavement which by that event you
have sustained.

In complying with the request of Congress I can not omit the occasion of
offering you my own condolence in the great loss you have sustained, and
of expressing my admiration of the eminent virtues of the distinguished
patriot whom it has pleased Providence to remove to his high reward.

I also pray you to be persuaded that your individual welfare and
prosperity will always be with me objects of that solicitude which the
illustrious services of the great friend and benefactor of my country
are calculated to awaken.


ANDREW JACKSON,

_President of the United States_.



RESOLUTION manifesting the sensibility of the two Houses of Congress and
of the nation on the occasion of the decease of General Lafayette.

_Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled_, That the two Houses of
Congress have received with the profoundest sensibility intelligence of
the death of General Lafayette, the friend of the United States, the
friend of Washington, and the friend of liberty.

_And be it further resolved_, That the sacrifices and efforts of this
illustrious person in the cause of our country during her struggle for
independence, and the affectionate interest which he has at all times
manifested for the success of her political institutions, claim from the
Government and people of the United States an expression of condolence
for his loss, veneration for his virtues, and gratitude for his
services.

_And be it further resolved_, That the President of the United States be
requested to address, together with a copy of the above resolutions, a
letter to George Washington Lafayette and the other members of his
family, assuring them of the condolence of this whole nation in their
irreparable bereavement.

_And be it further resolved_, That the members of the two Houses of
Congress will wear a badge of mourning for thirty days, and that it be
recommended to the people of the United States to wear a similar badge
for the same period.

_And be it further resolved_, That the halls of the Houses be dressed in
mourning for the residue of the session.

_And be it further resolved_, That John Quincy Adams be requested to
deliver an oration on the life and character of General Lafayette before
the two Houses of Congress at the next session.

JNO. BELL,

_Speaker of the House of Representatives_.

M. VAN BUREN,

_Vice-President of the United States and President of the Senate_.

Approved, June 26, 1834.

ANDREW JACKSON.



LA GRANGE, _October 21, 1834_.

SIR: The resolution of Congress communicated to me by your honored favor
of the 27th of June, that glorious testimony of American national
affection for my beloved and venerated father, has been received by his
family with the deepest sense of the most respectful and, give me leave
to say, filial gratitude.

And now, sir, that we experience the benefits of such a high and
soothing sympathy, we find ourselves called to the honor of addressing
to the people and Congress of the United States our heartfelt and
dutiful thanks.

Sir, you were the friend of my father, and the kind letter which
accompanied the precious message seems to be for us a sufficient
authorization to our claiming once more your honorable assistance for
the accomplishment of a duty dear to our hearts. We most fervently wish
that the homage of our everlasting devotion to a nation whose tears
have deigned to mingle with ours should be offered to both Houses
of Congress. Transmitted by you, sir, that homage shall be rendered
acceptable, and we earnestly pray you, sir, to present it in our name.
Our gratitude shall be forever adequate to the obligation.

The resolution which so powerfully honors my father's memory shall be
deposited as a most sacred family property in that room of mourning
where once his son and grandsons used to receive with avidity from him
lessons of patriotism and active love of liberty. There the daily
contemplation of it will more and more impress their minds with that
encouraging conviction that the affection and esteem of a free nation
is the most desirable reward that can be obtained on earth.

With the utmost respect, sir, I have the honor to be, your devoted and
obedient servant,

GEORGE W. LAFAYETTE.



WASHINGTON, _December 12, 1834_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives of
the 10th instant, calling for any information which the President may
possess respecting the burning of the building occupied by the Treasury
Department in the year 1833, I transmit herewith the papers containing
the inquiry into the cause of that disaster, which was directed and made
soon after its occurrence.

Accompanying this inquiry I also transmit a particular report from Mr.
McLane, who was then Secretary of the Treasury, stating all the facts
relating to the subject which were within the knowledge of the officers
of the Department and such losses of records and papers as were
ascertained to have been sustained.

ANDREW JACKSON.



_To the Senate_:

I transmit herewith, for the consideration of the Senate, papers showing
the terms on which the united tribes of the Chippewas, Ottawas, and
Potawatamies are willing to accede to the amendments contained in the
resolution of the Senate of the 22d of May last, ratifying conditionally
the treaty which had been concluded with them on the 26th day of
September, 1833.

ANDREW JACKSON.

DECEMBER 15, 1834.



WASHINGTON, _December 27, 1834_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit to the Senate a report from the Secretary of State, together
with the papers relative to the execution of the treaty of the 4th of
July, 1831, between the United States and France, requested by their
resolution of the ---- instant.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _December 27, 1834_.

_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:

I transmit to the House a report from the Secretary of State, together
with the papers relating to the refusal of the French Government to make
provision for the execution of the treaty between the United States and
France concluded on the 4th July, 1831, requested by their resolution of
the 24th instant.

ANDREW JACKSON.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

_Washington, December 27, 1834_.

The PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

The Secretary of State, to whom has been referred the resolution
of the House of Representatives of the 24th instant, requesting the
President of the United States "to communicate to the House, if not in
his opinion incompatible with the public interest, any communications or
correspondence which may have taken place between our minister at Paris
and the French Government, or between the minister from France to this
Government and the Secretary of State, on the subject of the refusal of
the French Government to make provision for the execution of the treaty
concluded between the United States and France on the 4th July, 1831,"
has the honor of reporting to the President copies of the papers desired
by that resolution.

It will be perceived that no authority was given to either of
the chargés d'affaires who succeeded Mr. Rives to enter into any
correspondence with the French Government in regard to the merits of
the convention, or in relation to its execution, except to urge the
prompt delivery of the papers stipulated for in the sixth article and to
apprise that Government of the arrangement made for receiving payment of
the first installment.

All which is respectfully submitted.

JOHN FORSYTH.



WASHINGTON, _January 5, 1835_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

In answer to the resolution of the House of Representatives passed on
the 24th ultimo, I transmit a report[10] from the Secretary of State upon
the subject.

ANDREW JACKSON.

[Footnote 10: Relating to claims of American citizens upon the Mexican
Government.]



WASHINGTON, _January 6, 1835_.

_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives passed on the
27th ultimo, I transmit a report made to me by the Secretary of State on
the subject; and I have to acquaint the House that the negotiation for
the settlement of the northeastern boundary being now in progress, it
would, in my opinion, be incompatible with the public interest to lay
before the House any communications which have been had between the two
Governments since the period alluded to in the resolution.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _January 13, 1835_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

In compliance with the resolution of the House of the 8th instant,
requesting "copies of every circular or letter of instruction emanating
from the Treasury or War Departments since the 30th day of June last,
and addressed to either the receiving or the disbursing officers
stationed in States wherein land offices are established or public works
are constructing under the authority of Congress," I transmit herewith
reports from the Secretaries of the Treasury and War Departments,
containing the information sought for.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _January 13, 1835_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I have received the resolution of the Senate of the 9th instant,
requesting me to communicate "a copy of any report made by any director
or directors of the Bank of the United States appointed by the
Government, purporting to give information to the Executive of certain
notes and bills of exchange discounted at the Bank of the United States
for account and benefit of George Poindexter, a member of the Senate;
also the name or names of such director or directors."

In my replies to the resolutions of the Senate of the 11th December,
1833, and of 12th of June, 1834, the former passed in their legislative
and the latter in their executive capacity, I had occasion to state the
objections to requests of this nature, and to vindicate in this respect
the constitutional rights of the executive department. The views then
expressed remain unchanged, and as I think them peculiarly applicable to
the present occasion I should feel myself required to decline any reply
to the resolution before me were there not reason to apprehend that
persons now in nomination before the Senate might possibly by such a
course be exposed to improper and injurious imputations.

The resolution of the Senate, standing alone, would seem to be adopted
with the view of obtaining information in regard to the transactions
which may have been had between a particular member of the Senate and
the Bank of the United States. It can, however, scarcely be supposed
that such was its object, inasmuch as the Senate have it in their power
to obtain any information they may desire on this subject from their own
committee, who have been freely allowed, as appears by their published
report, to make examinations of the books and proceedings of the bank,
peremptorily denied to the Government directors, and not even allowed
to the committee of the House of Representatives. It must therefore be
presumed that the resolution has reference to some other matter, and on
referring to the Executive Journal of the Senate I find therein such
proceedings as in my judgment fully to authorize the apprehension
stated.

Under these circumstances, and for the purpose of preventing
misapprehension and injustice, I think it proper to communicate herewith
a copy of the only report made to me by any director or directors of the
Bank of the United States appointed by the Government, since the report
of the 19th of August, 1833, which is already in the possession of
the Senate. It will be perceived that the paper herewith transmitted
contains no information whatever as to the discounting of notes or bills
of exchange for the account and benefit of the member of the Senate
named in their resolution, nor have I at any time received from the
Government directors any report purporting to give any such information.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _January 29, 1835_.

_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:

I transmit to the House of Representatives a report[11] from the
Secretary of State, upon the subject of a resolution of the 22d instant,
which was referred to that officer, together with the papers referred to
in the said report.

ANDREW JACKSON.

[Footnote 11: Relating to commerce with Cuba and Puerto Rico.]



WASHINGTON, _January 30, 1835_.

_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:

With, reference to the claim of the granddaughters of the Marshal de
Rochambeau, and in addition to the papers formerly communicated relating
to the same subject, I now transmit to the House of Representatives, for
their consideration, a memorial to the Congress of the United States
from the Countess d'Ambrugeac and the Marquise de la Gorée, together
with the letter which accompanied it. Translations of these documents
are also sent.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _February 6, 1835_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

I submit to Congress a report from the Secretary of War, containing the
evidence of certain claims to reservations under the fourteenth article
of the treaty of 1830 with the Choctaws, which the locating agent has
reserved from sale in conformity with instructions from the President,
who did not consider himself authorized to direct their location.

Should Congress consider the claims just, it will be proper to pass a
law authorizing their location, or satisfying them in some other way.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _February 6, 1835_.

_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:

I transmit to the House of Representatives a report of the Secretary of
State, accompanied with extracts from certain dispatches received from
the minister of the United States at Paris, which are communicated in
compliance with a resolution of the House of the 31st ultimo. Being of
opinion that the residue of the dispatches of that minister can not at
present be laid before the House consistently with the public interest,
I decline transmitting them. In doing so, however, I deem proper to
state that whenever any communication shall be received exhibiting any
change in the condition of the business referred to in the resolution
information will be promptly transmitted to Congress.

ANDREW JACKSON.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

_Washington, February 5, 1835_.

The PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

The Secretary of State, to whom has been referred the resolution of the
House of Representatives of the 31st ultimo, requesting the President
"to communicate to that House, if not incompatible with the public
interest, any correspondence with the Government of France and any
dispatches received from the minister of the United States at Paris, not
hitherto communicated to the House, in relation to the failure of the
French Government to carry into effect any stipulation of the treaty
of the 4th day of July, 1831," has the honor to report to the President
that as far as is known to the Department no correspondence has taken
place with the Government of France since that communicated to the
House on the 27th December last. The Secretary is not aware that the
dispatches received from the minister of the United States at Paris
present any material fact which does not appear in the correspondence
already transmitted. He nevertheless incloses so much of those
dispatches written subsequently to the commencement of the present
session of the French Chambers as may serve to shew the state of the
business to which they relate since that time, and also that portion of
an early dispatch which contains the substance of the assurances made to
him by His Majesty the King of the French at a formal audience granted
to him for the purpose of presenting his credentials, and he submits for
the President's consideration whether the residue can consistently with
the public interest be now laid before the House.

JOHN FORSYTH.



_Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State of the United States_.

[Extracts.]

PARIS, _October 4, 1833_.

SIR: On Monday I presented my letter of credence to the King, on which
occasion I made the address to him a copy of which is inclosed.

       *       *       *       *       *

His answer was long and earnest. I can not pretend to give you the words
of it, but in substance it was a warm expression of his good feeling
toward the United States for the hospitality he had received there,
etc. ... "As to the convention," he said, "assure your Government that
unavoidable circumstances alone prevented its immediate execution, but
it will be faithfully performed. Assure your Government of this," he
repeated, "the necessary laws will be passed at the next meeting of the
Chambers. I tell you this not only as King, but as an individual whose
promise will be fulfilled."



_Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State_.

[Extracts.]

PARIS, _November 22, 1834_.

       *       *       *       *       *

I do not hope for any decision on our affairs before the middle of
January. One motive for delay is an expectation that the message of the
President may arrive before the discussion, and that it may contain
something to show a strong national feeling on the subject. _This is
not mere conjecture; I know the fact_. And I repeat now from a full
knowledge of the case what I have more than once stated in my former
dispatches as my firm persuasion, that the moderate tone taken by our
Government when the rejection was first known was attributed by some
to indifference or to a conviction on the part of the President that
he would not be supported in any strong measure by the people, and by
others to a consciousness that the convention had given us more than we
were entitled to ask.

       *       *       *       *       *

I saw last night an influential member of the Chamber, who told me
that, ... and that the King had spoken of our affairs and appeared
extremely anxious to secure the passage of the law. I mention this as
one of the many circumstances which, independent of official assurances,
convince me that the King is sincere, and now I have no doubt of the
sincerity of his cabinet. From all this you may imagine the anxiety I
shall feel for the arrival of the President's message. On its tone will
depend very much, not only the payment of our claims, but our national
reputation for energy. I have no doubt it will be such as to attain both
of these important objects.



_Mr. Livingston to Mr. Forsyth_.

[Extract.]

PARIS, _December 6, 1834_.

       *       *       *       *       *

The Chambers were convened on the 1st instant under very exciting
circumstances, the ministers individually and the papers supposed to
speak their language having previously announced a design to enter into
a full explanation of their conduct, to answer all interrogations, and
place their continuance in office on the question of approval by the
Chambers of their measures.

This, as you will see by the papers, they have frankly and explicitly
done, and after a warm debate of two days, which has just closed, they
have gained a decided victory. This gives them confidence, permanence,
and, I hope, influence enough to carry the treaty. I shall now urge the
presentation of the law at as early a day as possible, and although I do
not yet feel very certain of success, my hopes of it are naturally much
increased by the vote of this evening. The conversations I have had
with the King and with all the ministers convince me that now they are
perfectly in earnest and united on the question, and that it will be
urged with zeal and ability.

Many of the deputies, too, with whom I have entered into explanations on
the subject, seem now convinced that the interest as well as the honor
of the nation requires the fulfillment of their engagements. This gives
me hopes that the endeavors I shall continue to make without ceasing
until the question is decided may be successful.

The intimation I have conceived myself authorized to make of the serious
consequences that may be expected from another rejection of the law, and
of the firm determination of our Government to admit of no reduction or
change in the treaty, I think has had an effect. On the whole, I repeat
that without being at all confident I now entertain better hopes than I
have for some time past done.



_Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State_.

[Extracts.]

PARIS, _December 22, 1834_.

Hon. JOHN FORSYTH,

_Secretary of State, etc._

SIR: Our diplomatic relations with this Government are on the most
extraordinary footing. With the executive branch I have little to
discuss, for they agree with me in every material point on the subject
of the treaty. With the legislature, where the great difficulty arises,
I can have no official communication. Yet, deeply impressed with the
importance to my fellow-citizens of securing the indemnity to which
they are entitled, and to the country of enforcing the execution of
engagements solemnly made to it, as well as of preventing a rupture,
which must infallibly follow the final refusal to execute the
convention, I have felt it a duty to use every proper endeavor to
avoid this evil. This has been and continues to be a subject of much
embarrassment.

       *       *       *       *       *

My last dispatch (6th December) was written immediately after the vote
of the Chamber of Deputies had, as it was thought, secured a majority
to the administration, and it naturally excited hopes which that
supposition was calculated to inspire. I soon found, however, both from
the tone of the administration press and from the language of the King
and all the ministers with whom I conferred on the subject, that they
were not willing to put their popularity to the test on our question.

It will not be made one on the determination of which the ministers are
willing to risk their portfolios. The very next day after the debate the
ministerial gazette (Les Débats) declared that, satisfied with the
approbation the Chamber had given to their system, it was at perfect
liberty to exercise its discretion as to particular measures which do
not form _an essential part of that system_; and the communications I
subsequently had with the King and the ministers confirmed me in the
opinion that the law for executing our convention was to be considered
as one of those free questions. I combated this opinion, and asked
whether the faithful observance of treaties was not _an essential part
of their_ system, and, if so, whether it did not come within their rule.
Without answering this argument, I was told of the endeavors they were
making to secure the passage of the law by preparing the statement[12]
mentioned in my former dispatch. This, it is said, is nearly finished,
and from what I know of its tenor it will produce all the effect that
truth and justice can be expected to have on prejudice and party spirit.

The decision not to make it a cabinet question will not be without its
favorable operation; ... some of the leaders of the opposition, who may
not be willing to take the responsibility of a rupture between the two
nations by breaking the treaty, when they are convinced that instead of
forcing the ministers to resign they will themselves only incur the
odium of having caused the national breach. In this view of the subject
I shall be much aided if by the tenor of the President's message it is
seen that we shall resent the breach of faith they contemplate.

It is on all hands conceded that it would be imprudent to press the
decision before the next month, when the exposition will be printed
and laid before the Chambers.

       *       *       *       *       *

On the whole, I am far from being sanguine of success in the endeavors
which I shall not cease to make for the accomplishment of this important
object of my mission, and I expect with some solicitude the instructions
for my conduct in the probable case of a rejection of the law.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

EDW. LIVINGSTON.

[Footnote 12: A memoir to be laid before the commission which may be
appointed to examine the law, intended to contain all the arguments and
facts by which it is to be supported.]



WASHINGTON, _February 10, 1835_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I have received the resolution of the Senate of the 2d instant,
requesting me to communicate copies of the charges, if any, which may
have been made to me against the official conduct of Gideon Fitz, late
surveyor-general south of the State of Tennessee, which caused his
removal from office.

The resolution is preceded by a preamble which alleges as reasons for
this request that the causes which may have produced the removal of the
officer referred to may contain information necessary to the action of
the Senate on the nomination of his successor and to the investigation
now in progress respecting the frauds in the sales of the public lands.

This is another of those calls for information made upon me by the
Senate which have, in my judgment, either related to the subjects
exclusively belonging to the executive department or otherwise
encroached on the constitutional powers of the Executive. Without
conceding the right of the Senate to make either of these requests,
I have yet, for the various reasons heretofore assigned in my several
replies, deemed it expedient to comply with several of them. It is now,
however, my solemn conviction that I ought no longer, from any motive
nor in any degree, to yield to these unconstitutional demands. Their
continued repetition imposes on me, as the representative and trustee of
the American people, the painful but imperious duty of resisting to the
utmost any further encroachment on the rights of the Executive. This
course is especially due to the present resolution. The President in
cases of this nature possesses the exclusive power of removal from
office, and, under the sanctions of his official oath and of his
liability to impeachment, he is bound to exercise it whenever the public
welfare shall require. If, on the other hand, from corrupt motives he
abuses this power, he is exposed to the same responsibilities. On no
principle known to our institutions can he be required to account
for the manner in which he discharges this portion of his public
duties, save only in the mode and under the forms prescribed by the
Constitution. The suggestion that the charges a copy of which is
requested by the Senate "may contain information necessary to their
action" on a nomination now before them can not vary the principle.
There is no necessary connection between the two subjects, and even if
there were the Senate have no right to call for that portion of these
matters which appertains to the separate and independent action of the
Executive. The intimation that these charges may also be necessary
"to the investigation now in progress respecting frauds in the sales of
public lands" is still more insufficient to authorize the present call.
Those investigations were instituted and have thus far been conducted
by the Senate in their legislative capacity, and with the view, it
is presumed, to some legislative action. If the President has in his
possession any information on the subject of such frauds, it is his duty
to communicate it to Congress, and it may undoubtedly be called for by
either House sitting in its legislative capacity, though even from such
a call all matters properly belonging to the exclusive duties of the
President must of necessity be exempted.

The resolution now before me purports to have been passed in executive
session, and I am bound to presume that if the information requested
therein should be communicated it would be applied in secret session to
"the investigation of frauds in the sales of the public lands." But,
if so applied, the distinction between the executive and legislative
functions of the Senate would not only be destroyed, but the citizen
whose conduct is impeached would lose one of his valuable securities,
that which is afforded by a public investigation in the presence of his
accusers and of the witnesses against him. Besides, a compliance with
the present resolution would in all probability subject the conduct and
motives of the President in the case of Mr. Fitz to the review of the
Senate when not sitting as judges on an impeachment, and even if this
consequence should not occur in the present case the compliance of the
Executive might hereafter be quoted as a precedent for similar and
repeated applications,

Such a result, if acquiesced in, would ultimately subject the
independent constitutional action of the Executive in a matter of great
national concernment to the domination and control of the Senate; if not
acquiesced in, it would lead to collisions between coordinate branches
of the Government, well calculated to expose the parties to indignity
and reproach and to inflict on the public interest serious and lasting
mischief.

I therefore decline a compliance with so much of the resolution of the
Senate as requests "copies of the charges, if any," in relation to Mr.
Fitz, and in doing so must be distinctly understood as neither affirming
nor denying that any such charges were made; but as the Senate may
lawfully call upon the President for information properly appertaining
to nominations submitted to them, I have the honor, in this respect, to
reply that I have none to give them in the case of the person nominated
as successor to Mr. Fitz, except that I believe him, from sources
entitled to the highest credit, to be well qualified in abilities and
character to discharge the duties of the office in question.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _February 14, 1835_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I beg leave to call the attention of Congress to the accompanying
communication from the Secretary of War, from which it appears that the
"act for the relief of Benedict Alford and Robert Brush," although
signed and duly certified by the proper officers as having passed the
two Houses of Congress at their last session, had not in fact obtained
the sanction of that body when it was presented to the President for his
approval.

Under these circumstances it is thought that the subject is worthy of
the consideration of Congress.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _February 16, 1835_.

_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:

I transmit to the House of Representatives, for their consideration, a
petition to the Congress of the United States from Adelaide de Grasse
de Grochamps, one of the surviving daughters of the Count de Grasse,
together with the letter which accompanied it. Translations of these
papers are also sent.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _February 18, 1835_.

_To the House of Representatives_:

Since my message a few days ago relating to Choctaw reservations other
documents on the same subject have been received from the locating
agent, which are mentioned in the accompanying report of the Secretary
of War, and which I also transmit herewith for the information and
consideration of Congress.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _February 21, 1835_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate as to the
ratification of the same, four treaties for Potawatamie reservations,
concluded by General Marshall in December last.

ANDREW JACKSON.



WASHINGTON, _February 25, 1835_.

_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:

I transmit to Congress a report from the Secretary of State, with copies
of all the letters received from Mr. Livingston since the message to the
House of Representatives of the 6th instant, of the instructions given
to that minister, and of all the late correspondence with the French
Government in Paris or in Washington, except a note of Mr. Sérurier,
which, for the reasons stated in the report, is not now communicated.

It will be seen that I have deemed it my duty to instruct Mr. Livingston
to quit France with his legation and return to the United States if an
appropriation for the fulfillment of the convention shall be refused by
the Chambers.

The subject being now in all its present aspects before Congress, whose
right it is to decide what measures are to be pursued in that event, I
deem it unnecessary to make further recommendation, being confident that
on their part everything will be done to maintain the rights and honor
of the country which the occasion requires.

ANDREW JACKSON.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

_Washington, February 25, 1835_.

The PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

The Secretary of State has the honor to submit to the President copies
of all the letters received from Mr. Livingston since the message to the
House of Representatives of the 6th instant, of the instructions given
to that minister, and of all the late correspondence with the French
Government in Paris or in Washington, except the last note of M.
Sérurier, which it has been considered necessary to submit to the
Government of France before it is made public or answered, that it may
be ascertained whether some exceptionable expressions are to be taken
as the result of a settled purpose in that Government or as the mere
ebullition of the minister's indiscretion.

JOHN FORSYTH.



_Mr. Livingston to Mr. Forsyth_.

No. 70.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

_Paris, January 11, 1835_.

Hon. JOHN FORSYTH.

SIR: Believing that it would be important for me to receive the
dispatches you might think it necessary to send with the President's
message, I ventured on incurring the expense of a courier to bring it
to me as soon as it should arrive at Havre. Mr. Beasley accordingly,
on the arrival of the _Sully_, dispatched a messenger with my letters
received by that vessel, and a New York newspaper containing the
message, but without any communication from the Department, so that
your No. 43 is still the last which I have to acknowledge. The courier
arrived at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 8th. Other copies were the
same morning received by the estafette, and the contents, being soon
known, caused the greatest sensation, which as yet is, I think,
unfavorable--the few members of the opposition who would have voted for
the execution of the treaty now declaring that they can not do it under
the threat of reprisals, and the great body of that party making use
of the effect it has on national pride to gain proselytes from the
ministerial side of the Chamber, in which I have no doubt they have
in a great degree for the time succeeded.

The ministers are aware of this, and will not, I think, immediately
urge the consideration of the law, as I have no doubt they were prepared
to do when the message arrived. Should Congress propose commercial
restrictions or determine to wait to the end of the session before they
act, this will be considered as a vote against reprisals, and then the
law will be proposed and I think carried. But I ought not to conceal
from you that the excitement is at present very great; that their pride
is deeply wounded by what they call an attempt to coerce them by threats
to the payment of a sum which they persist, in opposition to the
plainest proof, in declaring not to be due. This feeling is fostered by
the language of our opposition papers, particularly by the Intelligencer
and New York Courier, extracts from which have been sent on by
Americans, declaring them to be the sentiments of a majority of the
people. These, as you will see, are translated and republished here,
with such comments as they might have been expected and undoubtedly were
intended to produce, and if hostilities should take place between the
two countries those persons may flatter themselves with having the
credit of a great share in producing them. The only letter I have
received from home is from one of my family. This, to my great
satisfaction, informs me that the President will be supported by
all parties, and I am told that this is the language of some of the
opposition papers; but as they are not sent to the legation I can not
tell in what degree this support can be depended upon. Whether the
energetic language of the message will be made the pretext with some or
be the cause with others among the deputies for rejecting the law can
not, of course, be yet conjectured with any great degree of probability,
but I think it will have a good effect. It has certainly raised us in
the estimation of other powers, if I may judge from the demeanor of
their representatives here, and my own opinion is that as soon as the
first excitement subsides it will operate favorably on the counsels of
France. Already some of the journals begin to change their tone, and I
am much mistaken if the opposition here, finding that we are in earnest,
will incur the responsibility of a rupture between the two nations,
which they see must take place if the treaty be rejected. The funds
experienced a considerable fall as soon as the message was known, and
insurance rose. In short, it has made them feel the commercial as well
as political importance of our country.

The Comte de Rigny had requested me to communicate the message to him as
soon as it should be received. This I promised to do, and accordingly on
the morning of the 8th, to avoid any mistake as to the mode of making
the communication, I carried the paper to him myself, telling him that
I had received a gazette containing a paper said to be the message of
the President, which I delivered to him in compliance with my promise;
but I requested him to observe that it was not an authentic paper,
nor was it delivered in pursuance of instructions, nor in my official
character. I thought it, for obvious reasons, necessary to be very
explicit on this point, and he properly understood me, as he had not yet
read the message. Little more passed at the interview, and I thought of
it, but not immediately, to seek another. I shall probably, however, see
him to-night, and shall then appoint some time for a further conference,
of which I will by this same packet give you the result.

Mr. Middleton has just arrived from Madrid with the inscriptions for the
Spanish indemnity and a draft for the first payment of interest. His
instructions are, he says, to leave them with me, but as I have heard
nothing from the Department I shall advise the depositing them with
Rothschild to wait the directions of the President.

The importance of obtaining the earliest intelligence at this crisis of
our affairs with France has induced me to direct that my letters should
be sent by the estafette from Havre, and that if any important advice
should be received at such an hour in the day as would give a courier
an advance of some hours over the estafette, that a special messenger
should be dispatched with it.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient
servant,

EDW. LIVINGSTON.



_Mr. Livingston to Mr. Forsyth_.

No. 71.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

_Paris, January 14, 1835_.

Hon. JOHN FORSYTH.

SIR: The intended conference with the minister for foreign affairs of
which I spoke to you in my last (No. 70) took place yesterday morning. I
began it by expressing my regret that a communication from the President
to Congress had been so much misrepresented in that part which related
to France as to be construed into a measure of hostilities. It was, I
said, part of a consultation between different members of our Government
as to the proper course to be pursued if the legislative body of France
should persevere in refusing to provide the means of complying with a
treaty formally made; that the President, as was his duty, stated the
facts truly and in moderate language, without any irritating comment;
that in further pursuance of his official duty he declared the different
modes of redress which the law of nations permitted in order to avoid
hostilities, expressing, as he ought to do, his reasons for preferring
one of them; that in all this there was nothing addressed to the French
nation; and I likened it to a proceeding well known in the French law
(a family council in which the concerns and interests are discussed),
but of which in our case the debates were necessarily public; that a
further elucidation of the nature of this document might be drawn from
the circumstance that no instructions had been given to communicate it
to the French Government, and that if a gazette containing it had been
delivered it was at the request of his excellency, and expressly
declared to be a private communication, not an official one. I further
stated that I made this communication without instructions, merely
to counteract misapprehensions and from an earnest desire to rectify
errors which might have serious consequences. I added that it was very
unfortunate that an earlier call of the Chambers had not been made in
consequence of Mr. Sérurier's promise, the noncompliance with which was
of a nature to cause serious disquietude with the Government of the
United States. I found immediately that this was the part of the
message that had most seriously affected the King, for Comte de Rigny
immediately took up the argument, endeavoring to show that the
Government had acted in good faith, relying principally on the danger
of a second rejection had the Chambers been called at an early day
expressly for this object I replied by repeating that the declaration
made by Mr. Sérurier was a positive and formal one, and that it had
produced a forbearance on the part of the President to lay the state of
the case before Congress. In this conference, which was a long one, we
both regretted that any misunderstanding should interrupt the good
intelligence of two nations having so many reasons to preserve it and so
few of conflicting interests. He told me (what I knew before) that the
exposition was prepared, and that the law would have been presented the
day after that on which the message was received. He showed me the
document, read part of it to me, and expressed regret that the language
of the message prevented it being sent in. I said that I hoped the
excitement would soon subside and give place to better feelings, in
which I thought he joined with much sincerity. It is perhaps necessary
to add that an allusion was made by me to the change of ministry in
November and the reinstatement of the present ministers, which I told
him I had considered as a most favorable occurrence, and that I had so
expressed myself in my communications to you, but that this circumstance
was unknown at Washington when the message was delivered; and I added
that the hopes of success held out in the communication to which I
referred and the assurances it contained that the ministers would
zealously urge the adoption of the law might probably have imparted the
same hopes to the President and have induced some change in the measure
he had recommended, but that the formation of the Dupin ministry, if
known, must have had a very bad effect on the President's mind, as
many of that ministry were known to be hostile to the treaty.

When I took leave the minister requested me to reflect on the
propriety of presenting a note of our conversation, which he said should
be formal or otherwise, as I should desire. I told him I would do so,
and inform him on the next morning by 11 o'clock. We parted, as I
thought, on friendly terms, and in the evening, meeting him at the
Austrian ambassador's, I told him that on reflection I had determined to
wait the arrival of the packet of the 16th before I gave the note, to
which he made no objection. After all this you may judge of my surprise
when last night about 10 o'clock I received the letter copy of which is
inclosed, and which necessarily closes my mission. In my reply I shall
take care to throw the responsibility of breaking up the diplomatic
intercourse between the countries where it ought to rest, and will not
fail to expose the misstatements which you will observe are contained in
the minister's note, both as respects my Government and myself; but the
late hour at which I received the Comte de Rigny's note and the almost
immediate departure of the packet may prevent my sending you a copy of
my communication to him, which I shall use the utmost diligence in
preparing.

The law, it is said, will be presented to-day, and I have very
little doubt that it will pass. The ministerial phalanx, reenforced by
those of the opposition (and they are not a few) who will not take the
responsibility of involving the country in the difficulties which they
now see must ensue, will be sufficient to carry the vote. The recall of
Sérurier and the notice to me are measures which are resorted to to save
the pride of the Government and the nation.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient
servant,

EDW. LIVINGSTON.



_From Count de Rigny to Mr. Livingston_.

[Translation.]

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

_Paris, January 13, 1835_.

Hon. EDWARD LIVINGSTON, etc.

SIR: You have well comprehended the nature of the impressions produced
upon the King's Government by the message which His Excellency President
Jackson addressed on the 1st of December to the Congress of the United
States. Nothing certainly could have prepared us for it. Even though
the complaints expressed in it had been as just as they are in reality
unjust, we should still have had a right to be astonished on receiving
the first communication of them in such a form.

In the explanations which I am now about to make I can not enter upon
the consideration of any facts other than those occurring subsequently
to the vote by which the last Chamber of Deputies refused the
appropriation necessary for the payment stipulated in the treaty of July
4. However this vote may have been regarded by the Government of the
United States, it is evident that by accepting (_accueillant_) the
promise of the King's Government to bring on a second deliberation
before the new legislature it had in fact postponed all discussion and
all recrimination on the subject of this first refusal until another
decision should have either repealed or confirmed it. This postponement
therefore sets aside for the time all difficulties arising either justly
or unjustly from the rejection of the treaty or from the delay by which
it had been preceded; and although the message begins by enumerating
them, I think proper, in order to confine myself to the matter in
question, only to reply to the imputations made on account of subsequent
occurrences.

The reproaches which President Jackson considers himself authorized to
address to France may be summed up in a few words. The King's Government
promised to present the treaty of July 4 again to the Chambers as soon
as they could be assembled. They were assembled on the 31st of July, and
the treaty has not yet been presented to them. Such is exactly the whole
substance of the President's argumentation, and nothing can be easier
than to refute it.

I may first observe that the assembling of the Chambers on the 31st of
July, in obedience to a legal prescription that they should be called
together within a stated period after a dissolution of the Chamber of
Deputies, was nothing more than a piece of formality, and if President
Jackson had attended to the internal mechanism of our administrative
system he would have been convinced that the session of 1835 could not
have really commenced at that session of 1834. Everyone knew beforehand
that after a fortnight spent in the forms of installation it would be
adjourned.

The President of the United States considers that the bill relative to
the American claims should have been presented to the Chamber within
that fortnight. I can not understand the propriety of this reproach. The
bill was explicitly announced in the speech from the throne on the very
day on which the Chambers met. This was all that was required to make
known the opinion and design of the Government, and to prevent that
species of moral proscription to which absolute silence would have given
authority. With regard to the mere act of presentation so long before
discussion could possibly take place, this proceeding would have been so
unusual and extraordinary that it might have increased the unfavorable
prepossessions of the public, already too numerous, without producing
any real advantage in return. Above all, the result which the President
had in view, of being able to announce the new vote of the Chamber of
Deputies in his message, would not have been attained.

President Jackson expresses his regrets that your solicitations
(_instances_) had not determined the King's Government to call the
Chambers together at an earlier day. How soon soever they may have been
called, the simplest calculation will serve to shew that the discussions
in our Chambers could not have been known in the United States at the
opening of Congress, and the President's regret is therefore unfounded.

Moreover, the same obstacles and the same administrative reasons which
rendered a real session impossible during the months of July or August
were almost equally opposed to its taking place before the last weeks
of the year. The head of a government like that of the United States
should be able to comprehend more clearly than anyone else those moral
impossibilities which arise from the fixed character of the principles
of a constitutional régime, and to see that in such a system the
administration is subject to constant and regular forms, from which
no special interest, however important, can authorize a deviation.

It is, then, evident that far from meriting the reproach of failing
to comply with its engagements, far from having deferred, either
voluntarily or from negligence, the accomplishment of its promises, the
King's Government, ever occupied in the design of fulfilling them, was
only arrested for a moment by insurmountable obstacles. This appears
from the explanations now given, and I must add that the greater part of
them have already been presented by M. Sérurier to the Government of the
United States, which by its silence seemed to acknowledge their full
value.

It is worthy of remark that on the 1st of December, the day on which
President Jackson signed the message to Congress, and remarked with
severity that nearly a month was to elapse before the assembling of
the Chambers, they were in reality assembled in virtue of a royal
ordinance calling them together at a period earlier than that first
proposed. Their assemblage was not indeed immediately followed by the
presentment of the bill relative to the American claims, but you, sir,
know better than any other person the causes of this new delay. You
yourself requested us not to endanger the success of this important
affair by mingling its discussion with debates of a different nature,
as their mere coincidence might have the effect of bringing other
influences into play than those by which it should naturally be
governed. By this request, sir, you clearly shewed that you had with
your judicious spirit correctly appreciated the situation of things and
the means of advancing the cause which you were called to defend. And
permit me to add that the course which you have thought proper to adopt
on this point is the best justification of that which we ourselves have
for some months been pursuing in obedience to the necessities inherent
in our political organization, and in order to insure as far as lies in
our power the success of the new attempt which we were preparing to make
in the Chamber.

However this may be, the King's Government, freed from the internal
difficulties the force of which you have yourself so formally admitted,
was preparing to present the bill for giving sanction to the treaty of
July 4, when the strange message of December 1 came and obliged it again
to deliberate on the course which it should pursue.

The King's Government, though deeply wounded by imputations to which
I will not give a name, having demonstrated their purely gratuitous
character, still does not wish to retreat absolutely from a
determination already taken in a spirit of good faith and justice. How
great soever may be the difficulties caused by the provocation which
President Jackson has given, and by the irritation which it has produced
in the public mind, it will ask the Chambers for an appropriation of
twenty-five millions in order to meet the engagements of July 4; but at
the same time His Majesty has considered it due to his own dignity no
longer to leave his minister exposed to hear language so offensive to
France. M. Sérurier will receive orders to return to France.

Such, sir, are the determinations of which I am charged immediately to
inform you, in order that you may make them known to the Government of
the United States and that you may yourself take those measures which
may seem to you to be the natural consequences of this communication.
The passports which you may desire are therefore at your disposition.

Accept, sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

DE RIGNY.



_Mr. Livingston to Mr. Forsyth_.

No. 72.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

_Paris, January 15, 1835_.

SIR: Having determined to send Mr. Brown, one of the gentlemen
attached to the legation, to Havre with my dispatches, I have just time
to add to them the copy of the note which I have sent to the Comte de
Rigny. The course indicated by it was adopted after the best reflections
I could give to the subject, and I hope will meet the approbation of
the President. My first impressions were that I ought to follow my
inclinations, demand my passports, and leave the Kingdom. This would at
once have freed me from a situation extremely painful and embarrassing;
but a closer attention convinced me that by so doing I should give to
the French Government the advantage they expect to derive from the
equivocal terms of their note, which, as occasions might serve, they
might represent as a suggestion only, leaving upon me the responsibility
of breaking up the diplomatic intercourse between the two countries if
I demanded my passports; or, if I did not, and they found the course
convenient, they might call it an order to depart which I had not
complied with. Baron Rothschild also called on me yesterday, saying that
he had conversed with the Comte de Rigny, who assured him that the note
was not intended as a notice to depart, and that he would be glad to see
me on the subject. I answered that I could have no verbal explanations
on the subject, to which he replied that he had suggested the writing
a note on the subject, but that the minister had declined any written
communication. Rothschild added that he had made an appointment with the
Comte de Rigny for 6 o'clock, and would see me again at night, and he
called to say that there had been a misunderstanding as to the time of
appointment, and that he had not seen Mr. de Rigny, but would see him
this morning. But in the meantime I determined on sending my note, not
only for the reasons contained in it, which appeared to me conclusive,
but because I found that the course was the correct one in diplomacy,
and that to ask for a passport merely because the Government near which
the minister was accredited had suggested it would be considered as
committing the dignity of his own; that the universal practice in such
cases was to wait the order to depart, and not by a voluntary demand
of passports exonerate the foreign Government from the odium and
responsibility of so violent a measure. My note will force them to take
their ground. If the answer is that they intended only a suggestion
which I may follow or not, as I choose, I will remain, but keep aloof
until I receive your directions. If, on the other hand, I am told
to depart, I will retire to Holland or England, and there wait the
President's orders. In either case the derangement will be extremely
expensive and my situation very disagreeable. The law was not presented
yesterday, but will be to-day, and I have been informed that it is to be
introduced by an exposé throwing all the blame of the present state of
things on Mr. Sérurier and me for not truly representing the opinions of
our respective Governments. They may treat their own minister as they
please, but they shall not, without exposure, presume to judge of my
conduct and make me the scapegoat for their sins. The truth is, they
are sadly embarrassed. If the law should be rejected, I should not be
surprised if they anticipated our reprisals by the seizure of our
vessels in port or the attack of our ships in the Mediterranean with a
superior force. I shall without delay inform Commodore Patterson of the
state of things, that he may be on his guard, having already sent him a
copy of the message.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

EDW. LIVINGSTON.



_Mr. Livingston to the Count de Rigny_.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

_Paris, January 14, 1835_.

His Excellency COUNT DE RIGNY, etc.:

The undersigned, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of
the United States of America, received late last night the note of His
Excellency the Count de Rigny, minister secretary of state for foreign
affairs, dated the 13th instant.

The undersigned sees with great surprise as well as regret that a
communication made by one branch of the Government of the United States
to another, not addressed to that of His Majesty the King of the French,
nor even communicated to it, is alleged as the motive for a measure
which not only increases actual subjects of irritation, but which
necessarily cuts off all the usual means of restoring harmony to two
nations who have the same interests, commercial and political, to unite
them, and none but factitious subjects for collision.

The grave matter in the body of his excellency's note demands and will
receive a full answer. It is to the concluding part that his attention
is now requested. The undersigned, after being informed that it is the
intention of His Majesty's Government to recall Mr. Sérurier, is told
"that this information is given to the undersigned in order that he may
communicate it to his Government and in order that he may himself take
those measures which may appear to him the natural result of that
communication, and that in consequence thereof the passports which he
might require are at his disposition." This phrase may be considered as
an intimation of the course which, in the opinion of His Majesty's
Government, the undersigned ought to pursue as the natural result of Mr.
Sérurier's recall, or it may be construed, as it seems to have been by
the public, into a direction by His Majesty's Government to the minister
of the United States to cease his functions and leave the country.

It is necessary in a matter involving such grave consequences that there
should be no misunderstanding, the two categories demanding a line of
conduct entirely different the one from the other.

In the first, he can take no directions or follow no suggestions
but those given by his own Government, which he has been sent here to
represent. The recall of the minister of France on the grounds alleged
could not have been anticipated. Of course no instructions have been
given to the undersigned on the subject, and he will not take upon
himself the responsibility which he would incur by a voluntary demand
of his passports, although made on the suggestion of His Majesty's
Government. If this be the sense of the passage in question, the duty
of the undersigned can not be mistaken. He will transmit the note of
His Excellency the Comte de Rigny to his Government and wait its
instructions. Widely different will be his conduct if he is informed
that the conclusion of the Comte de Rigny's note is intended as a
direction that he should quit the French territory. This he will without
delay comply with on being so informed and on receiving the passports
necessary for his protection until he shall leave the Kingdom.

Leaving the responsibility of this measure where it ought to rest, the
undersigned has the honor to renew to His Excellency the Comte de Rigny
the assurance, etc.

EDW'D LIVINGSTON.



_Mr. Livingston to Mr. Forsyth_.

No. 73.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

_Paris, January 16, 1935_.

Hon. J. FORSYTH, etc.

SIR: The wind being unfavorable, I hope that this letter may arrive in
time for the packet.

By the inclosed semiofficial paper you will see that a law has been
presented for effecting the payment of 25,000,000 francs capital to the
United States, for which the budgets of the six years next succeeding
this are affected, and with a condition annexed that our Government
shall have done nothing to affect the interests of France. It would seem
from this that they mean to pay nothing but the capital, and that only
in six years from this time; but as the law refers to the treaty for
execution of which it provides, I presume the intention of the ministry
can not be to make any change in it, and that the phraseology is in
conformity to their usual forms. At any rate, I shall, notwithstanding
the situation in which I am placed in relation to this Government,
endeavor to obtain some explanation on this point.

The packet of the 16th arrived, but to my great regret brought me no
dispatches, and having received none subsequent to your No. 43, and that
not giving me any indication of the conduct that would be expected from
me in the event of such measures as might have been expected on the
arrival of the President's message, I have been left altogether to the
guidance of my own sense of duty under circumstances of much difficulty.
I have endeavored to shape my course through them in such a way as to
maintain the dignity of my Government and preserve peace, and, if
possible, restore the good understanding that existed between the two
countries. From the view of the motives of the President's message
contained in the answer of the Globe to the article in the Intelligencer
I am happy in believing that the representations I have made to the
Comte de Rigny, as detailed in my No. 71, are those entertained by the
Government, and that I have not, in this at least, gone further than it
would have directed me to do had I been favored with your instructions.

I have no answer yet to my note to the Comte de Rigny, a copy of which
was sent by my last dispatch, nor can I form any new conjecture as to
the event.

The inclosed paper contains a notice that I had been received by the
King. This is unfounded, and shall be contradicted. I shall not in the
present state of things make my appearance at court, and only in cases
where it is indispensable have any communication with the minister.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient, humble
servant,

EDW. LIVINGSTON.



_Mr. Forsyth to Mr. Livingston_.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

_Washington, February 13, 1835_.

EDWARD LIVINGSTON, Esq.

SIR: To relieve the anxiety expressed in your late communication to the
Department of State as to the course to be pursued in the event of the
rejection by the Chamber of Deputies of the law to appropriate funds
to carry into effect the treaty of 4th July, 1831, I am directed by
the President to inform you that if Congress shall adjourn without
prescribing some definite course of action, as soon as it is known here
that the law of appropriation has been again rejected by the French
Chamber a frigate will be immediately dispatched to Havre to bring you
back to the United States, with such instructions as the state of the
question may then render necessary and proper.

I am, sir, etc.,

JOHN FORSYTH.



_Mr. Forsyth to Mr. Livingston_.

No. 49.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

_Washington, February 24, 1835_.

EDWARD LIVINGSTON, Esq.,

_Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary_.

SIR: Your dispatches to No. 73 have been received at the Department--No.
73 by yesterday's mail. Nos. 70, 71, 72 were delayed until this morning
by the mismanagement of the young man to whose care they were committed
by the captain of the packet _Sully_ in New York.

In the very unexpected and unpleasant position in which you have been
placed I am directed by the President to say to you that he approves of
your conduct as well becoming the representative of a Government ever
slow to manifest resentment and eager only to fulfill the obligations
of justice and good faith, but at the same time to inform you that he
should have felt no surprise and certainly would have expressed no
displeasure had you yielded to the impulse of national pride and at once
have quitted France, with the whole legation, on the receipt of the
Count de Rigny's note of the 13th of January. M. Sérurier, having
received his orders, has terminated his ministerial career by the
transmission of a note, a copy of which and of all the correspondence
had with him is herewith inclosed. M. Pageot has been presented to me
as charged with the affairs of France on the recall of the minister.

The note of the Count de Rigny having no doubt, according to your
intention, received from you an appropriate reply, it is only necessary
for me now to say that the Count is entirely mistaken in supposing that
any explanations have been given here by M. Sérurier of the causes that
have led to the disregard or postponement of the engagements entered
into by France after the rejection of the appropriation by the last
Chamber of Deputies, and of which he was the organ. No written
communication whatever has been made on the subject, and none verbally
made of sufficient importance to be recorded, a silence with regard to
which could have been justly the foundation of any inference that the
President was satisfied that the course of the French administration was
either reconcilable to the assurances given him or necessary to secure
a majority of the Chamber of Deputies.

The last note of M. Sérurier will be the subject of separate
instructions, which will be immediately prepared and forwarded to you.

In the present position of our relations with France the President
directs that if the appropriation to execute the treaty shall be or
shall have been rejected by the French legislature, you forthwith quit
the territory of France, with all the legation, and return to the United
States by the ship of war which shall be in readiness at Havre to bring
you back to your own country. If the appropriation be made, you may
retire to England or Holland, leaving Mr. Barton in charge of affairs.
Notify the Department of the place selected as your temporary residence
and await further instructions.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN FORSYTH.



_Mr. Sérurier to Mr. Forsyth_.

[Translation.]

WASHINGTON, _February 23, 1835_.

Hon. JOHN FORSYTH,

_Secretary of State of the United States_.

SIR: I have just received orders from my Government which make it
necessary for me to demand of you an immediate audience. I therefore
request you to name the hour at which it will suit you to receive me at
the Department of State.

I have the honor to be, with great consideration, sir, your obedient,
humble servant,

SÉRURIER.



_Mr. Forsyth to Mr. Sérurier_.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

_Washington, February 23, 1835_.

M. SÉRURIER,

_Envoy Extraordinary, etc., of the King of the French_:

Official information having been received by the President of the recall
of Mr. Sérurier by his Government, and the papers of the morning having
announced the arrival of a French sloop of war at New York for the
supposed object of carrying him from the United States, the undersigned,
Secretary of State of the United States, tenders to Mr. Sérurier all
possible facilities in the power of this Government to afford to enable
him to comply speedily with the orders he may have received or may
receive.

The undersigned avails himself of the occasion to renew to Mr. Sérurier
the assurance of his very great consideration.

JOHN FORSYTH.



_Mr. Forsyth to Mr. Sérurier_.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

_Washington, February 23, 1835_.

The undersigned, Secretary of State of the United States, informs M.
Sérurier, in reply to his note of this instant, demanding the indication
of an hour for an immediate audience, that he is ready to receive in
writing any communication the minister of France desires to have made
to the Government of the United States.

The undersigned has the honor to offer M. Sérurier the assurances of his
very great consideration,

JOHN FORSYTH.



_Mr. Sérurier to Mr. Forsyth_.

[Translation.]

WASHINGTON, _February 23, 1835_.

Hon. JOHN FORSYTH,

_Secretary of State_.

SIR: My object in asking you this morning to name the hour at which it
would suit you to receive me was in order that I might, in consequence
of my recall as minister of His Majesty near the United States, present
and accredit M. Pageot, the first secretary of this legation, as chargé
d'affaires of the King. This presentation, which, according to usage, I
calculated on making in person, I have the honor, in compliance with the
desire expressed to me by you, to make in the form which you appear to
prefer.

I thank you, sir, for the facilities which you have been kind enough
to afford me in the note preceding that now answered, also of this
morning's date, and which crossed the letter in which I demanded an
interview.

I have the honor to renew to you, sir, the assurance of my high
consideration.

SÉRURIER.



WASHINGTON, _February 28, 1835_.

_To the Senate of the United States_:

I transmit to the Senate of the United States a report[13] of the
Secretary of State, to whom was referred the resolutions of that body
passed on the 2d and 17th days of the present month, together with such
portion of the correspondence and instructions requested by the said
resolutions as could be transcribed within the time that has elapsed
since they were received and as can be communicated without prejudice
to the public interest.

ANDREW JACKSON.

[Footnote 13: Relating to the treaty of indemnity with Spain of
February 17, 1834.]




VETO MESSAGE.


WASHINGTON, _March 3, 1835_.

_To the Senate_:


I respectfully return to the Senate, where it originated, the "act to
authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to compromise the claims allowed
by the commissioners under the treaty with the King of the Two Sicilies,
concluded October 14, 1832," without my signature.

The act is, in my judgment, inconsistent with the division of powers
in the Constitution of the United States, as it is obviously founded on
the assumption that an act of Congress can give power to the Executive
or to the head of one of the Departments to negotiate with a foreign
government. The debt due by the King of the Two Sicilies will, after the
commissioners have made their decision, become the private vested
property of the citizens of the United States to whom it may be awarded.
Neither the Executive nor the Legislature can properly interfere with it
without their consent. With their consent the Executive has competent
authority to negotiate about it for them with a foreign government--an
authority Congress can not constitutionally abridge or increase.

ANDREW JACKSON.




PROCLAMATION.


[From Statutes at Large (Little, Brown & Co.), Vol. XI, p. 781.]

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas by an act of Congress of the United States of the 24th of May,
1828, entitled "An act in addition to an act entitled 'An act concerning
discriminating duties of tonnage and impost' and to equalize the duties
on Prussian vessels and their cargoes," it is provided that, upon
satisfactory evidence being given to the President of the United States
by the government of any foreign nation that no discriminating duties of
tonnage or impost are imposed or levied in the ports of the said nation
upon vessels wholly belonging to citizens of the United States or upon
the produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported in the same from the
United States or from any foreign country, the President is hereby
authorized to issue his proclamation declaring that the foreign
discriminating duties of tonnage and impost within the United States are
and shall be suspended and discontinued so far as respects the vessels
of the said foreign nation and the produce, manufactures, or merchandise
imported into the United States in the same from the said foreign nation
or from any other foreign country, the said suspension to take effect
from the time of such notification being given to the President of the
United States and to continue so long as the reciprocal exemption of
vessels belonging to citizens of the United States and their cargoes,
as aforesaid, shall be continued, and no longer; and

Whereas satisfactory evidence has lately been received by me from His
Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Mechlenberg Schwerin, through an
official communication of Leon Herckenrath, his consul at Charleston,
in the United States, under date of the 13th April, 1835, that no
discriminating duties of tonnage or impost are imposed or levied in
the ports of the Grand Duchy of Mechlenberg Schwerin upon vessels
wholly belonging to citizens of the United States or upon the produce,
manufactures, or merchandise imported in the same from the United States
or from any foreign country:

Now, therefore, I, Andrew Jackson, President of the United States of
America, do hereby declare and proclaim that the foreign discriminating
duties of tonnage and impost within the United States are and shall be
suspended and discontinued so far as respects the vessels of the Grand
Duchy of Mechlenberg Schwerin and the produce, manufactures, or
merchandise imported into the United States in the same from the said
Grand Duchy or from any other foreign country, the said suspension to
take effect from the 13th day of April, 1835, above mentioned, and to
continue so long as the reciprocal exemption of vessels belonging to
citizens of the United States and their cargoes, as aforesaid, shall
be continued, and no longer.

[SEAL.]

Given under my hand at the city of Washington, the 28th day of April,
A.D. 1835, and of the Independence of the United States the fifty-ninth.

ANDREW JACKSON.

By the President:
  JOHN FORSYTH,
    _Secretary of State_.




SEVENTH ANNUAL MESSAGE.


WASHINGTON, _December 7, 1835_.

_Fellow-Citizens of the Senate and House of Representatives_:

In the discharge of my official duty the task again devolves upon
me of communicating with a new Congress. The reflection that the
representation of the Union has been recently renewed, and that the
constitutional term of its service will expire with my own, heightens
the solicitude with which I shall attempt to lay before it the state
of our national concerns and the devout hope which I cherish that its
labors to improve them may be crowned with success.

You are assembled at a period of profound interest to the American
patriot. The unexampled growth and prosperity of our country having
given us a rank in the scale of nations which removes all apprehension
of danger to our integrity and independence from external foes, the
career of freedom is before us, with an earnest from the past that if
true to ourselves there can be no formidable obstacle in the future
to its peaceful and uninterrupted pursuit. Yet, in proportion to the
disappearance of those apprehensions which attended our weakness, as
once contrasted with the power of some of the States of the Old World,
should we now be solicitous as to those which belong to the conviction
that it is to our own conduct we must look for the preservation of those
causes on which depend the excellence and the duration of our happy
system of government.

In the example of other systems founded on the will of the people we
trace to internal dissension the influences which have so often blasted
the hopes of the friends of freedom. The social elements, which were
strong and successful when united against external danger, failed
in the more difficult task of properly adjusting their own internal
organization, and thus gave way the great principle of self-government.
Let us trust that this admonition will never be forgotten by the
Government or the people of the United States, and that the testimony
which our experience thus far holds out to the great human family of the
practicability and the blessings of free government will be confirmed
in all time to come.

We have but to look at the state of our agriculture, manufactures, and
commerce and the unexampled increase of our population to feel the
magnitude of the trust committed to us. Never in any former period of
our history have we had greater reason than we now have to be thankful
to Divine Providence for the blessings of health and general prosperity.
Every branch of labor we see crowned with the most abundant rewards. In
every element of national resources and wealth and of individual comfort
we witness the most rapid and solid improvements. With no interruptions
to this pleasing prospect at home which will not yield to the spirit of
harmony and good will that so strikingly pervades the mass of the people
in every quarter, amidst all the diversity of interest and pursuits to
which they are attached, and with no cause of solicitude in regard to
our external affairs which will not, it is hoped, disappear before
the principles of simple justice and the forbearance that mark our
intercourse with foreign powers, we have every reason to feel proud
of our beloved country.

The general state of our foreign relations has not materially changed
since my last annual message.

In the settlement of the question of the northeastern boundary little
progress has been made. Great Britain has declined acceding to the
proposition of the United States, presented in accordance with the
resolution of the Senate, unless certain preliminary conditions were
admitted, which I deemed incompatible with a satisfactory and rightful
adjustment of the controversy. Waiting for some distinct proposal from
the Government of Great Britain, which has been invited, I can only
repeat the expression of my confidence that, with the strong mutual
disposition which I believe exists to make a just arrangement, this
perplexing question can be settled with a due regard to the well-founded
pretensions and pacific policy of all the parties to it. Events are
frequently occurring on the northeastern frontier of a character to
impress upon all the necessity of a speedy and definitive termination of
the dispute. This consideration, added to the desire common to both to
relieve the liberal and friendly relations so happily existing between
the two countries from all embarrassment, will no doubt have its just
influence upon both.

Our diplomatic intercourse with Portugal has been renewed, and it is
expected that the claims of our citizens, partially paid, will be fully
satisfied as soon as the condition of the Queen's Government will permit
the proper attention to the subject of them. That Government has, I am
happy to inform you, manifested a determination to act upon the liberal
principles which have marked our commercial policy. The happiest effects
upon the future trade between the United States and Portugal are
anticipated from it, and the time is not thought to be remote when a
system of perfect reciprocity will be established.

The installments due under the convention with the King of the Two
Sicilies have been paid with that scrupulous fidelity by which his whole
conduct has been characterized, and the hope is indulged that the
adjustment of the vexed question of our claims will be followed by a
more extended and mutually beneficial intercourse between the two
countries.

The internal contest still continues in Spain. Distinguished as
this struggle has unhappily been by incidents of the most sanguinary
character, the obligations of the late treaty of indemnification with us
have been, nevertheless, faithfully executed by the Spanish Government.

No provision having been made at the last session of Congress
for the ascertainment of the claims to be paid and the apportionment
of the funds under the convention made with Spain, I invite your early
attention to the subject. The public evidences of the debt have,
according to the terms of the convention and in the forms prescribed by
it, been placed in the possession of the United States, and the interest
as it fell due has been regularly paid upon them. Our commercial
intercourse with Cuba stands as regulated by the act of Congress.
No recent information has been received as to the disposition of the
Government of Madrid on this subject, and the lamented death of our
recently appointed minister on his way to Spain, with the pressure of
their affairs at home, renders it scarcely probable that any change is
to be looked for during the coming year. Further portions of the Florida
archives have been sent to the United States, although the death of one
of the commissioners at a critical moment embarrassed the progress of
the delivery of them. The higher officers of the local government have
recently shewn an anxious desire, in compliance with the orders from the
parent Government, to facilitate the selection and delivery of all we
have a right to claim.

Negotiations have been opened at Madrid for the establishment of a
lasting peace between Spain and such of the Spanish American Governments
of this hemisphere as have availed themselves of the intimation given
to all of them of the disposition of Spain to treat upon the basis of
their entire independence. It is to be regretted that simultaneous
appointments by all of ministers to negotiate with Spain had not been
made. The negotiation itself would have been simplified, and this
long-standing dispute, spreading over a large portion of the world,
would have been brought to a more speedy conclusion.

Our political and commercial relations with Austria, Prussia, Sweden,
and Denmark stand on the usual favorable bases. One of the articles of
our treaty with Russia in relation to the trade on the northwest coast
of America having expired, instructions have been given to our minister
at St. Petersburg to negotiate a renewal of it. The long and unbroken
amity between the two Governments gives every reason for supposing the
article will be renewed, if stronger motives do not exist to prevent
it than with our view of the subject can be anticipated here.

I ask your attention to the message of my predecessor at the opening
of the second session of the Nineteenth Congress, relative to our
commercial intercourse with Holland, and to the documents connected with
that subject, communicated to the House of Representatives on the 10th
of January, 1825, and 18th of January, 1827. Coinciding in the opinion
of my predecessor that Holland is not, under the regulations of her
present system, entitled to have her vessels and their cargoes received
into the United States on the footing of American vessels and cargoes as
regards duties of tonnage and impost, a respect for his reference of it
to the Legislature has alone prevented me from acting on the subject. I
should still have waited without comment for the action of Congress, but
recently a claim has been made by Belgian subjects to admission into our
ports for their ships and cargoes on the same footing as American, with
the allegation we could not dispute that our vessels received in their
ports the identical treatment shewn to them in the ports of Holland,
upon whose vessels no discrimination is made in the ports of the United
States. Giving the same privileges the Belgians expected the same
benefits---benefits that were, in fact, enjoyed when Belgium and Holland
were united under one Government. Satisfied with the justice of their
pretension to be placed on the same footing with Holland, I could not,
nevertheless, without disregard to the principle of our laws, admit
their claim to be treated as Americans, and at the same time a respect
for Congress, to whom the subject had long since been referred, has
prevented me from producing a just equality by taking from the vessels
of Holland privileges conditionally granted by acts of Congress,
although the condition upon which the grant was made has, in my
judgment, failed since 1822. I recommend, therefore, a review of the
act of 1824, and such a modification of it as will produce an equality
on such terms as Congress shall think best comports with our settled
policy and the obligations of justice to two friendly powers.

With the Sublime Porte and all the Governments on the coast of Barbary
our relations continue to be friendly. The proper steps have been taken
to renew our treaty with Morocco.

The Argentine Republic has again promised to send within the current
year a minister to the United States.

A convention with Mexico for extending the time for the appointment of
commissioners to run the boundary line has been concluded and will be
submitted to the Senate. Recent events in that country have awakened
the liveliest solicitude in the United States. Aware of the strong
temptations existing and powerful inducements held out to the citizens
of the United States to mingle in the dissensions of our immediate
neighbors, instructions have been given to the district attorneys of
the United States where indications warranted it to prosecute without
respect to persons all who might attempt to violate the obligations of
our neutrality, while at the same time it has been thought necessary to
apprise the Government of Mexico that we should require the integrity
of our territory to be scrupulously respected by both parties.

From our diplomatic agents in Brazil, Chile, Peru, Central America,
Venezuela, and New Granada constant assurances are received of the
continued good understanding with the Governments to which they are
severally accredited. With those Governments upon which our citizens
have valid and accumulating claims, scarcely an advance toward a
settlement of them is made, owing mainly to their distracted state or to
the pressure of imperative domestic questions. Our patience has been and
will probably be still further severely tried, but our fellow-citizens
whose interests are involved may confide in the determination of the
Government to obtain for them eventually ample retribution.

Unfortunately, many of the nations of this hemisphere are still
self-tormented by domestic dissensions. Revolution succeeds revolution;
injuries are committed upon foreigners engaged in lawful pursuits; much
time elapses before a government sufficiently stable is erected to
justify expectation of redress; ministers are sent and received, and
before the discussions of past injuries are fairly begun fresh troubles
arise; but too frequently new injuries are added to the old, to be
discussed together with the existing government after it has proved its
ability to sustain the assaults made upon it, or with its successor if
overthrown. If this unhappy condition of things continues much longer,
other nations will be under the painful necessity of deciding whether
justice to their suffering citizens does not require a prompt redress of
injuries by their own power, without waiting for the establishment of a
government competent and enduring enough to discuss and to make
satisfaction for them.

Since the last session of Congress the validity of our claims upon
France, as liquidated by the treaty of 1831, has been acknowledged by
both branches of her legislature, and the money has been appropriated
for their discharge; but the payment is, I regret to inform you, still
withheld.

A brief recapitulation of the most important incidents in this
protracted controversy will shew how utterly untenable are the grounds
upon which this course is attempted to be justified.

On entering upon the duties of my station I found the United States an
unsuccessful applicant to the justice of France for the satisfaction of
claims the validity of which was never questionable, and has now been
most solemnly admitted by France herself. The antiquity of these claims,
their high justice, and the aggravating circumstances out of which they
arose are too familiar to the American people to require description.
It is sufficient to say that for a period of ten years and upward our
commerce was, with but little interruption, the subject of constant
aggressions on the part of France--aggressions the ordinary features of
which were condemnations of vessels and cargoes under arbitrary decrees,
adopted in contravention as well of the laws of nations as of treaty
stipulations, burnings on the high seas, and seizures and confiscations
under special imperial rescripts in the ports of other nations occupied
by the armies or under the control of France. Such it is now conceded
is the character of the wrongs we suffered--wrongs in many cases so
flagrant that even their authors never denied our right to reparation.
Of the extent of these injuries some conception may be formed from the
fact that after the burning of a large amount at sea and the necessary
deterioration in other cases by long detention the American property so
seized and sacrificed at forced sales, excluding what was adjudged to
privateers before or without condemnation, brought into the French
treasury upward of 24,000,000 francs, besides large custom-house duties.

The subject had already been an affair of twenty years' uninterrupted
negotiation, except for a short time when France was overwhelmed by
the military power of united Europe. During this period, whilst other
nations were extorting from her payment of their claims at the point of
the bayonet, the United States intermitted their demand for justice out
of respect to the oppressed condition of a gallant people to whom they
felt under obligations for fraternal assistance in their own days
of suffering and of peril. The bad effects of these protracted and
unavailing discussions, as well upon our relations with France as upon
our national character, were obvious, and the line of duty was to my
mind equally so. This was either to insist upon the adjustment of our
claims within a reasonable period or to abandon them altogether. I could
not doubt that by this course the interests and honor of both countries
would be best consulted. Instructions were therefore given in this
spirit to the minister who was sent out once more to demand reparation.
Upon the meeting of Congress in December, 1829, I felt it my duty to
speak of these claims and the delays of France in terms calculated to
call the serious attention of both countries to the subject. The then
French ministry took exception to the message on the ground of its
containing a menace, under which it was not agreeable to the French
Government to negotiate. The American minister of his own accord refuted
the construction which was attempted to be put upon the message and at
the same time called to the recollection of the French ministry that
the President's message was a communication addressed, not to foreign
governments, but to the Congress of the United States, in which it
was enjoined upon him by the Constitution to lay before that body
information of the state of the Union, comprehending its foreign as well
as its domestic relations, and that if in the discharge of this duty he
felt it incumbent upon him to summon the attention of Congress in due
time to what might be the possible consequences of existing difficulties
with any foreign government, he might fairly be supposed to do so under
a sense of what was due from him in a frank communication with another
branch of his own Government, and not from any intention of holding
a menace over a foreign power. The views taken by him received my
approbation, the French Government was satisfied, and the negotiation
was continued. It terminated in the treaty of July 4, 1831, recognizing
the justice of our claims in part and promising payment to the amount
of 25,000,000 francs in six annual installments.

The ratifications of this treaty were exchanged at Washington on the
2d of February, 1832, and in five days thereafter it was laid before
Congress, who immediately passed the acts necessary on our part to
secure to France the commercial advantages conceded to her in the
compact. The treaty had previously been solemnly ratified by the King of
the French in terms which are certainly not mere matters of form, and of
which the translation is as follows:


  We, approving the above convention in all and each of the dispositions
  which are contained in it, do declare, by ourselves as well as by our
  heirs and successors, that it is accepted, approved, ratified, and
  confirmed, and by these presents, signed by our hand, we do accept,
  approve, ratify, and confirm it; promising, on the faith and word of a
  king, to observe it and to cause it to be observed inviolably, without
  ever contravening it or suffering it to be contravened, directly or
  indirectly, for any cause or under any pretense whatsoever.


Official information of the exchange of ratifications in the
United States reached Paris whilst the Chambers were in session. The
extraordinary and to us injurious delays of the French Government in
their action upon the subject of its fulfillment have been heretofore
stated to Congress, and I have no disposition to enlarge upon them here.
It is sufficient to observe that the then pending session was allowed to
expire without even an effort to obtain the necessary appropriations;
that the two succeeding ones were also suffered to pass away without
anything like a serious attempt to obtain a decision upon the subject,
and that it was not until the fourth session, almost three years after
the conclusion of the treaty and more than two years after the exchange
of ratifications, that the bill for the execution of the treaty was
pressed to a vote and rejected.

In the meantime the Government of the United States, having full
confidence that a treaty entered into and so solemnly ratified by the
French King would be executed in good faith, and not doubting that
provision would be made for the payment of the first installment which
was to become due on the 2d day of February, 1833, negotiated a draft
for the amount through the Bank of the United States. When this draft
was presented by the holder with the credentials required by the treaty
to authorize him to receive the money, the Government of France allowed
it to be protested. In addition to the injury in the nonpayment of the
money by France, conformably to her engagement, the United States were
exposed to a heavy claim on the part of the bank under pretense of
damages, in satisfaction of which that institution seized upon and still
retains an equal amount of the public money. Congress was in session
when the decision of the Chambers reached Washington, and an immediate
communication of this apparently final decision of France not to fulfill
the stipulations of the treaty was the course naturally to be expected
from the President. The deep tone of dissatisfaction which pervaded the
public mind and the correspondent excitement produced in Congress by
only a general knowledge of the result rendered it more than probable
that a resort to immediate measures of redress would be the consequence
of calling the attention of that body to the subject. Sincerely desirous
of preserving the pacific relations which had so long existed between
the two countries, I was anxious to avoid this course if I could be
satisfied that by doing so neither the interests nor the honor of my
country would be compromitted. Without the fullest assurances upon that
point, I could not hope to acquit myself of the responsibility to be
incurred in suffering Congress to adjourn without laying the subject
before them. Those received by me were believed to be of that character.

That the feelings produced in the United States by the news of the
rejection of the appropriation would be such as I have described them
to have been was foreseen by the French Government, and prompt measures
were taken by it to prevent the consequences. The King in person
expressed through our minister at Paris his profound regret at the
decision of the Chambers, and promised to send forthwith a national
ship with dispatches to his minister here authorizing him to give such
assurances as would satisfy the Government and people of the United
States that the treaty would yet be faithfully executed by France.
The national ship arrived, and the minister received his instructions.
Claiming to act under the authority derived from them, he gave to this
Government in the name of his the most solemn assurances that as soon
after the new elections as the charter would permit the French
Chambers would be convened and the attempt to procure the necessary
appropriations renewed; that all the constitutional powers of the King
and his ministers should be put in requisition to accomplish the object,
and he was understood, and so expressly informed by this Government at
the time, to engage that the question should be pressed to a decision at
a period sufficiently early to permit information of the result to be
communicated to Congress at the commencement of their next session.
Relying upon these assurances, I incurred the responsibility, great
as I regarded it to be, of suffering Congress to separate without
communicating with them upon the subject.

The expectations justly founded upon the promises thus solemnly made to
this Government by that of France were not realized. The French Chambers
met on the 31st of July, 1834, soon after the election, and although our
minister in Paris urged the French ministry to bring the subject before
them, they declined doing so. He next insisted that the Chambers, if
prorogued without acting on the subject, should be reassembled at a
period so early that their action on the treaty might be known in
Washington prior to the meeting of Congress. This reasonable request
was not only declined, but the Chambers were prorogued to the 29th of
December, a day so late that their decision, however urgently pressed,
could not in all probability be obtained in time to reach Washington
before the necessary adjournment of Congress by the Constitution. The
reasons given by the ministry for refusing to convoke the Chambers at
an earlier period were afterwards shewn not to be insuperable by their
actual convocation on the 1st of December under a special call for
domestic purposes, which fact, however, did not become known to this
Government until after the commencement of the last session of Congress.

Thus disappointed in our just expectations, it became my imperative
duty to consult with Congress in regard to the expediency of a resort
to retaliatory measures in case the stipulations of the treaty should
not be speedily complied with, and to recommend such as in my judgment
the occasion called for. To this end an unreserved communication of the
case in all its aspects became indispensable. To have shrunk in making
it from saying all that was necessary to its correct understanding,
and that the truth would justify, for fear of giving offense to
others, would have been unworthy of us. To have gone, on the other
hand, a single step further for the purpose of wounding the pride of a
Government and people with whom we had so many motives for cultivating
relations of amity and reciprocal advantage would have been unwise and
improper. Admonished by the past of the difficulty of making even the
simplest statement of our wrongs without disturbing the sensibilities of
those who had by their position become responsible for their redress,
and earnestly desirous of preventing further obstacles from that source,
I went out of my way to preclude a construction of the message by which
the recommendation that was made to Congress might be regarded as a
menace to France in not only disavowing such a design, but in declaring
that her pride and her power were too well known to expect anything from
her fears. The message did not reach Paris until more than a month after
the Chambers had been in session, and such was the insensibility of the
ministry to our rightful claims and just expectations that our minister
had been informed that the matter when introduced would not be pressed
as a cabinet measure.

Although the message was not officially communicated to the French
Government, and notwithstanding the declaration to the contrary which
it contained, the French ministry decided to consider the conditional
recommendation of reprisals a menace and an insult which the honor of
the nation made it incumbent on them to resent. The measures resorted
to by them to evince their sense of the supposed indignity were the
immediate recall of their minister at Washington, the offer of passports
to the American minister at Paris, and a public notice to the
legislative Chambers that all diplomatic intercourse with the United
States had been suspended. Having in this manner vindicated the dignity
of France, they next proceeded to illustrate her justice. To this end a
bill was immediately introduced into the Chamber of Deputies proposing
to make the appropriations necessary to carry into effect the treaty.
As this bill subsequently passed into a law, the provisions of which
now constitute the main subject of difficulty between the two nations,
it becomes my duty, in order to place the subject before you in a clear
light, to trace the history of its passage and to refer with some
particularity to the proceedings and discussions in regard to it.

The minister of finance in his opening speech alluded to the measures
which had been adopted to resent the supposed indignity, and recommended
the execution of the treaty as a measure required by the honor and
justice of France. He as the organ of the ministry declared the message,
so long as it had not received the sanction of Congress, a mere
expression of the personal opinion of the President, for which neither
the Government nor people of the United States were responsible, and
that an engagement had been entered into for the fulfillment of which
the honor of France was pledged. Entertaining these views, the single
condition which the French ministry proposed to annex to the payment of
the money was that it should not be made until it was ascertained that
the Government of the United States had done nothing to injure the
interests of France, or, in other words, that no steps had been
authorized by Congress of a hostile character toward France.

What the disposition or action of Congress might be was then unknown to
the French cabinet; but on the 14th of January the Senate resolved that
it was at that time inexpedient to adopt any legislative measures in
regard to the state of affairs between the United States and France, and
no action on the subject had occurred in the House of Representatives.
These facts were known in Paris prior to the 28th of March, 1835, when
the committee to whom the bill of indemnification had been referred
reported it to the Chamber of Deputies. That committee substantially
reechoed the sentiments of the ministry, declared that Congress had set
aside the proposition of the President, and recommended the passage of
the bill without any other restriction than that originally proposed.
Thus was it known to the French ministry and Chambers that if the
position assumed by them, and which had been so frequently and solemnly
announced as the only one compatible with the honor of France, was
maintained and the bill passed as originally proposed, the money would
be paid and there would be an end of this unfortunate controversy.

But this cheering prospect was soon destroyed by an amendment introduced
into the bill at the moment of its passage, providing that the money
should not be paid until the French Government had received satisfactory
explanations of the President's message of the 2d December, 1834, and,
what is still more extraordinary, the president of the council of
ministers adopted this amendment and consented to its incorporation
in the bill. In regard to a supposed insult which had been formally
resented by the recall of their minister and the offer of passports
to ours, they now for the first time proposed to ask explanations.
Sentiments and propositions which they had declared could not justly
be imputed to the Government or people of the United States are set up
as obstacles to the performance of an act of conceded justice to that
Government and people. They had declared that the honor of France
required the fulfillment of the engagement into which the King had
entered, unless Congress adopted the recommendations of the message.
They ascertained that Congress did not adopt them, and yet that
fulfillment is refused unless they first obtain from the President
explanations of an opinion characterized by themselves as personal
and inoperative.

The conception that it was my intention to menace or insult the
Government of France is as unfounded as the attempt to extort from the
fears of that nation what her sense of justice may deny would be vain
and ridiculous. But the Constitution of the United States imposes on
the President the duty of laying before Congress the condition of the
country in its foreign and domestic relations, and of recommending such
measures as may in his opinion be required by its interests. From the
performance of this duty he can not be deterred by the fear of wounding
the sensibilities of the people or government of whom it may become
necessary to speak; and the American people are incapable of submitting
to an interference by any government on earth, however powerful, with
the free performance of the domestic duties which the Constitution has
imposed on their public functionaries. The discussions which intervene
between the several departments of our Government belong to ourselves,
and for anything said in them our public servants are only responsible
to their own constituents and to each other. If in the course of their
consultations facts are erroneously stated or unjust deductions are
made, they require no other inducement to correct them, however informed
of their error, than their love of justice and what is due to their own
character; but they can never submit to be interrogated upon the subject
as a matter of right by a foreign power. When our discussions terminate
in acts, our responsibility to foreign powers commences, not as
individuals, but as a nation. The principle which calls in question
the President for the language of his message would equally justify a
foreign power in demanding explanation of the language used in the
report of a committee or by a member in debate.

This is not the first time that the Government of France has taken
exception to the messages of American Presidents. President Washington
and the first President Adams in the performance of their duties to the
American people fell under the animadversions of the French Directory.
The objection taken by the ministry of Charles X, and removed by the
explanations made by our minister upon the spot, has already been
adverted to. When it was understood that the ministry of the present
King took exception to my message of last year, putting a construction
upon it which was disavowed on its face, our late minister at Paris,
in answer to the note which first announced a dissatisfaction with
the language used in the message, made a communication to the French
Government under date of the 29th of January, 1835,[14] calculated to
remove all impressions which an unreasonable susceptibility had created.
He repeated and called the attention of the French Government to the
disavowal contained in the message itself of any intention to intimidate
by menace; he truly declared that it contained and was intended to
contain no charge of ill faith against the King of the French, and
properly distinguished between the right to complain in unexceptionable
terms of the omission to execute an agreement and an accusation of
bad motives in withholding such execution, and demonstrated that the
necessary use of that right ought not to be considered as an offensive
imputation. Although this communication was made without instructions
and entirely on the minister's own responsibility, yet it was afterwards
made the act of this Government by my full approbation, and that
approbation was officially made known on the 25th of April, 1835, to
the French Government. It, however, failed to have any effect. The law,
after this friendly explanation, passed with the obnoxious amendment,
supported by the King's ministers, and was finally approved by the King.

The people of the United States are justly attached to a pacific
system in their intercourse with foreign nations. It is proper,
therefore, that they should know whether their Government has adhered
to it. In the present instance it has been carried to the utmost extent
that was consistent with a becoming self-respect. The note of the 29th
of January, to which I have before alluded, was not the only one which
our minister took upon himself the responsibility of presenting on the
same subject and in the same spirit. Finding that it was intended to
make the payment of a just debt dependent on the performance of a
condition which he knew could never be complied with, he thought it a
duty to make another attempt to convince the French Government that
whilst self-respect and regard to the dignity of other nations would
always prevent us from using any language that ought to give offense,
yet we could never admit a right in any foreign government to ask
explanations of or to interfere in any manner in the communications
which one branch of our public councils made with another; that in
the present case no such language had been used, and that this had
in a former note been fully and voluntarily stated, before it was
contemplated to make the explanation a condition; and that there might
be no misapprehension he stated the terms used in that note, and he
officially informed them that it had been approved by the President,
and that therefore every explanation which could reasonably be asked or
honorably given had been already made; that the contemplated measure
had been anticipated by a voluntary and friendly declaration, and was
therefore not only useless, but might be deemed offensive, and certainly
would not be complied with if annexed as a condition.

When this latter communication, to which I especially invite the
attention of Congress, was laid before me, I entertained the hope that
the means it was obviously intended to afford of an honorable and speedy
adjustment of the difficulties between the two nations would have been
accepted, and I therefore did not hesitate to give it my sanction and
full approbation. This was due to the minister who had made himself
responsible for the act, and it was published to the people of the
United States and is now laid before their representatives to shew
how far their Executive has gone in its endeavors to restore a good
understanding between the two countries. It would have been at any
time communicated to the Government of France had it been officially
requested.

The French Government having received all the explanation which honor
and principle permitted, and which could in reason be asked, it was
hoped it would no longer hesitate to pay the installments now due.
The agent authorized to receive the money was instructed to inform the
French minister of his readiness to do so. In reply to this notice he
was told that the money could not then be paid, because the formalities
required by the act of the Chambers had not been arranged.

Not having received any official information of the intentions of the
French Government, and anxious to bring, as far as practicable, this
unpleasant affair to a close before the meeting of Congress, that you
might have the whole subject before you, I caused our chargé d'affaires
at Paris to be instructed to ask for the final determination of the
French Government, and in the event of their refusal to pay the
installments now due, without further explanations to return to the
United States.

The result of this last application has not yet reached us, but is daily
expected. That it may be favorable is my sincere wish. France having
now, through all the branches of her Government, acknowledged the
validity of our claims and the obligation of the treaty of 1831, and
there really existing no adequate cause for further delay, will at
length, it may be hoped, adopt the course which the interests of both
nations, not less than the principles of justice, so imperiously
require. The treaty being once executed on her part, little will remain
to disturb the friendly relations of the two countries--nothing, indeed,
which will not yield to the suggestions of a pacific and enlightened
policy and to the influence of that mutual good will and of those
generous recollections which we may confidently expect will then be
revived in all their ancient force. In any event, however, the principle
involved in the new aspect which has been given to the controversy is so
vitally important to the independent administration of the Government
that it can neither be surrendered nor compromitted without national
degradation. I hope it is unnecessary for me to say that such a
sacrifice will not be made through any agency of mine. The honor of my
country shall never be stained by an apology from me for the statement
of truth and the performance of duty; nor can I give any explanation
of my official acts except such as is due to integrity and justice
and consistent with the principles on which our institutions have
been framed. This determination will, I am confident, be approved
by my constituents. I have, indeed, studied their character to but
little purpose if the sum of 25,000,000 francs will have the weight
of a feather in the estimation of what appertains to their national
independence, and if, unhappily, a different impression should at any
time obtain in any quarter, they will, I am sure, rally round the
Government of their choice with alacrity and unanimity, and silence
forever the degrading imputation.

Having thus frankly presented to you the circumstances which since the
last session of Congress have occurred in this interesting and important
matter, with the views of the Executive in regard to them, it is at this
time only necessary to add that whenever the advices now daily expected
from our chargé d'affaires shall have been received they will be made
the subject of a special communication.

The condition of the public finances was never more flattering than at
the present period.

Since my last annual communication all the remains of the public
debt have been redeemed, or money has been placed in deposit for this
purpose whenever the creditors choose to receive it. All the other
pecuniary engagements of the Government have been honorably and promptly
fulfilled, and there will be a balance in the Treasury at the close of
the present year of about $19,000,000. It is believed that after meeting
all outstanding and unexpended appropriations there will remain near
eleven millions to be applied to any new objects which Congress may
designate or to the more rapid execution of the works already in
progress. In aid of these objects, and to satisfy the current
expenditures of the ensuing year, it is estimated that there will
be received from various sources twenty millions more in 1836.

Should Congress make new appropriations in conformity with the estimates
which will be submitted from the proper Departments, amounting to about
twenty-four millions, still the available surplus at the close of the
next year, after deducting all unexpended appropriations, will probably
not be less than six millions. This sum can, in my judgment, be now
usefully applied to proposed improvements in our navy-yards, and to new
national works which are not enumerated in the present estimates or
to the more rapid completion of those already begun. Either would be
constitutional and useful, and would render unnecessary any attempt
in our present peculiar condition to divide the surplus revenue or to
reduce it any faster than will be effected by the existing laws. In
any event, as the annual report from the Secretary of the Treasury will
enter into details, shewing the probability of some decrease in the
revenue during the next seven years and a very considerable deduction in
1842, it is not recommended that Congress should undertake to modify the
present tariff so as to disturb the principles on which the compromise
act was passed. Taxation on some of the articles of general consumption
which are not in competition with our own productions may be no doubt so
diminished as to lessen to some extent the source of this revenue, and
the same object can also be assisted by more liberal provisions for the
subjects of public defense, which in the present state of our prosperity
and wealth may be expected to engage your attention. If, however, after
satisfying all the demands which can arise from these sources the
unexpended balance in the Treasury should still continue to increase,
it would be better to bear with the evil until the great changes
contemplated in our tariff laws have occurred and shall enable us to
revise the system with that care and circumspection which are due to
so delicate and important a subject.

It is certainly our duty to diminish as far as we can the burdens of
taxation and to regard all the restrictions which are imposed on the
trade and navigation of our citizens as evils which we shall mitigate
whenever we are not prevented by the adverse legislation and policy
of foreign nations or those primary duties which the defense and
independence of our country enjoin upon us. That we have accomplished
much toward the relief of our citizens by the changes which have
accompanied the payment of the public debt and the adoption of the
present revenue laws is manifest from the fact that compared with 1833
there is a diminution of near twenty-five millions in the last two
years, and that our expenditures, independently of those for the public
debt, have been reduced near nine millions during the same period. Let
us trust that by the continued observance of economy and by harmonizing
the great interests of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce much
more may be accomplished to diminish the burdens of government and to
increase still further the enterprise and the patriotic affection of all
classes of our citizens and all the members of our happy Confederacy.
As the data which the Secretary of the Treasury will lay before you in
regard to our financial resources are full and extended, and will afford
a safe guide in your future calculations, I think it unnecessary to
offer any further observations on that subject here.

Among the evidences of the increasing prosperity of the country, not
the least gratifying is that afforded by the receipts from the sales of
the public lands, which amount in the present year to the unexpected
sum of $11,000,000. This circumstance attests the rapidity with which
agriculture, the first and most important occupation of man, advances
and contributes to the wealth and power of our extended territory.
Being still of the opinion that it is our best policy, as far as we can
consistently with the obligations under which those lands were ceded to
the United States, to promote their speedy settlement, I beg leave to
call the attention of the present Congress to the suggestions I have
offered respecting it in my former messages.

The extraordinary receipts from the sales of the public lands invite
you to consider what improvements the land system, and particularly the
condition of the General Land Office, may require. At the time this
institution was organized, near a quarter of a century ago, it would
probably have been thought extravagant to anticipate for this period
such an addition to its business as has been produced by the vast
increase of those sales during the past and present years. It may also
be observed that since the year 1812 the land offices and surveying
districts have been greatly multiplied, and that numerous legislative
enactments from year to year since that time have imposed a great
amount of new and additional duties upon that office, while the want
of a timely application of force commensurate with the care and labor
required has caused the increasing embarrassment of accumulated arrears
in the different branches of the establishment.

These impediments to the expedition of much duty in the General Land
Office induce me to submit to your judgment whether some modification
of the laws relating to its organization, or an organization of a new
character, be not called for at the present juncture, to enable the
office to accomplish all the ends of its institution with a greater
degree of facility and promptitude than experience has proved to be
practicable under existing regulations. The variety of the concerns and
the magnitude and complexity of the details occupying and dividing the
attention of the Commissioner appear to render it difficult, if not
impracticable, for that officer by any possible assiduity to bestow on
all the multifarious subjects upon which he is called to act the ready
and careful attention due to their respective importance, unless the
Legislature shall assist him by a law providing, or enabling him to
provide, for a more regular and economical distribution of labor, with
the incident responsibility among those employed under his direction.
The mere manual operation of affixing his signature to the vast number
of documents issuing from his office subtracts so largely from the time
and attention claimed by the weighty and complicated subjects daily
accumulating in that branch of the public service as to indicate the
strong necessity of revising the organic law of the establishment. It
will be easy for Congress hereafter to proportion the expenditure on
account of this branch of the service to its real wants by abolishing
from time to time the offices which can be dispensed with.

The extinction of the public debt having taken place, there is no longer
any use for the offices of Commissioners of Loans and of the Sinking
Fund. I recommend, therefore, that they be abolished, and that proper
measures be taken for the transfer to the Treasury Department of any
funds, books, and papers connected with the operations of those offices,
and that the proper power be given to that Department for closing
finally any portion of their business which may remain to be settled.

It is also incumbent on Congress in guarding the pecuniary interests
of the country to discontinue by such a law as was passed in 1812 the
receipt of the bills of the Bank of the United States in payment of the
public revenue, and to provide for the designation of an agent whose
duty it shall be to take charge of the books and stock of the United
States in that institution, and to close all connection with it after
the 3d of March, 1836, when its charter expires. In making provision in
regard to the disposition of this stock it will be essential to define
clearly and strictly the duties and powers of the officer charged with
that branch of the public service.

It will be seen from the correspondence which the Secretary of the
Treasury will lay before you that notwithstanding the large amount
of the stock which the United States hold in that institution no
information has yet been communicated which will enable the Government
to anticipate when it can receive any dividends or derive any benefit
from it.

Connected with the condition of the finances and the flourishing state
of the country in all its branches of industry, it is pleasing to
witness the advantages which have been already derived from the recent
laws regulating the value of the gold coinage. These advantages will be
more apparent in the course of the next year, when the branch mints
authorized to be established in North Carolina, Georgia, and Louisiana
shall have gone into operation. Aided, as it is hoped they will be, by
further reforms in the banking systems of the States and by judicious
regulations on the part of Congress in relation to the custody of the
public moneys, it may be confidently anticipated that the use of gold
and silver as a circulating medium will become general in the ordinary
transactions connected with the labor of the country. The great
desideratum in modern times is an efficient check upon the power of
banks, preventing that excessive issue of paper whence arise those
fluctuations in the standard of value which render uncertain the rewards
of labor. It was supposed by those who established the Bank of the
United States that from the credit given to it by the custody of the
public moneys and other privileges and the precautions taken to guard
against the evils which the country had suffered in the bankruptcy of
many of the State institutions of that period we should derive from that
institution all the security and benefits of a sound currency and every
good end that was attainable under that provision of the Constitution
which authorizes Congress alone to coin money and regulate the value
thereof. But it is scarcely necessary now to say that these
anticipations have not been realized.

After the extensive embarrassment and distress recently produced by the
Bank of the United States, from which the country is now recovering,
aggravated as they were by pretensions to power which defied the public
authority, and which if acquiesced in by the people would have changed
the whole character of our Government, every candid and intelligent
individual must admit that for the attainment of the great advantages of
a sound currency we must look to a course of legislation radically
different from that which created such an institution.

In considering the means of obtaining so important an end we must set
aside all calculations of temporary convenience, and be influenced
by those only which are in harmony with the true character and the
permanent interests of the Republic. We must recur to first principles
and see what it is that has prevented the legislation of Congress and
the States on the subject of currency from satisfying the public
expectation and realizing results corresponding to those which have
attended the action of our system when truly consistent with the great
principle of equality upon which it rests, and with that spirit of
forbearance and mutual concession and generous patriotism which was
originally, and must ever continue to be, the vital element of our
Union.

On this subject I am sure that I can not be mistaken in ascribing our
want of success to the undue countenance which has been afforded to the
spirit of monopoly. All the serious dangers which our system has yet
encountered may be traced to the resort to implied powers and the use of
corporations clothed with privileges, the effect of which is to advance
the interests of the few at the expense of the many. We have felt but
one class of these dangers exhibited in the contest waged by the Bank
of the United States against the Government for the last four years.
Happily they have been obviated for the present by the indignant
resistance of the people, but we should recollect that the principle
whence they sprung is an ever-active one, which will not fail to renew
its efforts in the same and in other forms so long as there is a hope
of success, founded either on the inattention of the people or the
treachery of their representatives to the subtle progress of its
influence. The bank is, in fact, but one of the fruits of a system at
war with the genius of all our institutions--a system founded upon a
political creed the fundamental principle of which is a distrust of
the popular will as a safe regulator of political power, and whose
great ultimate object and inevitable result, should it prevail, is the
consolidation of all power in our system in one central government.
Lavish public disbursements and corporations with exclusive privileges
would be its substitutes for the original and as yet sound checks and
balances of the Constitution--the means by whose silent and secret
operation a control would be exercised by the few over the political
conduct of the many by first acquiring that control over the labor and
earnings of the great body of the people. Wherever this spirit has
effected an alliance with political power, tyranny and despotism have
been the fruit. If it is ever used for the ends of government, it has to
be incessantly watched, or it corrupts the sources of the public virtue
and agitates the country with questions unfavorable to the harmonious
and steady pursuit of its true interests.

We are now to see whether, in the present favorable condition of the
country, we can not take an effectual stand against this spirit of
monopoly, and practically prove in respect to the currency as well as
other important interests that there is no necessity for so extensive a
resort to it as that which has been heretofore practiced. The experience
of another year has confirmed the utter fallacy of the idea that the
Bank of the United States was necessary as a fiscal agent of the
Government. Without its aid as such, indeed, in despite of all the
embarrassment it was in its power to create, the revenue has been paid
with punctuality by our citizens, the business of exchange, both
foreign and domestic, has been conducted with convenience, and the
circulating medium has been greatly improved. By the use of the State
banks, which do not derive their charters from the General Government
and are not controlled by its authority, it is ascertained that the
moneys of the United States can be collected and disbursed without loss
or inconvenience, and that all the wants of the community in relation
to exchange and currency are supplied as well as they have ever been
before. If under circumstances the most unfavorable to the steadiness of
the money market it has been found that the considerations on which the
Bank of the United States rested its claims to the public favor were
imaginary and groundless, it can not be doubted that the experience of
the future will be more decisive against them.

It has been seen that without the agency of a great moneyed monopoly the
revenue can be collected and conveniently and safely applied to all the
purposes of the public expenditure. It is also ascertained that instead
of being necessarily made to promote the evils of an unchecked paper
system, the management of the revenue can be made auxiliary to the
reform which the legislatures of several of the States have already
commenced in regard to the suppression of small bills, and which has
only to be fostered by proper regulations on the part of Congress to
secure a practical return to the extent required for the security of
the currency to the constitutional medium. Severed from the Government
as political engines, and not susceptible of dangerous extension and
combination, the State banks will not be tempted, nor will they have the
power, which we have seen exercised, to divert the public funds from the
legitimate purposes of the Government. The collection and custody of
the revenue, being, on the contrary, a source of credit to them, will
increase the security which the States provide for a faithful execution
of their trusts by multiplying the scrutinies to which their operations
and accounts will be subjected. Thus disposed, as well from interest
as the obligations of their charters, it can not be doubted that such
conditions as Congress may see fit to adopt respecting the deposits in
these institutions, with a view to the gradual disuse, of the small
bills will be cheerfully complied with, and that we shall soon gain in
place of the Bank of the United States a practical reform in the whole
paper system of the country. If by this policy we can ultimately witness
the suppression of all bank bills below $20, it is apparent that gold
and silver will take their place and become the principal circulating
medium in the common business of the farmers and mechanics of the
country. The attainment of such a result will form an era in the history
of our country which will be dwelt upon with delight by every true
friend of its liberty and independence. It will lighten the great
tax which our paper system has so long collected from the earnings of
labor, and do more to revive and perpetuate those habits of economy and
simplicity which are so congenial to the character of republicans than
all the legislation which has yet been attempted.

To this subject I feel that I can not too earnestly invite the special
attention of Congress, without the exercise of whose authority the
opportunity to accomplish so much public good must pass unimproved.
Deeply impressed with its vital importance, the Executive has taken all
the steps within his constitutional power to guard the public revenue
and defeat the expectation which the Bank of the United States indulged
of renewing and perpetuating its monopoly on the ground of its necessity
as a fiscal agent and as affording a sounder currency than could be
obtained without such an institution. In the performance of this duty
much responsibility was incurred which would have been gladly avoided if
the stake which the public had in the question could have been otherwise
preserved. Although clothed with the legal authority and supported by
precedent, I was aware that there was in the act of the removal of the
deposits a liability to excite that sensitiveness to Executive power
which it is the characteristic and the duty of freemen to indulge; but
I relied on this feeling also, directed by patriotism and intelligence,
to vindicate the conduct which in the end would appear to have been
called for by the best interests of my country. The apprehensions
natural to this feeling that there may have been a desire, through the
instrumentality of that measure, to extend the Executive influence, or
that it may have been prompted by motives not sufficiently free from
ambition, were not overlooked. Under the operation of our institutions
the public servant who is called on to take a step of high
responsibility should feel in the freedom which gives rise to such
apprehensions his highest security. When unfounded the attention which
they arouse and the discussions they excite deprive those who indulge
them of the power to do harm; when just they but hasten the certainty
with which the great body of our citizens never fail to repel an attempt
to procure their sanction to any exercise of power inconsistent with the
jealous maintenance of their rights. Under such convictions, and
entertaining no doubt that my constitutional obligations demanded the
steps which were taken in reference to the removal of the deposits, it
was impossible for me to be deterred from the path of duty by a fear
that my motives could be misjudged or that political prejudices could
defeat the just consideration of the merits of my conduct. The result
has shewn how safe is this reliance upon the patriotic temper and
enlightened discernment of the people. That measure has now been before
them and has stood the test of all the severe analysis which its general
importance, the interests it affected, and the apprehensions it excited
were calculated to produce, and it now remains for Congress to consider
what legislation has become necessary in consequence.

I need only add to what I have on former occasions said on this subject
generally that in the regulations which Congress may prescribe
respecting the custody of the public moneys it is desirable that as
little discretion as may be deemed consistent with their safe-keeping
should be given to the executive agents. No one can be more deeply
impressed than I am with the soundness of the doctrine which restrains
and limits, by specific provisions, executive discretion, as far as it
can be done consistently with the preservation of its constitutional
character. In respect to the control over the public money this doctrine
is peculiarly applicable, and is in harmony with the great principle
which I felt I was sustaining in the controversy with the Bank of the
United States, which has resulted in severing to some extent a dangerous
connection between a moneyed and political power. The duty of the
Legislature to define, by clear and positive enactments, the nature and
extent of the action which it belongs to the Executive to superintend
springs out of a policy analogous to that which enjoins upon all the
branches of the Federal Government an abstinence from the exercise of
powers not clearly granted.

In such a Government, possessing only limited and specific powers, the
spirit of its general administration can not be wise or just when it
opposes the reference of all doubtful points to the great source of
authority, the States and the people, whose number and diversified
relations, securing them against the influences and excitements which
may mislead their agents, make them the safest depository of power.
In its application to the Executive, with reference to the legislative
branch of the Government, the same rule of action should make the
President ever anxious to avoid the exercise of any discretionary
authority which can be regulated by Congress. The biases which may
operate upon him will not be so likely to extend to the representatives
of the people in that body.

In my former messages to Congress I have repeatedly urged the
propriety of lessening the discretionary authority lodged in the
various Departments, but it has produced no effect as yet, except
the discontinuance of extra allowances in the Army and Navy and the
substitution of fixed salaries in the latter. It is believed that the
same principles could be advantageously applied in all cases, and would
promote the efficiency and economy of the public service, at the same
time that greater satisfaction and more equal justice would be secured
to the public officers generally.

The accompanying report of the Secretary of War will put you in
possession of the operations of the Department confided to his care
in all its diversified relations during the past year.

I am gratified in being able to inform you that no occurrence has
required any movement of the military force, except such as is common to
a state of peace. The services of the Army have been limited to their
usual duties at the various garrisons upon the Atlantic and inland
frontier, with the exceptions stated by the Secretary of War. Our small
military establishment appears to be adequate to the purposes for which
it is maintained, and it forms a nucleus around which any additional
force may be collected should the public exigencies unfortunately
require any increase of our military means.

The various acts of Congress which have been recently passed in relation
to the Army have improved its condition, and have rendered its
organization more useful and efficient. It is at all times in a state
for prompt and vigorous action, and it contains within itself the power
of extension to any useful limit, while at the same time it preserves
that knowledge, both theoretical and practical, which education and
experience alone can give, and which, if not acquired and preserved in
time of peace, must be sought under great disadvantages in time of war.

The duties of the Engineer Corps press heavily upon that branch of the
service, and the public interest requires an addition to its strength.
The nature of the works in which the officers are engaged renders
necessary professional knowledge and experience, and there is no economy
in committing to them more duties than they can perform or in assigning
these to other persons temporarily employed, and too often of necessity
without all the qualifications which such service demands. I recommend
this subject to your attention, and also the proposition submitted at
the last session of Congress and now renewed, for a reorganization of
the Topographical Corps. This reorganization can be effected without any
addition to the present expenditure and with much advantage to the
public service. The branch of duties which devolves upon these officers
is at all times interesting to the community, and the information
furnished by them is useful in peace and war.

Much loss and inconvenience have been experienced in consequence of
the failure of the bill containing the ordinary appropriations for
fortifications which passed one branch of the National Legislature at
the last session, but was lost in the other. This failure was the more
regretted not only because it necessarily interrupted and delayed the
progress of a system of national defense, projected immediately after
the last war and since steadily pursued, but also because it contained
a contingent appropriation, inserted in accordance with the views
of the Executive, in aid of this important object and other branches
of the national defense, some portions of which might have been most
usefully applied during the past season. I invite your early attention
to that part of the report of the Secretary of War which relates
to this subject, and recommend an appropriation sufficiently liberal
to accelerate the armament of the fortifications agreeably to the
proposition submitted by him, and to place our whole Atlantic seaboard
in a complete state of defense. A just regard to the permanent interests
of the country evidently requires this measure, but there are also other
reasons which at the present juncture give it peculiar force and make
it my duty to call to the subject your special consideration.

The present system of military education has been in operation
sufficiently long to test its usefulness, and it has given to the
Army a valuable body of officers. It is not alone in the improvement,
discipline, and operation of the troops that these officers are
employed. They are also extensively engaged in the administrative and
fiscal concerns of the various matters confided to the War Department;
in the execution of the staff duties usually appertaining to military
organization; in the removal of the Indians and in the disbursement of
the various expenditures growing out of our Indian relations; in the
formation of roads and in the improvement of harbors and rivers; in
the construction of fortifications, in the fabrication of much of the
_matériel_ required for the public defense, and in the preservation,
distribution, and accountability of the whole, and in other
miscellaneous duties not admitting of classification.

These diversified functions embrace very heavy expenditures of public
money, and require fidelity, science, and business habits in their
execution, and a system which shall secure these qualifications is
demanded by the public interest. That this object has been in a great
measure obtained by the Military Academy is shewn by the state of the
service and by the prompt accountability which has generally followed
the necessary advances. Like all other political systems, the present
mode of military education no doubt has its imperfections, both of
principle and practice; but I trust these can be improved by rigid
inspections and by legislative scrutiny without destroying the
institution itself.

Occurrences to which we as well as all other nations are liable, both
in our internal and external relations, point to the necessity of an
efficient organization of the militia. I am again induced by the
importance of the subject to bring it to your attention. To suppress
domestic violence and to repel foreign invasion, should these calamities
overtake us, we must rely in the first instance upon the great body of
the community whose will has instituted and whose power must support
the Government. A large standing military force is not consonant to the
spirit of our institutions nor to the feelings of our countrymen, and
the lessons of former days and those also of our own times shew the
danger as well as the enormous expense of these permanent and extensive
military organizations. That just medium which avoids an inadequate
preparation on one hand and the danger and expense of a large force on
the other is what our constituents have a right to expect from their
Government. This object can be attained only by the maintenance of
a small military force and by such an organization of the physical
strength of the country as may bring this power into operation whenever
its services are required. A classification of the population offers the
most obvious means of effecting this organization. Such a division may
be made as will be just to all by transferring each at a proper period
of life from one class to another and by calling first for the services
of that class, whether for instruction or action, which from age is
qualified for the duty and may be called to perform it with least
injury to themselves or to the public. Should the danger ever become so
imminent as to require additional force, the other classes in succession
would be ready for the call. And if in addition to this organization
voluntary associations were encouraged and inducements held out for
their formation, our militia would be in a state of efficient service.
Now, when we are at peace, is the proper time to digest and establish
a practicable system. The object is certainly worth the experiment and
worth the expense. No one appreciating the blessings of a republican
government can object to his share of the burden which such a plan may
impose. Indeed, a moderate portion of the national funds could scarcely
be better applied than in carrying into effect and continuing such an
arrangement, and in giving the necessary elementary instruction. We are
happily at peace with all the world. A sincere desire to continue so and
a fixed determination to give no just cause of offense to other nations
furnish, unfortunately, no certain grounds of expectation that this
relation will be uninterrupted. With this determination to give no
offense is associated a resolution, equally decided, tamely to submit
to none. The armor and the attitude of defense afford the best security
against those collisions which the ambition, or interest, or some other
passion of nations not more justifiable is liable to produce. In many
countries it is considered unsafe to put arms into the hands of the
people and to instruct them in the elements of military knowledge. That
fear can have no place here when it is recollected that the people are
the sovereign power. Our Government was instituted and is supported by
the ballot box, not by the musket. Whatever changes await it, still
greater changes must be made in our social institutions before our
political system can yield to physical force. In every aspect,
therefore, in which I can view the subject I am impressed with the
importance of a prompt and efficient organization of the militia.

The plan of removing the aboriginal people who yet remain within the
settled portions of the United States to the country west of the
Mississippi River approaches its consummation. It was adopted on the
most mature consideration of the condition of this race, and ought to
be persisted in till the object is accomplished, and prosecuted with
as much vigor as a just regard to their circumstances will permit, and
as fast as their consent can be obtained. All preceding experiments
for the improvement of the Indians have failed. It seems now to be an
established fact that they can not live in contact with a civilized
community and prosper. Ages of fruitless endeavors have at length
brought us to a knowledge of this principle of intercommunication with
them. The past we can not recall, but the future we can provide for.
Independently of the treaty stipulations into which we have entered with
the various tribes for the usufructuary rights they have ceded to us,
no one can doubt the moral duty of the Government of the United States
to protect and if possible to preserve and perpetuate the scattered
remnants of this race which are left within our borders. In the
discharge of this duty an extensive region in the West has been assigned
for their permanent residence. It has been divided into districts and
allotted among them. Many have already removed and others are preparing
to go, and with the exception of two small bands living in Ohio and
Indiana, not exceeding 1,500 persons, and of the Cherokees, all the
tribes on the east side of the Mississippi, and extending from Lake
Michigan to Florida, have entered into engagements which will lead
to their transplantation.

The plan for their removal and reestablishment is founded upon the
knowledge we have gained of their character and habits, and has been
dictated by a spirit of enlarged liberality. A territory exceeding in
extent that relinquished has been granted to each tribe. Of its
climate, fertility, and capacity to support an Indian population the
representations are highly favorable. To these districts the Indians are
removed at the expense of the United States, and with certain supplies
of clothing, arms, ammunition, and other indispensable articles; they
are also furnished gratuitously with provisions for the period of a year
after their arrival at their new homes. In that time, from the nature
of the country and of the products raised by them, they can subsist
themselves by agricultural labor, if they choose to resort to that mode
of life; if they do not they are upon the skirts of the great prairies,
where countless herds of buffalo roam, and a short time suffices to
adapt their own habits to the changes which a change of the animals
destined for their food may require. Ample arrangements have also been
made for the support of schools; in some instances council houses and
churches are to be erected, dwellings constructed for the chiefs, and
mills for common use. Funds have been set apart for the maintenance of
the poor; the most necessary mechanical arts have been introduced, and
blacksmiths, gunsmiths, wheelwrights, millwrights, etc., are supported
among them. Steel and iron, and sometimes salt, are purchased for them,
and plows and other farming utensils, domestic animals, looms, spinning
wheels, cards, etc., are presented to them. And besides these beneficial
arrangements, annuities are in all cases paid, amounting in some
instances to more than $30 for each individual of the tribe, and in all
cases sufficiently great, if justly divided and prudently expended, to
enable them, in addition to their own exertions, to live comfortably.
And as a stimulus for exertion, it is now provided by law that "in all
cases of the appointment of interpreters or other persons employed for
the benefit of the Indians a preference shall be given to persons of
Indian descent, if such can be found who are properly qualified for the
discharge of the duties."

Such are the arrangements for the physical comfort and for the moral
improvement of the Indians. The necessary measures for their political
advancement and for their separation from our citizens have not been
neglected. The pledge of the United States has been given by Congress
that the country destined for the residence of this people shall be
forever "secured and guaranteed to them." A country west of Missouri and
Arkansas has been assigned to them, into which the white settlements
are not to be pushed. No political communities can be formed in that
extensive region, except those which are established by the Indians
themselves or by the United States for them and with their concurrence.
A barrier has thus been raised for their protection against the
encroachment of our citizens, and guarding the Indians as far as
possible from those evils which have brought them to their present
condition. Summary authority has been given by law to destroy all ardent
spirits found in their country, without waiting the doubtful result
and slow process of a legal seizure. I consider the absolute and
unconditional interdiction of this article among these people as the
first and great step in their melioration. Halfway measures will answer
no purpose. These can not successfully contend against the cupidity
of the seller and the overpowering appetite of the buyer. And the
destructive effects of the traffic are marked in every page of the
history of our Indian intercourse.

Some general legislation seems necessary for the regulation of the
relations which will exist in this new state of things between the
Government and people of the United States and these transplanted
Indian tribes, and for the establishment among the latter, and with
their own consent, of some principles of intercommunication which their
juxtaposition will call for; that moral may be substituted for physical
force, the authority of a few and simple laws for the tomahawk, and that
an end may be put to those bloody wars whose prosecution seems to have
made part of their social system.

After the further details of this arrangement are completed, with a very
general supervision over them, they ought to be left to the progress of
events. These, I indulge the hope, will secure their prosperity and
improvement, and a large portion of the moral debt we owe them will
then be paid.

The report from the Secretary of the Navy, shewing the condition of that
branch of the public service, is recommended to your special attention.
It appears from it that our naval force at present in commission,
with all the activity which can be given to it, is inadequate to the
protection of our rapidly increasing commerce. This consideration and
the more general one which regards this arm of the national defense
as our best security against foreign aggressions strongly urge the
continuance of the measures which promote its gradual enlargement and a
speedy increase of the force which has been heretofore employed abroad
and at home. You will perceive from the estimates which appear in the
report of the Secretary of the Navy that the expenditures necessary to
this increase of its force, though of considerable amount, are small
compared with the benefits which they will secure to the country.

As a means of strengthening this national arm I also recommend to your
particular attention the propriety of the suggestion which attracted the
consideration of Congress at its last session, respecting the enlistment
of boys at a suitable age in the service. In this manner a nursery of
skillful and able-bodied seamen can be established, which will be of
the greatest importance. Next to the capacity to put afloat and arm the
requisite number of ships is the possession of the means to man them
efficiently, and nothing seems better calculated to aid this object than
the measure proposed. As an auxiliary to the advantages derived from our
extensive commercial marine, it would furnish us with a resource ample
enough for all the exigencies which can be anticipated. Considering the
state of our resources, it can not be doubted that whatever provision
the liberality and wisdom of Congress may now adopt with a view to the
perfect organization of this branch of our service will meet the
approbation of all classes of our citizens.

By the report of the Postmaster-General it appears that the revenue
of the Department during the year ending on the 30th day of June last
exceeded its accruing responsibilities $236,206, and that the surplus
of the present fiscal year is estimated at $476,227. It further appears
that the debt of the Department on the 1st day of July last, including
the amount due to contractors for the quarter then just expired, was
about $1,064,381, exceeding the available means about $23,700; and that
on the 1st instant about $597,077 of this debt had been paid--$409,991
out of postages accruing before July and $187,086 out of postages
accruing since. In these payments are included $67,000 of the old debt
due to banks. After making these payments the Department had $73,000
in bank on the 1st instant. The pleasing assurance is given that the
Department is entirely free from embarrassment, and that by collection
of outstanding balances and using the current surplus the remaining
portion of the bank debt and most of the other debt will probably be
paid in April next, leaving thereafter a heavy amount to be applied in
extending the mail facilities of the country. Reserving a considerable
sum for the improvement of existing mail routes, it is stated that the
Department will be able to sustain with perfect convenience an annual
charge of $300,000 for the support of new routes, to commence as soon
as they can be established and put in operation.

The measures adopted by the Postmaster-General to bring the means of
the Department into action and to effect a speedy extinguishment of its
debt, as well as to produce an efficient administration of its affairs,
will be found detailed at length in his able and luminous report. Aided
by a reorganization on the principles suggested and such salutary
provisions in the laws regulating its administrative duties as the
wisdom of Congress may devise or approve, that important Department will
soon attain a degree of usefulness proportioned to the increase of our
population and the extension of our settlements.

Particular attention is solicited to that portion of the report of the
Postmaster-General which relates to the carriage of the mails of the
United States upon railroads constructed by private corporations under
the authority of the several States. The reliance which the General
Government can place on those roads as a means of carrying on its
operations and the principles on which the use of them is to be obtained
can not too soon be considered and settled. Already does the