Initiated by Augustus Caesar, Pax Romana meant, in the most simple of terms, 'Peace of Rome'. Lasting some 200 years in total, it was a time of prosperity allowing law, culture and economic growth to flourish throughout the empire. During this period conflicts with those outside of the empire were both few and far between for, by fairly governing the conquered and the vanquished alike, it allowed those under Roman rule to become citizens. It was, at its height, a time of real stability, a period when it could truly be said all roads led to Rome. However to maintain it, it needed the might of the legions and the strategic thinking of their commanders.
Like many periods of unrest throughout history, the prime mover for the Roman assault and invasion of Anglesey lay in the religious significance posed by Druidism. The Celts were not a fanatically religious people but the Romans saw Druidism as a serious menace - and Anglesey, spiritual home of the Druids, as the centre of that threat. The Romans were hostile to Druidism as it not only banded together individuals in a common focus but also allowed for an infrastructure of rebellion to flourish. So long as there were Druids in Britain, then rebellion and resistance would continue amongst the tribes and this, in turn, threatened the expansionism of the Empire itself. This challenge was seen as a significant - as well as strategic - threat as Anglesey remained the last bastion of Druidism in the British Isles. Its importance in any future Roman planning in terms of occupation and control could not, therefore, be underestimated.
The Celts, as a race of people, had been around at the dawn of European civilisation and can be said to be one of the great founding peoples of Europe. They came to Europe from their original homeland, situated around the headwaters of the Danube, the Rhine and the Rhone - rivers that still carry their Celtic names. This took place around the First Millennium BC and by the Third Century BC, settlements were established across Europe - from the Turkish Central Plain to Britain and Ireland. When we talk of Celts today however, we can refer to only six peoples who have survived over this time. These are the Scots, Irish, Manx, Cornish, Breton and Welsh peoples. Each has its own indigenous language - Gaelic or Brythonic - with individual localised variations peculiar to the region though sharing an overall common likeness. These languages are still spoken in Britian today.
In terms of religion the Celts did not have what we perceive nowadays to be a sense of worship nor, for that matter, did they have any formal God structure. The Celts believed that the environment and many objects had magical links and this resulted in both ritual and sacrifice to appease these myriad deities - including, according to Roman records, human sacrifice. Their sacred places were situated in woods or simple groves. The priestly class, the Druids, were the only tribe members permitted to carry out any of the ceremonies involved as they had been chosen at birth to follow this path. The Druids were also responsible for the telling of sacred myths, whose legacy lives on today in traditional Celtic literature. However, the Celts were orators - they did not commit these legends and myths to paper; that came much later on in history long after the Celts had vanished as a distinct group of people. It is to the Romans we must turn for accounts of this period.
In terms of ritual, the Roman historian Pliny mentions one such ceremony conducted by the Druids involving the oak tree, still considered sacred to modern day Druids. Mistletoe was ritually cut from the oak, and accompanied by the sacrifice of a bull. There are arguments as to whether the ritual was agrarian based - a farming blessing - or whether it had a deeper cultural significance though the exact purpose of this is both obscure and yet to be accurately determined. Within Druidic lore however, the mistletoe symbolises life through death. Pliny stated:
' It was gathered with due religious ceremony, if possible on the sixth day of the Moon when the influence of the orb was said to be at its height ' Pliny also record that the mistletoe, when taken in drink 'imparts fecundity to barren animals and that it is an antidote to all known poisons'.
The position of the Druids was closely interwoven within Celtic life and their influence was very powerful. Whilst Britain had a reputation as being home to the Druidic movement, Anglesey played a significant part in British and tribal cohesion being, as it was, the centre for Druidism in Britain. This importance as a central focus within both the Druidic belief system and as a strategic source of angst to the Romans could not be underestimated.
Situated off the mainland of North Wales and surrounded by sea, the only realistic approach available to any would-be invader was from the sea itself. Although the strip of water dividing Anglesey from mainland Wales is narrow, it is flushed by strong tides and peppered by quicksands. Without an accurate knowledge of these hazards, without an accurate understanding of the tides, an attack from this direction must have seemed foolhardy to the inhabitants and Druidic priests. As such, they must have felt secure. Anglesey is known in Welsh as Mam Cymru, which means Mother of Wales. It is also a bountiful island. As well as its religious status, it was rich in grain and had good farmland. It had copper mines where ornaments and weapons alike were fashioned. There were few hills, large expanses of lush plains, good streams. Forests straddled the whole island and the sea that surrounded it provided good fishing. Anglesey could theoretically survive without mainland Wales. Mainland North Wales itself is an area covered by mountains and valleys. The terrain allowed local tribes to successfully engage and skirmish with any Roman soldiery sent in to the district - so much so that the area was regarded as being extremely hostile militarily. The indigenous tribes (mainly the Ordovices) that occupied the area had been a thorn in the side of succesive Roman leaders ever since Caratacus escaped - reputedly to lead the tribes in northern Wales - after Claudius had invaded southern England in AD 43.
The Romans named Anglesey Mona Insulis, perhaps affording the island a more accurate nomenclature than that given it by its inhabitants. However, the insularity enjoyed by the Druids and the tribes on the island was to be short lived. Rome would see to that.
Rome itself had long since considered the area of Wales - and certainly Anglesey - as being key to any succesful occupation of Britain. Its importance lay in it being the centre of a common religion, a religion that preserved national consciousness across many tribal divisions. Anglesey therefore presented the continuing possibility of a unified threat, of a resistance, to Rome.
Resistance was something the Romans did not take lightly.
A Brief History of Rome and Britain
The Romans invaded Britain in AD 43, under the command of Aulus Plautinus. The Emperor Claudius visited the isles briefly to view the new province but returned to Rome soon after. Perhaps the climate did not appeal to him?
In military terms nothing had been seen to match the Roman Army. Indeed, it was not until a thousand years after the end of Empire that anything appeared to equal them. They were a well-organised, well-disciplined and well-trained force of men whose tactics and methodology in warfare were to be the mainstay of military tacticians for centuries after. Even today, we still marvel at the brilliance of the campaigns and at the way they were instrumental in pushing Rome's expansionism far beyond its natural borders
When the Romans landed in Britain it was in the guise of offering help to Verica, King of the Atrebates, in what is now Hampshire. Verica had contacted Rome to assist him in repelling the powerful Catuvellauni tribe. Claudius had four legions and their auxiliaries shipped from Gaul under the command of Aulus Plautinus. Landing at Richborough and at other points on the Kent coast, the Roman Army established a base with no significant interference from the local tribes. Soon they moved inland, crossing the River Medway and pushing the local tribes back as far as the River Thames. They met resistance here - answered by Plautinus committing his specialist Batavian troops to the fore by fording the river and quickly establishing a beachhead. With the local tribes promptly subdued, the Romans built a fort and waited for the arrival of Claudius.
Claudius duly arrived but before he left in August of that year, he flexed his muscles as asked by Verica - though his intentions were more than an answer for help. The army marched on the Catuvellauni - their capital was at Camulodunum, which is modern Colchester - and captured it without difficulty. There Claudius received a formal surrender of a number of tribes and then returned to Rome. He left orders to the army in Britain to crush the inland tribes and bring the province under the 'protection' of Rome. Against the seasoned and experienced army there was little put up in the way of stubborn resistance.
By AD 47, the army had given the emperor almost half of the island of Britain.
Between AD 59 and AD 61, Wales itself was to feel the full power of Rome.
History records that three legions were probably dominant in Britain around this time. These were:
II Augusta, probably stationed at Exeter and under the command of Poenius Postumius at the time of the Anglesey invasion. During the invasion of AD 43, Vespasian - who later became emporer - had commanded the legion. The II Augusta was reformed, by Augustus, from an earlier legion. It remained in Britain throughout the Empire, being last recorded at Richborough in the late 4th and early 5th Century. This legion were from Strasbourg.
XIV Gemina - later Gemina Martia Victrix - which was the backbone of the army in Britian and considerably experienced. Hailing from Mainz, they were based at Wroxeter. The term Gemina serves to imply that it was made up of either two legions made from one original or one made from two legions. The legion is reported to have left Britain in AD 66, returning temporarily in AD 70, but thereafter leaving permanently.
Vexillations of the XX probably based at Deva (Chester) and later known as XX Valeria Victrix. This legion was part of the invasion army, hailing originally from Nuess, and was last recorded as being in Britain towards the end of the 3rd Century. The main base was probably at Kingsholme near Gloucester but this has not been fully confirmed. Some elements of this legion remained at Colchester during the Welsh campaign
The XIV Gemina were commanded by Quintus Veranius until his death, when he was succeeded by Gaius Suetonius Paullinus, the man responsible for the first invasion of Anglesey and, later, for the defeat of Boudicca. Paullinus was well versed in the arts of command, strategy and warfare. He had been a legate in Maurentania during its conquest by Rome and was noted as being the first Roman to cross the Atlas Mountains. He had even written a book describing his experiences. Around AD 57, Suetonious Paullinus took part in the settling a general uprising in south east Britain. Here the Trinovantes and Iceni had revolted, inflicting heavy damage on the colony at Camulodunum, where they had massacred the colonists. Both London and Verulamium also fell to the native tribesmen. Paullinus, mustering only some ten thousand men, took on the uprising gaining a decisive victory in the process. 80,000 of the rebellious Britons perished against Paullinus's troops - some ten thousand more than had been killed in the three sacked colonies. For this deed, Suteonius Paullinus was commended, his prowess and leadership acknowledged by Rome.
A hint of what sort of man Paullinus was can be seen in the complaint made about his brutal reprisals against those who had dared to stand against Rome. A Procurator, C. Julius Alpinus, protested to the Emperor about the manner in which Paullinus was acting. In response, Nero sent Polyclitus, a freedman, to examine the case. On completion of the examination of the facts, Paullinus was recalled to Rome and relieved of his British command - but did not lose either his prestige nor the favour he had gained amongst the powerful in Rome. On the death of Quintus Veranius, sometime around 58-9, Suetonius Paullinus returned to Britain.
Initially commanding the IInd Augusta, he fought many battles, conquered two tribes, took 20 towns - and, under Vespasian, captured the Isle of Wight. He was still seen by his superiors as a loyal and experienced soldier, a man who got results. By late AD 59, Suetonius Paullinus was established as commander of the XIV Gemina. His fame was established and his star was still rising - and he knew this. Now he looked at Wales and in particular at Anglesey. Centre of Druidism, grain store for the mainland with its rich copper mines for metalwork and weapons, it was a strategic target that he planned to capture and garrison. By doing so he knew that Rome would be able to control Wales and thus annexe even more of Britain to the Emperor.
The Legionary and the Legion
A legionary was required by law to be a Roman citizen on enlistment. As such he enjoyed privileges 'before the law' and not ordinarily available to other citizens. However, in times when manpower was short, conditions were relaxed to the point where non-Roman citizens were recruited and enlisted being afforded citizenship as a result. Signing up for 25 years, the recruit was put through a particularly gruelling period of basic training in order to provide him with not just military skills but also the sort of skills needed on campaign. In modern terms, this would be similar to a specialist rank such as Combat Engineer. Life in the ranks was tough, even during training, and was not relaxed when the recruit became a fully fledged legionary. The Romans were noted for their harsh discipline - stoning to death, for example, being the punishment for anyone found asleep on guard duty.
Advancement for the exceptional legionary was good. Specialist training was available, and any individual with promise could rise through the ranks achieving high status relatively quickly. Advancement was encouraged and individuals showing promise nurtured and supported to achieve more.
In terms of personal weaponry, the legionary was well equipped. They carried two pilums, a javelin designed to be hurled at the enemy ranks. This weapon had a heavy iron head fitted to the end of an untempered iron spike itself secured to a wooden shaft by a thin peg of wood. On impact, the peg would break or the thin iron spike would bend - rendering the pilum useless - though its purpose was fulfilled. If thrown at an enemy shield for example, then the weapon would affix itself and add weight to the shield which in turn disadvantaged its bearer. This tactic had a distinct advantage for the legionary - as, drawing closer to his enemy, he would have the superior advantage in terms of mobility. The legionary was also equipped with a gladius - a short sword designed mainly for stabbing. This weapon was particulary useful in close quarter fights and was very effective in battlefield melees. Even the shield issued to the legionary was designed to be fought with. Fitted with a solid iron or bronze boss and edged with metal, it could be used to smash into an enemy who, distracted, would then fall victim to the well aimed thrust of the gladius. Each legionary was also issued with a broad leafed dagger as a side arm.
Personal protection was provided by body armour and by a helmet fitted with cheek and neck guards. Chain mail fitted over a wool jerkin was typical of this period - the more familiar segmented body armour coming later. In some cases, metal leg guards fitted from ankle to knee may have been worn - there is no distinct proof of this, however.
The rank and file legionary therefore were troops trained not just in battlefield infantry skills but in the myriad skills needed to sustain a campaign in the field. They worked as engineers constructing roads, marching camps, outposts, bridges. Individuals trained as artisans, as surveyors - resulting in little outside specialist help being needed on campaigns - all vital in ensuring the legion was wholly self-supporting.
The legion was made up of some 5500 infantry. Each was divided up into ten cohorts comprising six centuries of 80 men each. However, the first cohort had five double centuries. In order of rank, each century had its own Centurion and Optio, the senior of which was a Primus Pilus who was the Centurion of the first century of the first cohort. Cohorts also had a Tesserarius, Signifer and Cornicularius. These equate to NCO ranks in modern terms but have no real direct opposite. In terms of NCO status, the Optio was second-in-command to the Centurion and had been identified as promising in terms of promotion. As well as fulfilling his role as ordinary soldier, the Optio would also learn administration and leadership skills to prepare him for possible advancement within the Centuriate. One other role of the Optio was the keeping of records of men within his particular century.
The Centurions were without doubt the backbone of the legion. Chosen by virtue of their long service and experience, they reinforced discipline throughout the lower ranks and were also often first in line themselves for severe reprimand and punishment if there was trouble within the ranks themselves. In terms of rank advancement, a Centurion who showed promise could be promoted to command an auxiliary unit. However, the position most aspired to was that of Chief Centurion - commanding the first century of the first cohort ( and thus the cohort itself ) - the Primus Pilus. Once military service was completed, the Centurion could either retire or take on further service as camp prefect. This role fell to men with considerable experience in combat who had also served within the ranks. Seniority was such that the rank also allowed the prefect to serve as second in command of the legion itself, deputising control when the Legate was absent. The most senior figure was known as the Praefectus Castrorum literally a camp prefect.
Each legion had its own standard bearer, known as an Aquilifer. They also had 120 scouts as ala or cavalry available to them and much in the way of artillery and logistics support.
There were also six Tribunes and a legate attached to each legion. The role of the Legate is interesting in that men appointed to this role had previously served in the position of Tribune. The Legate relied heavily on his Centurions and other regulars for advice. The position was also one suited to those with political aspirations as many Legates returned to Rome to seek, and occupy, high political office. Politics played a key role in individual aspirations within the army. Senatorial status was afforded to the most senior Tribune, known as Tribunus Laticlavius. Route of ascencion here was via this post, advancing to Quaestor before being given command of a legion. Other tribunes, such as the Tribuni Angusticlavii, could expect to go on to command other units, normally auxilliaries.
It is also interesting to note that whilst in Britain the army also performed another role It also acted as a police force, enforcing legislation and committing itself to providing an administrative service. It served to patrol, to keep law and order and peace between tribes - and to uphold the long arm of the Empire and the word of the individual Emperor in power.
History records that the Romans, from the most junior rank to its most senior, were highly trained and thoroughly professional soldiers. There is no doubt that the Roman army was without equal at this period in history. In terms of those legions involved during the Anglesey campaign, the XIV Gemina was battle hardened and wholly professional. The vexilla from the XX - a vexillation comprised 2200 men on detachment from a legion - were also seasoned. It was this very experienced army that Suetonuis Paullinus took with him into Wales and later to defeat the Iceni Queen Boudicca.
Pre-Invasion
The fighting in Wales had been sporadic, intermittent and heavy. The army faced two tribes - the Silures of the southeast and the Ordovices led by Caractacus - the son of the Catuvellaunian King Cunobelinus. Whilst another commander moved against the tribes in the southeast ( II Augusta ), Paullinus led his legions - the XIV Gemina and a vexillation of the XX - into northwest Wales where they encountered heavy resistance from the locals - both Ordovices and Deceangli. Despite this, the army made its mark until the opposition on the mainland was effectively ended. Veranius had planned for a two year long campaign in Wales but had died before he had seen its end. It would fall to his successor, Paullinus, to complete. Having moved swiftly and decisively into North Wales, there was only Anglesey to contend with.
Their opposition on Anglesey, whilst lacking the discipline and training of Paullinus' Legions, did not lack courage. The tribes in Wales were, essentially, guerilla fighters - hitting fast and hard at outposts and supply convoys but never willingly engaging in open field warfare. In fact, the Silures had taken over a dozen years to subjegate and had cost the Army a great deal in terms of men and military committment. The inhabitants of North Wales were certainly not going to be an easy foe to bring to their knees. However, whilst they excelled at using the mountainous terrain to their advantage - and had become a thorn in the side of the Romans as a result - what was to happen on the bloody shores of Anglesey was to be an extreme example of how ruthless and militarily efficient the Romans were.
The open battlefield tactics of the Celtic tribes were well known to the Romans. The awesome, massed charge of the Celts in face to face combat - designed to smash a path through an enemy - had been overcome within the Roman ranks by the use of tight discipline, plentiful reserves and artillery and cavalry support. The historian Strabo, writing around the 1st century AD said:
'The whole race, which is now called Celtic or Galatic, is madly fond of war, high spirited and quick to battle, but otherwise straightforward and not of evil character. And so, when they are stirred up they assemble in their bands for battle, quite openly and without forethought; so that they are easily handled by those who desire to outwit them. For at any time or place, and on whatever pretext you stir them up, you will have them ready to face danger, even if they have nothing on their side but their own strength and courage.'
No one can accurately say whether those who massed on the banks of the Menai Straits did so as an organised foe or whether they answered a call to arms to stand and defend the island. In typical Celt fashion, we can assume that they spent a lot of time boasting across the water to the Romans - banging the flat of their swords on their shields, shouting abuse and sounding off their war trumpets. If they had charioteers then these would fly up and down their ranks, the drivers taunting the enemy with displays of their skill.
In terms of personal weaponry and armour, the Celts were - by comparison - lightly armed. The chief weapon was the sword, with some of the infantry carrying javelins or spears. Some of the infantry would also have carried daggers for personal defence in close combat. Shields would be large, fairly narrow and oval or oblong in shape or smaller and round - we cannot be historically sure given both the period ( which is not as well documented as later Roman expeditions were ) and different tribes involved. Body armour would have been scant for the Celts wore no breast plate. They would have had helmets however - although the use of body armour must surely have depended on individual ownership. It is likely that most of the defenders possessed no more than basic weaponry with no personal armour of any substance.
In terms of tactics, if the Anglesey army had been organised then the Romans could expect to meet javelin volleys followed by close hand to hand fighting in which the use of chariots was key - dividing the legionarys, engaging with the Roman cavalry and then withdrawing, coming in again and again until the divided ranks of their foe could be dealt with by the men on the field - the infantry. The battle would continue like this - charge, engage, retire. Re-group, charge, engage - until the enemy was defeated or had withdrawn. Yet history does not record how the Anglesey Celts stood and engaged the Romans so we can only assume that the stand would have been based on tactics employed in earlier, large scale confrontations. Whatever, there can be little doubt that the tactics which would be used were already known and had been planned for by Suetonius Paullinus. Having fought battle after battle in Britian, he would have been aware of his foe - and how best to deal with them.
Whilst the island facing Paullinus was known to be heavily and fiercely defended - it also presented Paullinus with a unique problem. Divided from mainland Britain by the treacherous waters of what is now known as the Menai Straits, he was faced with not only crushing the Celts and their religious leaders on Anglesey - he also had the problem of getting his army across.
He had, as one would have expected, come prepared.
Battle lines
Paullinus had brought with him not only his legions, but also artillery to support them. Ballistae - catapults capable of throwing flaming missiles up to 2000 feet were very much in evidence. They could also be adapted to shoot iron bolts or rocks, devastatingly effective against massed ranks or earthwork fortifications. He also brought Onagers - which were able to hurl boulders or small bags of stones accurately. These would have to have been dismantled for the journey but, once erected, would provide artillery support that would be devastating against massed ranks. Onagers were siege weapons but, used in this campaign, their use in firing across the water, laying down a barrage in support of the amphibious operation, would not have escaped Paullinus's attention. The Legions also brought crossbows and spare weapons as part of the huge logistics train vital to support the invasion itself.
All the machinery of war that had been used successfully throughout Europe was thus brought to the field of coming battle. Paullinus had also brought small flat-bottomed boats which he planned to use to support his advance into Anglesey. Unlike the previous assualt on the Isle of Wight, which had been aided by vessels of the Roman Navy, the situation concerning Anglesey was different. The Menai Straits is a narrow strip of water dividing Anglesey from mainland Britain - but it is tidal and fast flowing on both flood and ebb tides.. Under other circumstances, the Romans would have connected bridgeworks to these boats to enable to infantry and cavalry to land on the far shore. The spot chosen by Paullinus was some 250 yards across - but Paullinus had reasoned, correctly, that bridges would be useless. They would be wrecked in a very short time by the action of the swift flowing currents. His plan was to use the boats as landing craft for his infantry, crossing at slack water, supported by cavalry swum across - and all covered by a bombardment of fire and stones. With this in mind, and in full view of the Celts on the far shore, Paullinus made his camp at what is known today as Llanfairisgaer, outside of modern Caernarfon.
Paullinus knew that the Anglesey Druids and the people who occupied the island had held out against Rome for too long. He also knew their arrogance and sense of strength would have to be smashed completely if the invasion was to be a success. To this end he had with him veteran soldiers who had fought not only in Britain but also across Europe - seasoned troops whose worth in battle was beyond question. Paullinus also knew the opposition was made up of lightly armed tribesmen, including many refugees from the mainland advance, whose armour was non-existent and who did not have the battlefield support he and his army possessed. Whilst he reasoned that they would be no easy adversary it is reported that he anticipated there being little trouble in defeating them; but first he had to get across.
The Fight
On the fateful morning, the preparations for the invasion began in earnest. Boats were carried down to the edge of the water, the infantry awaiting the order to row across. The ballistae and onegers were charged and ready, the crossbows primed and set. Having formed his cavalry up to swim their mounts over during the slack tide, Paullinus addressed his troops.
Meanwhile, on the far bank, thousands of tribesmen had gathered. Whilst the Druids invoked dark forces on the invaders, the tribesmen beat their shields with the flat of their swords and cheered, jeered and insulted the Romans. Women - wild painted, shrieking madly - danced naked through the irregular ranks and waved torches of fire to warm their men folk to the heat of battle. The melee must have sounded like the very harpies of Hades to the disciplined Roman troops. Many of the Romans were riveted in terror, others - perhaps more seasoned - looked both at the occupied ground and the water they must cross and debated their chances of success. The tribes on the opposite bank held the higher ground. To gain it, the Romans had to ford the Straits, make the shore - and only then would they be able to meet their enemy in battle. Tacitus recorded that many of the soldiery stood 'watching fearfully, their limbs shaking in terror'.
Paullinus knew his troops were apprehensive. He rode amongst them, chiding them for their unfounded fears and reminding them of their honour as Roman soldiers. He reminded them too of what they would face when they returned to Rome and probably told them of the disgrace they would face for having been intimidated by a people no less than savages, mere guerilla fighters who did not know the honour of full battle. It is recorded that he began to win his men around, stirring them eventually into a battle frenzy and filling them with a sense of duty and obligation. He would have urged them on to victory, speaking of the glory that would be theirs when the battle was won, telling them of the honours they would receive for defeating the foe on the far bank. Whatever he said to them, it worked. The army that took to the water that day did so with a vigour bordering on a blood frenzy
The boats were launched. Accompanied by the cavalry who swam their horses over, the legions began their assault on Anglesey. What a sight it must have been! The beetle like craft slowly making their way across the slate grey waters of the Menai Straits. Armed cavalrymen on horseback breasting foam as they swam over to meet the enemy. More cavalry swimming across between the many boats containing the heavily armed legionaries. The air filled with the whine and shrieks of missiles as they flew from one bank to the other, their dull impact raising both earth and the shrieks and moans of the enemy when they landed. The shouting of Centurions and Principales. The screams of the tribesmen and their supporters, the clash of metal swords on shield the mad martial music of warfare.
Yet, even before they had landed, there would have been, inevitably, casualties. Boats capsized, sending the heavily armed troops to the bottom of the Straits to drown. Arrows, fired in ranks against the invaders, would have struck horse and rider, would have landed in the small boats killing many and leaving the survivors to try and paddle for the shore - their work hindered by the deadweight of their fallen comrades. Perhaps the Celts threw their javelins as the first of the legion landed in an effort to stem the tide of invasion - but it would have been of little use. One can only summise that the first troops ashore would have waited until they were of sufficient number before starting to make their move. The coast there is low, gently sloping up from the beach, and the going - once the troops were clear of the water's edge - would have been firm. The gradient is also gentle, not hilly, so any advantages the Celts may have thought they had would have been very quickly dispelled by the sheer number of troops coming ashore to form up for battle.
When they landed, the slaughter began in earnest. It is documented that the Romans, perhaps goaded on by the shame they had shown before they had started their transit across the waters, fought with ferocity and a fury that became legendary throughout Britain. Slowly they established a beachhead, prepared the ground for those who followed them - and then began to cut and slash their way forward to establish their foothold.
The might of Rome must have looked awesome to the rabble-like tribesmen that opposed them. The Romans knew that breaking into the enemy line was the only way to start a rout - which was always advantageous as it incurred heavy enemy losses. After the fear and uncertainty of the river crossing the Romans would have ordered their lines in to fight as they had always done - close combat after having thrown their pilums to thin out the enemy line. With organised efficiency, supported by cavalry and with their artllery having done a great deal of work to thin out the enemy ranks and fortifications, they slowly - but surely - began to take to the killing ground.
In routing the enemy - it is inconceivable that the tribesmen would have been sufficiently organised enough to withstand such an assault - the killing began in deadly earnest. After the uncertainties earlier in the day, after the river crossing and initial contact with the enemy, the sight of a breaking line must have appeared like a release to the tense Roman soldiers. Killing an enemy who has run away is easier than killing one that stands to fight - and the Romans exploited this weakness to the full. It is said that they spared none they met on that bloody field of battle. Men, women and children were slaughtered, butchered by an army spurred on by its earlier shame. Many of the Druids and their followers were thrown into their sacred groves of oak and then burned alive. There were, it is said, few prisoners taken.
How long the battle lasted is not known. What is, however, is the fact that the Romans showed no quarter in the fight for Mona Insulis.
In contrast, whilst Suetonius Paullinus made his mark on Anglesey as the bloodiest of the invaders, Agricola took the island 15 years later, garrisoning it completely. Unlike Paullinus, Agricola used the Lavan Sands opposite Beaumaris as his entry point. The swim was shorter, the landing easier. That he met resistance goes without saying, that he quelled it is certainly true - but if historical memory recalls any of the Romans it is Suetonius Paullinus whose name is synonymous with the desperate and bloody butchery that was the first invasion of Anglesey. Tacitus, the eminent Roman historian said of him:
" He proceeds always against the vanquished, even after they have surrendered, with excessive vigour. Justice under his administration had frequently the air of personal injury. ''
Today, the bloody shore runs from Moel-y-Don to the sou'west of Llanfair PG to Tal-y-Foel opposite Caernarfon. Even today, the shore bears testimony to the carnage of that day's events. Place names such as Bryn-y-Beddau, the Hill of Graves, still appear on modern maps of the island. Here the islanders who survived after Paullinus had left to fight Boudicca buried their dead. Above the village of Llanidan, are two fields still known as The Field of the Long Battle and the Field of Bitter Lamentation. There is also Plas Goch, the Red Place; its name giving a hint to the story behind it.
Silent witness
Standing on the foreshore below Tal-y-Foel it wouldn't be hard to try and picture the scene. Think of half naked men, dark haired and dark eyed, fair skinned and blue eyed. Young and old. Small, wiry in stature, their bodies decorated in blue woad. Carrying small shields made of leather skin and swords made of iron. Around them, wild shrieking women and white robed Druids lamenting and wailing to the heavens above. Hear the stattacco beat of metal on leather, a stuttering heartbeat of defiance. Listen, on the wind, for the screams and the shouting. The whistles and the jeers. Listen for the defiance. Stand on that bloody shore, with your ear cocked to the sighing wind. Close your eyes and see if you can catch again the horror of that long day. Imagine what the island's defenders must have felt as they looked across the slate grey waters of the straits, seeing the might of Rome displayed like a taunt on the far bank. Tents and campfires, huge unknown tower-like machines. The glint of sunlight on polished weapons, the whinnying and neighing of horses. Listen to the first screams of the dying, the lamentations of the wounded. The pounding march of Roman sandals, the jarring singing slash of sword against sword. The drumbeat hooves of the cavalry. The trumpets….
…and then, the first sight of the dreaded foe. An armoured man, with shining helmet, and huge shield. Approaching you under a hail of stones and short spears thrown to decimate the very ranks you stand in. A man who advanced, shoulder to shoulder with his comrades in a long unbroken line. Who fought you with a disciplined ease, thrusting his shield boss against your face and then stabbing upwards from the protection of the shield itself for your stomach, slashing sideways to deflect a blow from one of your own ranks before coming at you again…
…and behind him, more of the same supported by cavalry who thrust and stabbed with spears and hacked indiscriminately at your own comrades with their swords. The whole monstrous army moving against you like an unstoppable, human tide. Dividing your ranks, scything down all who stood before them. Trampling over the dead and the dying and moving with a merciless advance, driving you backwards across the muddy field until you have no option but to stand, to fight and to die or to flee -
- flee from the hot, coppery smell of blood. The scents of leather and sweat. The animal grunting of the unstoppable foreigners who moved amongst you, killing, butchering. Run from the carnage and the shrieking. Leave those whom you once called friend dead or writhing in unspeakable agony on the muddy ground
Yet there would be no sanctuary that long bloody day. If you were lucky you died in battle, facing the enemy. Those who managed to flee and run far enough away would have made for the forests that then covered the island, using their local knowledge to hide away from the invaders. Those who were caught were, so history states, either put to the sword - or thrown alive into the many funeral pyres.
In a very short while, a brutal while, the tribes of Anglesey were decimated and shattered, their holy men murdered and their sacred groves destroyed. Those who survived probably fled to the forests which then covered the island or perhaps further afield to the neighbouring island of Holyhead. Those left wounded were butchered by the Legions who now dominated the land. Paullinus's campaign for total victory in North Wales was done and the jewel in his crown was the taking of Anglesey.
His triumph, however, was to be short lived. Not too soon after his victory he and his legions were called away to fight Boudicca - another bloody chapter that would be a decisive victory for Rome and an echoing defeat for the British tribes. Anglesey would slumber, never quite awakening from the horror of the assault, until Agricola landed 15 years later to garrison the island and bring it fully under the pax Romana.
Remnants
What is left today to attest to the Roman invasion of Anglesey? Not much, for time has taken its toll - yet there is still enough.
Examples of later Roman occupation can be found in a small signal or watchtower, situated on the coast overlooking the Irish Sea on Holyhead Island. It is known by its Welsh name of Caer y Twr. It probably dates from the 4th Century. Near to this also are the remains of a small hut village, which was Roman-British. The signal tower at Caer-y-Twr is probably a defensive structure and parts of the wall are over ten feet thick. If it was a defensive structure then its role may well have been to alert the fortlet in Holyhead town of the imminent arrival of Irish raiders, overlooking - as it does - a splendid view of of the Irish Sea. Speculative historians have said it may also have been a Pharos, a lighthouse, situated to warn Roman warships and merchantmen of the dangers close in to the coast.
To visit Caer y Twr requires stamina and a map because it is situated at the rear of Holyhead Mountain. It is not on the tourist trail. The views from such a vantage point are well worth the exertion needed to reach it however, and a smaller pull upwards to the summit of Holyhead Mountain will reward the visitor with a glimpse of Ireland on an exceptionally clear day. The views of Holyhead and Anglesey from this vantage point are also worth the effort.
In a good season, with few people around to spoil your thoughts, one could be forgiven for imagining the lot of a Roman soldier charged with guard duty at such a hostile spot. For here, when the wind brings in the freezing fog from the Irish Sea or gales blast the coastline, one's mind could be forgiven for wandering. The high sea cliffs amplify the rollers that crash against the land and the shrieking cries of the hundreds of seabirds must sound like the tormented wailings of lost souls. With the wind finding every nook and cranny, and the isolation at this far edge of the Empire evident, the soldier's lot must have been far from a popular posting.
Also in Holyhead town are the remains of a fortlet, overlooking the harbour. Standing on the West side of the port, it consisted of three massive walls sited to the north, west and south of the port. Three circular towers stood at each corner with the sou'east side being omitted. Today, only the northwest tower is wholly Roman, the other two having been rebuilt over time by other cultures. The fortlet was built around 300AD to guard against Irish pirates and - it is thought - was also part of a naval port, home to a small fleet of warships - though there is no evidence to support this. It is also thought that a quayside was incorporated into the fort, under the northeast tower. When the Irish were not raiding, did they trade with the locals and the garrison here?
Considering the fact that Anglesey was invaded twice during the occupation of Britain, little remains to testify to this. Later occupation and garrisoning can be seen in the ruins mentioned above - and Caernarfon, on the mainland, has an excellent museum which records these times. However, in terms of evidence based history there is little to show of the campaigns, one of which must rank as one of the bloodiest operations in the Roman occupation of Britain - whilst remaining an outstanding example of Roman leadership, logistics and planning.
Gnaeus Julius Agricola is far better known in the history of Anglesey than his predecessor, Suetonius Paulinus. Whilst Paulinus's invasion was the first aimed at the Druidic homeland of Mona Insulis, scant knowledge is available to historians as to its extent and effect. Many historians have suggested its purpose was the total destruction of the Druids whilst others have said that the push was a determined effort to crush, totally, the base of resistance for the Ordovices of North Wales. If anything, it is generally agreed that it was left as unfinished business although the reasons for this are tactical, given the uprising which Paulinus was hastily called away to quell. The records pertaining to the second campaign under Agricola provide more detail - due, it has to be said, because the famous Roman historian Tacitus was Agricola's son in law. Tacitus left behind a very detailed biography of his father in law thus guaranteeing him a permanent place in history as a result. Interestingly, Agricola had served under Paulinus as a military tribune during much of the British campaign. The son of a wealthy Senator, he was following the cursus honorum - the way of honour - which would take him through traditional posts, both civil and military, to the eventual one of Consul. His was a marked path from birth, both by virtue of his class and the opportunities it afforded him and in his long career he achieved high status. He is recorded as being both a fair and an honourable man, humane even, which is perhaps at odds with the way some of the British campaigns were carried out - but he was also a competent, astute soldier. Whilst Tacitus may have had reason to portray his father in law in a good light, there is no denying that Agricola was one of the better representatives of Rome and its presence in Britain.
Therefore, in terms of the Anglesey campaign, here was a man who had served with Paulinus against the tribes on Anglesey and later in the Boudicca uprising - a man who had been in the thick of the fighting during the earlier battles in Britain. The island was already well known to Agricola; history would record that it would also remember him.
Background to Agricola.
During the Roman civil war of AD69, Agricola had lent his full support to Vespasian. Nero's reign as Emperor had been marked by greed and autocratic rule, a madman who had brought mistrust and shame to the glory of the Empire. It was, as some historians have remarked, a miserable end to the Julio-Claudian dynasty, which had done so much for the Empire and its people. The civil war resulted in much blood letting and fighting and three emperors were appointed in one year - and just as quickly destroyed. It was a time of instability and confusion at all levels of society and whilst the end of Nero's reign had generally been greeted with jubilation, it also provoked some very mixed emotions. Amongst those experiencing this were many of the Legions and their commanders - a situation capitalised on by the would-be Emperors who quickly made offerings to buy the loyalty of the army to ensure their own rise to power. However, the previously secret workings of the empire had been thrown open for all to see; an emperor did not need to be made in Rome.
The Civil War came about during AD68 and for many reasons. The Judean War was dragging on, the provincial armies - which were supported by their civil populations - wished for their generals to aspire to Emperorship and there was revolt and dissatisfaction throughout the far corners of the empire itself. Julius Vindex, who was then Governor of Central Gaul, and the commander of Legio III Augusta - Macer - both revolted against Nero. Sulpicius Galba, then Governor of Spain, proclaimed himself emperor and joined the revolt - though the Senate supported him in his aims. He marched on Rome in strength that led Nero to commit suicide as a result. Galba was briefly made Emperor but was murdered in a plot by Marcus Salvius Otho whom Galba had not chosen as his successor, the murder being arranged with the support of a large number of legions. This then caused the Rhine legions to seize the moment and also to revolt, choosing Aulus Vitellius for Emperor, and also marching on Rome to lay claim to the title and position. In the ensuing battle Vitellius defeated Otho at Bedriacum after which - rather than face the charges which would be laid against him - Otho committed suicide. Peace, however, was not to be for the newly proclaimed Emperor. Vitellius learned that the eastern legions had declared for their general, Vespasian, and he had no choice but to prepare to counter this threat. Vespasian, however, had at his disposal the legions occupying both the east and those stationed on and around the Danube - a considerable force. At the second battle of Bedaricum the pro-Vespasian legions under Primus defeated Vitellius's forces and Vespasian was duly made Emperor. The civil war was ended.
Interestingly Tacitus records that Otho's men had during the civil war, plundered and murdered Agricola's mother, Julia Procilla, on the family estate situated at Intimilium, near Liguria. Tacitus states that Agricola joined Vespasian because of this although it has been suggested that the siding with Vespasian had something to do with the fact that Agricola had spent time in Britain during Vespasian's early career. The truth we shall perhaps never know but the outcome was that Agricola's loyalty to Vespasian was to pay him handsome dividends as a result.
Whilst there were many battles fought - on the fields of the empire and, undoubtedly, in the Senate - the army stationed in Britain were less troublesome. Tacitus puts this down to the fact that they were further afield and separated by the sea - but also states that another reason may have been to do with the fact that they were seasoned enough to save their hatred for the enemy. Whatever, the result of the bitter civil war was a new emperor, Vespasian - undoubtedly a soldier's choice. He rewarded Agricola's loyalty by appointing him commander of a force headed for Britain. Agricola had served as a military tribune - tribunus laticlavius - on the staff of Suetonius Paulinus during 58-61 so knew the tribes, their strengths and weaknesses and - more importantly - the Britons themselves. His military career had also seen him serving under Cerealis as legate of the Legio XX, at both times during intensive campaigning. As commander of XX, Agricola knew he had under him a seasoned and experienced legion that had added the title Valeria Victrix to its standard. When is not entirely certain, although it is likely it was awarded for their service during the Boudiccan revolt.
Having served Rome well, a seasoned leader and combatant with experience in both the affairs of state and the army, he was a natural choice. Vespasian's choice of the legion's new commander, however, was also a political one. The legion, under its previous commander Roscius Coelius, had been reluctant to swear allegiance to Vespasian and had allied itself initially with Vitellius. By removing Roscius Coelius and replacing him with Agricola, Vespasian knew he had given the legion a hard choice as they would have difficulty in rejecting someone as high profile, and as loyal, as Agricola was. Vespasian had chosen well.
In AD73 Agricola returned to Rome, serving as Governor of Aquitania before returning to Britain and taking up the post of Govenor in AD78, replacing S. Julius Frontinus. It was during the late end of the campaign season of AD78 that Agricola had reason to turn his eyes towards Anglesey again and this time determined to finish what Paulinus had begun.
Legio XX
It is thought that the founding of Legio XX may have been as early as 40BC in support of one of Octavian's campaigns. Again, there is historical evidence to support the fact that the legion was likely active during 31BC when Rome fought against Antonius and Cleopatra. Again, there is evidence of the legions exploits during the Pannonian revolt of 6AD and P. Quinctilius Varus's defeat of 9AD, a dark year for Rome. During that year, three legions - The XVII, the XVIII and the XIX - were completely destroyed in the Tuetonbergwald Forest by the Germans under Arminius. This set back the planned annexing of the land across the Rhine and was viewed as a considerable loss of men and equipment. The base of the XX at Nuess ( Nouaesium ) was thus probably tied in with the campaigns across the Rhine which were, at that time, extremely active.
In 43AD, the legion was part of the Claudian invasion of Britain and it is likely that they made their first base at Camulodunum, modern day Colchester, before moving on to Kingsholm, near Gloucester and from there possibly to Usk in what is today the county of Gwent. The legion fought many actions against both the Silures and Ordovices during this time and was part of Suetonius Paulinus's first campaign against the stronghold of Anglesey. From here, a vexillation of the XX then joined with Legio XIII Gemina and some of the auxiliia used in the Anglesey campaign to support Legio IX Hispania, who had been ambushed by Boudicca's rebel forces as they rampaged across the country. The ensuing battle - against a vastly superior number - was a victory for Paulinus and his legions and was so viciously fought that it effectively ended rebellion in southern Britain. As a result, the XX were probably awarded the title Valeria Victrix. A lot has been written on the origin of this title and it is, perhaps, best not to add fuel to the debate apart from to say that both titles - meaning martial and victorious but also meaning victorious eagle - are probably an apt honour title and recognition for the way in which the legion conducted itself on both campaigns.
In 65-66AD the legion appear to have been based at Viroconium (Wroxeter) replacing the XIV Gemina who were returned to Germany. Their previous base at Kingsholm was taken over by the Legio II Augusta. In 87AD the XX moved to Deva (Chester). Evidence for their occupation of Deva can be found in, amongst other sources, the Antonine Itinerary of the late second century, which displays Chester as Deva Leg XX Vict. Deva itself came into being during the Scapula campaigns, and was probably a marching camp situated at the mouth of the River Dee Deva Fluvius. By 79AD, the camp had developed into a large military base for Legio II Adiutrix Pia Fidelis, who were withdrawn to support Domitian in the Dacian wars in 87AD, replaced by the XX and the main base for the rest of their time in Britain.
The Welsh Campaign of Agricola
News had reached Agricola of an attack on a small fort in North Wales that had almost wiped out the cavalry regiment stationed there. These forts had been set up during Frontinus's excursion into Wales when he had defeated the Silures before pushing on into the territory occupied by the Ordovices. They were not only small garrison settlements but also provided much valuable intelligence on events within the provinces and so had an important strategic value. Agricola knew that the situation with the Ordovices needed to be settled once and for all as, in the years since Paulinus's withdrawal from the area to crush the Boudiccan revolt, there had been opportunity for the Ordovices and their Druids - a religion Rome saw as dangerous - to gather strength anew. Left alone, it could prove to be a nagging thorn in the side of any Governor and thus militarily irritable. Such a situation meant that valuable troops and resources would be tied up indefinitely, slowing down the push Agricola wished to make in the conquest of Britain.
At worst, however, there was the real threat of a continued organised resistance. This was something Agricola saw as a reality and he was determined to crush it once and for all. His reasoning was that in order to continue North; he had to settle the situation to his flank and rear or risk having to abandon his campaign. Once again, the island was to know the might of Rome - and the methods that the Empire preferred to use to mark its authority. Unlike Paulinus, Agricola took one legion - Legio XX - on campaign into North Wales and, in one determined push not only smashed the Ordovices - but did it with such totality that the tribe never fully recovered until the third century AD.
Tacitus records:
The Ordovices, shortly before Agricola's arrival, had destroyed
nearly the whole of a squadron of allied cavalry quartered in their
territory. Such a beginning raised the hopes of the country, and all
who wished for war approved the precedent, and anxiously watched the
temper of the new governor. Meanwhile Agricola, though summer was
past and the detachments were scattered throughout the province,
though the soldier's confident anticipation of inaction for that year
would be a source of delay and difficulty in beginning a campaign,
and most advisers thought it best simply to watch all weak points,
resolved to face the peril.
Tacitus. Agricola 18.
In this, the first of his battles with the Ordovices, Tacitus records that Agricola gathered together a force of veterans and some auxiliaries and immediately went to do battle with the enemy. Tacitus records that Agricola found the Ordovices would not meet him on the level field of battle but preferred, instead, to attempt to take advantage by remaining on a hilltop. This did not appear to bother Agricola, who - leading his men from the front - advanced up the hill to fight. Again, I turn to Tacitus:
The tribe was all but exterminated.
Tacitus. Agricola 18.
Interestingly, the use of the word 'exterminated' brings to mind the purpose of Suetonius Paulinus's initial campaign - and perhaps reason - for showing what appears to be no quarter. However, it is likely that Agricola's aim was to punish the tribes who had dared to taunt him. There is, in the spaces between the words of Tacitus, reason to suspect that this was not a vengeance mission designed to show the enemy his displeasure but rather to show them his mettle. By making his mark now, at this early stage, Agricola was sending a clear signal to his enemy; I will retaliate. Also, when one considers that this was not the traditional campaign season - which usually began in the warm summer months - Agricola was perhaps also saying that he would fight no matter what and that the old status quo, the established and unwritten rules of the previous governors, were not the rules by which he lived or intended to operate.
Having won the initial battle, he now turned his attention towards Anglesey again knowing full well that this was the island stronghold from which the enemy not only operated but also could retreat to. Divided from the mainland by the treacherous waters of the Menai Straits, a source of readily available food and rich in natural resources for weapon making, it was a tempting target. The opportunity to stamp out the threat once and for all was before him and, while he had the impetus, he took it.
However, the problems that had faced Suetonius Paulinus also faced Agricola. How to get across from the mainland. He had no fleet available to him, displaying clearly that his actions in continuing the campaign were not fully thought out. A successful occupation could have been carried out by using elements of the Roman Navy - but this would have taken time to gather and to plan - and time was something Agricola did not have on his side. With autumn coming fast, weather conditions alone would be problematic. The winds across Anglesey are predominately southwesterly and the Straits run roughly in a SW-NE diagonal. The Irish Sea can spawn some ferocious winds and even in what appears to be a sheltered area; the Menai Straits can produce some nasty surprises. Add to that the incredibly swift tides which run through and you have the makings of an assault that would need careful planning, probably having to be left until the following year - by which time the island tribes would have had time to prepare and to plan.
However, and as he had himself been with Suetonius Paulinus during the first invasion, Agricola knew the Straits could be forded. Tacitus records that:
He picked a body of native auxiliaries who knew the fords and
that had a facility for swimming which belongs to their nation.....
he then launched them upon the enemy so suddenly that the astonished
islanders, who looked for fleets of ships upon the sea, promptly came
to the conclusion that nothing was hard and nothing invincible to men
who fought in this fashion.
Tacitus. Agricola 18
This, in itself, is interesting in that Tacitus's references clearly show that the Auxilia took the brunt of the fighting in the initial assault and did so with such success that the result was a surrender. It is widely recorded that the auxilia were usually first in battle, being re-inforced by the main body of the legion, and were not - as some have suggested - 'reserves' pushed into battle when there were gaps in the main ranks. The term 'Batavians' has been mentioned in many historical texts at this point, referring to the renowned swimmers and horsemen mentioned by Tacitus. However, who they were in reality is uncertain although it is likely that the use of the term 'Batavians' was a general one, indicating an acknowledgement of a geographic region that produced individuals of high calibre. As it stands, Batavia was a Rhine island which shows that the area referred to was Germany - though, just to throw us off course - many historians say that the title was no more than a title, with the men within the unit being drawn from various locations. Thus a Friesian could quite easily be found serving alongside a German or a Gaul!
Notwithstanding the debate, the assault - according to Tacitus - was quickly decided. Again, many historians have said that the crossing of the main body of the legion was made via the Lavan Sands, which - at low tide - almost span the Menai Straits from the mainland. This is feasible, as the sands can dry enough to provide a firm surface for movement - but only if you know the area. They shift, being changed by the strong tides, and there is never a guarantee that what was once a safe crossing will remain so. It is my belief that Agricola used locals, recruited expressly for the purpose, to show him the routes used by the Ordovices and others to access Anglesey. What is clear is that the route used by Suetonius Paulinus - near to Llanfairisgaer - was not used for the second invasion. Unlike Paulinus, Agricola did not have artillery support, relying instead on cavalry and infantry to support the invasion. A definite assault point is hard to find although my own knowledge of the area leads me to believe that the staging point would have been just south of Llanfairfechan and Lower Bangor. I would also tactfully suggest that once the Auxiliaries had gained their foothold, the rest of the legion followed in boats perhaps commandeered for the purpose by the advance party. If this were the case, then the shortest boat route across would almost certainly be Lower Bangor to the village of modern day Menai Bridge. If, however, they did use the sands then they would have to have swum - even if only for a short distance - at some stage as the sands do not dry out so as to make for a total dry crossing. Given the equipment carried by the typical legionary in battle, I will stick my neck out here and say that, at some stage, the bulk of the XX were brought across by boat.
Again, whilst I use the term legion here, we must not forget that there were also an Auxilia involved - and both needing the strong support organisation who travelled with them. A legion is some 5000 men strong, for the best part infantry, organised into ten cohorts of six centuries each. Remembering the structure of my previous article on Paulinus, this is true except for the first cohort who had five double centuries, and thus were twice the size of the others within the legion. There would also be cavalry alae within the legion itself, figures of which vary but the most likely being 18 troops of 32 mounted men each.
Figures for the auxiliaries are again somewhat disputed but an auxilia could comprise three distinct sections. Alae (cavalry), cohorts (infantry) and numeri. In terms of total numbers, the auxilia could match the legion it supported in also having a total of 5000 men. Looking back to my previous comment that Agricola must have had local knowledge available to him to mount such a successful attack, the numeri were a unit of non-Roman origin who maintained their own language, uniform, weapons and ethnic characteristics. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that such men would be attracted into serving with the Roman army, perhaps recruited from local tribes by the prospect of regular wages and good food. Whether Agricola had at his disposal elements of his old enemies, the Silures and Ordovices, whom he was able to use as guides is unknown but my contention is that he did. How else would he have successfully forded what is, even today, a dangerous stretch of water?
There were then the other troops involved in support of a campaign. Transport, medical aides, pack animal handlers, caterers, and armourers. There was the support of the administrators - the writers and messengers. At the single end of the scale there would also be a haruspex, a priest-like individual who read the omens found in the entrails of the sacrificial animals, as well as the keeper of the sacrificial animals themselves - in short, a whole corps of many different trades which were vital to the campaign as they allowed the soldiers to do what they did best; fight. So, when we talk of campaigns, we must not forget that the legion itself was not the only mass on the battlefield - it also needed support to ensure its well being.
Bearing in mind the need to have retained some of his forces behind him, Agricola may only have used vexillation of the legion, together with a similar number of the auxilia - but, even if he were to have divided his forces as such, the number of armed men available to him would still be considerable.
Anglesey - the final battle.
On landing, with the auxiliaries having borne the brunt of the fighting, was there then a wholesale slaughter of the Ordovices? Many historical texts allude to it being a bloody campaign and yet Tacitus clearly states that peace was asked for. Without the benefit of any real historical accuracy it seems feasible to suggest that Agricola used the legion to slaughter those that had stood against him. Tacitus himself suggests that the tribes were almost completely wiped out. Did he, perhaps, recall Suetonius Paulinus's invasion and deliberately set out to complete it? In terms of strategy, if his aim were to ensure there would be no more rebellion from the tribes then it would follow that the best way of ensuring this would be to maintain the thrust of invasion and to massacre his enemies. Roman tactics would usually involve no mercy in many cases as a living adversary was considered to be a threat. The usual practise was to kill outright although some prisoners would be taken - though their choices were limited; become slaves to their new masters or gladiators for their enjoyment.
The historical reason for the initial invasion of Anglesey had been to smash completely the 'power base' of the Druids, thus negating the threat posed by them and those who followed them whilst also ensuring Roman superiority in the area. Anglesey was, after all, a valuable strategic asset to both sides and to leave it capable of being used by the enemy surely must have resulted in a bloody assault now that Agricola had the land - and, unlike Paulinus, the time to ensure the job was completed.
It is probably useful to point out at this stage that the cavalry and infantry performed the action and not with the resources that Paulinus had had at his disposal. This leads me to believe that Agricola almost certainly took full advantage of the opportunity won by him to ensure he did not need to come back and finish what he had started. As a forward thinker, the need to tie up valuable resources should he lose the day must have been a spur for him and it is therefore almost certain that the legion spent a considerable time on Anglesey ensuring that what they started, they finished. Add to this the fact that a number of the legionaries would have been involved in the first invasion and would therefore recall they had indeed 'unfinished business' and it is fair to assume that there was no withdrawal - or acceptance of any surrender - until it was clear there was to be no more threat.
How would the battle have been fought? At this point, I would assume that many of the Ordovices who had fled the earlier battle with Agricola may well have sought refuge on Mona and so more or less forewarned the resident tribes of the event. Whether this meant they were prepared is something we do not know for certain, though Tacitus does state that Agricola:
...launched them on a surprise attack.
Tacitus. Agricola 18.
It seems very strange that the islanders would not have posted patrols along their coastline, seeing as how news of the defeat of the Romans earlier - before Agricola had retaliated - must have reached them. Again, the massing on the far bank of the Menai Straits of a large enemy army would surely have given the local tribes time to prepare some form of defence.
In terms of defence and meeting the invading Romans, the battle must have been fought the way many had been fought before. On foot, with chariots and mounted horsemen. Their families would also have been nearby, camped out to watch the battle and to tend to the many wounded who would come their way as the day progressed. The drawing up of ranks of men would have been made with tribal and familial distinctions to the fore, so in terms of discipline it is probably best to assume there was none apart from the single focus of ridding the land of the enemy. Whilst the Celts as a whole often outnumbered their Roman adversary, it was the tight discipline and training of the Romans who more often than not won the day.
It is feasible to assume that the standard Roman response of two javelin volleys and a counter-charge would have met the initial charge the local tribes would have made. This served to allow the advancing Romans to gain ground, freeing up the rear where other troops would still have been landing. If the initial wave acted as infantry to buy time for the others to mount up, then a successful stand would have been easily established. In terms of attack tactics, this seems the likely start of the day. This use of cavalry as infantry was not new - in AD48, Scapula had used dismounted cavalry to attack the Iceni defences (Annals 12.31) - and it is recorded that the Romans would always try to seize any initiative available to them to achieve their goal.
If there were no organised stand by the inhabitants of Anglesey, did the invasion move from the initial stand to smaller ones as the Romans landed and hunted down their foe? We cannot be sure of either for what Tacitus records he does so briefly and without being specific. However, while he had the initiative, it seems fairly certain that Agricola did not withdraw the bulk of his forces from the island until he had completed the task in hand. The building of the fort at Segontium (Caernarfon) took place shortly after so perhaps the role of the troops eventually stationed there was to operate within Anglesey and to maintain a presence. The building of a small defensive fortlet at Holyhead and the establishment of a watchtower may have come much later but another fortlet was built at Aberffraw sometime during this period. This in itself showed that either Agricola or his force ranged right through the island during the first push and, with the establishment of Segontium, suitable sites for fortlets were later chosen and manned after his main withdrawal. Either way, it shows clearly that the reach of the empire was long.
Whatever action was fought, it resulted in the end of Anglesey as an anti-Roman stronghold. Quite apart from any battle - which must have been a disorganised affair if the resident tribes were, as Tacitus says, taken by surprise - the Romans would then have undertaken the wholesale slaughter of the remaining tribes followed by a tactical policy akin to the 'scorched earth' methods used in later years by many other armies of invasion and occupation. Their aim in doing this was two-fold: to ensure their control was absolute and to make quite certain there would be no further rebellions.
Some historians say he deliberately continued the work left unfinished by Suetonius Paulinus and destroyed almost the whole of the tribes occupying the island. It is certainly true that he would have wished them rendered unable to rise against him, becoming no more of a threat - and we must not forget that these tribes had been a thorn in the side of the Romans for many years. He would certainly have ensured that their potency was diluted and that, this time, they would not dare to take arms against Rome. It is doubtless true that Agricola's audacious thrust against the mainland Ordovices and then his tactical swing towards Anglesey earned him a reputation as a man not to be crossed. Agricola did, therefore, achieve what Suetonius Paulinus had not been able to do in his Welsh campaign against the Ordovices - near total annihilation and removal of a significant tactical threat. Agricola thus quelled the Ordovices and Anglesey, at last, fell. Tacitus records:
And so, peace having been sued for and the island given up,
Agricola became great and famous as one who, when entering on his
province, a time when others spend in vain display and a round of
ceremonies, chose rather toil and danger. Nor did he use his success
for self-glorification, or apply the name of campaigns and victories
to the repression of conquered people....Yet by thus disguising his
renown he really increased it, for men inferred the grandeur of his
aspirations from his silence about services so great.
Tacitus. Agricola 18
It is known that, once he had garrisoned the island, he then began to impose quotas on the remaining population - as he did throughout Britain. However, he was not unjust in his dealings with the vanquished. It was common practise for the Britons to have to purchase back from the Romans the grain they had paid as taxes - and at a much higher price than they had been given for it. Not only did they have to endure this imposition, but they also had to deliver their taxes (grain) to military posts, some of which were miles away! Certainly a harsh interpretation of the 'hearts and minds' philosophy used by various military leaders since. Agricola all but put a stop to this, ensuring that they were treated with some respect and so he came to be seen as a fair man by the local population. However, he also ensured a military presence remained. He built forts in strategic locations and controlled the area of his conquests by separating tribes into small units, keeping them constantly under surveillance. Many tribes surrendered rather than fight as his reputation and policies of fear against opponents (and advantages for those who co-operated) went before him. He had, it appears, the judgement to strike the best balance between pressure and persuasion and to ensure that it was delivered in equal measure. Yet even this fairness was, perhaps, a deliberate psychological exercise.
Agricola went on to greater glories than those of Anglesey, and his deeds are well documented in the history of Britain. In terms of what he achieved in North Wales and Anglesey - I leave it to Tacitus to end this piece which shows, quite clearly, how forward thinking Agricola was.
And so the population was gradually led into the demoralising temptations of arcades,
baths and sumptuous banquets. The unsuspecting Britons spoke of such novelties as
'civilisation', when in fact they were only a feature of their enslavement.
Tacitus. Agricola 21.
Sources of reference:
Tacitus The Agricola and The Germania. Trans. H. Mattingly and revised translation by S. A. Handford. Penguin Books 1970.
Yann Le Bohec. The Imperial Roman Army. Trans R. Bate. Routledge 1989.
K. Goldsworthy. The Roman Army at War 100BC - AD200. Clarendon Paperbacks Oxford University Press 1998
Todd. Roman Britain (Third Ed) Blackwell Books 1999.
Guy de la Bedoyere. Eagles over Britannia - The Roman Army in Britain. Tempus 2001.
A. Birley. Garrison Life at Vindolanda - a band of brothers. Tempus 2002
M. Simkins. The Roman Army from Caesar to Trajan. Osprey Men-at Arms series. Osprey Publishing 1984.
P. Wilcox. Rome's Enemies (2) - Gallic and British Celts. Osprey Men-at-Arms series. Osprey Publishing 1985.
Henri Hubert. The History of the Celtic People. Including: The Rise of the Celts and The Greatness and Decline of the Celts. Bracken Books. 1993.
Frank Delaney. Legends of the Celts. Grafton Books. 1989.
Ian Skidmore. Anglesey and Lleyn Shipwrecks. Christopher Davies. 1979.
Also, many Internet sites of specific interest. These can be recommended to all students of the Roman Army. Some were specific to my research whilst others provided an excellent portal to many sites of historical interest.
http://www.bedoyere.freeserve.co.uk
http://webpages.charter.net/brueggeman
http://www.43dln.freeserve.co.uk/legxx/legxx.html
http://www.ukans.edu/history/index/europe/ancient_rome/E/Roman/home.html
http://www.morgue.demon.co.uk/Pages/Other stuff/LINKS.HTM
http://members.tripod.com/~S_van_Dorst/legio.html